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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: GEORGE 
D. PERRY. Supreme Court Case No. 38694
 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
 
WELFARE,
 
Petitioner-Appellant,
 
vs.
 
BARBARA K. MCCORMICK, Personal
 
Representative of the Estate of George D. Perry,
 
Respondent on Appeal.
 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court ofthe Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada. 
HONORABLE KATHRYN A. STICKLEN 
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT PETER C. SISSON 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO BOISE, IDAHO 
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Date: 5/31/2011 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: CCLUNDMJ 
Time: 02:50 PM ROA Report 
Page 1 of 5 Case: CV-IE-2009-05214 Current Judge: Kathryn A. Sticklen 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of George D Perry Deceased 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of George D Perry Deceased 
Date Code User Judge 
3/18/2009 NCIE CCCHILER l\Iew Case Filed - Informal Estate Christopher Bieter 
3/19/2009 APPL CCCHILER Application for Informal Probate of Will and Christopher Bieter 
Informal Appointment of Personal Representative 
WILL CCCHILER Last Will And Testament Christopher Bieter 
ACAP CCCHILER Acceptance Of Appointment Christopher Bieter 
3/20/2009 STNP CCMARTLG Statement Of Informal Probate Of Will And Christopher Bieter 
Informal Appointment Of Personal Representative 
LTST CCMARTLG Letters Of Testamentary Christopher Bieter 
CDIS CCMARTLG Civil Disposition entered for: McCormick, Barbara Christopher Bieter 
K, Other Party; Perry, George D, SUbject. Case 
Close date: 3/20/2009 
STAT CCMARTLG STATUS CHANGED: Closed Christopher Bieter 
STNP CCMARTLG Statement Of Informal Probate Of Will And Christopher Bieter 
Informal Apointment Of Personal Representative 
LTST CCMARTLG Letters Of Testamentary Christopher Bieter 
CDIS CCMARTLG Civil Disposition entered for: McCormick, Barbara Christopher Bieter 
K, Other Party; Perry, George D, SUbject. Case 
Close date: 3/20/2009 
3/30/2009 CRCL CCMARTLG Creditors Claim (Wells Fargo Bank NA) Christopher Bieter 
4/7/2009 IFHD CCMARTLG Information To Heirs And Devisees Christopher Bieter 
4/15/2009 MISC CCMARTLG Satisfaction Of Probate Claim (Wells Fargo Bank Christopher Bieter 
NA) 
DEI\IO CCMARTLG Demand For Notice (Larry L Goins For Idaho Christopher Bieter 
Dept Health and Welfare) 
CAES CCMARTLG Claim Against Estate (Idaho Dept Health and Christopher Bieter 
Welfare) 
6/2/2009 CERS CCMARTLG Certificate Of Service Christopher Bieler 
6/4/2009 NOTC CCCHILER Notice of Disallowance of Claim (Idaho Dept Christopher Bieler 
Health and Welfare) 
CERS CCCHILER Certificate Of Service Christopher Bieler 
6/15/2009 PETN CCNELSRF Petition for Allowance of Claim (Larry Goins for 
Idaho Department of Health & Wealthfare) 
Christopher Bieler 
6/25/2009 OBJE CCNELSRF Objection to Petition for Allowance of Claim Christopher Bieler 
CERS CCNELSRF Certificate Of Service Christopher Bieter 
11/27/2009 MEMO CCMARTLG Memorandum In Support Of The PR's Objection Christopher Bielter 
To Dept of Health And Welfare's Petn For 
Allwance Of Claim 
AFFD CCMARTLG Affidavit of Barbara K McCormick In Support of Christopher Bieter 
Objection To Dept of Health And Welfare's Petn 
for Allowance Of Claim 
PPUB CCMARTLG Proof Of Publication Christopher Bieter 
CERS CCMARTLG Certificate Of Service Christopher Bieter 
Notice Of Telephonic Status Conference (1-08-09 Christopher Bieter 12/4/2009 NOTH CCMARTLG 
@ 2:30 pm) 
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Date: 5/31/2011 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: CCLUNDMJ 
Time: 02:50 PM ROA Report 
Page 2 of 5 Case: CV-IE-2009-05214 Current Judge: Kathryn A. Sticklen 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of George 0 Perry Deceased 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of George 0 Perry Deceased 
Date Code User Judge 
12/4/2009 HRSC CCMARTLG Hearing Scheduled (Status 01/08/2010 02:30 
PM) Telephonic Conference 
Christopher Bieter 
STAT CCMARTLG STATUS CHANGED: Closed pending clerk 
action 
Christopher Bieter 
CERS CCMARTLG Certificate Of Service Christopher Bieter 
12/9/2009 CERS CCMARTLG Certificate Of Service Christopher Bieter 
AMEN CCMARTLG Amended Notice Of Telephonic Status 
Conference (1-08-10 @ 2 pm) 
Christopher Bieter 
HRSC CCMARTLG Hearing Scheduled (Status 01/08/201002:30 
PM) Conference 
Christopher Bieter 
1/8/2010 HRHD MCURIZDJ Hearing result for Status held on 01/08/2010 Christopher Bieter 
02:30 PM: Hearing Held Telephonic Conference 
1/14/2010 NOTH CCMARTLG Notice Of Hearing On Objection To Petn For 
Allowance of Claim (2-26-10 @ 9 am) 
Christopher BiE!ter 
HRSC CCMARTLG Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 
02/26/201009:00 AM) Objection To Petn For 
Allowance of Claim 
Christopher Bieter 
CERS CCMARTLG Certificate Of Service Christopher Bieter 
1/21/2010 AMEN CCMARTLG Amended Notice Of Hearing On Objection To 
Petn for Allowance Of Claim (2-26-10@ 9 am) 
Christopher Bieter 
CERS CCMARTLG Certificate Of Service Christopher Bieter 
1/29/2010 MEMO CCMARTLG Memorandum In Support Of Petn for Allowance 
Of Claim 
Christopher Bieter 
2/26/2010 HRHD MCURIZDJ Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on 
02/26/2010 09:00 AM: Hearing Held Objection 
To Petn For Allowance of Claim 
Christopher Bieter 
3/10/2010 ORDR MCURIZDJ Order Disallowing Claim Christopher Bieter 
CDIS CCMARTLG Civil Disposition entered for: Idaho Department Of Christopher Bieter 
Health And Welfare, Other Party; Idaho 
Department Of Health And Welfare.. Other Party; 
McCormick, Barbara K, Other Party; Perry, 
George 0, Subject. Case Close date: 3/10/2010 
STAT CCMARTLG STATUS CHANGED: Closed Christopher Bieter 
3/18/2010 MOTN CCMARTLG Motion For Stay Pending Appeal (W Corey 
Cartwright For Idaho Dept Of Health And 
Welfare) 
Christopher Bieter 
BREF CCMARTLG Brief In Support Of Motn To Stay Kathryn A. Sticklen 
APDC CCMARTLG Appeal Filed In District Court Kathryn A. Sticklen 
CAAP CCMARTLG Case Appealed: Kathryn A. Sticklen 
NOTR CCMARTLG Notice Of Reassignment (To Judge Kathryn 
Sticklen) 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
3/19/2010 CERS CCMARTLG Certificate Of Service Kathryn A. Sticklen 
3/23/2010 OGAP DCTYLENI Order Governing Procedure On Appeal Kathryn A. Sticklen 
3/26/2010 NOTH CCMARTLG Notice Of Hearing (4-20-10 @ 2:30 pm) Kathryn A. Sticklen 000003
 
Date: 5/31/2011 Fourth Judicial District Court· Ada County User: CCLUNDMJ 
Time: 02:50 PM ROA Report 
Page 3 of 5 Case: CV-IE-2009-05214 Current Judge: Kathryn A. Sticklen 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of George D Perry Deceased 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of George D Perry Deceased 
Date Code User Judge 
3/26/2010 
3/29/2010 
4/2/2010 
4/8/2010 
4/9/2010 
4/16/2010 
4/20/2010 
4/27/2010 
5/10/2010 
5/11/2010 
5/20/2010 
5/28/2010 
6/3/2010 
6/18/2010 
HRSC
 
MOTN
 
MEMO
 
CERS
 
NOTH
 
CERS
 
RPLY
 
CERS 
BREF 
RSPS 
RPLY 
CERS 
AMEN 
AMEN 
DCHH 
AMEN 
ORDR 
TRAN 
NOTC 
DEOP 
CERS 
TRAN 
NOTC 
MOTN 
AFFD 
MEMO 
NOHG 
HRSC 
CTSV 
CCMARTLG 
CCMARTLG 
CCMARTLG 
CCMARTLG 
CCMARTLG 
CCMARTLG 
CCMARTLG 
CCMARTLG 
CCMARTLG 
CCMARTLG 
CCMARTLG 
CCMARTLG 
CCMARTLG 
CCMARTLG 
CCNELSRF 
DCTYLENI 
DCTYLENI 
CCMARTLG 
DCTYLENI 
DCTYLENI 
CCMARTLG 
DCTYLENI 
DCTYLENI 
CCSWEECE 
CCSWEECE 
CCSWEECE 
CCSWEECE 
CCSWEECE 
CCSWEECE 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/20/201002:30
 
PM) To Stay Pending Appeal
 
Motion For Transcript 
Memorandum In Support Of Motn For Transcript 
Certificate Of Service 
Notice Of Hearing (4-20-10 @ 2:30 pm) 
Certificate Of Service 
PR's Reply Memorandum To Dept's Motn For 
Stay Pending Appeal
 
Certificate Of Service
 
Brief Re Fiduciary Duty Of PR To Creditors 
Response To Motn For Transcript 
PR's Reply Memo To Dept's Brief Re Fiduciary 
Duty Of PR To Creditors And Motn for Atty Fees 
And Costs 
Certificate Of Service 
Amended Certificate Of Service 
Amended Certificate Of Service 
Hearing resu It for Motion held on 04/20/2010 
02:30 PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Sue Wolf 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 500 To Stay Pending Appeal 
Amended Order Governing Procedure on Appeal 
Order Approving Motion for Transcript 
Transcript Of Proceedings Lodged 
Notice of Lodging of Appeal Transcript 
Memorandum Decision and Order (RE: Motion 
for Stay Pending Appeal) 
Certificate Of Service 
Transcript Filed 
Notice of Filing Transcript on Appeal 
PR's Motion For Attorney Fees And Costs 
Affidavit of Peter C Sisson In Support of PR's 
Motion For Atty Fees and Costs 
Supplemental Memorandum In Support of PR's 
Motion For Atty Fees and Costs 
Notice Of Hearing (07-12-10 at 2:30 pm) 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Attorney fees and 
Costs 07/12/201002:30 PM) 
Certificate Of Service 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticlden 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Stick len 
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Date: 5/31/2011 Fourth Judicial District Court· Ada County User: CCLUNDMJ 
Time: 02:50 PM ROA Report 
Page 4 of 5 Case: CV-IE-2009-05214 Current Judge: Kathryn A. Sticklen 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of George D Perry Deceased 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of George D Perry Deceased 
Date Code User Judge 
6/29/2010 BREF CCNELSRF Brief and Objection in Opposisiton to Attorney Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Fees 
7/7/2010 MEMO CCSWEECE PR's Reply Memorandum To Departments Brief Kathryn A. Sticklen 
And Objection in Opposition To Attorney Fees 
CERS CCSWEECE Certificate Of Service Kathryn A. Sticklen 
7/8/2010 BREF CCMARTLG Appellant's Brief Kathryn A. Sticklen 
7/12/2010 DCHH DCOLSOMA Hearing result for Motion for Attorney fees and Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Costs held on 07/12/2010 02:30 PM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: K. Madsen 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 
7/23/2010 MOTN CCMARTLG Motion For Extension Of Time In Which To File Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Respondent's Brief 
AFFD CCMARTLG Affidavit Of Peter C Sisson In Support Of Motn Kathryn A. Sticklen 
For Extension Of Time In Which to File 
Respondent's Brief 
CERS CCMARTLG Certificate Of Service Kathryn A. Sticl<len 
7/26/2010 MEMO CCNELSRF PR's Memorandum on Applicability Kathryn A. Sticklen 
CERS CCNELSRF Certificate Of Service Kathryn A. Sticl<len 
BREF CCNELSRF Simultaneous Brief RE: Finality and Idaho Code Kathryn A. Sticl<len 
12-117 
7/27/2010 ORDR DCTYLENI Order Approving Motion for Extension of Time in Kathryn A. Sticlclen 
Which to File Respondent's Brief (due 9/2/10) 
8/26/2010 BREF CCMARTLG Respondent's Brief Kathryn A. Sticlden 
CERS CCMARTLG Certificate Of Service Kathryn A. Sticf,len 
9/16/2010 BREF CCMARTLG Appellant's Reply Brief Kathryn A. Sticklen 
9/22/2010 NOTH CCMARTLG Notice Of Hearing (11-04-10 @ 1:30 PM) Kathryn A. Sticf:len 
HRSC CCMARTLG Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument on Appeal Kathryn A. Stid:len 
11/04/201001:30 PM) 
10/4/2010 AMEN CCMARTLG Amended Notice Of Hearing Kathryn A. Sticklen 
HRSC CCMARTLG Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument on Appeal Kathryn A. Sticklen 
11/18/2010 02:00 PM) 
CERS CCMARTLG Certificate Of Service Kathryn A. Stic~Jen 
HRVC CCMARTLG Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal held Kathryn A. Stic~Jen 
on 11/04/201001 :30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
10/13/2010 DEOP DCTYLENI Memorandum Decision and Order Kathryn A. Stick.len 
11/18/2010 DCHH DCKORSJP Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal held Kathryn A. Sticklen 
on 11/18/2010 02:00 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: No Court Reporter 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 
Document sealed 
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Date: 5/31/2011 
Time: 02:50 PM 
Page 5 of 5 
Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-IE-2009-05214 Current Judge: Kathryn A. Sticklen 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of George D Perry Deceased 
User: CCLUNDMJ 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of George D Perry Deceased 
Date 
3/16/2011 
4/7/2011 
4/11/2011 
5/31/2011 
Code 
DEOP 
APSC 
NOTC 
NOTC 
User 
DCTYLENI 
CCTHIEBJ 
CCMARTLG 
CCLUNDMJ 
Memorandum Decision and Order 
Document sealed 
Appealed To The Supreme Court 
Notice Of Preparation Of Appeal Transcript 
Notice of Transcript Lodged - Supreme Ct. 
Docket # 38694 
Judge 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
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Peter C. Sisson 
SISSON & SISSON 
The Elder Law Firm, PLLC 
2402 West Jefferson Street MAR 18 2009Boise. Idaho 83702
 
Tel: (208) 387-0729 j LA',:IDr,! r,\. ,:\ .:r-; , ,
 
Fax: (208) 331-5009 0'>.. L f.'U;J:
 
[I;r-" . 
Idaho State Bar # 4682 
Attorney for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CV E 0905214J 
IN THE MATTER OF: Case No. 
GEORGE D. PERRY, APPLICATION FOR INFORMAL 
PROBATE OF WILL AND INFORMAL 
Deceased. APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE 
(I.e. ] 5-3-301) 
APPLICANT, BARBARA K. MCCORMICK, formerly BARBARA K. PERRY, STATES AND 
REPRESENTS TO THE COURT THAT: 
1.	 Applicant's interest in this matter is that of the Daughter and Personal Representative of 
Decedent a devisee under the decedent's will and a person having priority for 
appointment as personal representative. 
2.	 The person whose appointment as personal representative is sought is the Applicant and 
is qualified to act as such and has priority because there is no person with a higher or 
equal priority for appointment. The person whose appointment as personal representative 
is sought has priority for appointment as the person nominated in, or pursuant to the 
exercise of a power conferred by, the decedent's will. 
3.	 The decedent died on February 25, 2009. at the age 01'79 years. A copy of his death 
certificate is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference. 
APPLICATION FOR INFORMAL PROBATE OF WILL AND 
INFORMAL APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE - PAGE 1 
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4.	 Venue is proper because at the time of death the decedent was domiciled in this county. 
5.	 The names and addresses of the children, heirs, and devisees of the decedent are: 
Barbara J. McCormick George D. Perry, Jr. 
2525 .loretta Drive 20966 Wells Road 
Boise, Idaho 83704 Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Steven A. Perry Richard J. Perry 
8179 East McKenzre 594 W. Halverson 
Nampa, Idaho 83687 Middleton, Idaho 83644 
Robert E. Boyle Martha (Marty) Simonson 
3519 Rose Hill Street 2085 N. Trailview Place 
Boise, Idaho 83705 Boise, Idaho 83702 
Martha Jean Perry Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare 
c/o Barbara J. McCormick, Trustee of the Medicaid Estate Recovery 
Supplemental Care Trust for Martha J. Perry P.O. Box 83720 
2525 .loretta Drive Boise, Idaho 83720-0036 
Boise, Idaho 83704 
There are no surviving parents of Decedent. Decedent has no surviving siblings. 
6.	 No personal representative has been appointed in this state or elsewhere whose 
appointment has not been terminated. 
7.	 Applicant has neither received nor is aware of any demand for notice of any probate or 
appointment proceeding concerning the decedent that may have been filed in this state or 
elsewhere. 
8.	 The time limit for informal probate or appointment has not expired because not more than 
three years have passed since the decedent's death. 
9.	 The original of the decedent's will, dated February 4, 2005, accompanies this application. 
To the best of applicant's knowledge, neither that will nor any other will of the decedent 
has been the subject of a previous probate order. 
APPLICATlON FOR INFORMAL PROBATE OF WILL AND 
INFORMAL APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE - PAGE 2 
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10.	 Applicant believes that the will which is the subject of this application was validly 
executed. 
II.	 Having exercised reasonable diligence, applicant is unaware of any instrument revoking 
the will which is the subject of this application and believes that such will is the 
decedent's last will. 
\2. To the best of applicant's knowledge, the will to which this application relates is not part 
of a known series of testamentary instruments (other than wills or codicils), the latest of 
which does not expressly revoke the fonner. 
13.	 Bond is not required under I.e. 15-3-603. 
14. Any required notice has been given or waived. 
WHEREFORE, APPLICANT REQUESTS THAT: 
I.	 The decedent's will, dated February 4, 2005, be infonnally probated. 
2.	 Barbara K. McConnick be infonnally appointed personal representative of the estate of 
the decedent, to act without bond. 
3.	 Upon qualification and acceptance, letters testamentary be issued. 
DATED 
--~--+------
Peter C. Sisson 
Attorney for Applicant 
APPLICATION FOR INFORMAL PROBATE OF WILL A~D 
INFORMAL APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE - PAGE 3 
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DATED - '7'+- -0+- - -1-A1-
 
VERIFICATION
 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Ada ) 
Barbara K. McCormick, Applicant, being sworn, says that the facts set forth in the 
foregoing application are true, accurate, and complete to the best of applicant's knowledge and 
belief. 
Barbara K. McCormick - Applicant 
SlJlJSCRJlJED AND SWORN TO bCfore~~ , 2009. ~u--
..,........"
 ~~•••,~ hRIE t:~'" Notary Public for Idaho ~~. 0/ ~ ~~ 
...... ••••••••• ~'# Residing at ~rn , Idaho$ ••• .•. U>.~ 
: • I NO?, e. 0 ~ My Commission Expires z-rf-,,)-cJ 1/ . 
: ,. -1.J6 \.-r. ~ --'--L--. 
: • , TJ..; : 
• ..,(l ., , • :~\ it : 
';.7·... ill. Ie '.!\ ~. .~ f 
,..., 0 ..•••••••• ..
"" 'P IDA\\O ..
""" , ... 
APPLICATION FOR INFORMAL PROBATE OF WILL AND 
INFORMAL APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE - PAGE 4 
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F~bruary 25, 2009 
M~ridian Care and 
• 1.i."METHOD OF DISPOSITION 
A"nill X Crf'm.lIlOn nf''llJIJrv 
, DM"'" E"'"mom,," 
A,m,''''h"m'',,'o 
· O'he'IS<'''''~1 . _ ....•. 
• 17a. SIGNATURE OF FUNERAL SERVICE LICENSEE OR PERSON ACTlNG AS SUCH 
.23. DATE OF DEATH tMo/Da."l'lj lSrf'+1 mOlllll) 
• 19a. IF DEAtH OCCURRED IN A HOSPITAL: 
InI>Cl11('n! FR'Ou1palll'nl) DOA. 
.20. FACIUTY NAME (It tlQ\ '''\:llity. \-Ilve-~tr@t!1 ;uhl 'Iumbe') 
PART I Enlf" the ch"lfI 01 eycnt:; . -UISR"'~9!'.. 
Barbara McCormick 
STATE FilE NO. 
Stille 01 Idano 
CERTIFICATE OF DEATH 
STATE OF IDAHO 
DEPARTf\1ENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE 
BUREAU OF VITAL RECORDS AND HEALTH STATISTICS 
DAl E F'l.. !:C' BY STATE ~EGISTRAA: 
2 SEX 3. SOCIAL SeCURITY NUMBER 
.c 
TYPE tJR
 
"'liNT IN
 ] George D. Perry	 Male  o 4a. AGE ~,l$[ t'''~I\J,1,. db. UNDER 1 YEAR ~t". UNb~Rl DAY 5. DATE OF BIRTH ,M' l'."lllPEAM"'N~NT 
BLACK IN" o 79	 
   Overland Park, KSDO NOT USE 
~ ('Ie.llslFELT np PEN 8 ia. RESIDENC'l· STATE OR fOFlElGN COUNTRY 7b. COUNTY	 7e. cm OR TOWN 
'OR 
INSTAUcnONS
 
SEE
 "'.., TD	 .Ada ~leridian ~ 7d. STREET AND NUMBER 7e. APT. NO. If. ZIP' CODE 713.	 INSIDE City 
L,.IMITS? 
~ANOBOO"S 
No 
..S! 8. \IARITAL STATUS AT TlME OF DEATH .- 9-:-·S!JiivrV.iNG SPOUSE'S NAMEll1 ';"I;P g,::''; rJ:("l('-.1 n.t",':-! 
~ 1351 \~. Pine 83642	 X"'cs 
u: 
-g X Mart>t"c _ M.'Imf'd t'>u! SPI'a'i1lell ,\"u\',\>'d _ [1''.;'r(:",J ~~,;o"PI '1'.' 'l<.'C' _ l'n~n(,WI1 Martha Harper
.cz:limlal : 10 'EVER IN US. lla. FATHER S NAME ;r,IS\ "'~'J.:llf' L,,~! SlJlT'll .. 'llb 'BIR-THPLACE (StaIO Tl'rn':01\' C' CC',s'Qn C('(,ntr'-. 
'E ARMED 
:'!;: FORC." Archie \'1. Perry ~lT 
Qj 12a. "40THER'S MAIDEN NAME (F,r!';t ·.~'ddle. L,..:SI. ;;lJ'I'lll	 12b. BIRTHPLACE IStale, IplnG!)· 'or F('relgn CClunlr.,.1 
KS~ X No _ . .~eona Cox 
p:lnl' -- --.- ~Jb: RELATIONSHIP TC>"DECEDEN-T 'Je', 'AAIUNG ADDRESS iSr~[.';..t~·IILl r.u.,t,{'r~ c~:) .Sf;>!",. r."C(',J('IIIlmlm:!:m:i. 81J•. INFORMANTS NAME (r)1OC ~'" 
2525 Joretta Dr.Daughter Bois~, .10 83714..._ .. 
lS~ PLACe QF'C)lSPOSITION \N<ll~tl ~;-'J JdurrSS 01 cemelory. • 115. NAME AND CQM~LETE ADDRESS OF FUNERAL fACIL,.ITY 
('lhfl' pl:ln~) 
Cloverdale Crematory Cloyerdale Funer<ll Home 
1200 N. Cloverdale Rd. 1200 N. Cloverdale Rd. 
Boise,_ID, 83713.... . .... Boise, ID 83713 _... _ 
• 17b. UCENSE NUMBER (Q,' hCf'n5ee) 18. WAS CORONER CONTACTED 
. M_ 804 DUE TOy~:USf OF DE~:H? 
PLACE OF DEATH (19-221 
• 19b. iF DEATH OCCURRED SOMEWHERE ornER THAN A HospiTAL .. 
Hosl-l,ce lac,11ty XX",jUlsmg Il<lfllP..'lOll!1 !P,"\ ciJl.!I.I(.'hty e . OuclIllf'nl's home ,'- Dlhpr (SpeCify) _ 
'* 21. CITY, TOWN. OR LOCAnON Of DEATH. AND ZIP CODE . --_. '* U.-COUNTY OF DEATH 
Rehab M~ridian, 10 83642 Ada 
24. TIME OF DEATH' 25, DATE PRONO\JNCl;C DEAD (Mo DdYll'l) (Srf'I(n~<ltllh) '26. mie: fRQNQUt-4CEO DEAD 
0030 (2"", F~bruary 25, 2009 0030 (2dl1 ) 
27. CAUSE OF DEATH 
"·luII"'5. (', comphl;aloon'3- - lhal rllrecUy Cflust'rl thf' d('al!1 00 NOT enlc, h~,mlrl,,1 A'o'f'nls $Id1 <15 ca,u,ac Aplllo..malf' I"lerval 
alfl'51. lespnalory a'f(!sl, Of 'o'r.nlm:ulm "t>nlla~on ,~r(hoUI !>tlOWlflg ~le (!11(llogy), NOT f\OAnEVlf\lj Enle' only one causc on;J !Ina U1l5<l11u Oeilth 
:~~::,~::"~~~\~~~;::~J<tl .~.Y). ~.-f _:~~~l._' _~; (,~ _. __ ;Z)'.<"~:':'') 
"e","'"" ", d'''') 
a 
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LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT 
MAR t :12009OF 
J. DIN;!) NAV 
8\/ L t\/l~.r·:~-l;' ..GEORGE D. PERRY 
LJEl-'ur\ 
0905214cv IE 
I, George D. Perry, with the present addressof21 04 Tendoy, Boise, Idaho 83705, being 
of lawful age and sound mind and not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence 
of any person, do make, publish and declare this my LAST WILL and TESTAMENT in the: 
manner following, to-wit: 
ITEM I 
REVOCAnON OF PRIOR WILLS/CODICILS 
I hereby expressly revoke any and all other and former Wills and Codicils to Wills by 
me at any time heretofore made. 
ITEM II 
MARITAL STATUS 
I am married and my spouse's name is Martha J. Perry. All references in this Will 
to my spouse's name are to Martha J. Perry. 
ITEM III 
CHILDREN 
I have four (4) living children, whose names are as follows, to-wit: George D. Perry, 
Jr., Barbara K. Perry, Richard J. Perry and Steven A. Perry. 
Richard J. Perry and Steven A. Pe~are the children of my marriage to my wife, 
Martha J. Perry. George D. Perry, Jr. and Barbara K. Perry are children of a previous 
marriage. Donna J. Holmes and Christine N. Ramsey, also children of my previous 
marriage, are deceased. Christine N. Ramsey did not leave issue. Donna J. Holmes left 
issue. I intentionally make no provision for any distribution from my estate to any of 
Donna J. Holmes' issue. 
My wife, Martha J. Perry, has two children from a previous marriage, whose names 
are as follows, to-wit: Robert E. Boyle and Marty Simonson. I will refer to them herein as 
my step-children. I further certify that I have no other children, living or deceased, nor have 
I ever adopted a child. 
ITEM IV 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
I direct that my Personal Representative shall not be required to furnish bond, and 
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shall be allowed to administer my estate without the intervention of Court, with full power 
to sell, mortgage, lease or dispose of all my Estate, real, personal or mixed, at public or 
private sale for any reason which may seem right or proper to said Personal Representative, 
regardless of whether or not it is necessary to do so for the purpose of administering my 
Estate, and I vest full power and authority in my Personal Representative to carry out the 
provisions of this, my Last Will and Testament, under a non-intervention Will procedure. 
I nominate and appoint the following people in the following order of priority as my 
Personal Representative until one such person qualifies and accepts to act as my Personall 
Representative: 
1. Barbara K. McCormick, of 2525 Joretta Drive, Boise, Idaho 83704; 
2. George D. Perry, Jr., of20966 Wells Road, Caldwell, Idaho 83605; 
3. Steven A. Perry, of 8179 East McKenzre, Nampa, Idaho 83687. 
My Personal Representative shall have the full power and discretion to do everything 
necessary to settle my Estate. I direct that my Personal Representative, shall pay all the 
expenses of my last illness and burial, and all transfer and other taxes due on or from my 
Estate, all costs and charges of the administration of my Estate and all my just debts, as soon 
as the same can be conveniently paid, and that no order of Court be required therefor. 
All estate, inheritance, succession or other death taxes, duties, charges or assessments. 
imposed on or in relation to any property by reason of my death, whether passing under this 
Will or otherwise, shall be paid by my Personal Representative out ofthe residue ofmy Estate, 
without proration ofany charge therefor against any person who receives such property under 
the terms of this Will or otherwise. 
ITEM V
 
FUNERAL ARRANGEMENTS
 
It is my intention to prepare a "Letter of Instruction" regarding my preferred burial 
wishes, and I direct that my Personal Representative follow these instructions in so far as 
possible. 
ITEM VI 
CHARACTER OF PROPERTY 
All ofmy Estate is separate property and community property. It is my intention by this 
Will to dispose of my separate property and my one-half interest in the community property 
of myself and my spouse. 
Last Will and Testament - ---b~:::XL.J:C~v~·"'7~¥-~lJ.!.~~~I-/J/),o/ 
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ITEM VII 
PERSONAL PROPERTY DISTR1BUTION 
I give my personal and household effects of every kind, including but not limited to 
furniture, appliances, furnishings, pictures, silverware, china, glassware, jewelry, wearing 
apparel, boats, personal automobiles and other vehicles, in accordance with a written statement 
signed by me or in my handwriting which I intend to leave at my death. I give all of such 
property not effectively disposed of by such written statement to my children who survive me, 
to be divided among them as they shall agree, or if they shall fail to agree within six months 
after the appointment of my personal representative, to be divided among them in portions of 
approximately equal value, as determined by my personal representative. 
ITEM VIII
 
SUPPLEMENTAL CARE TRUST FOR SURVIVING SPOUSE
 
A. Ifmy spouse, Martha J. Perry, survives me for five (5) days, then I give, devise and 
bequeath to her the rest, residue and remainder of my estate IN TRUST, to my Personal 
Representative, as Trustee, in lieu of any statutory allowances available to my surviving 
spouse. This share of my estate that is set aside for Martha J. Perry, shall be held by my 
Trustee, in a trust for the benefit of Martha 1. Perry, in a Supplemental Care Trust in 
accordance with the following provisions: 
1. Intent. 
It is my intention by this Trust to create a purely discretionary supplemental care fund 
for the benefit of Martha J. Perry, herein after referred to as the beneficiary. It is not my 
intention to displace public or private financial assistance that may otherwise be available to 
the beneficiary. The following enumerates the kinds of supplemental, nonsupport 
disbursements that are appropriate for the Trustee to make from this trust to or for the 
beneficiary. Such examples are not exclusive: medical, dental and diagnostic work and 
treatment for which there are no private or public funds otherwise available; medical 
procedures that are desirable in the Trustee's discretion, even though they may not be necessary 
or life saving; supplemental nursing care and rehabilitative services, differentials in cost 
between housing and shelter for shared and private rooms in institutional settings; care 
appropriate for the beneficiary that assistance programs may not or do not otherwise provide; 
expenditures for travel, companionship, cultural experiences, and expenses in bringing the 
beneficiary's siblings and other appropriate persons for visitation with the beneficiary. 
2. Supplement, not support. 
I do not want this Trust eroded by the beneficiary's creditors nor do I want the 
beneficiary's public or private assistance benefits made unavailable to the beneficiary or 
terminated. This Trust is not for the beneficiary's primary support. It is to supplement the 
Last Will and Testament ­_~ 5't- ;J , £4AJ}'
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beneficiary's supplemental care needs only. 
I have no obligation of support owing to the beneficiary, and the beneficiary has no 
entitlement to the income or corpus of this trust, except as the Trustee in his, her or its 
complete, sole, and absolute, and unfettered discretion, elects to disburse. In this regard tht: 
Trustee may act unreasonably and arbitrarily, as I could, if! were living and in control ofthest: 
funds. The Trustee's discretion in making nonsupport disbursements as provided for in this 
instrument is final as to all interested parties, including the state or any governmental agency 
or agencies, even if the Trustee elects to make no disbursements at all. The Trustee's sole and 
independent judgment, rather than any other parties' detennination, is intended to be the 
criterion by which disbursements are made. No court or any other person should substitute its 
or their judgment for the discretionary decision or decisions made by the Trustee. 
3. Income. 
Any income received by the Trustee not distributed to or for the benefit of the Trust 
beneficiary, shall be added annually to the Trust's principal. 
4. Access to Public Benefits. 
The Trustee shall consider all resources and income limitations that affect the 
beneficiary's right to public assistance programs. Distribution to or for the benefit of the 
beneficiary shall be limited so that the beneficiary is not disqualified from receiving public 
benefits to which the beneficiary is otherwise entitled. The beneficiary's probable and possible 
future supplemental care needs should be considered by the Trustee in connection with 
disbursements made by the Trustee from this Trust. The interests of remainder beneficiaries 
are only of secondary importance. 
5. Resist Requests. 
The Trustee should resist any request for payments from this trust for services that any 
public or private agency has the obligation to provide to my beneficiary. In this regard, the 
Trustee may not be familiar with the federal, state and local agencies that have been created to 
financially assist disabled persons. If this is the case, the Trustee should seek assistance in 
identifying public and private programs that are or may be available to the beneficiary so that 
the Trustee may better serve the beneficiary. 
6. Spendthrift Provisions 
No part of this Trust, neither principal nor income, shall be subject to anticipation or 
assignment by the beneficiary nor shall the Trust corpus or income be subject to attachment by 
any public or private creditor of the beneficiary; nor may the Trust principal and income be 
taken by any legal or equitable process by any voluntary or involuntary creditor, including those 
r,ast Will and Testament - s:iI?P1r- J) I ~'!) 
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that have provided for the beneficiary's support and maintenance. Further, under no 
circumstances may the beneficiary compel distributions from this Trust. 
7. Trustee - Authority to Terminate Trust 
If the existence of this supplemental care Trust adversely affects the beneficiary from 
receiving public entitlements or private support benefits, the Trustee may terminate this Trust. 
If this occurs, the remainder interest will be accelerated, and the remainder beneficiaries shall 
receive the accrued and undistributed income and corpus then held by the Trustee. 
In the event of voluntary termination, as provided for in this article, it is my hope and 
expectation that the remainder beneficiaries will continue to provide for the nonsupport care 
needs of the beneficiary. This request is an expression of my wishes. It is not binding on the 
remainder beneficiaries, and is merely precatory language in this paragraph. 
If Martha J. Perry fails to survive me for five (5) days, or upon the death of the 
beneficiary or upon the Trust's earlier termination. the trust created for Martha J. Perry, shall 
be distributed according to Item VIII (B) of this Last Will and Testament. 
8. Trustee's Powers 
To carry out the purposes of the Trust created under this Will, and subject to any 
limitations stated elsewhere herein, the Trustee is vested with all of the powers and authority 
as set forth in the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act, being Chapter 1 of Title 68, Idaho Code, as 
now in effect and as it may hereafter from time to time be amended after the date of my Will 
and after my death. The Trustee shall specifically have the power to invest in non-income 
producing assets. 
9. Unsupervised Administration 
The Trust created by this Will may be administered by my Trustee free from the control 
of any court that may otherwise have authority over my estate. 
10. Successor Trustee: Trustee Powers and Duties 
No resignation shall be effective until acceptance by the successor Trustee. No Trustee 
shall be required to post surety or personal bond while serving in this fiduciary capacity. 
The Trustee should take whatever legal steps may be necessary to initiate or continue 
any public assistance program for which the beneficiary is or may become eligible. The 
Trustee may bring such action in any court or regulatory agency having jurisdiction over the 
maUer, to secure a ruling or order that the Trust described in this article is not available to the 
beneficiary for any purpose absent specific exercise ofthe Trustee's discretion. Any expenses 
Last Will and Testament - _~ ¥,d) ·e0i 
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of the Trustee, including reasonable attorney's fees, specifically incurred in connection with 
matters relating to determination ofeligibility of the beneficiary for public or private support, 
but not limited to such services, shall be a proper charge to the Trust. 
II. Choice and Effect of Law 
This Last Will and Testament is entered into and executed in the State ofIdaho. It shall 
be administered in accordance with the laws of that state. 
B. The rest, residue and remainder ofmy estate shall be distributed in equal shares to 
my children and step-children who survive me for five (5) days. In the event any of my said 
children or step-children should predecease me or should not be living upon the death of the 
beneficiary of the Supplemental Care Trust referred to herein or upon the Trust's earlier 
termination, then in that event such individual's share shall lapse. 
ITEM IX 
CONTEST 
Every person under this Will who shall contest in any Court any provision of this 
instrument shall not be entitled to receive any property of any type whatsoever under this Will. 
That person shall receive absolutely nothing under the provisions of this Will or out of my 
estate. Any property which would have passed to that person under this Will, shall instead be 
distributed as if such person had died prior to my death without issue. My Personal 
Representative is specifically authorized to defend at the expense of my estate any contest or 
attack of any nature upon this Will, or upon any portion thereof. 
ITEM X 
CHARACTER OF DISTRIBUTION 
Unless otherwise specifically stated, all distributions, whether of income or principal. 
shall be the separate property of each individual distributee, beneficiary or heir under this will. 
All income, rents, issues, profits, gains and appreciation of property distributed to each individual 
as separate property shall also be the separate property of each such individual. 
ITEM XI 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have signed these presents and do publish and declare 
the same as and for my LAST WILL and TESTAMENT, consisting of eight (8) typewritten 
pages, the witnesses' certificate included, and on the bottom of each page I have signed my 
name for greater security. 
I, George D. Perry, the Testator, sign my name to this instrument this t( ~ay of 
February, 2005, and being first duly sworn, do hereby declare to the undersigned authority that 
Last Will and Testament ­ ---"=-=:...=-=-"""""--=:"p.--..L-\oc.L~--lJ=:"">«:'-£.=....., 
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I sign and execute this instrument as my Last Will and that I sign it willingly (or willingly 
direct another to sign for me), that I execute it as my free and voluntary act for the purposes 
therein expressed, and that I am eighteen (18) years of age or older, of sound mind, and under 
no constraint or undue influence. 
George D. Perry 
Testator 
We, George D. Perry, Jr. and Steven A. Perry, the witnesses, sign our names to this 
instrument, being first duly sworn, and do hereby declare to the undersigned authority that the 
Testator signs and executes this instrument as his last Will and that he signs it willingly (or 
willingly directs another to sign for him), and that each of us, in the presence and hearing of 
the Testator, hereby signs this Will as witness to the Testator's signing, and that to the best of 
our knowledge the Testator is eighteen (18) years of age or older, of sound mind, and under no 
constraint or undue intluence. 
eOgeDP~,f?~ 
Residing at Caldwell, Idaho 
Steven A. Perry 
Residing at Nampa, Idaho 
Last Will and Testament ­ ~-V) 'jL JJ. L 7Page 7 - George D. Perry I 
000018
  
  
-  J  
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: SS. 
County of Ada ) 
On this tj"7!..- day ofFebruary, 2005, before me personally appeared George D. Perry., 
the Testator, and George D. Perry, Jr. and Steven A. Perry, the witnesses, known to me (or 
proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence) to be the persons whose names are: 
subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that they executed the same. IN 
WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal the day and year in this 
certificat ve ritten. 
Notary Public in and r Idaho
 
Residing at Boise, Idaho.
 
My commission expires 12/12/08.
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Ada	 LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL APR 'I 52009 
STATE OF IDAHO J. DAVID NAVARRO. Clerk 
ByLMARTIN 
DEI'UWJEANNE T. GOODENOUGH 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Division ofHuman Services 
LARRY L. GOINS 
Deputy Attorney General 
Division ofHuman Services 
3276 Elder, Ste. B 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036 
Telephone: (208) 332-7961 
ISB No. 2295 
[goinsl@dhw.idaho.gov] 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE ) 
OF ) Case No. CV IE 0905214 
) 
GEORGE D. PERRY, ) DEMAND FOR NOTICE 
) 
Deceased. ) (I.e. § 15-3-204) 
) 
) EXEMPT: I.e. § 31-3212 
COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare, (hereinafter the 
"Department") pursuant to Idaho Code § 15-3-204, and hereby files its Demand for Notice oforders 
or other filings pertaining to the estate ofthe above-named Decedent. The Department asserts that 
it has a financial or property interest in said estate based upon the amount of medical assistance 
benefits which it was required to payon behalfofthe Decedent's spouse, MARTHA J. PERRY, and 
based upon its right to recover the amount ofmedical assistance benefits paid on her behalf as set 
forth at Idaho Code § 56-218. 
DEMAND FOR NOTICE - Page 1 
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The Department further requests a copy of the Inventory and Appraisement, upon its 
preparation within three months ofthe personal representative's appointment, pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 15-3-706. 
Notice should be given to the Department through its attorney, LARRY L. GOINS, Deputy 
Attorney General, Division ofHuman Services, 3276 Elder, Suite B, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 
83720-0036. 
DATED this ~ day ofApril, 2009. 
~i;;i;=
RRYL. GOINS ~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES that a true and correct copy ofthe foregoing 
DEMAND FOR NOTICE was mailed first class, postage prepaid, on the 13 day of April, 
2009, to: 
BARBARA K MCCORMICK
 
C/O PETER C SISSON
 
ATTORNEY AT LAW
 
2402 W JEFFERSON ST
 
BOISE ID 83702
 
ADA COUNTY CLERK
 
ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE
 
200 W FRONT STREET
 
BOISE ID 83702
 
!ntUdLU~D 
Marchelle Premo, Legal Assistant 
Division ofHuman Services 
DEMAND FOR NOTICE - Page 2 
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Chief, Division of Human Services
 
LARRY L. GOINS
 
Deputy Attorney General
 
Division of Human Services
 
3276 Elder, Ste. B
 
P.O. Box 83720
 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036
 
Telephone: (208) 332-7961
 
ISB No. 2295
 
[goinsl@dhw.idaho.gov]
 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE )
 
OF ) Case No. CV IE 0905214
 
)
 
GEORGE D. PERRY,	 ) CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE 
) 
) (I.e. § 15-3-804) 
Deceased.	 ) 
) EXEMPT: I.e. § 31-3212 
) 
COMES NOW the State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare (the "Department"), 
through undersigned counsel, and hereby makes claim against the above-captioned estate. This 
claim is based upon the Claimant's statutory right to recover the amount ofmedical assistance paid 
on behalfof the Decedent's spouse, MARTHA J. PERRY, as set forth at Idaho Code § 56-218. The 
Claimant has paid medical assistance benefits on behalf of the Decedent's spouse MARTHA J. 
PERRY in the amount of $106,251.08, as of April 8, 2009. To the extent that the Claimant is 
CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE-l 
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obligated to make further medical assistance payments on behalfofthe Decedent's spouse, it reserves 
the right to supplement its claim. 
IMPORTANT: This claim is made in accordance with the Department's right to establish 
its claim pursuant to Idaho Code § 56-218. As long as the decedent's spouse survives, there: is no 
demand for payment of this claim. This claim is made against any property or estate which, at any 
time, had been the community property of the decedent and decedent's spouse, or which had been 
the property of decedent's spouse. The Department will not object to distribution of the .~state 
to the decedent's surviving spouse. However, the Department demands that, before any other 
distribution of the estate, adequate provision be made for the future payment of the Department's 
claim pursuant to Idaho Code § 15-3-81O(b)(2). Transfers of property by either spouse (except to 
one another), including transfers by will and the failure to claim probate allowances, may affect the 
eligibility ofthe survivor for Medicaid services, and may be set aside in accordance with Idaho Code 
§ 56-218(2). 
DATED this 134day ofApril, 2009. ~~~_.~RYL.G~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County ofAda ) 
JULIE RAICHART, being first duly sworn, deposes and states: That I am the Claimant's 
Paralegal; that I have read the above and foregoing claim against the decedent's estate and know the 
contents thereof; and that, to my knowledge and belief, the facts stated therein are true and correct. 
~~ JU RAICHART, Paralegal 
CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE - 2 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this J..lJ~ day of April, 2009. 
"" ......",
".... A E '... 
,...... ~ ...\l. . PI>"'1t 
.... ~4..:" ....~_iI!.~iI!.. ~T
IIlJ ~OT-1 ~ 
: Jt}- ... ~Z.f~l·: • -._ 0 
: ,~ Notary Public for Idaho ~ \~\ --{lSUe Commission Expires: 8--1l{ /';)-Q(?--#..,~ 0
 "''''~ 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
 
THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES that duplicate originals of the foregoing 
CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE were mailed first class, postage prepaid, on the '-3 day ofApril, 
2009, to: 
BARBARA K MCCORMICK
 
C/O PETER C SISSON
 
ATTORNEY AT LAW
 
2402 W JEFFERSON ST
 
BOISE ID 83702
 
ADA COUNTY CLERK
 
ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE
 
200 W FRONT STREET
 
BOISE ID 83702
 
~g~~ 
Division ofHuman Services 
CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE - 3 
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Peter C. Sisson JUN 042009 
SISSON & SISSON 
J. DAVJO I11\'1IAfilHO, Cleft.~The Elder Law Firm, PLLC 
ByE-CHILD2402 West .Jefferson Street DSIUTV 
Boise. Idaho 83702 
Tel: (208) 387-0729 
Fax: (208) 331-5009 
Idaho State Bar # 4682 
Attorney for Personal Representative 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
GEORGE D. PERRY. 
Deceased. 
Case No. CV IE 0905214 
NOTICE OF DISALLOWANCE 
OF CLAIM 
(I.C. 15-3-806) 
TO: THE DEAPRTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE. Claimant. 
The undersigned personal representative of the above-entitled estate hereby disallows 
your claim for $106.251.08 (and any supplemental claim for further medical assistance payments 
made on behalf of Decedent's spouse) presented on April 13,2009. Claimant's reliance upon 
I.e. ~ 56-218 to make its claim "against any property or estate which, at any time, had been the 
community property of the decedent and decedent's spouse, or which had been the property of 
decedent's spouse" exceeds the scope of recovery aIIowed by federal law, is preempted by 
federal law. and is hereby disallowed. 
NOTICE OF DISALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 1 
File #08-/97 
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Claimant's demand that "before any other distribution of the estate, adequate provision be 
made for the future payment of the Department's claim pursuant to I.C. § 15-3-810(b)(2)" is also 
hereby disallowed because no assets of the estate are subject to the Claimant's claim, nor will 
they be upon Decedent's spouse's death. 
Failure to protest the disallowance by tiling a petition for allowance in the above named 
court. or commencing a proceeding against the undersigned, within sixty (60) days after the 
mailing of this notice shall result in your claim for the disallowed amount indicated above being 
forever barred. 
DATED this zJday of June, 2009. 
~d4MQ~ 
BARBARA K. McCORMICK 
Personal Representative 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Ada ) 
On this ~ day of June, 2009, before me personally appeared Barbara K. McCormick. 
known to me (or proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence) to be the person whose name 
is subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that she executed the same. 
.',........".,.
 
~••, ~~RIE W•••• ~~ " .•••••••• /<. ".
,:.- •• -<p~ ~.. ·.0 *.0Notary Public in and for the State of Idaho S,.l ~OT-1h •• ~~ 
:. '4'r}. \ :Residing at 1t/47J1;J1J- . Idaho . : ..... ..,..-. . 
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Jb...r 15 2009	 
­
Ada County Clerk	 NO. \005' FILED 
A.M P.~i .-----. 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL JUN 15 2009 
JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH	 J. DAVID NAVAHRO, Clerk 
By RIC iJELSONDeputy Attorney General DEPUT" 
Chief, Human Services Division 
LARRY L. GOINS 
Deputy Attorney General 
Division of Human Services 
3276 Elder Street, Suite B 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036 
Telephone: (208) 332-7961 
ISB No. 2295 
[goinsl@dhw.idaho.gov] 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF ) Case No. CV IE 0905214 
) 
GEORGE D. PERRY, ) PETITION-FOR ALLOWANCE 
) OF CLAIM 1 
Deceased.	 ) 
) 
COMES NOW the State ofIdaho, Department ofHealth and Welfare (Department), claimant 
in the above matter, by and through its attorney, LARRY L. GOINS, Deputy Attorney General, and 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 15-3-806(b), petitions the Court as follows: 
1. The Department has paid medical assistance (Medicaid) benefits on behalf of the 
decedent's surviving spouse, MARTHA J. PERRY in the amount of$109,464.23 to date; 
2. After appointment and pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 15-3-804 and 56-218, a written 
statement ofthe Department's claim in the amount of 106,251.08, was timely mailed to the Personal 
Representative of the estate and filed with the Court on April 15,2009; 
PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 2 
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3. The Department's statutory claim is just and valid, and payment should be allowed for 
the total amount ofmedical assistance paid on behalfofthe decedent's surviving spouse to the fullest 
extent possible. 
WHEREFORE, THE DEPARTMENT REQUESTS that the Court enter an Order allowing 
the above listed claim to be paid to the fullest extent possible. 
DATED this ~day of June, 2009. 
\.... _A-;­~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing PETITION 
FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM was mailed first class, postage prepaid on the II day of 
June, 2009, to: 
BARBARA K MCCORMICK 
C/O PETER C SISSON 
SISSON & SISSON 
2402 W JEFFERSON ST 
BOISE,ID 
/Y)CM~ Q2Y;l " ~e Premo, Legal Assistant 
PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 2
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Peter C. Sisson 
SISSON & SISSON 
The Elder Law Firm, PLLC 
2402 West Jefferson Street 
Boise. Idaho 83702 
Tel: (208) 387-0729 
Fax: (208)331-5009 
Idaho State Bar # 4682 
Attorney for Personal Representative 
NO.,_~ __=;:::-._--­
A.M~_Y...l-'.1...-_F_ll~.~. _ 
JUN 25 2009 
J. DAVID NAVAR RD, Clerk
 
By AIC NELSON
 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
 
THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
IN THE MATTER OF: Case No. CV IE 0905214 
GEORGE D. PERRY, OBJECTION TO PETITION 
FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM 
Deceased. 
COMES NOW, Barbara K. McCormick. the Personal Representative of the above-named 
estate. by and through her attorney Peter C. Sisson, and hereby objects to the Petition for 
Allowance of Claim filed herein by the State of Idaho. Department of Health and Welfare. 
This Objection is based on the Memorandum in SUPP0l1 of Objection to Petition for 
A!lO\vance of Claim and atlidavit(s) in suppo11 to be filed in this matter. Oral argument is 
requested at the hearing to be set on this matter. Time for creditor claims runs on August 10, 
2009. The Personal Representative will notice up a hearing on this matter after that date. 
DATEDthis&of.lUne,2009. 1N~ 
PETER C. SISSON 
Attorney for Personal Representative 
OJBECTION TO PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 1 
File #08-197 
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Peter C. Sisson 
SISSON & SISSON 
The Elder Law Firm, PLLC 
2402 West Jefferson Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Tel: (208) 387-0729 
Fax: (208) 331-5009 
Idaho State Bar # 4682 
Attorney for Personal Representative 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
GEORGE D. PERRY, 
Deceased. 
Case No. CV IE 0905214 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S 
OBJECTION TO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
AND WELFARE'S PETITION 
FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM 
COMES NOW, Barbara K. McConnick, the Personal Representative of the above-named 
estate, by and through her attorney of record, Peter C. Sisson, ofthe finn Sisson & Sisson, The 
Elder Law Finn, PLLC, and hereby submits the following Memorandum in Support of the 
Personal Representative's Objection to the Department of Health and Welfare's ("Department") 
Petition for Allowance of Claim. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The Personal Representative ("PR"), Barbara McConnick, was appointed in this probate 
action on March 19,2009. Pursuant to statute, the Department was given notice of the probate 
action on April 3, 2009. On April 13,2009, the Department filed its Claim Against Estate in the 
amount of $1 06,251.08. On June 2, 2009, the PR timely filed her Notice Of Disallowance Of 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S OBJECTION TO 
DEPARTMENT'S PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - Page 1 
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Claim, denying the Department's Claim in its entirety. On June 11,2009, the Department filed 
its Petition For Allowance Of Claim. On June 25,2009, the PR filed her Objection To Petition 
For Allowance Of Claim, noting that the time for creditor claims had not yet passed, but when it 
had, she would file a Memorandum in Support and set the matter for hearing. The PR has now 
filed the Legal Advertising Proof of Publication from the Idaho Statesman, verifying that legal 
notice to creditors was duly published and the time for claims has now passed. She now fil{:s her 
Memorandum in Support of Objection to the Department's Petition for Allowance of Claim, the 
PR's affidavit in support of said Objection, and hereby requests that a hearing be set on the IPR's 
disallowance of the Department's claim this matter. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On July 31,2006, Martha Jean Perry, George's spouse (hereinafter "Martha"), 
conveyed all of her right, title and interest in the couple's home located at 2104 Tendoy Drive, 
Boise, Idaho via quit claim deed to her husband, George Perry. Affidavit of Barbara McCom1ick, 
Exhibit A, incorporated herein by reference. 
2. As of October 1, 2006, the Department approved Martha for Medicaid benefits. 
Affidavit of Barbara McCormick, Exhibit B, incorporated herein by reference. 
3. Martha's health care needs have progressively increased over the years and she now 
lives in a skilled nursing facility. From October, 2006, Martha has continued to receive 
Medicaid benefits and she receives those benefits today. 
4. Over the years, George's health situation also progressively declined. He ultimately 
was forced to enter into a nursing home after a long-struggle to remain home. By this time he 
had exhausted his liquid resources and decided to sell his home because he would be unable to 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S OBJECTION TO 
DEPARTMENT'S PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - Page 2 
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maintain it, even if qualified for Medicaid benefits. In an effort to sell the home, he provided the 
Department with written verification documenting the fair market value of the home and tht~ 
Department agreed that the proposed sale price of $150,000 was fair market value. Affidavit of 
Barbara McCormick, Exhibit C, incorporated herein by reference. 
5. Unfortunately, delays in receiving response from the Department caused the buyer 
who had wanted to purchase the property to back out of that transaction. The home remaim:d on 
the market. George Perry died in a nursing home on February 25,2009, before he could 
complete the sale of the home with a new buyer who had by that time agreed to purchase the 
home. 
6. The Personal Representative of the Estate of George D. Perry consummated the sale 
of the home on March 26, 2008, for a total sales price of $160,000. Affidavit of Barbara 
McCormick, Exhibit D, incorporated herein by reference. 
7. The balance of the house sale proceeds, minus disbursements for administrative costs, 
is now held in the Estate's checking account as reflected in the Estate Inventory. Affidavit of 
Barbara McCormick, Exhibit E, incorporated herein by reference. The proceeds from the sale of 
George Perry's home are the only assets that are contained in the Estate of George Perry. The 
Inventory makes clear that all estate assets were George Perry's separate property. The 
Department failed to make any objection to the PR's Inventory. George's personal property was 
of de minimus value and was given to charity prior to his death when he moved to the nursing 
home. The Estate of George D. Perry holds no other real or personal property. 
8. The only property that Martha currently owns is one financial account located at 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S OBJECTION TO 
DEPARTMENT'S PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - Page 3 
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Wells Fargo, checking account # ending -3540. This account is an income-qualifying or "Miller" 
trust account that was necessary to qualify Martha for Medicaid. Martha's fixed monthly income 
(social security and pension) is direct deposited into this account every month. Funds are then 
paid out of this account in the same month for Martha's Medicaid patient share of cost, for her 
health insurance premium and for her personal needs allowance. This account holds less than 
$2,000 at the end of each month after the above amounts are paid out every month. Affidavit of 
Barbara McCormick, Exhibit F, incorporated herein by reference. Martha owns no other re:al or 
personal property. Affidavit of Barbara McCormick, incorporated herein by reference. 
9. The Personal Representative stipulates and agrees that upon Martha Jean Perry's 
death, any amounts left in Wells Fargo checking account # ending -3540 are owed to and will be 
paid to the Department pursuant to its right to recover for Medicaid assistance paid out during 
her lifetime against assets in which Martha had an interest at her death. Aside from the funds in 
this Wells Fargo checking account, Martha does not own any interest in any other property. 
Affidavit of Barbara McCormick, incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case requires interpretation of a federal statute and consideration of whether the 
Department's application ofIdaho law (I.C. § 56-218) violates federal law and is therefore 
preempted by federal law. Under certain circumstances specified by federal law, the states are 
allowed to recover correctly paid medical assistance benefits from the estates of Medicaid 
recipients. Federal law requires the states to make claims against the probate estates of Medicaid 
recipients to recovery correctly paid benefits. Federal law also allows the states to expand the 
definition of "estate" to include non-probate assets owned by a recipient at the time of the 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S OBJECTION TO 
DEPARTMENT'S PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - Page 4 
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recipient's death. Idaho has chosen this expanded definition of "estate." I.C. § 56-218(4). 
Nothing in the federal medical assistance statutes authorizes a direct medical assistance estate 
claim against the estate of any person other than the recipient ofbenefits. Despite strong 
pressure from the states and others, in 1993 Congress refused to enact legislation to allow direct 
claims against the estates of non-recipient surviving spouses. 
Under the current statute, the states are permitted to pull back into a recipient's estatl~ any 
real or personal property or other assets in which the recipient held a legal title or interest at the 
time of the recipient's death (to the extent of the interest). Idaho's estate recovery statute, Idaho 
Code § 56-218, requires that a medical assistance claim be filed against the estate of a deceased 
recipient, but also requires that a claim be asserted against the estate of a surviving spouse who 
never received medical assistance benefits. The Department's interpretation and application of 
I.e. § 56-218 in its estate recovery claims (including the one at bar) conflicts with federal law to 
the extent that the Department asserts recovery claims against assets in the non-Medicaid 
spouse's probate estate which were not assets in which the Medicaid recipient held an interest at 
the time of the Medicaid recipient's death. 
The Department ofHealth and Human Services (HHS) is the United States government's 
principal agency in charge of protecting the health of all Americans and providing essential 
human services. The work of HHS is conducted by the Office of the Secretary and 11 agencies. 
CMS (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services) is the HHS agency that governs the 
Medicaid program in the United States. HHS most recently stated in clear and unambiguous 
terms that an estate recovery claim by a state could be asserted only against assets in which the 
Medicaid recipient held a legal title or interest at the time of death to the extent of the interest. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S OBJECTION TO 
DEPARTMENT'S PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - Page 5 
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In the instant case, none of the assets in the Estate ofGeorge Perry are assets in which 
Martha Perry, the Medicaid recipient, holds a legal title or interest. Since she doesn't hold any 
such interest now, while she is alive, she cannot possibly hold any such interest at the time ofher 
death. The Department's claim in this probate action is exactly the type of recovery claim which 
goes beyond what federal law allows. That is why the PR disallowed the Department's Claim 
and that is why this Court should uphold that disallowance. 
OVERVIEW OF STATE AND FEDERAL LAW GOVERNING RECOVERY OF 
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE BENEFITS CORRECTLY PAID 
Statutory Framework 
Congress enacted Medicaid in 1965 as Title XIX of the Social Security Act to ensure 
medical care to individuals who do not have the resources to cover essential medical services. 
Arkansas Dept. ofHealth and Human Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 (2006); In Re Estate of 
Kaminsky, 141 Idaho 436, 439, 111 P.3d 121 (2005). The program is jointly funded with the 
states as a "cooperative endeavor in which the Federal Government provides financial assistance 
to participating States to aid them in furnishing health care to needy persons." Harris v. McRae, 
448 U.S. 297, 308,100 S.Ct. 2671, 65 L.Ed.2d 784 (1980). Participating states enact legislation 
and rules, incorporate them into state medical assistance plans, and submit those plans to the U.S. 
Secretary of Health and Human Services for approval. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)-(b) (2000 & Supp. 
III 2(03). After this, the states can receive federal payments. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2000). Each 
state administers its own program within the federal requirements, and the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services (CMS) administer the program and approve state plans. Arkansas Dept. 
ofHealth and Human Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 (2006). 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S OBJECTION TO 
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One of the requirements imposed on state plans in order to participate in the program and 
receive federal funding is that the state must "comply with the provisions of [42 U.S.c. § 1396p] 
with respect to liens, adjustments and recoveries of medical assistance correctly paid, transfl~rs of 
assets, and treatment of certain trusts." 42 U.S.C. § l396a(a)(18) (2000). 
When determining the eligibility of a married person to receive Medicaid, states consider 
assets of both husband and wife as available to the spouse requesting benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 
1396r-5(c) (2000). But there are several provisions in place to protect the community spouse (the 
spouse not applying for Medicaid) from being impoverished as a result of the spend-down of 
assets needed to qualify the applicant for Medicaid. The value of the couple's horne is not 
included among assets considered eligible to pay for medical care. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(5); 42 
U.S.c. § 1382b(a)(1) (2000). The community spouse ofa Medicaid recipient is also entitled to 
an allowance of income and assets designated for his or her needs that is not considered available 
to pay for the recipient spouse's medical care. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(d). Furthermore, the 
recipient spouse has the right to transfer assets, including an interest in the homestead, to his or 
her community spouse. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2). Medicaid thus balances the obligation of 
community spouses to contribute to the payment ofmedical expenses for their recipient spouses 
against the accommodation of the community spouse's need to provide for his or her own 
support. 
Federal Medicaid Recovery Provisions 
Although it is not applicable to the facts before us, it is important to start with the pre­
1993 federal law on Medicaid recovery, because it is the basis for the rationale of several rekvant 
cases, including the sole case in Idaho that peripherally addressed the issue at bar. Prior to 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S OBJECTION TO 
DEPARTMENT'S PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - Page 7 
000036
 13 (
 
)(I
 
 
-
amendments adopted in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1993, the federal 
Medicaid statute stated a general principle that there should be no recovery of correctly paid 
Medicaid benefits, subject to several exceptions, one of which is relevant here: 
No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of 
an individual under the State plan may be made, except-­
* * * * 
(B) in the case of any other individual who was 65 years of age or older when he 
received such assistance, from his estate. 
42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(1) (1988). 
Under this pre-1993 law, states were allowed, but not required, to recover Medicaid 
benefits paid to recipients 65 or older, and the statute specified the recovery would be from the 
recipient's estate. The statute also provided that this recovery from the recipient's estate could 
only be made after the death ofthe recipient's surviving spouse. [d. § 1396p(b)(2) (1988). 
Despite this prohibition against recovery before the death of a surviving spouse, there was no 
express mention of recovery from the estate of a surviving spouse. The pre-1993 federal law 
contained no definition of the term "estate." 
Section 1396p(b) was amended as part of the OBRA amendments of 1993. Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub.L. No. 103-66, § l3612(a), (c), 107 Stat. 312,627-28 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l), (4) (2000)). As amended, the federal law 
retained the general prohibition against states attempting to recover Medicaid payments correctly 
paid on behalf of an individual, with limited exceptions. 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b) (2000). But the 
1993 amendments changed section 1396p(b) in several ways. First, the 1993 amendments 
lowered the age criterion for recovery from 65 to 55. Second, the 1993 amendments made 
recovery allowed by the exceptions mandatory rather than permissive. Third, the amendments 
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added a definition of "estate," which itself had both mandatory and pennissive elements. As 
amended, the general nonrecovery rule and the relevant exception read as follows: 
(I) No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf 
of an individual under the State plan may be made, except that the State shall seek 
adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an 
individual under the State plan in the case of the following individuals: 
* * * * 
(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when the 
individual received such medical assistance, the State shall seek adjustment or 
recovery from the individual's estate * * *. (emphasis added) 
Id. The amended version of section 1396p(b)( I)(B) retained the express reference to recovery 
from the recipient's estate. Furthennore, as was true pre-amendment, this recovery from the 
recipient's estate is only pennitted after the death ofthe recipient's surviving spouse: "Any 
adjustment or recovery under paragraph (1) may be made only after the death of the individual's 
surviving spouse, if any * * *." 42 U.S.C. § I 396p(b)(2) (emphasis added). As with the pre-I 993 
version, the amended federal statute contains no express authorization for, or reference to, 
recovery from a surviving spouse's estate. 
The 1993 amendments added a definition of "estate" for purposes of Medicaid recove'ry, 
with a mandatory provision that looks to state probate law and an optional provision that 
authorizes states to expand the definition beyond the scope ofprobate law: 
[T]he tenn "estate", with respect to a deceased individual -­
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included within 
the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; and 
(B) may include, at the option of the State * * * any other real and personal 
property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at 
the time ofdeath (to the extent ofsuch interest), including such assets conveyed to 
a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, 
tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement. 
42 U.S.C. § I396p(b)(4) (emphasis added). 
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Under this provision, a state has the option to adopt a definition of "estate" for Medicaid 
recovery purposes that includes some assets which, under ordinary probate law, would not be 
part of the Medicaid recipient's estate, because they would pass immediately to someone els(~ on 
the recipient's death. For example, when two persons hold property in joint tenancy with a right 
of survivorship and one dies, the deceased joint tenant's interest ordinarily passes directly to the 
surviving joint tenant and is not part of the probate estate. Under the optional expanded 
definition allowed by federal law, for Medicaid recovery purposes the interest of a deceased joint 
tenant who had received Medicaid would be included in his estate, rather than passing directly to 
the surviving joint tenant. 
Thus federal statutes place limits on the state's powers to define the scope of recovery of 
medical assistance benefits correctly paid. The limits are set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p. 
Arkansas Dept. ofHealth and Human Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 (2006). 
Idaho's Medicaid Recoverv Provisions 
Idaho Code (I.e.) § 56-218, entitled "RECOVERY OF CERTAIN MEDICAL 
ASSISTANCE" states in pertinent part, 
(1) Except where exempted or waived in accordance with federal law medical 
assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an individual who was fifty­
five (55) years of age or older when the individual received such assistance may 
be recovered from the individual's estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any, 
for such aid paid to either or both: ... 
(4) For purposes of this section, the term "estate" shall include: 
(a) All real and personal property and other assets included within the
 
individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probate law; and
 
(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in which the 
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death, to the extent of 
such interest, including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the 
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deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life 
estate, living trust or other arrangement. (emphasis added). 
Idaho has adopted verbatim the optional federal provision that authorizes states to expand 
the definition of "estate" beyond the scope of probate law. I.C. § 56-218(4). Therefore, it 
follows that Idaho is required to abide by the interpretation of the language in the federal statute 
that CMS and HHS promulgate. Idaho law currently allows the state to seek recovery for 
medical assistance paid "from the individual's estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any, for such 
aid paid to either or both." I.e. § 56-218(1). The Department does not interpret and apply this 
statutory language consistently with federal law. In order to be consistent with federal law, the 
Department's claims against a Medicaid spouse's estate must be against "assets in which the 
individual [Medicaid recipient] had any legal title or interest at the time of death, to the extent of 
such interest." The Department, however, regularly makes claims against assets in which the: 
Medicaid recipient had no legal title or interest at the time ofhis death. That is the case in this 
matter and that is the reason this Court should rule in favor of the Personal Representative's 
disallowance of the Department's claim in this case. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Does federal law limit the scope of recovery against the individual's estate or the 
estate of the spouse to assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at the time of her 
death, thereby preempting the broader recovery sought by the Department in this case? 
2. If recovery is limited to assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at thl;: 
time of her death what, if any, interest does Martha Perry have in the homestead sale proceeds 
that make up the assets in the Estate ofGeorge Perry, her deceased husband? 
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I. FEDERAL LAW PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW 
Whether federal law preempts state law is primarily an issue of statutory interpretation. 
Congressional purpose is "'the ultimate touchstone'" of the preemption inquiry. Malone l'. White 
Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504,98 S.Ct. 1185,55 L.Ed.2d 443 (1978) (quoting Retail Clerks 
Int'IAss'n, Local 1625 l'. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96,103,84 S.Ct. 219,11 L.Ed.2d 179 (1963)). 
The Court's primary focus in the analysis must be to ascertain the intent of Congress. See Cal. 
Fed. Sal'. & Loan Ass'n l'. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280-81,107 S.Ct. 683, 93 L.Ed.2d 613 (1987). 
The United States Supreme Court has explained that "[c]onsideration of issues arising under the 
Supremacy Clause 'start[s] with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] 
not to be superseded by Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congr{:ss. '" 
Cipollone l'. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516,112 S.Ct. 2608,120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992) 
(quoting Rice l'. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,230,67 S.Ct. 1146,91 L.Ed. 1447 
(1947)). Thus, preemption is generally disfavored. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516,518,112 S.Ct. 
2608). 
Congress may preempt state law in several ways. Cal. Fed. Sal'. & Loan Ass'n, 479 U.S. 
at 280, 107 S.Ct. 683. First, it may do so with express language preempting state law. Id. 
Second, it may do so by fully occupying the field, that is, "congressional intent to pre-empt state 
law in a particular area may be inferred where the scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently 
comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress 'left no room' for supplementary 
state regulation." Id. at 280-81,107 S.Ct. 683 (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230,67 S.Ct. 1146). In 
this case, Congress did not expressly preempt state law nor did it so completely occupy the field 
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as to leave no room for state action, because the Medicaid program specifically permits and even 
requires action by participating states. 
The third kind ofpreemption is at issue in this case. Even when Congress has not chosen to 
displace state law expressly or by fully occupying the field, "federal law may nonetheless pre­
empt state law to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law." Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 
479 U.S. at 281, 107 S.Ct. 683. Conflict preemption occurs when compliance with both state 
and federal laws is impossible. Fla. Lime Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142­
143, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963). Conflict preemption also occurs when the state law 
is "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,67,61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941). 
II. THE DEPARTMENT'S APPLICATION OF I.e. § 56-218 IN THIS CASE 
ACTUALLY CONFLICTS WITH FEDERAL LAW AND IS THEREFORE 
PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL LAW. 
The Department's claim against the Estate of George Perry is premised on the Medicaid 
benefits paid out on behalf of his spouse, Martha. Federal law precludes the Department from 
asserting a claim against any property which Martha, the Medicaid recipient, does not have l{~gal 
title to or an interest in at the time of her death. See discussion, supra. In this case, the 
Department's claim against the estate of Martha Perry's spouse must be denied because she has 
no legal title to nor any interest in the assets of the Estate of George Perry, nor will she ever have 
such an interest, even at the time of her death. 
The appellate courts in Idaho have not squarely addressed the issue presented in this case, 
although the only two Idaho cases which have dealt with Medicaid recovery claims are discussed 
below. However, a very recent decision from the Supreme Court of Minnesota and the 
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procedural aftennath of that decision is particularly instructive in this case. In Re Estate ofBarg, 
752 N.W. 2d 52 (Minn. 2008) is the latest state court decision on point and is on all fours with 
the instant situation. The Court's analysis in Barg provides an in-depth and exhaustive revit:w of 
state court cases analyzing the issue. Reading Barg in its entirety is very instructive on the issue 
at bar because Minnesota's department ofhealth and welfare made the same argument in favor of 
its recovery action as is made by Idaho's Department in this action. The facts ofBarg, when 
pared down to the essentials, are essentially the same facts as are present in this probate. For the 
Court's convenience, the PR has appended a complete copy ofBarg to this Memorandum as 
Appendix 1. 
In Barg, supra at 73-74, the Minnesota Supreme Court struck down a provision of the 
state's Medicaid estate recovery statute that allowed recovery from the estate of a surviving 
spouse for any assets jointly owned by the couple at any point during their marriage. In that 
case, Mrs. Barg transferred her partial interest in the couple's home to her husband when she 
entered a nursing home. She died without leaving a probate estate and her husband died soon 
thereafter. The county then sought recovery against Mr. Barg's estate for the amount of 
Medicaid benefits paid out on behalf of Mrs. Barg. The Minnesota Supreme Court detennined 
that the county could recover only from assets that the Medicaid recipient had a legal interest in 
at the time ofher death. Since Mrs. Barg had no legal interest in any property when she died 
because she had transferred her interest to her husband while she was alive, the Court ruled that 
the county had no way to seek recovery from Mr. Barg's estate. Id. 
These are the same facts present in the instant case. Martha transferred her interest in the 
couple's home to her husband years ago in 2006, prior to applying for Medicaid benefits. She 
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retains no legal interest in that real property, nor in the proceeds from the sale of that real 
property, which are the only assets that make up her husband's estate. Statement of Facts 
("SOF"), ,-r~. 1-2, 7-8. 
The Supreme Court of Minnesota discussed the federal statute at length, which is directly 
applicable to the instant case because Idaho has adopted the federal language verbatim in I.C. § 
56-218. In discussing the statute at issue it addressed the state's argument that the "other 
arrangement" phrase opened the door for the broader recovery allowed under Minnesota's 
statute. The Court rejected that argument. The Court's opinion on the scope of the Minnesota 
recovery statute, directly on point with the instant case, is cited at length below. 
We tum to a determination ofwhether the scope of recovery from a surviving 
spouse's estate allowed under Minnesota law is consistent with federal law. 
Subdivision 2 of Minn.Stat. § 256B.15 allows the state to recover from a 
surviving spouse's estate "the value of the assets of the estate that were marital 
property or jointly owned property at any time during the marriage." (Emphasis 
added.) The County argues that this broad estate recovery authority does not 
conflict with federal law because the pre-1993 version of section 1396p(b) should 
be construed broadly and the 1993 amendments were intended to expand, not 
restrict, state estate recovery authority. In asserting this argument for broad estate 
recovery authority, the County emphasizes that it is consistent with the dual goals 
of federal law of recouping Medicaid expenses to make assistance available to 
more qualifying recipients, while protecting community spouses from 
pauperization during their lifetimes. The Estate argues that, because section 
1396p(b)(1) allows recovery only from a recipient's estate and section 1396p(b)(4) 
allows expansion of the estate only to include assets in which the recipient had an 
interest at the time of death, the "any time during the marriage" recovery allowed 
by subdivision 2 is preempted. 
The County's argument would take us too far down the path of favoring 
the purpose of the law at the expense of the plain meaning of its language. 
Significantly, no court has embraced the County's argument that the pre­
1993 federal law authorized recovery from a surviving spouse's estate of 
assets that were jointly owned during the marriage but transferred by the 
recipient spouse prior to her death. Indeed, of the courts that have 
interpreted federal law to allow direct claims against the estate of a surviving 
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spouse, only one has construed that authority to extend to assets that were 
transferred before the death of the Medicaid recipient, and that court relied 
on language from the 1993 amendments to support that extension. See In re 
Estate o/Wirtz, 607 N.W.1d 882, 885-86 (N.D.2000). 
Other courts that have recognized authority to recover from a source other 
than the Medicaid recipient's estate have construed that authority to reach only 
assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at the time of her death, that 
is, assets which were part of the recipient's estate as defined by traditional state 
probate law or included in the estate under an expanded definition allowed by the 
1993 amendments to federal law. See Bucholtz, 114 F.3d at 925-27 (limiting 
recovery to assets that were part of recipient's estate as defined by state probate 
law); Kizer, 887 F.2d at 1006 (same); Jackman, 970 P.2d at 8-10 (holding that 
recovery from surviving spouse's estate allowed by Idaho Medicaid recovery 
statute is limited by federal law to assets that were part of the Medicaid 
recipient's estate as defined under state probate law); Thompson, 586 N.W.2d 
at 851 n.3 (recognizing that "expansive definition of 'estate' in [section] 
1396p(b)(4) extends only to assets in which the medical assistance benefits 
recipient 'had any legal title or interest in at the time of death"'); see also In re 
Estate ofSmith, No. M2005-01410-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 3114250 at *4 
(Tenn.Ct.App. Nov.1, 2006) (explaining that courts that have allowed recovery 
against estates of surviving spouses have required that recipient had interest in 
assets at time of death).... 
As noted above, the only decision to deviate from this limiting principle 
requiring an interest at the time of death is Wirtz. Although the North Dakota 
court had acknowledged in its earlier Thompson decision that recovery allowed 
under section 1396p(b) is limited to assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an 
interest at the time of death (indeed that was the basis on which the court 
rationalized allowing recovery from the surviving spouse's estate), 586 N.W.2d at 
851 n. 3, the court held in Wirtz that any assets conveyed by the Medicaid 
recipient to his spouse before his death were subject to recovery from the 
surviving spouse's estate, 607 N.W.2d at 886. The court stated that limiting 
recovery under section 1396p(b) to "assets in the surviving spouse's estate that the 
Medicaid recipient had legal title to and conveyed through joint tenancy, tenancy­
in-common, survivorship, life estate, or living trust" would ignore the words 
"interest" and "other arrangement" in the federal law. Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d at 885. 
Concluding that the words "interest" and "other arrangement" are ambiguous, the 
court relied on the Congressional intent it perceived "to allow states a wide 
latitude in seeking Medicaid benefit recoveries." Id. at 885-86. The court did not 
explain why the same purpose acknowledged in Thompson was consistent with 
the limitation to recovery from assets in which the recipient had an interest at the 
time of death, yet also justified abandoning that limitation in Wirtz. 
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We cannot agree that the "other arrangement" language in the 1993 
amendment is ambiguous in the sense implied in Wirtz. The plain meaning of 
"other arrangement," read in the context of section 1396p(b)(4), is 
arrangements other than those expressly listed that also convey assets at the 
time of the Medicaid recipient's death. 
We return again to the language of the federal statute. The federal optional 
definition of "estate" allows inclusion of any other real and personal property and 
other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of 
death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, 
heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in 
common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement. 
42 U.S.C. § I396p(b)(4)(B) (emphasis added). The "including" clause further 
describes the assets that a state may include in this expanded estate. The clause 
describes those assets in two ways--first by the limiting adjective "such," and 
second by the language describing how and to whom "such assets" are 
"conveyed." The "such" limitation plainly refers back to the immediately 
preceding clause describing the assets as those "in which the individual had any 
legal title or interest at the time of death." The including clause then describes to 
whom "such" assets may have been conveyed--a "survivor, heir, or assign ofthe 
deceased individual." Id. (emphasis added). And finally, the clause describes 
several methods by which the conveyance of "such" assets might take place -­
"through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, 
or other arrangement." Id. 
Inclusion in the list of examples of "such assets" is predicated on the recipient 
having a legal interest at the time of death. When we construe a federal statute we 
must, if at all possible, give effect "to every word Congress used." Reiter v. 
Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339, 99 S.Ct. 2326,60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979). To 
read "other arrangement" to include a lifetime transfer would be to read the words 
"at the time of death" out of the statute. The conclusion that "other arrangement" 
cannot include lifetime transfers is further supported by the additional context. 
"[O]ther arrangement" ends a list of examples of conveyances that occur at the 
time of death. The list of recipients of the conveyance, "a survivor, heir, or assign 
ofthe deceased individual," leaves no doubt that the "individual," a Medicaid 
recipient, must have died for the conveyance to occur. A recipient cannot have 
heirs or survivors during his or her lifetime. Nor can there be an "assign of the 
deceased" during the recipient's lifetime. In light of the plain statutory language 
and its context, the conclusion of the Wirtz court that "other arrangement" is 
sufficiently ambiguous to include lifetime transfers is unreasonable. 
We conclude that there is no principled basis on which to interpret the 
federal law to allow recovery of assets in which the Medicaid recipient did 
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not have an interest at the time of her death. As explained above, the 
rationale for finding authority to recover from a surviving spouse's estate at 
all emanates from the authority granted in the federal law to recover from 
the "estate" of the Medicaid recipient. Property transferred prior to death 
would not be part of the recipient's estate. Further, as recognized by every 
decision except Wirtz, to the extent the 1993 amendments allow states to 
expand the definition of "estate" for Medicaid recovery purposes, the 
language of the federal law clearly limits that expansion to assets in which 
the recipient had an interest at the time of her death. Accordingly, we hold 
that Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 2, is partially preempted to the extent that it 
authorizes recovery from the surviving spouse's estate of assets that the 
recipient owned as marital property or as jointly-owned property at any time 
during the marriage. To be recoverable, the assets must have been subject to 
an interest of the Medicaid recipient at the time of her death. (Emphasis 
added) 
!d. at 68-71. 
The State ofMinnesota filed a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court seeking to 
overturn the Minnesota Supreme Court's ruling in Barg. In May of2009, the U.S. Solicitor 
General submitted an amicus curiae brief authored by not only that office but joined by the 
attorneys from the Department ofHHS in response to the U.S. Supreme Court's order inviting 
the Solicitor General to express the views of the United States. This is THE most recent le;gal 
briefing by HHS on the issue. The United States' brief examines and rejects each and every 
argument posited by the State ofMinnesota seeking to expand Medicaid estate recovery beyond 
that allowed by federal law. For the Court's convenience, the entire United States Solicitor 
General's amicus curiae brief filed in In Re Estate ofBarg is attached hereto and incorporated 
herein as Appendix 2. 
The import of the United States' briefing in this matter cannot be overemphasized. The 
legal positions taken in that brief represent HHS's interpretations of federal law. CMS, as noted 
above, is governed by HHS. By accepting federal support for its Medicaid program, Idaho is 
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legally obligated to abide by HHS/CMS interpretations of federal Medicaid law. In its 2009 
briefing in Barg before the U.S. Supreme Court, the United States Solicitor General and HHS 
expressly reject the interpretation and application that Idaho's Department relies upon in using 
I.C. § 56-218 to support the claim made against the Estate of George Perry in this case. 
The United States in Barg, supra at p. 8-9, stated in pertinent part, 
The Minnesota Supreme Court's decision is correct and does not warrant 
further review. The federal Medicaid Act permits recovery of correctly paid 
benefits from the estate of the recipient's surviving spouse, but limits that 
recovery to the value of assets in which the recipient had a legal interest at the 
time of her death ... 
A. The Decision Of The Minnesota Supreme Court Is Correct 
1. The Minnesota Supreme Court correctly concluded that the Medicaid 
Act forbids petitioner from seeking to recover correctly paid benefits from assets 
in which the Medicaid recipient had no legal interest at the time ofher death. 
Under the Medicaid Act, a State generally may not seek to recover 
correctly paid Medicaid benefits. 42 U.S.C. I396p(b)(1). The Act provides, 
however, that a State (1) must seek recovery of nursing home and related benefits 
paid on behalf of an individual over the page of 55 from "the individual's estate" 
as defined by state probate law; and (2) may, at its option, define "the individual's 
estate" more broadly to include any "assets in which the individual had any legal 
title or interest at the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such 
assets conveyed to a survivor, heir or assign of the deceased individual through 
joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other 
arrangement." 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(I)(B), (b)(4)(A) and (B). Thus, the Medicaid 
Act, which permits recovery only after the death of the recipient's surviving 
spouse, 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(2), authorizes a State to fIle a reimbursement 
claim against the surviving spouse's estate, up to the value of any assets in 
which the Medicaid recipient had a legal interest at the time of her death. 
The Minnesota estate-recovery law exceeds the scope of that 
authorization. It permits the State to recover from a surviving spouse's estate "the 
value of the assets of the estate that were marital property or jointly owned 
property at any time during the marriage, " Minn. Stat. Ann. § 256B.I5, subd. 2 
(2007) (emphasis added), without regard to whether the recipient retained an 
interest in the assets at the time ofher death. Because a State may not recover 
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correctly paid Medicaid benefits except to the extent authorized by federal 
law, see 42 V.S.c. 1396p(b)(1), Minnesota's statute conflicts with federal law 
and is therefore preempted. See California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'n v. Guerra, 
479 U.S. 272, 280-282 (1987). (emphasis added). 
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Barg went on to determine whether Dolores Barg 
owned any interest in the property held by her husband's estate. It stated, 
Dolores's joint ownership in the homestead and certificates of deposit no longer 
existed at the time ofher death. No other recognizable interest has been 
identified.... We conclude that Dolores had no interest in assets at the time of 
her death that were part of a probate estate or an expanded estate definition 
permissible under federal law, and therefore there is no basis for the County's 
claim against the estate. 
Id. at 72-73. 
The same conclusion follows in this case. Martha Perry retains no legal interest 
whatsoever in the house sale proceeds that make up the Estate of George Perry. Nor can she be 
said to have any interest in those assets under the expanded estate definition permissible under 
federal law. She conveyed all of her right, title and interest in the horne to her husband years ago 
via a quit claim deed. SOF, ~ 1. The Department has no valid recovery claim nor will it ever 
have a valid claim against the assets making up the Estate of George Perry. The Court should 
rule accordingly. 
Idaho Cases 
In 2005, our Supreme Court considered the Department's claim filed in the probate of a 
Medicaid recipient's estate whose spouse survived him. In Re Estate o/Kaminsky, 141 Idaho 
436, 111 P. 3d 121 (2005). Although the issue in Kaminsky was the timeliness of the 
Department's clam, the Court did recognize that the Department's recovery claim was properly 
made only against the Medicaid recipient's estate. The Court stated, 
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Medicaid is a public assistance program designed to provide medical care and 
services to persons with insignificant financial resources. The provisions of 
Idaho's Public Assistance Law (Chapter 2, Title 56, Idaho Code) and its 
implementing regulations provide eligibility requirements. Only persons with few 
financial resources qualify for assistance and assistance comes with strings 
attached. Included in these strings is a right on the part of the State, pursuant 
to I.e. § 56-218, to obtain reimbursement of Medicaid assistance from the 
estate of a recipient. Under any reasonable definition, this right of recovery 
constitutes a "claim" against the recipient's estate. (emphasis added). 
Id. at 439. The Department did not attempt in Kaminsky, however, to assert any claim against the 
surviving/community spouse's estate. l 
In 1998, our Supreme Court in Idaho Department ofHealth and Welfare v. Jackman., 132 
Idaho 213, 215, 970 P.2d 6, 8-10 (1998), held that the version of I.e. § 56-218 then in effect 
(pre-OBRA 1993) authorized the Department to recover against the surviving spouse's estate but 
expressly recognized that such recovery was limited by federal law to assets that were part of the 
Medicaid recipient's estate as defined under state probate law. The Jackman Court recognized 
that federal law does preempt the authority granted to the Department by I.e. § 56-218, and held 
that the only asset that might be recoverable against from the surviving spouse's estate was 
community property accumulated by the couple after the execution of their marriage settlemt::nt 
agreement. Id. at 215-216. Our Supreme Court has already recognized, therefore, that federal 
law does preempt in the area of Medicaid recovery claims - i.e. with respect to I.C. § 56-218. 
Jackman is also important with respect to two further points in that opinion. 
First, the Court held that the separate property assets of the Medicaid recipient's spouse 
(the community spouse) were not subject to an estate recovery claim by the Department. Id. at 
I Reference is sometimes made in case law to the "surviving spouse" which is often used to refer to the "community 
spouse" or the spouse which is not the Medicaid recipient. This Memorandum refers to George Perry as the 
community spouse because he did not in fact "survive" his spouse, Martha Perry, the Medicaid recipient. 
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216. This conclusion is consistent with the federal law because the Medicaid recipient does not 
own any interest in the community spouse's separate property. In Jackman, the Court held that 
all assets transferred to the community spouse upon the Medicaid spouse's approval for Medicaid 
by use of a marriage settlement agreement effectively transmuted those assets into the separate 
property assets of the Medicaid recipient's spouse, precluding the Department's claim against 
those assets. The Court held that the community spouse's separate property, including the 
community property transmuted by agreement, was not part of the Medicaid recipient's estate 
and not subject to the Department's recovery claim. Id. at 216-217. In this case, all property of 
the estate in the Inventory served on the Department was identified as George Perry's separate 
property. Those assets are entirely made up of proceeds from the sale of George's home. Martha 
conveyed all of her right, title and interest in the home to George in 2006. Therefore, the home 
and the proceeds from the sale of the home are George's separate property assets. The 
Department never objected to that characterization in the Inventory. 
Second, the Jackman Court also rejected the Department's effort to use the post-OBRA 
1993 definition of "assets" in 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(e)(l )(B) as support for a broader right to 
recovery. Id. The Jackman Court rejected this argument because the definition of "assets" was 
not in effect at the time the agreement transmuting the couple's community property into the 
Medicaid recipient spouse's separate property was signed in that case. In other words, the 
definition of "assets" that the Department sought to rely upon in Jackman was pre-OBRA 1993. 
If the Department seeks to resurrect that argument in this case, the Court should reject it a second 
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time, but not because the definition is not in effect. The Court should reject it because the 
argument lacks substantive merit. 
The State ofMinnesota posited the very same argument when it sought certification 
before the U.S. Supreme Court in order to reverse the Minnesota Supreme Court's ruling in In Re 
Estate OjBarg, 752 N.W.2d 52 (2008). In rejecting the State of Minnesota's argument that the 
tenn "assets" supported a broader right to recovery, the U.S. Solicitor General stated, 
2. Petitioner [State ofMinnesota] argues (Pet. 25-28) that the text of the 
Medicaid Act imposes no limit on pennissible recovery from the estate of the 
Medicaid recipient's surviving spouse, because the Act defines the tenn "assets" 
to include "all income and resources of the individual and of the individual's 
spouse." 42 U.S.C. 1396p(h)(l). According to petitioner, "[b]y including 
resources of both 'the individual' and 'of the individuals spouse' in the meaning 
of 'assets,' Congress clearly intended that the spouse's resources fall within the 
scope of § 1396p(b)(4)(B)." Pet. 27. 
Petitioner is incorrect. Although the general statutory definition of 
"assets" does encompass resources of both "the individual" (i.e., the Medicaid 
recipient) and "The individual's spouse," the particular provision of the Medicaid 
Act at issue here refers specifically to any "assets in which the individual had any 
legal title or interest at the time of death." 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4)(B) (emphasis 
added). Petitioner's argument finds it necessary to rewrite that clause to read 
"'any * * * assets in which [either or both the individual and the individual's 
spouse] had any legal title or interest.'" Pet. 26 (brackets and asterisk in 
original) (emphasis added). But this editing does nothing less than make the 
statute say the opposite of what it says. The plain language of the operative 
provision of the Act refutes petitioner's readings.2 
3. Petitioner's reading of the Medicaid Act also finds little support in the 
Act's other provisions concerning the treatment of spousal assets. See Pet. 27-28. 
As petitioner notes, the Medicaid Act generally considers the community 
2 In describing the operation of the amended estate-recovery provision, the legislative history of the 1993 
amendments also focused on the assets of the individual who had received Medicaid benefits, rather than the 
resources of both the individual and his or her spouse. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 213, l03d Cong., 1st Sess. 835 
(1993) ("At the option of the State, the estate against [which] ......... recovery is sought may include any real or 
personal property or other assets in which the beneficiary had any legal title or interest at the time of death. including 
the home.") (emphasis added) (footnote original) 
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spouse's assets for purposes of detennining whether an institutionalized 
individual is eligible to receive benefits. But the Act also exempts certain 
property, such as the couple's home, from consideration, 42 U.S.C. 1382b(a)(10, 
1396r-5(c)(5), and allows the community spouse to retain certain amounts of 
resources and income that are not considered available to pay for the applicant's 
medical care, 42 U.S.C. 1396r-5(d) and (f)(2). Moreover, once the 
institutionalized spouse is detennined to be eligible for benefits, the Medicaid Act 
provides that "no resources ofthe community spouse shall be deemed available to 
the institutionalized spouse." 42 U.S.c. 1396r-5(c)(4). The Medicaid Act, in 
short, imposes significant limitations on petitioner's asserted principle that 
"spouses are expected to support each other." Pet. 27. To read Section 
1396p(b)(4)(B) in accordance with its plain tenns thus is consistent with the 
broader statutory scheme. 
4. Because Section 1396p(b) leaves no ambiguity about limiting 
spousal estate recovery to the value of assets in which the Medicaid recipient 
had a legal interest at the time of death, the presumption against preemption 
does not come into play, Pet. 28 (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 
485 (1996))--even assuming, arguendo, that this presumption has force in the 
context of a comprehensive federal-state cooperative program like Medicaid in 
which the State's program is subject to federal approval. And for similar reasons, 
petitioner's suggestion that the decision below improperly enforces against the 
State "[a]n ambiguous condition" on the acceptance of federal funds under 
Spending Clause legislation lacks any merit. Pet. 28 n.8 (citing Arlington Cent. 
Sch. Dist. Bd. OfEduc. V. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291,296 (2006)). (emphasis added) 
Petitioner also errs (Pet. 20-23, 28 n.8) in asserting that the Minnesota 
Supreme Court's interpretation of Section 1396(b)(4)(B) is inconsistent with the 
interpretation of the responsible federal agency. HHS has neither promulgated 
regulations nor issued guidance interpreting Section 1396p(b)(4)(B) to authorize 
this kind of estate recovery that petitioner urges in this case. To be sure, eMS in 
2007 approved Minnesota's state plan amendment incorporating its statutory 
spousal recovery provisions. See Pet. App. 89a-93a. But CMS' s approval is not 
the equivalent ofbinding interpretive guidance. Cf. 42 C.F.R. 430.16(a)(I) (a 
state plan or plan amendment is deemed approved if eMS does not act within 90 
days after submission). Moreover, CMS's approval followed binding judicial 
decisions in Minnesota's own courts interpreting the Medicaid Act to limit 
recovery to assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at time of death. 
See, e.g., In re Estate ofGullberg, 652 N.W.2d 709, 714 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002). 
As set forth above in this brief, see p. 9, supra, HHS also interprets the Medicaid 
Act to limit recovery in that manner. (emphasis added). 
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The Department applies the language in I.C. § 56-218 too broadly in 
attempting to recover against assets in which Martha, the Medicaid recipient, has no title 
or interest. Martha conveyed all ofher interest in those assets to her husband years ago. 
The Department's effort to broaden the scope of recovery allowed under I.C. § 56-218 
violates federal law and is therefore preempted by federal law. This Court should uphold 
the PR's disallowance of the Department's claim in its entirety. 
CONCLUSION 
None of the assets in the Estate of George Perry are assets in which Martha Perry will 
hold a legal title or interest at the time ofher death. She holds no such interest now. She 
relinquished any right, title or interest to that property years ago. The Department is applying 
I.C. § 56-218 too broadly in making a claim in this probate, in contravention of federal law. The 
Department's recovery claim in this action seeks to recover against the separate property assets of 
George Perry - assets in which Martha has no title or interest. 
For all the foregoing reasons, the Personal Representative respectfully requests that the 
Court uphold her disallowance of the Department's recovery claim against the Estate of George 
Perry. 
/~ 
DATED this ~ day of November, 2009. 
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Appeal from the District Court, Mille Lacs County, Steven P. Ruble, J. 
56 
Mille Lacs County Attorney, Melissa M. Saterbak, Asst. Mille Lacs County Attorney, Milaca, MN, for appellant Mille Lacs 
County. 
Thomas J. Meinz, Princeton, MN, for respondent Michael Barg. 
Julian J. Zweber, St. Paul, MN, for amici curiae Elder Law Section of the Minnesota State Bar Association and National 
Senior Citizens Law center. 
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Robin Christopher Vue-Benson, Asst. Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, for amicus curiae 
Minnesota Commissioner of Human Services. 
Heard, considered, and decided by the court en bane. 
OPINION 
MEYER, Justice. 
The Mille Lacs County Family Services and Welfare Department (County) filed a claim against the Estate of Francis E. 
Barg (Estate), seeking to recover Medicaid benefits correctly paid on behalf of his predeceased wife, Dolores Barg. The 
Estate partially allowed the claim, and disallowed the other part. The district court, concluding that Dolores Barg's 
interest in the couple's property was limited because she had conveyed it to her husband before her death, evaluated 
her interest as a life estate, and upheld the partial disallowance. The County appealed, arguing that it was entitled to 
recovery from the full value of the property. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, partially allowing the claim 
and evaluating Dolores Barg's interest in the property as a joint tenancy interest equivalent to one-half the value of the 
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property. In re Estate ofBarg, 722 
57 
N.W.2d 492, 497 (Minn.App.2006). We affirm in part and reverse in part. 
Factual and Procedural Background. 
The parties have stipulated to the facts in this case. Dolores J. Barg was born in 1926, married Francis E. Barg in 
1948, and remained married to him until her death in 2004. In 1962 and 1967, in two separate transactions, the Bargs 
took title as joint tenants to real property in Princeton, Minnesota. Their home was located on this property. On October 
24, 2001, Dolores Barg entered a nursing home in Mille Lacs County, at first paying the costs herself. In December 2001, 
she applied for long-term Medicaid benefits.(fn1) 
An asset assessment for Dolores Barg was completed in February 2002. The Bargs' marital assets including their 
homestead totaled $137,272.63.(fn2) Approval for long-term Medicaid benefits was given retroactive to December 1, 
2001. 
On February 27, 2002, Francis Barg executed his Will, nominating the couple's son Michael F. Barg as personal 
representative, leaVing his estate to his surviving descendants, and making no provision for his wife. Dolores Barg 
transferred her joint tenancy interest in the homestead property to Francis Barg on July 2, 2002, when her dau~lhter and 
guardian of her estate, Barbara Anderson, executed a Guardian's Deed. Also in July 2002, Barbara Anderson deleted 
Dolores Barg's name from certificates of deposit the couple held jointly at Bremer Bank. There is no allegation that these 
actions were improper or fraudulent. 
On January 1, 2004, Dolores Barg died, having received $108,413.53 in Medicaid benefits. At the time of her death, 
assets belonging to either Dolores or Francis Barg included three certificates of deposit, a checking account, and an IRA 
account, all in the name of Francis Barg alone; one certificate of deposit payable to the funeral home for Dolores Barg's 
funeral; two vehicles, together worth approximately $9,000; the homestead titled in Francis Barg's name, valued at 
$120,800; and miscellaneous household goods and furniture. All of these assets had been jointly held at some time 
during the couple's 55-year marriage. 
On May 27, 2004, Francis Barg died, never having received Medicaid benefits. On July 30, 2004, the County filed a 
claim against Francis Barg's estate, seeking to recover $108,413.53, the full amount Dolores Barg had received in 
Medicaid benefits. 
Michael Barg disallowed $44,533.53 of the claim, and allowed $63,880. The County petitioned for an allowance of 
the full claim, arguing that the entire value of the marital property, both the homestead and the certificates of deposit, 
was subject to its claim because Dolores Barg's joint tenancy interest gave her a right to use of the entire property. The 
district court concluded that Dolores Barg's interest in the property at the time of her death was 
58 
equivalent to a life estate, and upheld the partial disallowance. 
The County appealed. The court of appeals explained that, based on In re Estate ofGu//berg, 652 N.W.2d 709 
(Minn.App. 2002), the County's ability to recover against Francis Barg's estate was limited to Dolores's interest in marital 
or jointly owned property at the time of her death. Barg, 722 N.W.2d at 496. The court decided that property law 
principles should be applied to determine the nature of that interest and that under federal law and Gu//berg, Dolores 
Barg retained a joint tenancy interest in the homestead at the time of her death. Id. at 497. The court valued that 
interest as an undivided one-half of the property's value, and remanded the case to the district court for a recalculation 
of the amount of the claim that was allowable. Id. 
The County petitioned for review. The Estate opposed review but sought conditional cross-review on the issue of 
whether federal law permits the State to recover at all from a surviving spouse's estate. We granted review, as well as 
cross-review, and asked for briefing on whether the Estate had adequately preserved for review the issue of "whether 
the county may recover Medicaid benefits correctly paid on behalf of a predeceased spouse from the estate of a 
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surviving spouse." We granted requests by the Minnesota Commissioner of Human Services to file an amicus curiae brief 
aligned with the County and to participate in oral argument.(fn3) We also granted requests by the Elder Law Section of 
the Minnesota State Bar Association and the National Senior Citizens Law Center to file an amicus curiae brief clligned 
with the Estate. After oral argument, we asked the parties for supplementary briefing on the relationship of the 2003 and 
2005 amendments of Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subds. 1 and 1c-1k (2006), to the authority the County argues exists under 
Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 1a (2006) and Minn.stat. § 256B.15, subd. 2 (2006), and how that relationship affects 
preemption analysis and the scope of recovery permissible under Minnesota law. 
Statutory Framework. 
Congress enacted Medicaid in 1965 as Title XIX of the Social Security Act to ensure medical care to individuals who 
do not have the resources to cover essential medical services. Martin ex rei. Hoffv. City ofRochester, 642 N.W.2d 1,9 
(Minn. 2002). Medicaid was intended to be the payor of last resort. ld. The program is jointly funded with the states as a 
"cooperative endeavor in which the Federal Government proVides financial assistance to participating States to aid them 
in furnishing health care to needy persons." Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308, 100 S.Ct. 2671, 65 L.Ed.2d 784 (1980). 
Participating states enact legislation and rules, incorporate them into state medical assistance plans, and submit those 
plans to the u.s. Secretary of Health and Human Services for approval. 42 U.S.c. § 1396a(a)-(b) (2000 & Supp. III 
2003). After this, the states can receive federal payments. 42 USc. § 1396 (2000). Each state administers its own 
program within the federal requirements, and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)(fn4) administer 
59 
the program and approve state plans. Martin, 642 N.W.2d at 9. One of the reqUirements imposed on state plans is that 
they must "comply with the provisions of [42 U.s.c. § 1396p] with respect to liens, adjustments and recoveries of 
medical assistance correctly paid, transfers of assets, and treatment of certain trusts." 42 USc. § 1396a(a)(18) (2000). 
To receive Medicaid, a person must qualify as either "categorically" or "medically" needy. Estate ofAtkinson v. Minn. 
Dep't ofHuman Servs., 564 N.w.2d 209, 210-11 (Minn.1997). A person is "categorically needy" if he is eligible for other 
specified federal assistance programs. ld. at 211. A person is "medically needy" if he incurs medical expenses that 
reduce his income to roughly the level of those who are categorically needy. ld. To qualify as medically needy a person 
may have income no higher than a defined threshold and may own assets of no more than a defined value. ld. If the 
assets of a Medicaid applicant and her spouse exceed the qualifying threshold, they must "spend down" their assets until 
they are at or below the qualifying threshold. ld. If a potential Medicaid recipient transfers assets below fair market value 
within a certain period of time before eligibility, the recipient is deemed ineligible for benefits for a time period mandated 
by statute. 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(c) (2000). This provision prevents people who are not needy from becoming eligible for 
Medicaid by transferring their assets away. 
When determining the eligibility of a married person to receive Medicaid, states consider assets of both husband and 
wife as available to the spouse requesting benefits. 42 USc. § 1396r-5(c) (2000). But there are several provisions in 
place to protect the community spouse(fn5) from being impoverished as a result of the spend-down of assets needed to 
qualify the applicant for Medicaid. See Atkinson, 564 N.W.2d at 211; 42 USc. § 1396r-5 (2000). The value of the 
couple's home is not included among assets considered eligible to pay for medical care. ld. § 1396r-5(c)(5); 42 USc. § 
1382b(a)(1) (2000). The community spouse of a Medicaid recipient is also entitled to an allowance of income and assets 
designated for his or her needs that is not considered available to pay for the recipient spouse's medical care. 42 U.S.c. 
§ 1396r-5(d). Furthermore, the recipient spouse has the right to transfer assets, including an interest in the homestead, 
to his or her community spouse. 42 USc. § 1396p(c)(2). Medicaid thus balances the obligation of community spouses to 
contribute to the payment of medical expenses for their recipient spouses against the accommodation of the community 
spouse's need to provide for his or her own support. 
Federal MedicaId Recovery Provisions. 
Although it is not applicable to the facts before us, it is useful to start with the pre-1993 federal law on Medicaid 
recovery, because it is relied on in the parties' arguments and is the basis for the rationale of several relevant cases. 
Prior to amendments adopted in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1993, the federal Medicaid statute 
stated a general principle that there should be no recovery of correctly paid Medicaid benefits, subject 
60 
https:!/demo.lawriter.net/stateslMN/books/Case_Law/result?number=1 11/2/2009 
000058
'" 
iSSi
    
Oi
v
 
  
Ci i
Si
Ci i rn
l    12/
Casemaker - MN - Case Lav' - Search - Result Page 4 of 15 
to several exceptions, one of which is relevant here: 
No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the 
State plan may be made, except -­
* * * * 
(B) in the case of any other individual who was 65 years of age or older when he received such
 
assistance, from his estate.
 
42 U.s.c. § 1396p(b)(1) (1988). Under this pre-1993 law, states were allowed, but not required, to recovel' Medicaid 
benefits paid to recipients 65 or older, and the statute specified the recovery would be from the recipient's estate. The 
statute also provided that this recovery from the recipient's estate could only be made after the death of the recipient's 
surviving spouse. fd. § 1396p(b)(2) (1988). Despite this prohibition against recovery before the death of a surviving 
spouse, there was no express mention of recovery from the estate of a surviving spouse. The pre-1993 federal law 
contained no definition of "estate." 
Section 1396p(b) was amended as part of the OBRA amendments of 1993. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1993, Pub.L. No. 103-66, § 13612(a), (c), 107 Stat. 312,627-28 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(1), (4) 
(2000)). As amended, the federal law retained the general prohibition against states attempting to recover Medicaid 
payments correctly paid on behalf of an individual, with limited exceptions. 42 U.s.c. § 1396p(b) (2000). But the 1993 
amendments changed section 1396p(b) in several ways. First, they lowered the age criterion for recovery from 65 to 55. 
Second, they made recovery allowed by the exceptions mandatory rather than permissive. Third, they added a definition 
of "estate," which itself had both mandatory and permissive elements. As amended, the general nonrecovery rule and 
the relevant exception read as follows: 
(1) No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under 
the State plan may be made, except that the State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical 
assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the case of the following 
individuals: 
* * * * 
(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when the individual received such 
medical assistance, the State shall seek adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate * * *. 
fd. The amended version of section 1396p(b)(1)(B) retained the express reference to recovery from the recipient's 
estate. Furthermore, as was true pre-amendment, this recovery from the recipient's estate is only permitted after the 
death of the recipient's surviving spouse: "Any adjustment or recovery under paragraph (1) may be made only atrerthe 
death of the individual's surviving spouse, if any * * *." 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(2) (emphasis added). And like the pre­
1993 version, the amended federal statute contains no express authorization for, or reference to, recovery from a 
surviving spouse's estate. 
The 1993 amendments added a definition of "estate" for purposes of Medicaid recovery, with a mandatory provision 
that looks to state probate law and an optional provision that authorizes states to expand the definition beyond the 
scope of probate law: 
[T]he term "estate", with respect to a deceased individual -­
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included within the individual's estate, as 
defined 
61 
for purposes of State probate law; and 
(B) may include, at the option of the State * * * any other real and personal property and other assets in 
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which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time ofdeath (to the extent of such interest), 
including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint 
tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement. 
42 U.s.c. § 1396p(b)(4) (emphasis added). Under this provision, a state has the option to adopt a definition of 
"estate" for Medicaid recovery purposes that includes some assets which, under ordinary probate law, would not be part 
of the Medicaid recipient's estate, because they would pass immediately to someone else on the recipient's death. For 
example, when two persons hold property in joint tenancy with a right of survivorship and one dies, the decea~,ed joint 
tenant's interest ordinarily passes directly to the surviving joint tenant and is not part of the probate estate. Under the 
optional expanded definition allowed by federal law, for Medicaid recovery purposes the interest of a deceased joint 
tenant who had received Medicaid would be included in his estate, rather than passing directly to the surviving joint 
tenant. 
Minnesota's Medicaid Recovery Laws. 
Minnesota has long had a policy of requiring participants in the Medicaid program and their spouses to use their own 
assets to pay their share of the cost of care during or after enrollment. Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. l(a) (2006). To 
implement this policy, since 1987 Minnesota law has provided for recovery of Medicaid benefits paid from the estate of a 
recipient or the estate of the recipient's surviving spouse. Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 1a (originally enacted as Act of 
June 12, 1987, ch. 403, art. 2, § 82, 1987 Minn. Laws 3255, 3347). As relevant here, subdivision 1a provides that, "on 
the death of the survivor of a married couple, either or both of whom received medical assistance, * * * the total 
amount paid for medical assistance rendered for the person and spouse shall be filed as a claim against the estate of the 
[recipient] or the estate of the surviving spouse." fd. (emphasis added). A claim against the estate of a surviving spouse 
for medical assistance provided to the recipient spouse may be made up to "the value of the assets of the estate that 
were marital property or jointly owned property at any time dUring the marriage." fd., subd. 2 (emphasis added). 
The broad estate recovery authority contained in subdivisions 1a and 2 was supplemented in 2003 by amendments 
to the statute expanding subdivision 1 and adding subdivisions 1c-1k. Act of June 5, 2003, ch. 14, art. 12, §§ 40-50, 
2003 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 1751,2205-17. These amendments implement the optional expanded definition of 
"estate" authorized in the 1993 amendments to the federal law. See Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 1(a)(2) (2006); 42 
U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(4)(B). The 2003 amendments to the Minnesota estate recovery law modify common law to provide for 
continuation of a recipient's life estate or joint tenancy interest in real property after his death for the purpose of 
recovering medical assistance, Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 1(a)(3) (2006), and include that continued interest in the 
recipient's estate. Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subds. 19, 1h(b), 1i(a), 1j. The 2003 amendments also establish specific 
procedures for exercising claims against these continued life estate and joint tenancy interests, as well as procedures 
and waiting periods that differ according to whether the recipient's spouse, dependent children, or other relatives 
62 
living in the homestead survive the recipient. Act of June 5, 2003, ch. 14, art. 12, §§ 48-49, 2003 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. 
Sess. 1751,2213-17 (codified as amended at Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subds. 1i and 1j). In this case, the County filed its 
claim under subdivisions 1a and 2 and did not rely on provisions added in the 2003 amendments. 
The issues presented in this case involve several questions about the relationship between the recovery provisions of 
federal and Minnesota Medicaid law. The court of appeals held that a partial disallowance of the County's claim was 
proper, relying on its earlier decision in Gu//bergthat the broad authorization in subdivision 2 for recovery up to the value 
of all assets of the estate that were marital property or jointly owned at any time during the marriage was partially 
preempted by the 1993 amendments to the federal law that limit the expanded estate to assets in which the recipient 
spouse had a legal interest at the time ofher death. Barg, 722 N.W.2d at 595-96 (citing Gu//berg, 652 N.W.2d Cit 714). 
The County, and its supporting amicus curiae the Commissioner of the Department of Human Services, argue that 
the court of appeals was wrong, both here and in Gu//berg, in finding any preemption of the broad estate recovery 
authorized in subdivisions 1a and 2. They contend that there was nothing in the federal statute prior to the 1993 
amendments that limited the states' authority to pursue estate recovery of Medicaid benefits paid, and that the 1993 
amendments were intended by Congress to expand state options, not limit them. Alternatively, the County argues that 
even if recovery is limited to the assets in which the recipient had an interest at the time of her death, Dolores Barg had 
an interest in the property notwithstanding the conveyance to her husband, and the court of appeals erred in valuing 
that interest as only one-half the value of the homestead. 
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The Estate and its supporting amici curiae counter that federal law authorizes recovery only from a recipient's estate, 
and Minnesota law that allows recovery from a surviving spouse's estate is therefore preempted.(fn6) The Estate argues 
that recovery is also barred because, to the extent recovery is allowed from the estate of a surviving spouse, federal law 
limits that recovery to the value of assets in which the recipient had a legal interest at the time of her death, and 
subdivision 2 of section 256B.15 is preempted to the extent it allows broader recovery. Finally, the Estate argues that 
there should be no recovery here because Dolores Barg had no legal interest 
63 
in the homestead or the certificates of deposit at the time of her death, having conveyed her interest to her husband 
during her lifetime. 
Thus, the issues presented are as follows. First, does federal law preempt the authorization in Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, 
subd. la, for recovery of Medicaid benefits paid for a recipient spouse from the estate of the surviving spouse? Second, if 
such recovery from a surviving spouse's estate is not preempted, does federal law limit the recovery to assets in which 
the recipient had an interest at the time of her death, preempting the broader recovery allowed in Minn.stat. § 256B.15, 
subd. 2, as to assets owned as marital property or in joint tenancy at any time during the marriage? Third, if recovery is 
limited to assets in which the recipient had an interest at the time of her death what, if any, interest did Dolores Barg 
have in the homestead or the certificates of deposit at the time of her death, and specifically, was the court of appeals 
correct in holding that Dolores Barg had a joint tenancy interest for purposes of estate recovery even though she 
transferred that interest to her husband during her lifetime? We address these issues in turn, after first reviewing basic 
preemption principles. 
1. 
Whether federal law preempts state law is primarily an issue of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. 
Martin, 642 N.W.2d at 9. The application of law to stipulated facts is a question of law, which we also review de novo. 
Morton Bldgs., Inc. v. Comm'r ofRevenue, 488 N.W.2d 254, 257 (Minn.1992). 
Congressional purpose is ", the ultimate touchstone'" of the preemption inquiry. Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 
U.S. 497, 504,98 S.Ct. 1185, 55 L.Ed.2d 443 (1978) (quoting Retail Clerks Int'l Assn, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 
U.s. 96, 103, 84 S.Ct. 219, 11 L.Ed.2d 179 (1963)). Our primary focus in the analysis must be to ascertain the intent of 
Congress. See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn v. Guerra, 479 U.s. 272,280-81, 107 S.Ct. 683,93 L.Ed.2d 613 (1987). The 
United States Supreme Court has explained that "[c]onsideration of issues arising under the Supremacy Clause' start[s] 
with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by Federal Act unless that 
[is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.'" Opal/one v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 
120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.s. 218, 230,67 S.Ct. 1146,91 L.Ed. 1447 
(1947)). Thus, preemption is generally disfavored. Martin, 642 N.W.2d at 11 (citing Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516, ')18, 112 
S.Ct. 2608). 
Congress may preempt state law in several ways. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn, 479 u.s. at 280, 107 S.Ct. 683. First, 
it may do so with express language preempting state law. Id. Second, it may do so by fully occupying the field, that is, 
"congressional intent to pre-empt state law in a particular area may be inferred where the scheme of federal re~lulation 
is sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress 'left no room' for supplementary state 
regulation." Id. at 280-81, 107 S.ct. 683 (quoting Rice, 331 U.s. at 230,67 S.ct. 1146). Here, it is clear that Congress 
neither expressly preempted state law nor so completely occupied the field as to leave no room for state action, because 
the Medicaid program specifically permits and even requires action by participating states. Martin, 642 N.W.2d at 11. 
The third kind of preemption is at issue in this case. Even when Congress 
64 
has not chosen to displace state law expressly or by fully occupying the field, "federal law may nonetheless pre-empt 
state law to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law." Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn, 479 u.s. at 281, 107 S.Ct. 683. 
Conflict preemption occurs when compliance with both state and federal laws is impossible, Fla. Lime Avocado Growers, 
Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143,83 S.Ct. 1210, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963), or when the state law is "an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davldowitz, 312 U.s. 52, 67,61 
S.Ct. 399,85 L.Ed. 581 (1941). 
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II.
 
We now turn to the question of whether Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. la, which requires Medicaid recovery against 
the estate of a surviving spouse, is preempted by federal law, particularly 42 USc. § 1396p(b)(l)(B). Because only 
conflict preemption may be applicable, we seek to determine whether compliance with both statutes is impossible or 
whether the state law stands as an obstacle to accomplishment of the purposes of the federal law. 
The County seeks recovery here under subdivision la of section 256B.15, which authorizes--indeed requires-­
recovery of Medicaid benefits from the estate of the surviving spouse of a recipient. The Estate argues that this state law 
authorization to recover from the estate of the surviving spouse is preempted because it conflicts with 42 U.S.c. § 1396p 
(b)(l), which prohibits recovery of correctly paid Medicaid benefits except from the estate of the recipient of the 
benefits. 
The federal statute establishes a general prohibition against recovery of correctly paid Medicaid benefits, subject to 
three specified exceptions: 
(1) No adjustment or recovery ofany medical assistance correctly paId on behalfofan individual under 
the State plan may be made, except that the State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical 
assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the case of the fol/owing 
individuals: 
42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(1) (emphasis added). Only one exception potentially applies to the circumstance of this case: 
(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when the individual received such 
medical aSSistance, the State shall seek adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate * * *. 
Id. § 1396p(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Because this express exception to the general rule against recovery of 
Medicaid benefits directs that recovery come from the recipient's estate and makes no reference to a surviving spouse's 
estate, the Estate argues that recovery from the surviving spouse's estate is not allowed under federal law. Because 
exceptions to a general statement of policy are to be construed narrowly, Comm'r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739, 109 S.Ct. 
1455, 103 L.Ed.2d 753 (1989), it appears on its face that recovery from the surviving spouse's estate is not permitted by 
federal law. 
Two courts have agreed with this analysis and concluded that section 1396p(b)(l)(B) authorizes recovery only from 
the recipient's estate and does not allow recovery from the estate of a surviving spouse. Hines v. Dep't ofPub. Aid, 221 
II1.2d 222, 302 I1I.Dec. 711, 850 N.E.2d 148, 152-53 (2006); In re Estate ofBudney, 197 Wis.2d 948, 541 N.W.2d 245, 
246 (1995), rev. denied546 N.W.2d 471 (Wis. 1996). The Wisconsin Court of Appeals explained that the federal statute 
never "counter[ed] the initial blanket prohibition" 
65 
on recovery by authorizing recovery from the surviving spouse's estate. Budney, 541 N.W.2d at 246. The Illinois 
Supreme Court noted that under federal and Illinois law, the state had authority to seek reimbursement from the 
recipient's estate after the death of his surviving spouse. Hines, 302 I1I.Dec. 711, 850 N.E.2d at 153. But insteacl, as 
here, the state sought recovery from the estate of the surviving spouse. Id. The court explained that federal law allows 
only three exceptions under which a state may seek reimbursement and "[a]11 are specifically directed to the estate of 
the recipient. No provision is made for collection from the estate of the recipient's spouse." Id. The court declined to add 
to the unambiguous language of the federal statute or to recognize exceptions beyond those specified in the federal law. 
Id. 
The Commissioner argues that Hines and Budney were wrongly decided, misinterpreting the federal statute, 
particularly in light of the presumption against preemption. The County contends that this statutory exception to the 
nonrecovery principle allows recovery generally against individuals who received benefits after age 55, and does not 
narrowly limit the sources of recovery. The County asserts that the reference to the individual's estate is merely a 
designation of the timing for recovery rather than a limit on the scope of recovery, because the language does not say 
that the state may recover "only" from the individual's estate. The County argues that, absent such express limiting 
language, and applying the presumption against preemption, section 1396p(b)(1)(B) merely specifies one potential 
source of recovery, the recipient's estate, and does not preclude others, such as a spouse's estate. 
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In our view, the plain language of section 1396p(b)(l)(B) comports far more closely with the interpretation of the 
Illinois Supreme Court in Hines than with the County's expansive view of the authority imparted by that provision. 
Moreover, we know of no court that has adopted the County's broad view of that language alone. Indeed, in explaining 
the then-existing law in a report on proposed OBRA amendments in 1993, a House Report referred only to the possibility 
of recovery from the estate of the recipient, even when describing recovery after the death of a surviving spouse: 
Under current law, a State has the option of seeking recovery of amounts correctly paid on behalf of an 
individual under its Medicaid program from the individual's estate if the individual was 65 years or older at 
the time he or she received Medicaid benefits. The State may not seek recovery from the beneficiary's 
estate until the death of the surviving spouse, if any, and only if the individual has no surviving minor 01­
disabled child. 
H.R.Rep. No. 103-111, at 208 (1993), as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 535 (emphasis added). In contrast, 
describing the proposed 1993 amendments to the Medicaid recovery law passed by the House, the same House Report 
stated that newly-required state estate recovery programs would have to "provide for the collection of the amounts 
correctly paid by Medicaid on behalf of the individual for long-term care services from the estate of the individual or the 
surviving spouse." Id. Thus, when the House wanted to describe recovery from the surviving spouse's estate, it said so 
clearly. 
Nevertheless, despite the seemingly plain language providing only for recovery from the recipient's estate, we 
acknowledge that several courts have interpreted the federal recovery provisions to allow recovery from the estate of a 
surviving 
66 
spouse. The courts reaching this conclusion have for the most part relied on the 1993 amendments to the feder-aI law 
that allow the states to adopt an expanded definition of estate for purposes of Medicaid recovery. For example, the New 
York Court of Appeals explained, in dicta, that although federal law did not expressly provide for recovery of Medicaid 
payments from the "secondarily dying spouse's estate," the 1993 amendments gave the states power to recover against 
the spouse's estate for certain categories of assets. In re Estate ofCraig, 82 N.Y.2d 388, 604 N.Y.S.2d 908, 624 N.E.2d 
1003,1006 (1993). The North Dakota Supreme Court agreed with the Craig interpretation that the 1993 expanded estate 
provision gave the states the option to recover against a surviving spouse's estate assets conveyed through joint tenancy 
or right of survivorship. In re Estate of Thompson, 586 N.W.2d 847, 850 (N.D.1998). Indeed, the court in Thompson 
rejected the ruling in Budney that recovery against a surviving spouse's estate is not allowed under federal law on the 
basis that the Budneycourt had not considered the optional expanded definition of "estate." Thompson, 586 N.W.2d at 
850. The North Dakota court concluded that "consideration of all the relevant statutory provisions, in light of the 
Congressional purpose to provide medical care for the needy, reveals a legislative intention to allow states to trace the 
assets of recipients of medical assistance and recover the benefits paid when the recipient's surviving spouse dies." Id. at 
851. The court explained that, under the circumstances, it made no difference whether recovery was from one estate or 
the other: 
Because the expansive federal definition of "estate" in 42 U.s.c. § 1396p(b)(4) extends only to assets in 
which the medical assistance benefits recipient "had any legal title or interest in at the time of death," it is 
a matter oflittle moment whether the department seeks to recover the benefits paid by filing a claim in 
the estate of the recipient after the death of the recipient's surviVing spouse or by filing a claim in the 
surviving spouse's estate. 
Id. n. 3 (emphasis added). Finally, in Idaho Department ofHealth and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 
6,9-10 (1998), the Supreme Court of Idaho also ruled that some recovery of Medicaid benefits could be made from the 
estate of a surviving spouse, but held that such recovery was preempted by federal law except to the extent of assets 
that had been in the recipient's estate as defined by state probate law. 
These courts provide little explanation for their conclusions that the statutory language expressly mentioning 
recovery only from the recipient's estate also allows recovery from the surviving spouse's estate. We infer that the courts 
viewed the authority to recover from assets that were part of the recipient's estate after the death of the surviving 
spouse to fairly imply authority to recover those assets from the surviving spouse's estate to which they had passed on 
the death of the recipient. In other words, to the extent assets in the surviving spouse's estate are there because they 
had passed to the surviving spouse from the estate of the recipient, recovery from those assets in the surviving spouse's 
estate is, in essence, recovery from the recipient's estate. 
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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals appears to have made a similar unspoken inference in assessing preemption of 
California Medicaid recovery laws in two cases. Bucholtz v. Belshe, 114 F.3d 923 (9th Cir.1997); Citizens Action League v. 
Kizer, 887 F.2d 1003 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1056, 110 S.Ct. 1524, 108 L.Ed.2d 764 (1990). In both cases, 
the 
67 
Ninth Circuit addressed whether California's Medicaid recovery law was preempted by pre-1993 amendment federal law. 
The California law allowed the state to seek recovery not only from the estate of the deceased Medicaid recipient, but 
", against any recipient of the property of that decedent by distribution or survival. '" Kizer, 887 F.2d at 1005 (q Joting cal. 
Welf. & Inst.Code § 14009.5 (West Supp.1989)). Thus, California law allowed the state to trace assets of the deceased 
Medicaid recipient and seek reimbursement from the recipients of those assets. 
In Kizerthe plaintiffs were individuals who had owned property in joint tenancy with a Medicaid recipient and had 
succeeded to ownership by right of survivorship upon the death of the Medicaid recipient. fd. at 1005. To determine 
whether California's claimed right of recovery from these surviving joint tenants was inconsistent with federal law, the 
court looked to section 1396p(b)(l)(B), which, as discussed above, provided the general prohibition against recovery with 
the exception for individuals who were 65 years old when they received assistance. fd. at 1006. The Ninth Circuit noted 
that the federal statute provided only for recovery from the individual's "estate," and in the absence of a federell statutory 
definition of estate, looked to common law for the meaning of the term. fd. at 1006. The court held that an "e~.tate" 
under common law did not include property held in joint tenancy at death, and therefore the California law that allowed 
recovery against such property went beyond the recipient's estate and was too broad. fd. at 1008. The court in Ktzerdid 
not expressly address the issue of whether assets within the definition of "estate" could only be reached by a claim 
against the recipient's estate, or whether federal law would permit the state to follow those assets and make the claim 
against a surviving joint tenant--or, as here, a surviving spouse. 
Several years later, still applying pre-1993 federal law, the Ninth Circuit again addressed a preemption challenge to 
the same broad California Medicaid recovery provision. Bucholtz, 114 F.3d at 924. At issue in Bucholtz was application of 
the state recovery law to assets of Medicaid recipients that had been subject to three forms of joint interests: inter vivos 
trusts, tenancy in common, and community property. fd. at 924. The court applied the Kizer principle that ,,' use of the 
word "estate" in the [federal] recoupment provision limits a state's recovery to property which descends to the recipient's 
heir or the beneficiaries of the recipient's will upon death,'" id. at 925 (quoting Kizer, 887 F.2d at 1005), to each of the 
forms of shared interest at issue. The court concluded that, like the joint tenancy in Kizer, property held in an inter vivos 
trust is not part of the decedent's estate under California common law, and therefore was not part of the estate subject 
to recovery under the federal law. fd. at 926. In contrast, the court explained, a decedent's interest in property held in 
tenancy in common or community property is subject to disposition and administration as part of the decedent's estate 
under California law. fd. at 926-27. The Ninth Circuit concluded not only that the decedent's interest in property held in 
those forms was subject to recovery under the federal law, but also held, albeit without explanation, that recovery could 
be sought from the heirs or beneficiaries who received that property; "[california] may, however, pursue people who 
received properly held by the decedent in the form of tenancy in common or community property." fd. at 928 (emphasis 
added). Like other courts, the Ninth Circuit seems to have inferred that the federal law's reference to recovery from the 
Medicaid recipient's "estate" conferred 
68 
authority to follow the assets from that estate and recover them from the people who received the property. 
Thus, the courts that have considered the issue are split on the question of whether the narrow reference in section 
1396p(b)(1) to recovery from the estate of the Medicaid recipient allows recovery only through a direct claim a9ainst that 
estate, or whether recovery is also allowed from those who received covered assets from the Medicaid recipient's estate, 
including the estate of a surviving spouse. Were this an ordinary question of statutory interpretation, we would conclude 
that the plain language of the federal statute provides only for recovery against the Medicaid recipient's estate, as the 
Illinois court persuasively reasoned in Hines. But we are influenced by the principle that preemption of state laws is 
disfavored, combined with the fact that allowing recovery against a surviving spouse's estate is consistent with both the 
federal provision precluding recovery from the Medicaid recipient's estate until after the death of a surviving spouse as 
well as with the purposes of the federallegislation.(fn7) These additional considerations lead us to conclude that the split 
in authority, in these particular circumstances, illustrates sufficient ambiguity about the intent of the federal estate 
recovery language that we cannot say that Minnesota's requirement in Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. la, to seek 
reimbursement from the estate of a surviving spouse conflicts with federal law such that it is preempted. 
https:lldemo.lawriter.net/stateslMN/books/Case_Law/result?number=1 1112/2009 
000064
i l. C l
lei
lei
r,:!1
lei  
lei
Ci i
Ci i Oi
lei II
'' el
Oi
lei
lei
lei
Ci i
   
Casemaker - MN - Case La\F - Search - Result Page 10 of 15 
-

Accordingly, we hold that federal law does not preclude all recovery from the estate of a surviving spouse, and the 
authorization in subdivision 1a to make a claim against the estate of a surviving spouse is therefore not preempted. The 
question remains whether federal law limits the scope of recovery against the estate of a surviving spouse and, in 
particular, whether that recovery may reach all property previously held by the Medicaid recipient spouse either as 
marital property or jointly with the surviving spouse during the marriage, as allowed by l\1inn.Stat. § 256B.15, 5ubd. 2. 
III. 
We turn to a determination of whether the scope of recovery from a surviving spouse's estate allowed under 
Minnesota law is consistent with federal law. Subdivision 2 of Minn.Stat. § 256B.15 allows the state to recover from a 
surviving spouse's estate "the value of the assets of the estate that were marital property or jointly owned property at 
any time during the marriage." (Emphasis added.) The County argues that this broad estate recovery authority does not 
conflict with federal law because the pre-1993 version of section 1396p(b) should be construed broadly and the 1993 
amendments were intended to expand, not restrict, state estate recovery authority. In asserting this 
69 
argument for broad estate recovery authority, the County emphasizes that it is consistent with the dual goals of federal 
law of recouping Medicaid expenses to make assistance available to more qualifying recipients, while protecting 
community spouses from pauperization during their lifetimes. The Estate argues that, because section 1396p(b)(1) 
allows recovery only from a recipient's estate and section 1396p(b)(4) allows expansion of the estate only to include 
assets in which the recipient had an interest at the time of death, the "any time during the marriage" recovery allowed 
by subdivision 2 is preempted. 
The County's argument would take us too far down the path of favoring the purpose of the law at the expense of 
the plain meaning of its language. Significantly, no court has embraced the County's argument that the pre-1993 federal 
law authorized recovery from a surviving spouse's estate of assets that were jointly owned during the marriage but 
transferred by the recipient spouse prior to her death. Indeed, of the courts that have interpreted federal law to allow 
direct claims against the estate of a surviving spouse, only one has construed that authority to extend to assets that 
were transferred before the death of the Medicaid recipient, and that court relied on language from the 1993 
amendments to support that extension. See In re Estate of Wirtz, 607 NW.2d 882, 885-86 (N.D.2000). 
Other courts that have recognized authority to reCOver from a source other than the Medicaid recipient's estate have 
construed that authority to reach only assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at the time of her death, 
that is, assets which were part of the recipient's estate as defined by traditional state probate law or included in the 
estate under an expanded definition allowed by the 1993 amendments to federal law. See Bucho/tz, 114 F.3d at 925-27 
(limiting recovery to assets that were part of recipient's estate as defined by state probate law); Kizet; 887 F.2d at 1006 
(same); Jackman, 970 P.2d at 8-10 (holding that recovery from surviving spouse's estate allowed by Idaho Medicaid 
recovery statute is limited by federal law to assets that were part of the Medicaid recipient's estate as defined under 
state probate law); Thompson, 586 NW.2d at 851 n. 3 (recognizing that "expansive definition of 'estate' in [section] 
1396p(b)(4) extends only to assets in which the medical assistance benefits recipient' had any legal title or intel"est in at 
the time of deathlll); see a/so In re Estate ofSmith No. M2005-01410-COA-R3-CY, 2006 WL 3114250 at *4 
(Tenn.Ct.App. Nov.1, 2006) (explaining that courts that have allowed recovery against estates of surviving spouses have 
required that recipient had interest in assets at time of death). 
Similarly, in relying on the 1993 amendments as authority for recovery from a surviving spouse's estate, our court of 
appeals acknowledged that the 1993 amendments limit the assets subject to recovery to those in which the Medicaid 
recipient had a legal interest at the time of her death. See Gu//berg, 652 NW.2d at 714 (holding that Minn.Stat. § 
256B.15, subd. 2, authorization to reach assets that were marital property or owned jointly at any time during the 
marriage, is partially preempted by federal law limitation to assets in which recipient had interest at time of death). And 
the court of appeals acknowledged that limitation again in this case. Barg, 722 N.W.2d at 496 ("After Gu//berg, the 
state's ability to reCOver was limited to the recipient's interest in marital or jointly owned property at the time of the 
recipient's death."). 
As noted above, the only decision to deviate from this limiting principle requiring 
70 
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an interest at the time of death is Wirtz. Although the North Dakota court: had acknowledged in its earlier Thompson 
decision that recovery allowed under section 1396p(b) is limited to assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest 
at the time of death (indeed that was the basis on which the court rationalized allowing recovery from the surviving 
spouse's estate), 586 N.w.2d at 851 n. 3, the court held in Wirtz that any assets conveyed by the Medicaid recipient to 
his spouse before his death were subject to recovery from the surviving spouse's estate, 607 N.W.2d at 886. T~e court 
stated that limiting recovery under section 1396p(b) to "assets in the surviving spouse's estate that the Medicaid 
recipient had legal title to and conveyed through joint tenancy, tenancy-in-common, survivorship, life estate, or living 
trust" would ignore the words "interest" and "other arrangement" in the federal law. Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d at 885. 
Concluding that the words "interest" and "other arrangement" are ambiguous, the court relied on the Congressional 
intent it perceived "to allow states a wide latitude in seeking Medicaid benefit recoveries." ld. at 885-86. The court did 
not explain why the same purpose acknowledged in Thompson was consistent with the limitation to recovery from assets 
in which the recipient had an interest at the time of death, yet also justified abandoning that limitation in Wirtz. 
We cannot agree that the "other arrangement" language in the 1993 amendment is ambiguous in the sense implied 
in Wirtz. The plain meaning of "other arrangement," read in the context of section 1396p(b)(4), is arrangements other 
than those expressly listed that also convey assets at the time of the Medicaid recipient's death. 
We return again to the language of the federal statute. The federal optional definition of "estate" allows inclusion of 
any other real and personal property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest 
at the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or 
assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, 
living trust, or other arrallgement. 
42 U.s.c. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) (emphasis added). The "including" clause further describes the assets that a state may 
include in this expanded estate. The clause describes those assets in two ways--first by the limiting adjective "such," and 
second by the language describing how and to whom "such assetsll are "conveyed. 1I The "such ll limitation plainly refers 
back to the immediately preceding clause describing the assets as those "in which the individual had any legal title or 
interest at the time of death." The including clause then describes to whom "such II assets may have been conveyed--a 
IIsurvivor, heir, or assign ofthe deceased individual." ld. (emphasis added). And finally, the clause describes several 
methods by which the conveyance of "such II assets might take place -- IIthrough joint tenancy, tenancy in common, 
survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement." ld. 
Inclusion in the list of examples of "such assetsll is predicated on the recipient having a legal interest at the time of 
death. When we construe a federal statute we must, if at all possible, give effect lito every word Congress used .. 11 Reiter 
v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.s. 330, 339, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979). To read 1I0 ther arrangement" to include a 
lifetime transfer would be to read the words "at the time of death ll out of the statute. The conclusion that "other 
arrangement" cannot 
71 
include lifetime transfers is further supported by the additional context. II[O]ther arrangementll ends a list of eXclmples of 
conveyances that occur at the time of death. The list of recipients of the conveyance, "a survivor, heir, or assign of the 
deceased individual," leaves no doubt that the lIindividual," a Medicaid recipient, must have died for the conveyance to 
occur. A recipient cannot have heirs or survivors during his or her lifetime. Nor can there be an "assign of the deceased" 
during the recipient's lifetime. In light of the plain statutory language and its context, the conclusion of the Wirt"court 
that "other arrangement" is sufficiently ambiguous to include lifetime transfers is unreasonable. 
We conclude that there is no principled basis on which to interpret the federal law to allow recovery of assets in 
which the Medicaid recipient did not have an interest at the time of her death. As explained above, the rationale for 
finding authority to recover from a surviving spouse's estate at all emanates from the authority granted in the federal law 
to recover from the lIestate" of the Medicaid recipient. Property transferred prior to death would not be part of the 
recipient's estate. Further, as recognized by every decision except Wirtz, to the extent the 1993 amendments allow 
states to expand the definition of lIestate" for Medicaid recovery purposes, the language of the federal law clearly limits 
that expansion to assets in which the recipient had an interest at the time of her death. Accordingly, we hold that 
Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 2, is partially preempted to the extent that it authorizes recovery from the surviving spouse's 
estate of assets that the recipient owned as marital property or as jointly-owned property at any time during the 
marriage. To be recoverable, the assets must have been subject to an interest of the Medicaid recipient at the ti'l1e of 
her death. 
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This brings us to the question of whether Dolores Barg had any interest in property at the time of her death that 
would allow the County to make a claim against the estate of her surviving spouse, despite her transfer of her joint 
interest in the property prior to her death. As we have noted, the court of appeals acknowledged the interest-at-time-of­
death limitation on spousal estate recovery, but nevertheless found that for these purposes Dolores retained a joint 
tenancy interest at the time of her death that made the value of that interest recoverable from Francis's estate. Barg, 
722 N.W.2d at 496, 497. Eschewing reference to either marital property law or probate law to determine the nature of 
any interest at the time of death, the court of appeals looked to standard real property law and Gullberg in deciding that 
Dolores retained a joint tenancy interest. Id. at 496-97. We do not agree. 
The court of appeals determined that Dolores retained a joint tenancy interest in the property based on its 
understanding that the court in Gullberg had recognized a continuing joint tenancy interest because the lifetime transfer 
was an "other arrangement," and because the court apparently understood section 1396p(b)(4) to "explicitly allow[] a 
state to broaden the definition [of estate] beyond the meaning used in probate law and to include joint-tenancy interests 
that have been previously conveyed to a spouse." Id. at 497. Section 1396p(b)(4) cannot be construed to include lifetime 
transfers of property in the phrase "other arrangement" because the plain language and the context require that phrase 
to be limited to conveyances occurring upon the death of the recipient. For that reason, we cannot 
72 
agree with the court of appeals' characterization of section 1396p(b)(4) as allowing the expanded definition of estate to 
include "preViously conveyed" joint tenancy interests. The language of section 1396p(b)(4) requires that any interest 
included in the expanded estate must be one in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at the time of her death, 
not one that was previously conveyed. We conclude that Dolores did not retain a joint tenancy interest in the property at 
the time of her death, because that interest was effectively and legally transferred before her death. 
The question remains whether Dolores had any other interest in the property at the time of her death that may be 
considered part of an expanded estate for recovery purposes under Minnesota law. We agree with the court of appeals 
that courts should not look to marital property law to find such an interest, because the statute in which marital property 
is defined limits the definition to the purposes of that chapter. Minn.5tat. § 518.003, subds. 1, 3b (2006);(fn8) see Barg, 
722 N.W.2d at 496. Similarly, we agree that the recognizable interests at the time of death cannot be limited to those 
defined by probate law, because the purpose of section 1396p(b)(4) is to allow states to expand the definition of estate 
beyond probate law. See Barg, 722 N.W.2d at 497. We therefore agree that real property law principles, informed by 
principles of probate law, should be the basis for ascertaining any interests at the time of death. Any interest recognized 
must be consistent with the underlying foundational rationale that recovery from a surviVing spouse's estate is allowed 
only because of its relationship to the recipient's estate, from which federal law expressly allows recovery. With those 
principles in mind, we caution that for an interest to be traceable to and recoverable from a surviving spouse's estate, 
the interest must be (1) an interest recognized by law, (2) which the Medicaid recipient held at the time of death, and 
(3) that resulted in a conveyance of an interest of some value to the surviving spouse that occurred as a result of the 
recipient's death. Further, to the extent the interest is not part of the standard probate estate, l\Ilinnesota law must have 
expanded the definition of estate to include the interest, as authorized by section 1396p(b)(4). 
Dolores's joint ownership in the homestead and certificates of deposit no longer existed at the time of her death. No 
other recognizable interest has been identified. 
The County argues that the reference to marital property in subdivision 2 reflects the Minnesota legislature's intent 
to make all marital property subject to spousal estate recovery. But subdivision 2 makes no reference to an interest at 
the time of death or to re-defining the probate estate to include all marital property, even property transferred prior to 
death. This is not surprising because subdivision 2 was enacted long before the optional estate definition authority was 
added to federal law. 
The district court indicated that because Dolores was married to Francis even after the transfer of her interest in the 
homestead, she retained some interest in the property. But whatever that interest, it dissipated at Dolores's death, 
rather than resulting in transfer of an interest of value to Francis. 
We conclude that Dolores had no interest in assets at the time of her death that were part of a probate estate or an 
expanded estate definition permissible under federal law, and therefore there is no 
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basis for the County's claim against the estate. 
Finally, we note that in 2003 the Minnesota legislature amended section 256B.15 by extending the definition of 
estate for Medicaid recovery purposes to include assets owned by a recipient spouse in joint tenancy or life estate at the 
time of her death, Act of June 5, 2003, ch. 14, art. 12, §§ 40-50,2003 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 1751, 2205-2217 
(codified as amended at Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subds. 1, lc-lk). The amendments do not mention the other fOl'ms of 
conveyance at death listed in the federal definition of "estate," except that the "right of survivorship" is mentioned with 
respect to joint tenancies. Jd. subds. 1(a)(6), 19, lh(b). Thus, the legislature chose only to include two forms of 
ownership in the expanded definition of estate. Also, as provided in the federal law, the inclusion of joint tenancy and life 
estate interests in the recipient's estate is expressly limited to interests the recipient owned at the time of death. 
Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subds. lh(b)(2), li(a). The amendments further limit the scope of recovery by exemptinq from the 
reach of subdivisions lc through lk a "homestead owned of record, on the date the recipient dies, by the recipient and 
the recipient's spouse as joint tenants with a right of survivorship." Minn.5tat. § 256B.15, subd. 1(a)(6). In 2005, the 
legislature retroactively made the provisions continuing life estates and joint tenancies effective only for life estate and 
joint tenancy interests created on or after August 1, 2003. Act of July 14, 2005, 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 4, art. 7, 2005 Minn. 
Laws 2454, 2649 (codified at Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. l(c)). 
It is difficult to discern the intended reach of the 2003 amendments.(fn9) If the pre-2003 law allowed recovery 
against the surviving spouse's estate as argued by the County, there was little need to enact the 2003 amendments to 
reach those assets in the case of a recipient who leaves a surviving spouse. The parties apparently agree that the 2003 
amendments do not apply to or influence this case, for reasons that are not clear to us. 
It suffices to say that even if the 2003 amendments were applicable, they would provide no basis for the County's 
claim. The new subdivision li specifically applies to circumstances in which a Medicaid recipient against whom 21 recovery 
claim could otherwise be filed is survived by a spouse. Minn.5tat. § 256B.15, subd. li(b). That subdivision provides 
procedures for filing a claim without making a recovery until the death of the surviving spouse. Jd., subd. 1(f). If this 
subdivision were to be applied to this case, several limitations would preclude recovery. Dolores Barg, the recipient, 
owned no life estate or joint tenancy interest at the time of her death. If she had owned a joint tenancy at the time of 
her death, it would have been a homestead owned of record by her and her spouse as joint tenants with a right of 
survivorship, and thus exempted from the reach of subdivision li. Jd., subd. 1(a)(6). Finally, that joint tenancy was 
established in the 1960s, well before August 1, 2003. 
In summary, we hold that federal law does not preempt all Medicaid recovery from spousal estates, and Minn.Stat. § 
256B.15, subd. la, is therefore not preempted to the extent it allows claims against the estate of a surviving spouse of a 
Medicaid recipient. However, the allowable scope of spousal estate recovery is limited. Subdivision 2 of section 256B.15 
is preempted to the extent that it allows recovery from assets in which the deceased Medicaid recipient did not have a 
legal interest at the time of death, and to 
74 
the extent that it permits recovery beyond the extent of the recipient's interest. Finally, we hold that Dolores Ba"g had no 
interest in property at the time of her death that can form the basis for recovery against the estate of Francis Barg. 
v. 
We have concluded that the County's claim for full recovery against all the assets in Francis Barg's estate was 
preempted by federal law because recovery is limited to assets in which Dolores had an interest at the time of her death, 
but the question of the appropriate remedy remains, because the County argues that the Estate waived the right to deny 
the claim in its entirety. Although we have decided as a matter of law in our preemption analysis that the state is 
preempted from reqUiring reimbursement from assets in a spouse's estate in which the recipient spouse had no interest 
at the time of her death, that does not resolve the remedy issue here. Although a state may not compel payment from a 
spouse's estate beyond the scope authorized by federal law, federal preemption does not preclude an estate from 
voluntarily paying all or part of a claim that could not be compelled. 
Here, the Estate only partially disallowed the County's claim, thus allowing the remainder of the claim. Minnesota 
Statutes § 524.3-806(a) (2006) provides that, on petition of the personal representative after notice to the claimant, the 
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court may "for cause shown permit the personal representative to disallow" a previously-allowed claim. But the personal 
representative made no such request here. When questioned at the hearing in district court whether the personal 
representative was challenging the entire claim of the County, the representative affirmed that he was challen9ing only 
the part already disallowed. When the district court affirmed that partial disallowance and the County appealed, the 
Estate did not file a notice of review in the court of appeals to challenge the implicit award to the County of the allowed 
part of its claim. A respondent who does not file a notice of review to challenge an adverse ruling of the distrid: court 
waives that issue in the court of appeals. See Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 106; Ford v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. 
Co., 294 N.W.2d 844, 845 (Minn. 1980). Having partially allowed the County's claim and having then failed to properly 
seek a reversal of that allowance in both the district court and court of appeals, the Estate will not be permitted to seek 
that relief for the first time in this court. 
Accordingly, the decision of the court of appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court's denial of the 
County's claim for full recovery is affirmed. The court's remand for an award to the County based on the existence of a 
joint tenancy interest is reversed. The matter is remanded to the district court for entry of judgment based on the partial 
allowance made, but not subsequently challenged, by the Estate. 
Affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
ANDERSON, PAUL H., J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 
DIETZEN, J., not having been a member of this court at the time of the argument and submission, took no part in
 
the consideration or decision of this case.
 
Footnotes: 
FNl. "Medicaid" is the popular name for this cooperative federal-state program. See 42 U.s.c. § 1396-1396v (2000). 
In Minnesota it is referred to as "medical assistance." Minn. Stat. § 256B.02, subd. 8 (2006). 
FN2. For purposes of determining eligibility of one spouse for Medicaid, the value of a couple's home is excluded. 42 
U.s.c. § 1396r-5(c)(2), (5) (2000); 42 U.S.c. § 1382b(a)(1)(2000). In the asset assessment for Dolores Barg, $104,875 
was excluded. This amount corresponds to the value of the home, one jointly-owned vehicle, and a burial lot. When 
completing the asset assessment, a portion of the couple's resources is reserved for the needs of the spouse not 
applying for Medicaid. 42 U.S.c. § 1396r-S(c)(2), (f)(2)(A) (2000). Protected assets for the non recipient spouse, Francis 
Barg, were calculated to be $24,607. 
FN3. The Commissioner's motion to supplement the record on review is granted as to the following documents: 
North Dakota Medicaid State Plan, Transmittal No. 95-016; Indiana Medicaid State Plan, Transmittal No. 05-012; Idaho 
Medicaid State Plan, Transmittal No. 01-006; and Minnesota Medicaid State Plan, Transmittal No. 06-10. The motion is 
denied as to the e-mail correspondence dated November 4, 1999. 
FN4. Formerly the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA). See Wis. Dep't ofHealth & Family Servs. v. Blumer, 
534 U.S. 473,479 n. 1, 122 S.Ct. 962, 151 L.Ed.2d 935 (2002). 
FN5. Throughout this opinion, our discussion of spouses is premised on circumstances similar to those of the Bargs. 
One spouse, who we refer to as the recipient spouse, applies for and receives Medicaid benefits. The other, who we refer 
to as the community or surviving spouse, receives no Medicaid benefits and survives the recipient spouse. 
FN6. The Estate sought cross-review on this issue of "whether the county may recover Medicaid benefits correctly 
paid on behalf of a predeceased spouse from the estate of a surviving spoLlse." We requested briefing on whether that 
issue had been adequately preserved for review. The County argues that the Estate failed to preserve the issue because 
it only partially disallowed the County's claim, it confirmed before the district court that only the disallowed portion of the 
claim was contested, and it asked the court of appeals to affirm the district court's decision. The County's argum~nts go 
to the scope of the remedy available in this case, an issue that we address infra. But this issue also has a legal aspect 
independent of the specific scope of recovery available in this case. That legal component is necessary to a thorough 
analysis of the preemption issues presented here, and we will therefore address the issue in that context. No new or 
controverted facts are needed in order to address this purely legal question, and no prejudice will result from our 
consideration of the issue because the parties addressed the issue in their briefs to the district court, the court of 
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appeals, and this court. See Watson v. United Servs. Auto. Assn, 566 N.W.2d 683, 687-88 (Minn.1997). 
FN7. The United States Supreme Court has described Congress's passage of the anti-impoverishment provisions as 
an effort to "protect community spouses from' pauperization' while preventing financially secure couples from obtaining 
Medicaid assistance." Wis. Dep't ofHealth & Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.s. 473,480, 122 S.Ct. 962, 151 L.Ed.2d 935 
(2002). Allowing recovery from a spouse's estate does not risk impoverishing a community spouse, because the spouse 
must be dead for the recovery to occur. Nor does it impede the furnishing of Medicaid benefits to other impoverished 
individuals; indeed, it can be expected to do quite the opposite. See West Virginia v. U.S. Dep't ofHealth & Human 
Servs., 289 F.3d 281, 285 (4th Cir.2002) (noting that Congress expected the estate recovery provisions to allow 
government to realize savings of $300 million over five years, and that the savings have been even greater). 
FN8. Formerly Minn.Stat. § 518.54, subds. 1, 5 (2004). 
FN9. The parties' supplemental briefs shed little light on this question. 
MN 
N.w.2d 
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QUESTION PRESENTED 
The Medicaid program J 42 U,S.C. 1396 et seq., gen­
erally forbids participating States from recovering cor­
rectly paid benefits. The statute requires, however, that 
a State seek to recover the cost ot nursing home services 
paid on behalf of an individual over the age of 55 from 
the individual's probate estate, after both the individual 
and her surviving spouse have died. The statute also 
permits (but does not reqUire) a State to recover from 
"any other real and personal property and other assets 
in which the individual had any legal title or interest at 
the time of death (to the extent of Buch interest), includ­
ing such assets conveyed to a survivor, heirJ or assign of 
the deceased individual through joint tenancy. tenancy 
in common. SUrvivorship, life estate, living trust, or oth­
er arrangement. If 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4)(B). 
The question presented is whether, under Section 
1396p(b)(4)(B). a State that seeks to recover correctly 
paid benefits from the estate of the recipient's SUrviving 
spouse is limited to recovering the value of assets in 
which the recipient had a legal interest at the time of 
her death. 
(I)
 
'ON =tlOHd 
000073
, . -
-
.
ui
su -
, 
, survivors -
ent:' ( )
survi i
 
" ~OH
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
Statelnent 10 • 0 •••• 0 •••• 0 ••• 0 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Discussion	 80 •• 0 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
A.	 The decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court 
is correct 80 • 0 • 
B.	 The decision below does not warrant further 
review . 0', • " •••••••••••••••••••••• o ••••••••• 12 
Conclusion ...•...	 160 00 •••••• 0 ••••• o' ••••••••••••••••• 0 
TABLEOFAUTHORITms 
CaMS: 
Arlin¢o'n Cent. Sch. Dist. Sri ofEduc.. v. Mu-rp"'Y, 
548 U.S. 291 (2006) •............................• 12 
Atkins v. Ri'V6'1't1., 477 U.S. 154 (1986) . 20 ••••••••••••••• , 
California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 
479 U.S. 272 (1987) .••....................••...... 9 
Estate ofBudney, In re, 541 N.W.2d 246 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 1995) 13 
Esktt8 ofG-ullberg, In re, 662 NoW.2d 709 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2(02) 6, 7, 120 0 ••••••••• 0 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 
E~ ofWirtZ', In 1'6, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 
2000) .....•.........•..................... 8, 13, 14 
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) ••..........•.... 10 
Hines v. Depa:rl:ment afPub. Aid, 850 N.E.2d 148 
(ill. 2006) .......•....................•... 130 • • • • •• 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lokr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) 110 • • •• 
Sckweikerv. Gray PantMrs, 453 U.S. 34 (1981) ••....... 2
 
Ul;_~ ...... n';... n,.".,¥ nf 1-1D"II" ,e,. "mm.;l'lI.<:Il'M"'. v. 
(lIn 
'ON	 3NJHd WO~L:J 
000074
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . .  
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
....... ............... ..............
......................................  
E  I IES
d.
.................  
.n
 
...................................... 
. .
. . . . . . . . . .    . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 re,
  . . . .     . . •  . . ..  
/
   . . . . •        . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . .  ..  
......... ..  
t rB I  
  __  I ,.II . 'l' .<: I'Mllf. 
I I)
 
IV
 
Statutes and regulation: Page 
Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 
103-66, § 13612, 107 Stat. 6Z7 , 4 
Social Security Act. Tit. XI~ 42 U.S.C. 1896 et 8eq. . . . . .. 1 
42 U.S.C. 1396 ...........................•....... 2 
42 U.S.C. 13008 2 
42 U.S.C. 1896a(a){10)(A)(i)(IV) 2 
42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(10)(AXiXV!) ......•............. 2 
42 U.S.C. 1896a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VII) .............•..... 2 
42 U.S.C. 1396a.(a)(10)(C) , , .. , ....•.. " 2 
42 U.S.C. 13OO8(a)(11) ...................•... , ..•• 2 
42 U.S.C. 1896&(a)(18) 3 
42 U.S.C. 1396b(a)(I) 2 
42 U.S.C. 1396d(b) . .. . .. .. . .. .. . . . .. .. . . . .. .. . .. .. 2 
42 U.S.C. 1896p •................................. 4 
42 U.s.C. 1896p(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 11. 13 
42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(l) 3,9 
42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(l)(A) •.•....................... 4 
42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(1)(B) (1988) . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 3 
42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(I)(B) ....................•... 4, 9 
42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(2) •..•.....••.........•..•.•. 4.9 
42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(2)(A) 4,7 
42 U.S.C. 1896p(b)(2)(B) 6 
42 U.s.C.1396p(b)(3) 4 
42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4)(A) ••.........•......••.••• 4,9 
42 U.S.C. 1896p(b)(4)(B) ...•...........•••... passim 
42 U.S.C. 1396p(c)(l)(A) , ......•....•••...• ' 3 
42 U.S.C. 1396p(e)(2) ,.... 3 
'ON 3NOHd : ~..::l 
000075
 
................... , .. 
,    
,  , .  ,
96& .................................. 
{ .................... 
,
{
.............. ..  , 
968(a)( 7  , . ...
............................ 
............................. 
          .      . .    
                              
........................... 
)(1
                     
. . ..... . .
........................ 
...................... ,... 
............................. 
( )( )( .... . . . .
. Bi
..............•....  , , , •.
, .........................
v 
Statutes and regulation-Continued: Page 
. 42 U.S.C. 1396P(hXl) 10
 
42 U.S.C. 1396r-5(c)(4) 3,11
 
42 U.S.C. 1882b(a)(1) ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 3, 11
 
Act of June 12, 1987, ch. 403, art. 2, § 82 (Minn. Stat.
 
42 U.S.C. 1396r-5(c) ..........•.•.............•.•• 2
 
42 U.S.C. 1896r--5(c)(5) 3, 11
 
42 U.S.C. 1896r-5<d) 3, 11
 
42 U.S.C. 1396r·5(f){2) 3, 11
 
Ann. § 256B.15 (2007)) ..•.••..........•.•.••.•.... 5
 
§ 25GB.15, subd. 2 ................•......... 5,7,9
 
42 C.F.R. 430.16(a)(l) 12
 
Miscellaneous: 
66 Fed. Reg. 35,437 (2001) •...............•.......... 2
 
Governor's Reromrnmulaticm, Minnesota State
 
Budgtd, 2010·11 Biennial Budget, HUmQ,tt Services
 
Deptt (Jan. Z'1,20(9) .••.•••.......•........•....• 15
 
H.R. Cont. Rep. No. 218, 100<1 Cong., 1st Seas. (1993) ... 10
 
Oft'ice of Assistant Secretary for Pollcy & Evaluation,
 
HHS, Policy Br. No.6, Medicaid Estate Recooer-y
 
()ption.s (Sept. 20(5) • . • . . . . . . . . . . . . • .• 15
 
'ON 3I'D-ld : wmu 
000076
st t
IS ............................  
 
......................... S,l  
.........................  
- ( ...........................  
.........................  
                             
 
 
 
( )(1 ..............................  
 
r uJ. t  
u an  
~ 7, ... . . . .  
f  
 
.  
8 .......... ....•.  
No. 08-603 
LEO VOS, DIREcroR, MILLE LAcs COUNTY,
 
MINNESOl'A, FAMILY SERVICES AND WELFARE
 
DEPARTMENT, ET AL., PETITIONERS
 
v. 
MICHAEL F. BARG 
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
 
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MINNESOTA
 
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE 
This brief is filed in response to the Court's order 
inviting the Solicitor General to express the views of the 
United States. In the view of the United States, the peti­
tion for a writ of certiorari should be denied. 
STATEMENT 
1. a. The Medicaid program, established in 1965 in 
Title XIX of the Social Security Act (Medicaid Act), 42 
U.S.C. 1396 et 8eq., is a cooperative federal-state pro­
gram under which the federal government provides fund­
ing to States to provide medical assistance to eligible 
needy persons. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 
(1980). 
To participate in the Medicaid program, a State must 
develop a plan specifying, among other things, the cate­
gories of individuals who will receive medical assistance 
(1) 
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under the plan and the BPeclftC kinde of medical care and 
eervices that will b. covered. 42 U.S.C. 1896&. State 
Medicaid plana are reviewed by the Centers tor Medi­
care and Medicaid Services (eMS) (formerly the Health 
Care Financing Admlnl.tration) In the Depart;1nant ot 
Health and Human Servtce8 (HHS). 42 U.S.C. 1896; see 
66 Fed. Reg. 85,487 (2001). If eMS approv_ a State'. 
pl~ the State ia thereafter eligible for federal reim­
bursement tor a apecitled pereentqe of the amounts 
"expended • • • as medical -atance UDder the State 
plan'" 42 U.S.C. 1896b(a){1), 1896d(b). 
b. The Medicaid Aet requires partidpaUng Statets 
to provide Medicaid benefits to the "categorieal­
ly needy." that ie, those persona eligfble tor tlnanclal 8&­
atatance under IIpec1fled federal programs. Atki7U 
v. RifHIrtJ., 477 U.S. 1M, 167 (1986); see 4.2 U.S.C. 
1896a(a)(lO)(A)(t)(IV). (VI) and (VII). 
The Act alao permits States to extend benetlte to 
the "medically needy," that la, "perao~ laeking the abD.­
Ity to pay for medtcal expenees, but with lDeomea t.oo 
larg'e to quality for eatMgorical _latance." ScIwHri.1wr v. 
Grall PGtUMnJ, 458 U.S. 34, 37 (1981); see 42 U.S.C. 
1896&(a)(10)(C). To quality .. medteally needy, a person 
may have tneome no higher than a detlned. threshold and 
may own aaaeta ot no more than a detlnftd value. If the 
aueta of • Medicaid appUeant eJCcee<! the qualifying 
threshold, .he must ".pend dawn" her _setal unW they 
are at or below the qUalityina threshold. See 42 U .S.C. 
1896a(a)(17). 
When a married person 18 inBtitutWnaUzed in • nUrB­
ing home or other fac:Wty. the Medicaid Act eonaidere the 
_aet. of both the tDAltttuttonallzed apOUlM! and the non­
buJdtuttonalized. or "community'" spouse tn deterrntn­
Ing the appUeant'. eUgfbUtty for beDeftte. 42 U .s.c. 
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1396r-5(c). To prevent the community apouee from beiDi:' 
impoveriahed ... reault of a required llpend-down of 
88set87 the st.atute e:xempta certain aa~ta7 such .. thEl 
couple's home and an automobU., 42 U.S.C. 1882b(a)(1),. 
1396r-o(c)(6), and allowe the community spouse to retain, 
a certain level of reeourcee and income that are not con·, 
aidered available to pay for the applicant7s medical care" 
42 U.S.C. 1396r-6(d) and (t)(2). See Wi.CO'Kain Dep't of 
H_alth & Famil-v SfIT1J& v. Blu,m#J1", 584 u.s. 478, 480 
(2002) (antl-impoverl.ehment provisions are Intended to 
"protect coll1JJlunity spoU8e8 from 'pauperi~tion7whUe 
preventing tinanetally seCU1"e eouplee from obtaining 
Medicaid ass1atanee"). Furthermore, although the Medi­
caid Act generally forbids a Medicaid appl1cant or her 
spouse from traD.rerring aaeet8 at below market value in 
order to become eligible for beneftte7 42 U.S.C. 
1896p(c)(lXA), the atatute expreesly perm1t8 the appli­
cant to trana'. assets, including an Intereet in the home­
stead, to the community SpOU8e, 42 U.S.C. 1396p(c)(2). 
Once the lnatltutionalized spouse Is determined to be 
eligible tor beneftte, the atatute provides that "no re­
sources ot the community spolUle shall be deemed avail­
able to the institutionalized spouse." 42 U.S.C. 1396r­
5(c)(4). 
c. ~ a general rule7 the Medicaid Act forbids Statea 
from aeeking recovery ot Medicaid benetlts that were 
correctly paid. 42 U.S.C. 1896p(b)(1); Bee alllo 42 U.S.C. 
1896a(a)(18). The statute providea an exc:eption7 how­
ever, for recovery trom tbe estates of certain tnatttutton­
alized and older beneftcfaries. 
Before 1998. the Medicaid Ace. recovery provision 
permitted, but did Dot require, States to recover benefits 
paid OD behalf of certain individoals. from the individu­
als' estatea. 42 U.S.C. 1896p(b)(1)(B) (1988). In 1998, 
•
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Congress amended Section 1396p to reqnire States to 
recover correctly paid benefitl!l in certain circumstances. 
Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA 1993), Pub. 
L. No. 103-66, § 13612, 107 Stat. 627. As amended, the 
Act's estate-recovery provi5ion requires States to seek 
recovery in the case of an individual who was perma­
nently imstitutionalized, 42 U.S.C. 1396P(b)(l)(A), and in 
the case of a person who received, at age 55 or thereaf­
ter, nursing facility services, home and community­
based services, or related hospital and prescription drug 
services, 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(1)(B). In addition, a State 
has the option to seek recovery of the cost of other items 
or services paid on behalf of individuals over the age of 
55. Ibid. The recovery "may be made only after the 
death of the individual's surviving spouse, if any," and 
only at a time when the individual has no sUrviving chil­
dren under the age of 21 or children who are blind or 
disabled. 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(2) and (2)(A). Such recov­
ery may be waived In cases where it ''would work an un­
due hardship." 42 U.S.C.1396p(b)(3). 
The statute provides for recovery of the cost of bene­
fits paid on behalf of an individual over the age of 55 
from "the individual's estate'" 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(1)(B). 
The term "estate," for those purposes, "shall include all 
real and personal property and other assets included 
within the individual's estate, 8$ defined for purposes of 
State probate law." 42 U,S.C. 1396p(b)(4)(A). The stat­
ute further provides that an individual's "estate" 
may include. at the option of the State ... ... ., any 
other real and personal property and other assets in 
which the individual had any legal title or intereet at 
the time of death (to the extent of such interest), in­
cluding such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or 
assign of the deceased individual through joint ten­
'ON 3NOHd 
000080
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ancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life e$tate, 
living trust, or other arrangement. 
42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4)(B). 
2. Since 1987, Minnesota law has provided for recov­
ery of Medicaid benefits from the estate of a recipient's 
surviving spoulSe, as well alS from the estate of a recipi­
ent. Act of June 12,1987, ch. 403, art. 2, § 82 (Minn. Stat. 
Ann. § 2568.15 (2007». Minnesota's estate-recovery law 
provides that ural claim against the estate of a surviving 
spouse who did not receive medical assistance, for medi­
cal assistance rendered for the predeceased spouse, is 
limited to the value of the assets oC the estate that were 
marital property or jointly owned property at any time 
during the marriage." Minn. Stat. Ann. § 256B.15, subd. 
2 (2007). 
3. In 2004, petitioner filed a claim against the estate 
of Francis Barg, in which he sought recovery of Medicaid 
benefits paid on behalf of Mr. Barg's predeceased 
spouse, Dolores Barg. Pet. App. 4a.1 
a. During their marriage, the Bargs purchased real 
property in Princeton, Minnesota, to which they took 
title a8 joint tenants. In 2001, Ms. Barg entered a nurs­
ing home, and shortly thereafter applied for, and re­
ceived, long-term Medicaid benefits. Pet. App. 2a-3a. 
Ms. Barg subsequently transferred her joint tenancy 
interest in the homestead property to Mr. Barg. At the 
time of the transfer, the assessed value of the property 
was $120,800. Ms. Barg also terminated her ownership 
interest in certificates of deposit the couple had held 
jointly. [d. at 3a-4a. 
On March 2, 2009, this Court granted the State otMinne.ota's con­
ditional motion to intervene M a party .ugned with petitioner Vos. All 
references in this brief to "petitioner" refer to petitioner V08. 
"(J-,I 3NOHd 
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Ms. Barg died in Z004, having received a total of 
$108,413.53 In medical-assistance benefits through the 
state Medi~aid program. Mr. Barg died five months 
later. Pet. App. 4a. 
b. In his claim against Mr. Barg"e estate, petitioner 
80ught to recover the fun amount of Medicaid benefits 
paid on behalf of Ms. Barg. Pet. App. 4a. Respondent, 
who is the representative of Mr. Barg's estate, allowed 
$68,880 ae a claim against the estate, but disallowed 
$44,538.53. Ibid. I 
Petitioner filed a claim-allowance petition in state 
court. The district court upheld the partial disallowance. 
Pet. App. 46a-518. The court relied on the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals' decision in In re Estate of Gullberg, 
652 N.W.2d 709 (2002), which held that Minnesota's 
estate-recovery law is preempted Insofar as it penults 
recovery up "to the value of the 88sets or the e8tate that 
were marital property" at any point in the marriage, be­
cause 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(2)(B) permits recovery only "to 
the extent of" the Medicaid recipient's interest at the 
time of death. Gullberg, 652 N.W.2d at 714. The court 
concluded that, at time of her death, Ma. Barg's interest 
in the &Meta of Mr. Barg's estate that were marital prop­
erty, including a life-eetate intel"elSt in the homestead and 
a personal property allowance, totaled $68,880. Pet. App. 
5Oa-51a. 
c. The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed and 
remanded for recalculation of petitioner's allowable 
claim. Pet. App. 52a-648. Like the district court, the 
I ReIlpondent'a partJst allowance oC $68,880 apparently rested on 
the premise thatMe. Barg (1) had. on.haJfintereet in the homestead, 
valued at $lS8.88O. at the time otherdeath. despite the interviv06 trana­
fer, and (2)was entJtled to. personaJ property allowance fD the amount 
ofS5OOO. See Pet. App. 49a. 
:~.:1 
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eourt of appeals concluded that, under federal law, the 
claim was necessarily limited to the value of Ms. Barg's 
interest in specified assets at the time of her death. 
Id. at 58a (citing Gullberg, 652 N.W.2d at 714). The 
court of appeals concluded, however, that Ms. Barg's 
interest in the homestead at the time of her death was a 
joint tenancy interest. valued 8B a one-half interest in the 
propertys value of $120,800, or $60,400. Id. at 62a. 
d. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed in part 
and reversed in part, concluding that petitioner was not 
entitled to full recovery from Mr. Bar~s estate. Pet. 
App.la-45a. 
As an initial matter, the court rejected respondent's 
contention that federal law completely preempts Minne­
sota's estate-recovery law insofar as it permits recovery 
from the estate of the Medicaid recipient's surviving 
spouse. Pet. App. 19a-308. The court concluded that 
allowing recovery from 8 surviving spouse's estate is con­
sistent with both the Act's preclusion of recovery from 
the Medicaid recipient's estate until after the death of a 
surviving spouse, 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(2)(A), as well as the 
purposes of the Medicaid Act's recovery provisions. Pet. 
App.29a. 
The court concluded, however, that federal law limits 
the scope of recovery against a surviving spouse's 
estate to the value of assets in which the recipient spouse 
had an interest "at the time of death," 42 U.S.C. 
1396p(b)(4)(B), and thereby preempts Minnesota's 
estate-recovery law insofar as it permits the State 
to reach any other assets "that were marital proper­
ty or jointly owned property at any time during the mar­
riage." Pet. App. 31a (quoting Minn. Stat. Ann. 
§ 256B.15, subd. 2 (2007»; see id. at 30a-37a. 
'ON 3IO-ld 
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The court further concluded that Ma. Barg did not 
bave any intereat In the homeatead or bank accounta at 
the time of her death, because she had transferred her 
iDtereet in tJioee au.tIS to Mr. Bara before ahe died. The 
court therefore held that pet.ttloner had no ie.at entitle­
ment to satisfaction of the State'., claim from those u- . 
eete. Pet. App. 87a-48a. But because re.pondent bad 
partially allowed petitioner'. claim, and never chaUenaed 
the district court's award ot that partial allowauce of 
$68,880, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that peti­
tioner could recover that amount. /d. at 48a-40a. 
DISCU88ION 
The Minneeota Supreme Court's decisioD fa correct 
and does Dot warrant further revifIW. The federal 
Medicaid Act permit. recovery of correctly paid benellta 
tram the estate of the recipient'. aurvivins spouse, but 
limft8 that reeovery to the value ot a&l8eta in which the 
recipient had a lecaJ. intere.t at the time of her death. 
Although the ~t in thia cue cUtfen from the ~t 
in 1ft,,... /iJetaU qfWina, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 20(0). the 
differenee may not reflect a disagreement about the 
meaninc of federal Medicaid law, but only dtver'lrent con­
clusion. about when, under state law, an individual re­
tains a legallnterut In aueta conveyed to a spouee. The 
petition for a writ of certiorari ehould be denied. 
A..	 Th. Dedttoa Of 'I'he MbmNOta Sa......... Coan 1. Co.... 
reel 
1.	 The MinUe8ot& Supreme Court correctly con­
cluded that the Medicaid Act. forbide petitioner from 
aeektna to recover correctly paid benetlte trom _eta In 
wbfob the Medteaid recipient had no lecaI interest at the 
time of her death. 
"ON ::N:JHd 
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Under the Medicaid Act, a State generally may not 
Hek to recover correctly paid Medicaid beneflt&. 42 
U.S.C. 1896p(b)(l). The Act provid.., however, that a 
State (1) mN08t seek recovery of nuniDtf home and re­
lated beneftta paid on b4llhaltof an tndMdual over the age 
ot 56 from ·'the individual'. estate" .. defined by state 
probate law; and (2) ma~, at ita option, deftne "the indi­
vidual's _tate" more broadly to include any "asaete in 
which the individual had any legal title or Interest at the 
time of death (to the extent of Buch interest), including 
Buch asaets conveyed to a survivor, heir or aaaign of the 
deceaaed individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in 
common, sun1vorahip, life estate. living trust. or other 
arrangement." .u U.S.C. 1896P(b)(l)(B). (b)(4)(A) and 
(D). Thua, the Medicaid Act, which permits recovery 
only after the death of the recipient's surviving apouse. 
42 U.S.C. 1896p(b)(2), aathor1zell a State to tile a reim­
bursement claim agalnat the surviving spouse's estate, 
up to the value of any &Mete in which the Medicaid recip­
Ient had a legal interest at the time of her d.ath. 
The Minneaota eetate-recovery law exceeda the scope 
of that authorbation. It pennfta the State to recover 
from a snrvtvlng spouse's _tate "the value of the &IIseta 
of the estate that were marital property or Jointly owned 
property at ma~ ti."". during tJu m4rria.ge," Minn. Stat. 
AnD. I 266B.16, sUbel. 2 (2007) (emphaeia added), without 
regard to whether the recipient retained an interest in 
the 88set8 at the thne of her death. Because a State may 
not recover correctly paid Medicaid benefiu except to 
the extent authorked by federal law, .ee 42 U.S.C. 
1896p(b)(1), Minnesota's statute contlictB with federal 
law and Ie therefore preempted. S•• Cal(fm-nia. Ftfld. 
Sew. & Loa.,. A •• 'n v. GuftTa, 479 U.S. 272. 280-282 
(1987). 
-
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2. Petitioner argues (Pet. 25-28) that the text of the 
Medicaid Act imposes no limit on permissible reeovery 
from the estate of the Medicaid recipient's surviving 
spouse, because the Act defines the tenn "alSl5eta" to in~ 
elude "all income and resources of the individual and of 
the individual's spouse." 42 U.S.C. 1396p(h)(1). Accord­
ing to petitioner, "[b]y including resources of both 'the 
individual' and 'of the individual's spouae' in the meaning 
of 'assets,' Congress clearly intended that the spouse's 
resources fall within the scope of § 1396p(b)(4)(B)." Pet. 
27. 
Petitioner is incorrect. Although the general statu~ 
tory definition of "assets" does encompass resources of 
both "the individual" (i.e., the Medicaid recipient) and 
"the individual's spouse," the particular provision of the 
MedIcaid Act at issue here refers specifically to any "as­
sets in which the individual had any legal title or inter­
est at the time of death." 42 U.S.C.1396p(b)(4)(B) (em­
phasis added), Petitioner's argument finds it necessary 
to rewrite that clause to read 'Uany * * * assets in 
which [either or both the individual and the individual's 
BPOU86] had any legal title or interest.''' Pet. 26 (brack-
X	 ets and asteriks in original) (emphasis added). But this 
editing does nothing less than make the statute say the 
opposite of what it says. The plain language of the oper­
ative provision of the Act refutes petitioner's reading.' 
• In describing the operation ot the amended estate-recovery pro­
vision, the legislative history of the 1993 amendments also focused on 
the assets of the individual who had received Medicaid benefits. rather 
than the resources of both the individual and his or her apouae. See 
H.R. Con!. Rep. No. 218, l03d Cong., 1st Sese. 835 (1993) ("At the 
option ofthe State. the eitate against [which] • • • recovery is 80Ught 
may Include any real or personal properly or other 8S&ets in which tJw 
'ON 3I'01d 
000086
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3. Petitioner's reading of the Medicaid Act also finds 
little support in the Act's other provisions concerning the 
treatment of spousal assets. See Pet. 27-28. AJ5 peti­
tioner notes, the Medicaid Act generally considers the 
community spouse's assets for purposes of determining 
whether an institutionalized individual i8 eligible to re­
ceive benefits. But the Act also exempts certain prop­
erty, such as the couple's home, from consideration. 42 
U.S.C. 1382b(a)(1), 1396r-5(c)(5), and allows the commu­
nity spouse to retain certain amounts of resources and 
income that are not considered available to pay for the 
applicant's medical care, 42 U.S.C. 1396r-5(d) and (f)(2). 
Moreover, once the institutionalized spouse is deter­
mined to be eligible for benefits, the Medicaid Act pro­
vides that "no resources of the community spouse shall 
be deemed available to the institutionalized spouse." 42 
U.S.C. 1396r-5(c)(4). The Medicaid Act. in short, im­
poses significant limitations on petitioner's asserted 
principle that "spouses are expected to support each 
other." Pet. 27. To read Section 1396P(b)(4)(B) in accor­
dance with its plain tenns thus is consistent with the 
broader statutory scheme. 
4. Because Section 1396p(b) leaves no ambiguity 
about limiting spousal estate recovery to the value of 
assets in which the Medicaid recipient had a legal inter­
est at the time of death, the presumption against pre­
emption does not corne into play, Pet. 28 (citing Medtron­
ie, Inc. v. Lokr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (l996))-even assum­
ing, arguendo, that this presumption has force in the con­
text of a comprehensive federal-state cooperative pro­
gram like Medicaid in which the State's program is sub­
beneficiaryhad any legal title or interest at the time ofdeath, including 
the home. j (emphasis added). 
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j ect to federal approval. And for similar reasons, peti­
tioner's suggestion that the decision below improperly 
enforces against the State "[a]n ambiguous condition" on 
the acceptance of federal funds under Spending Clause 
legislation lacks any merit. Pet. 28 n.8 (citing Arlington 
Cent. Sck. Dist. Bd. ofEduc. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 
296 (2006». 
Petitioner also errs (Pet. 20-23, 28 n.S) in a~serting 
that the Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation of 
Section 1396p(b)(4)(B) is Inconsistent with the interpre­
tation of the responsible federal agency. HHS has nei­
ther promulgated regulations nor issued guidance inter­
preting Section 1396p(b)(4)(B) to authorize the kind of 
estate recovery that petitioner urges in this case. To be 
sure, eMS in 2007 approved Minnesota's state plan 
amendment incorporating ite statutory spousal recovery 
provisions. See Pet. App. 89a-93a. But eMS's approval 
Is not the equivalent of binding interpretive guidance. 
Cf. 42 C.F.R. 430.16(a)(1) (a state plan or plan amend­
ment is deemed approved if CMS does not act within 90 
days atter 8ubmission). Moreover, eMS's approval fol­
lowed binding judicial decisions in Minnesota's own 
courts interpreting the Medicaid Act to limit recovery to 
assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at 
time of death. See, e.g., In r6 Estate of Gullberg, 652 
N.W.2d 709, 714 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002). As set forth 
above in this brief, see p. 9, 8Up1'4, HHS also interprets 
the Medicaid Act to limit recovery in that manner. 
B. The Decision Below Doe' Not Warrant Further Review 
1. Petitioner contends (Pet. 24-25) that review is 
warranted to resolve a conflict between the decision be­
low and the North Dakota Supreme Courtts decision in 
"ON :NJHd 
000088
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Wirtz, supra.' In Wirtz, much as in this case, a Medicaid 
recipient had transferred a8set8 to his spouse before his 
death, and the State sought to reeover the cost of the 
Medicaid benefits from the 13pouse's estate after her 
death. The court held that the State was permitted un­
der 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4)(B) to recover the value of any 
assets "in which the deceased recipient once held an in­
terest," inclUding assets conveyed to his spouse before 
his death. Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d at 886. 
But the different results in this case and in Wirtz may 
not reflect a disagreement about the meaning of federal 
Medicaid law. Notably, the North Dakota Supreme 
Court, like the Minnesota Supreme Court, stated that 
the State "[could] assert a claim against real or personal 
A:J the Minneljota Supreme Court noted (Pet. App. 21a-22a), two 
other state courtti have concluded that Sectlon 1396p(b) authorizes re­
covery only from the estate or a MediCaid recipient, and not from the 
estate of his or her spouse. See Hi1UJ' v. Depo.rt1rumt ofPu/). Aid, 850 
N.E.2d 148(Ill. 20(6); In reE8toteo/B?J.dMY, 641 N.W.2d 245 (Wi!. Ct. 
App.1996). But those decisions and the decision below are not in con­
flict. Both Hfnu and Budnefl are consistent with the principle that a 
State may recover from the estate of a Medicaid recipient's survivinC 
spouse if it exercises its option under Section 1396p(b)(4XB) to define 
!.he individual's estate more broadly than it Is ddtned \Ulder state pro­
bate law. See Hi'l'l.68, 850 N.E.2d at 153-154 (explaining that the state 
legialawre could have defined the recipient's estate in such a way u to 
provide tor; recovery ot certain assets from the estate of ltis survivinl 
spouse, but had chosen not to do :to); Budney, 541 N.W.2d at 246 &; 
n.2 (holding that a state statute authorizing full recovery from a sur­
viving spouse's elltate exceeded the State's authority under 42 U.S.C. 
1396p(b), without considerini whether it would have been permissible 
for the State to recover from the 6Urvtving spouse's estate the value of 
assets inwhich the recipient had an interest at the time of death). Re-­
spondent here, in any event, does notchall~ethe MinnesotaSupreme 
Court's conclusion that a State is pennitted to recover from the elrtate 
of a surviving spouse in some circumstances. See Bl'. in Opp. 6,8-9, 19. 
'ON ::NJHd 
000089
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property, and other BSsetl5 in which [the recipient] had 
any legalliLle or other intere~t at his death." Wirtz, 607 
N.W.2d at 885 (emphasis added); see also ibid. ("Our 
inquiry • ...... is ......... whether [the recipient] had 
'real and personal property and other a5setlS in which 
[he] had any legal title or interest at the time ofdeath. It) 
(emphasis added). Although its reasoning is not entirely 
clear, the court in Wirtz appeared to conclude that the 
recipient in that case, despite (ormal conveyance of cer~ 
tain assets before death, retained an intere5t in the rele­
vant property until his death, when the interest was con­
veyed to his spouse through "other arrangement." 607 
N .W.2d at 885 (quoting 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4)(B». The 
court did not elaborate on the nature of that interest, 
although it referred to the State's argument that 
the recipient had retained a "marital or equitable inter­
est" in the assets at the time of his death, icl. at 883, and 
noted that other courts had interpreted Section 
1396p(b)(4)(B) to reach stateAlaw community-property 
and homestead interests, id. at 885. 
The different results reached by the North Dakota 
Supreme Court and the court below on similar facts thus 
may reflect not conflicting interpretations of federal 
Medicaid law, but only different views of when, under 
state law, a spouse retains a legal interest in property 
conveyed to his or her spouse. Compare Wirtz, 607 
N.W.2d at 885-886, with Pet. App. 38a-40a (concluding 
that, after Ms. Barg transferred her interest in the 
homestead and bank accounts, she no longer had a legal 
interest that could have been conveyed to Mr. Barg upon 
her death), and id. at 40a (noting that Minnesota law 
"makes no reference to • • • re-derming the probate 
estate to include all marital property, even property 
transferred prior to death"). 
'ON 3NOHd 
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Even it the decisions in Wirtz and this case do reflect 
a disagreement aa to proper interpretation of the Medi­
caid Act, this Court's review would not be warranted. 
The Minne50ta Supreme Court's interpretation of federal 
law is correct, and to date, only the North Dakota Su­
preme Court has allowed Medicaid recovery following an 
inter vivos transfer of 35sete between spouses. Assum­
ing arguendQ that. the North Dakota Supreme Court mis­
understood federal Medicaid law, rather than simply 
applied a peculiar feature of its own property law, the 
North Dakota court has not had an opportunity to con­
sider HHS's interpretation, and the conflict may work 
itself out as the issue is further addressed in the lower 
courts. 
2. Although petitioner (Pet. 31-33) is correct that 
estate-recovery efforts are important to the Medicaid 
program, questions concerning the scope of the Act's 
estate-recovery provisions have not arisen frequently, 
and relatively few States have opted to seek estate recov­
ery to the maximum extent permitted by federal law. 
See Office of Assistant Secretary for Policy & Evalua­
tion, HHS, Policy 8,.,.. No.6, Medicaid Estate Recovery 
Collection8 tbI. 4 (Sept. 2005) (only nine States make 
maximum U8e of federal policy options); see also Pet. 81. 
Moreover, although the federal Medicaid Act limits 
estate recovery to those assets in which the Medicaid 
recipient had a legal interest at the time of her death, the 
nature and extent of such interests remain largely the 
domain of state law. Notably, Minnesota's Governor has 
proposed redefining marital property interests to permit 
recovery of medica.l assistance trom the estate of the 
later-surviving spouse in this context. See Governor-'s 
Recommendation, Minnesota State Budget, ~010·11 Bi­
ennial Budget, Human SenriC6S Dep't 132 (Jan. 27, 
'ON 3I'O-/d 
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2009). That. proposal has not become law, nor has it been 
reviewed by the Secretary of HHS. The proposal, how­
ever. suggests that Minnesota may be able to work to­
ward greater asset recovery consistent with the clear 
terms of federal Medicaid law. 
CONCLUSION 
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted. 
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!. DAViD :'JAVAAno PI'i!!lrk 
By,:>. BOURNE ' - ~, 
Peter C. Sisson DEPlirr 
SISSON & SISSON 
The Elder Law Firm, PLLC 
2402 West Jefferson Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Tel: (208) 387-0729 
Fax: (208) 331-5009 
Idaho State Bar # 4682 
Attorney for Personal Representative 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
IN THE MATTER OF: Case No. CV IE 0905214 
GEORGE D. PERRY, AFFIDAVIT OF BARBARA K. 
McCORMICK IN SUPPORT OF 
Deceased. OBJECTION TO DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH AND WELFARE'S PETITION 
FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM 
-------------------' 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: SS. 
County of Ada ) 
BARBARA K. McCORMICK, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am the duly appointed Personal Representative of the above entitled estate and the 
daughter of decedent, George D. Perry ("George"). I make this affidavit based on my 
personal knowledge. 
2. On July 31, 2006, Martha Jean Perry, George's spouse (hereinafter "Martha"), and my 
long-time step-mother, conveyed all of her right, title and interest in the couple's home 
AFFIDAVIT OF BARBARA K. McCORMICK IN SUPPORT OF 
OBJECTION TO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE'S 
PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 1 
File #09-039 
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located at 2104 Tendoy Drive, Boise, Idaho via quit claim deed to her husband, George 
Perry. Attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit A is a true and 
correct copy of the Quitclaim Deed in which Martha quitclaimed all of her right, title and 
interest in that real property to George. 
3.	 As of October 1,2006, the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare ("Department") 
approved Martha for Medicaid benefits. Attached hereto and incorporated herein by 
reference as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the Department notice of approval for 
Medicaid. 
4.	 Martha's health care needs have progressively increased over the years and she now lives 
in a skilled nursing facility. From October, 2006, Martha has continued to receive 
Medicaid benefits and she receives those benefits today. 
5.	 Over the years, George's health situation also progressively declined. He ultimately was 
forced to enter into a nursing home after a long-struggle to remain home. By this time he 
had exhausted his liquid resources and decided to sell his home because he would be 
unable to maintain it, even if qualified for Medicaid benefits. In an effort to sell the 
home, he provided the Department with written verification documenting the fair market 
value of the home and the Department agreed that the proposed sale price of $150,000 
was fair market value. A true and correct copy of the December 16, 2008 letter from the 
Department agreeing that $150,000 was the fair market value of the property is attached 
hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit C. 
AFFIDAVIT OF BARBARA K. McCORMICK IN SUPPORT OF 
OBJECTION TO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE'S 
PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 2 
File #09-039 
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6.	 Unfortunately, delays in receiving response from the Department caused the buyer who 
had wanted to purchase the property to back out of that transaction. The home remained 
on the market. George Perry died in a nursing home on February 25,2009, before he 
could complete the sale of the home with a new buyer who had by that time agreed to 
purchase the home. 
7.	 The Personal Representative of the Estate of George D. Perry consummated the sale of 
the home on March 26, 2008, for a total sales price of $160,000. A true and correct copy 
of the settlement statement on that closing is attached hereto and incorporated herein as 
Exhibit D. 
8.	 The balance of the house sale proceeds, minus disbursements for administrative costs, is 
now held in the Estate's checking account. Attached hereto and incorporated herein by 
reference as Exhibit E is a true and correct copy of the Personal Representative's 
inventory of the Estate. The proceeds from the sale of George Perry's home are the only 
assets that are contained in the George's Estate. The Inventory makes clear that all estate 
assets were George Perry's separate property. The Department failed to make any 
objection to the PR's Inventory. George's personal property was of de minimus value and 
was given to charity prior to his death when he moved to the nursing home. The Estate of 
George D. Perry holds no other real or personal property. 
9.	 I handle Martha's finances for her. The only property that Martha Jean Perry currently 
owns is one financial account located at Wells Fargo, checking account # ending -3540. 
This account is an income-qualifying or "Miller" trust account that was necessary to 
AFFIDAVIT OF BARBARA K. McCORMICK IN SUPPORT OF 
OBJECTION TO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE'S 
PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 3 
File #09-039 
000095
 
 
 
 
 
qualify Martha for Medicaid. Martha's fixed monthly income (social security and 
pension) is direct deposited into this account every month. Funds are then paid out of this 
account in the same month for Martha's Medicaid patient share of cost, for her health 
insurance premium and for her personal needs allowance. This account holds less than 
$2,000 at the end of each month after the above amounts are paid out every month. 
Attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit F is a true and correct 
copy of a letter from Paula Guenat, Premier Banker at Wells Fargo, establishing that as of 
9/9/09, this account had a balance of$1,682.96. Martha owns no other real or personal 
property. 
10. The Personal Representative stipulates and agrees that upon Martha Jean Perry's death, 
any amounts left in Wells Fargo checking account # ending -3540 are owed to and will be 
paid to the Department pursuant to its right to recover for Medicaid assistance paid out 
during her lifetime against assets in which Martha had an interest at her death. Aside 
from the funds in this Wells Fargo checking account, Martha does not own any interest in 
any other property. No other property could possibly pass from Martha to George Perry's 
Estate or to any other individual upon Martha's death because she doesn't own or have 
any interest in any other property. 
AFFIDAVIT OF BARBARA K. McCORMICK IN SUPPORT OF 
OBJECTION TO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE'S 
PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 4 
File #09-039 
000096
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. 
DATED this 2bdayof ;l;d1t~""- , 2009. 
\',]iJJ~ I! liit {~~-BARBARA K. McCORMIC 
AFFIDAVIT OF BARBARA K. McCORMICK IN SUPPORT OF 
OBJECTION TO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND \VELFARE'S 
PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 5 
File #09-039 
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ADA COUNTY nEconOFIl J. IlftVIO N~VAMO "MUUNI iJ.uu 
BOISE IDAHO 071af/a. '8 PM 
DEPUTY lonnl. Ob8r.....t, . 
RECORDED-REQUEST OF III 11111111111111111111 IIIIIIJI II Ial 1061222flSGeorg. D. Perry 
QUITCLAIM DEED 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, !'AftA-.T1fft; .:I!2,A.;: ,(llllllfDr, does~ 
hereby convey, release, remise and forever quitclaim unto '
 
G f¢.p12.~ if. D, f!L!LP-1 'whose address ios
 
cllt/ £/ o~ ~ WA.. fir~L;q ~3.?~th~ofOllowing
 
described premises, to-wIt: 
OLdY- -//,£oF 0d, L-!.J of ()~j)1~ ;f'u!3()' ~/:r,,~-lUo ,fj...,
 
, ~~/'tV (; "J):? ,#~ Pt:.A. ,... 'T~ 6';:- 0 PIL...r£t) /IV ~~
 
ALC'~~ c9P.I"I-tJA- Qa.u 1LJ7-t, ~A. 0'
 
_____..,...-- ..,...--__-----' '__ county. 
Together°wlth the appurtenances. 
This deed Is Intended to convey to the Grantee all right, title, and interest of the Grantor 
in and to said property, now owned or hereafter acquired. 
Date/(--31,.., "k ,20_. 
) 
) 88. 
l 
:---::--_:-:--~' 2cQ!e before 0 me, the 
for said state; 0 personally appeared 
known to me to be the perSon~~~~~~~ik~~~iiit~;o~t.~a~ndda;ack~o nowledged to me that sibs executed 
•. ~ 
000099
 ______  ____  ' v,vv,..,,,,
II COIIDFII DAVID
f/f
Sonnl e  ! 11111111111 
f!5 
I 1' ft  J!;: flm:r Gnm  
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&ltlif Ollowing 
l
o )  { "~-lUo  
 ..4~/'tV .1fl/.}  
 C' ~ 9 p.1  A LJ~lt'  
 ________  ____ 
oat9/{ -31 ... 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Countyof~ 
On this _o~l~ __ _ 
tary 
~:=w;;;ft-:~----:-:- ',
~~~~~is!~dk~~~~~~~dai;kn known to me to be the perSon 
Yo! 0 t. and ack
"0....' 
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Guy A Henry 
823 Park Centre 
Nampa Id 83651 IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH &WEIJFARE 
We provide interpreter services at no cost. If you need help reading this letter, please call us at 1-866-262-8640. After your call is 
answered, please wait on the line while you are connected with a translator.
 
Nosotros proveemos los servicios de un interprete, sin costo alguno. Si necesita ayuda leyendo esta carta por favor llamenos at
 
1-866-262-8640. Cuando contesten su Hamada, favor de esperar un momento en la linea mientras Ie conectan con un traductor.
 
Martha J Perry November 24, 2006 
C/O Sisson/Sisson
605 E Highland View 
Boise ID 83702 Case Number 714828 
Important Information About 
Your Health Coverage 
Your Health Coverage for Martha Perry is approved starting the first of
 
October 2006.
 
Home and Community-Based Services (HCBS) for Martha Perry are appr,oved

starting October 2006.
 
You may need to pay part of the cost of your care. You will get a separate

letter from our Regional Medicaid Unit wlth the payment informatiol1.
 
If you don't agree with this decision about your application or case,

please call me. We can review the facts used to make this decision
 
together or you may ask for a hearing. In a hearing you and I tel'l a
 
neutral person from outside Health and Welfare, called a hearin9 officer,

about your case. This person w"ill decide if the Department actlon on your
 
case was correct.
 
You may ask for a hearing in writing or by calling me. If you make a
 
hearing request in writing you may make a copy for your records. You may
 
use a hearing request form from our office or just write on a piece of
 
paper why you want a hearing. Then mail, fax, or bring your request to my

office.
 
If you would like a hearing, you must make your request by December' 24,
 
2006.
 
Guy Henry
 
208-465-8444 (phone) 208-442-2810 (fax)

HenryG@idhw.state.id.us
 
Case Manager: Guy Henry Caseload: SS Case: 714828 Field Office: 3214 1 000101
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We based your Health Coverage on the following facts. 
Your family size is	 . 
Monthly Income:
Social Security, pension and money from other sources $1,396.77 
Money from work . . . . . . . . . . . . $0.00 
Total money for month . . . . . . . . . $1,396.77 
Limit for your household size ..... $1,056.00 
Monthly Deductions: 
Money from work not counted . . . . . $0.00 
Money from other sources not counted. $20.00 
Countable Assets: 
Such as cash, bank accounts, investments & vehicles	 $0.00 
Limit for your household. .	 . $2,000.00 
More Information About Your Health Coverage 
The first time we approve Heal th Coverage, we send each el igible pierson a 
Idaho Health Coverage card. If you haven't already received a card, one 
will arrive in about 10 days. 
Keep your card in a safe place. If your card is lost or stolen please call 
me for a replacement. 
Always take your card with you when you get health care services. 
We do not discriminate on the basis of: 
» Age »Color» Disability » Gender 
»Religion »Race »National Origin 
If you believe you have been discriminated against, you can file a 
complaint at your local Health and Welfare office or at either of the 
offices listed below: 
» Civil Rights Manager » Dept of Health and Human Services 
PO Box 83720	 Region X
Boise, ID 83720-0036	 Mall Stop RX-11
 
2201 6th Ave
 
Seattle, WA 98121 
Case Manager: Guy Henry	 Caseload: 55 Case: 714828 Field Office: 3214 2 000102
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RECEIVED 
IDAHO DEPARTM ENT OF OEe 1u 200B 
HEALTH & WELFARE 
C.l. "BUTCH" OTTER· GOVERNOA DIVISION OF MEDICAID 
BUREAU OF FINANCIAL OPERATIONSRICHARD ~~~ffi~&- ~,T'2 008 PO. Box 83720 
Boise, 10 83720·0036 
PHONE 208·287·1150 
FAX 208·334·6515 
Sisson & Sisson
 
2402 West Jefferson St
 
Boise ID 83702
 
RE: George E. Perry MID# 1525875 and Martha J. Perry MID# 1525874 
Dear Mr. Sisson, 
The Department acknowledges the proposal for the property owned by Martha and 
George Perry at 2104 W Tendoy Drive, Boise ID. Upon reviewing the documentation 
you provided, and the current market, the Department agrees that the proposed sale price 
of $150,000 is fair market value. Please inform me who the title company will be, as the 
department will need to review the preliminary HUD I Settlement Statement prior to the 
closing. 
I will need to know what your client's intent is for the proceeds. Will they be using it to 
pay privately for the skilled nursing and or nursing home fees? They may only use it for 
their care and not gift any away. Your prompt response is appreciated. 
We thank you for your cooperation and continued communication with the department. 
If you have questions or need any assistance, please feel free to call me. 
;{~~ 
Estate Recovery Officer 
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'" TITLEONE CORPORATION ".
 
1101 W. River St.
 
Boise, ID 63702
 
(206)424-6511
 
STATEMENT OF SETTLEMENT FOR SELLERS 
PROPERTY ADDRESS: 2104 W. Tendoy Drive, Boise, 10 63705 
PURCHASER/BORROWER(S): Karyl Hayden 
SELLER(S): Martha Jean Boyle and Estate of George Donald Perry 
SETTLEMENT DATE: March 26, 2009 DISBURSED: March 27, 2009 PRORATION DATE: March 27,2009 
DEBIT CREDIT 
Contract Sales Price 160,000.00 
Prorata Sewer & Trash 03/01/09 thru 04130/09 $ 57.30 32.88 
Payoff of first mortgage Wells Fargo 66,574.75 
2nd half 2008 Taxes Ada County Treasurer 861.56 
County Taxes 01/01/09 to 03127109 251.12 
Commissions - Total commissions: to 6.0000 9,600.00 9.600.00 
Less Deposit Retained 1,000.00 
4,800.00 Group One 
4,800.00 SwoDe Investment ProDerties 
Settlement or Closing Fee TItleOne Corporation 262.50 
TItle Insurance Premium Westcor Land TItle Insurance Company 785.00 
Recording Fees TItleOne Corporation 9.00 
Subtotals 78,343.93 160,032.88 
Balance Due TO Seller 81,688.95 
TOTALS 160,032.88 160,032.88 
The above figures do not include sales or use taxes on personal property 
APPROVED and ACCEPTED 
SELLER(S): ESCRpyv A~ # "-­
h1{)L(& ~ t1C/.d1(UaKm/~~ ~ GtitL/~ 
Marttii(Jean B~ 1 oll~.k o"",;I:illeOne Cor~ /
 
Estate of George Donald Perry
 
BvJ?O--tAfkB. ,;/ Y11 (~ ~
 
~~~.
 
(A0982008.PFD/A0982008/21 ) 
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90-DAY INVENTORY OF PROPERTY OF
 
GEORGE D. PERRY, Deceased
 
Date of Death: February 25, 2009
 
RECAPITULATION 
Community Property Separate Property 
Schedule A - Real Estate $ $
 
Schedule B - Cashllnvestments $ $ 81,788.96
 
Schedule C - Miscellaneous Other Property $ $
 
Schedule 0 - Expenses/Costs paid since 0.0.0. $ $ (4,693.04)
 
TOTAL NET VALUE $ $ 77,09592 
SCHEDULE A - REAL ESTATE 
Description Community Property Separate Property 
$ 
Totals $ $ 
SCHEDULE B - CASH 
Community Property Separate Property 
Estate checking wlWelis Fargo $ $ 81,1'88.96 
Totals 
=$=========$=======8=1=,7':88.96 
SCHEDULE C • OTHER MISCELLANEOUS PROPERTY 
Community Property Separate Property 
$ $ 
Totals $ $ 
SCHEDULE 0 . EXPENSES/COSTS PAID SINCE 0.0.0. 
Amount 
Publication fee $ (100.04) 
Attorney's fees $ (4,500.00) 
Filing fee $ (£13.00) 
Totals $ (4,6~13.04) 
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Date 09 f 09 f 2009 
To:	 Barbara McCormick
 
FBO Martha J Perry
 
2525 N Joretta Dr
 
Boise, 10 83704
 
US
 
Regarding Customer:
 
Martha J Perry
 
2525 N Joretta Or
 
Boise, 1083704
 
US
 
To Whom It May Concem: 
This letter is verification that the customer named above has an account with Wells Fargo. This account, number 
2578173540, was opened 01/1412009 and has a current balance of $1682.96. 
If you need deposit information, refer to the customer named above. The account holder can provide deposit 
information from their monthly statements. 
Please call the Wells Fargo Customer Service location at 1-800-869-3557 (1-800...TO-WELLS) if you hi~ve any 
questions. We hope that this information is useful. 
Sincerely, (1 
--=Rt~DwnJ 
Paula Guenat
 
Premier Banker
 
TQOM120699 
L/L d 22	 « 02SS-S££-S02 £L~90nv 06JB~ Sl19M OL:9L 60-60-6002 
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH 
Deputy Attorney General J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
By PATRICIA A DWONCHChief, Human Services Division DEPUT'( 
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT 
Deputy Attorney General 
Human Services Division 
3276 Elder, Ste. B 
POBox 83720 
Boise ID 83720-0036 
Telephone: (208) 332-7961 
ISB No. 3361 
[cartwriw@dhw.idaho.gov] 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
) 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: ) Case No. CV IE 0905214 
) 
GEORGE D. PERRY, ) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
) PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF 
Deceased. ) CLAIM 
---------------) 
COMES NOW the State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter the 
"Department") and submits the following memorandum of points and authorities in support of its 
Petition for Allowance of Claim: 
I. 
ISSUES AND SUMMARY 
The personal representative has filed her "Memorandum in Support ofthe Personal 
Representative's Objection to Department ofHealth and Welfare's Petition for Allowance of 
Claim" (hereinafter "PR Brief') which argues, in essence, that the spousal recovery provisions in 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - I Y:\MRCaseslEstate\PerryM\Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance.wpd 
000111
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1 I \
Idaho Code § 56-218(1) are invalid and pre-empted by federal law. This argument relies 
primarily on the reasoning found in a Minnesota Supreme Court case, In re Estate of Barg, 752 
N.W.2d 52 (2008), in which the Minnesota Supreme Court held that Minnesota's spousal 
recovery law was partially preempted by federal Medicaid law. 
The personal representative's reliance on Barg, however, is misplaced. Whether a 
spouse's estate is subject to recovery is a question of state marital property and probate law. The 
Idaho Supreme Court has already considered this exact issue in the case of Idaho Department of 
Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213,970 P.2d 6 (1998) (copy provided)', and held 
that Idaho law permits spousal recovery where the property had been owned by the Medicaid 
recipient or jointly owned after October 1, 1993. Because each Supreme Court was interpn:ting 
its own state's law, Barg is not necessarily inconsistent with Jackman, but ifit is, Jackman 
controls in Idaho, not Barg. 
Jackman is dispositive in this case. Even ifit were not, however, the real property in this 
estate was jointly held at the time of the decedent's death because the decedent's attempted 
transfer of the property to himself, using his power of attorney, was improper and invalid. 
Therefore, even the Barg decision does not support the disallowance of the Department's estate 
recovery claim. 
'Copies of relevant cases have been provided together with the exhibits as a convenience to court and counsel. 
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BACKGROUND FACTS 
George D. Perry ("George") was born  and died February 25,2009, at the 
age of79. Martha J. Perry ("Martha") was born  and at the time of this 
memorandum is still living. Martha was previously known as Martha Jean Boyle and, no later 
than September 18, 1977, was the owner, as her sole and separate property, of certain real 
property in Ada County. Exhibit A. At some point in time later, Martha and George were 
married. On November 18, 2002, Martha executed a Quitclaim Deed, with the grantor named as 
"Martha Jean Boyle" and the grantee as "Martha Jean Perry & George Donald Perry." Exhibit B. 
At some point, with Martha's health declining, George and Martha needed assistance in pa)ing 
for Martha's care. About September 15, 2006, they applied for medical assistance, also known 
as Medicaid, to help pay for Martha's care. Martha was determined to be eligible for Medicaid 
beginning October 1, 2006. Since that date, the Department has provided payment for Martha's 
care, through the Medicaid program, in the sum of at least $108,364.23.2 
About July 31, 2006, George purported to transfer Martha's interest in the real proP(:rty to 
himself, signing a Quitclaim Deed on behalf ofMartha as her Power of Attorney. See 
Exhibit "A" to Affidavit ofBarbara K. McCormick. As stated earlier, George died February 25, 
2009. On March 19, 2009, Barbara McCormick was appointed personal representative for 
George's estate and on March 26,2009, Barbara McCormick executed a Deed ofDistribution 
conveying the real property to one Karyl Hayden. Exhibit C. The inventory does not reflect the 
2This was the amount on April 27, 2009. Medicaid expenditures are ongoing. 
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real property, but shows "Cash/Investments" in the sum of$81,788.96, which are the net 
proceeds of the sale of the real property.3 On April 8,2009, a Medicaid lien was filed with the 
Secretary of State's Office securing the Department's interest in George's estate. 
A Notice to Creditors was published April 8, 2009. About April 15, 2009, the 
Department filed its Claim Against Estate in the sum of$106,251.08. The Department's claim 
was presented as a contingent claim and stated as follows: 
IMPORTANT: This claim is made in accordance with the Department's 
right to establish its claim pursuant to Idaho Code § 56-218. As long as the 
decedent's spouse survives, there is no demand for payment of this claim. This 
claim is made against any property or estate which, at any time, had been the 
community property ofthe decedent and decedent's spouse, or which had been the 
property ofdecedent's spouse. The Department will not object to distribution of 
the estate to the decedent's surviving spouse. However, the Department demands 
that, before any other distribution of the estate, adequate provision be made for the 
future payment of the Department's claim pursuant to Idaho Code § 
15-3-81O(b)(2). Transfers ofproperty by either spouse (except to one another), 
including transfers by will and the failure to claim probate allowances, may affect 
the eligibility of the survivor for Medicaid services, and may be set aside in 
accordance with Idaho Code § 56-218(2). 
About June 2, 2009, the personal representative filed a Notice ofDisallowance ofClaim. On 
June 15,2009, the Department filed its Petition for Allowance ofClaim. 
3The personal representative suggests that the Department has somehow agreed with her characterization of the 
estate property as separate property because "the Department failed to make any objection to the PR's Inventory." PR 
Brief, p. 3, ~ 7. While it makes no legal difference, the Department notes that there is nothing in the probate code that 
requires the Department to object to errors in the inventory. Therefore, there was no "failure" on the part of the 
Department and the Department has neither acquiesced or agreed to anything by not objecting to the Inventory. 
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III.
 
THIS IS AN ORDINARY SPOUSAL RECOVERY CASE OF 
THE TYPE ANTICIPATED BY IDAHO CODE § 56-218. 
A.	 Estate Recovery Is Simple in Concept. 
While the statutes and rules governing estate recovery can be complicated, the concept of 
estate recovery is actually quite simple: 
Nursing home care has become astonishingly costly. Medicaid assists elderly couples in 
paying for nursing home care. Medicaid is the payer of last resort. Unlike Medicare, Medicaid is 
not an insurance program; there are no premiums or payroll deductions. Medicaid is a public 
welfare program paid for with general fund monies from both the state and federal governments. 
Normally, a person must have exhausted their own resources before becoming eligible for 
Medicaid. A single person can have no more than $2,000 in available resources to qualify. 
When one spouse of a couple needs assistance, the healthy spouse, who will stay at home, needs 
the home, the car, and money, just to survive in the community. The Medicaid spouse is allowed 
to transfer assets to the non-Medicaid spouse to provide for his needs. 
When both spouses have passed away, the couple's assets are recovered to repay 
Medicaid, up to the amount Medicaid has paid. Medicaid assists the needy elderly. It is not 
intended to preserve an inheritance for the able-bodied heirs of Medicaid recipients. 
B.	 This Is an Ordinary Case Falling Squarely Within Idaho Code § 56-218(1). 
The personal representative suggests this is an "as applied" challenge to Idaho law, as if it 
is not the law itself she attacks, but merely the "Department's application of' the law.4 Make no 
4pR Brief, pp. 4, 5, 13, 19. 
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mistake, however, her attack goes to the very core of spousal recovery in Idaho and would 
eviscerate Idaho's estate recovery law. The system is designed to assure the couple's assets are 
available for their needs and permits them to freely transfer property between themselves to 
accomplish that. If recovery were not possible from assets conveyed to the spouse for his needs, 
the only spousal recovery that would be made would be from people too ill-informed to hire an 
elder law attorney to help them transfer their assets. 
Where a single individual is on Medicaid, recovery is simple: When that person dies, the 
state recovers from the assets of her estate. When the nursing home spouse dies first, she 
normally has so little, her property simply passes to her surviving spouse and the state waits. for 
the second death, the death of the surviving spouse, and recovers from the estate of that spouse. 
When, however, the non-Medicaid spouse dies first, as in this case, there are three possibilities: 
(1) Ifthe couple's assets pass by law to the Medicaid spouse, the state merely waits for 
the death ofthe Medicaid spouse and can recover from the resulting joint probate; 
(2) If probate is opened for the non-Medicaid spouse, and the property passes to the 
Medicaid spouse, the Department must file a claim, but will defer recovery and will recover from 
the remaining estate of the Medicaid spouse; 
(3) Ifprobate is opened for the non-Medicaid spouse, and the couple's property is to pass 
to third parties, the Department must file a claim and the estate must provide for the 
Department's future recovery of Medicaid payments. 
This is the process created by Idaho Code § 56-218(1): 
(1) Except where exempted or waived in accordance with federal law 
medical assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an individual who 
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was fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the individual received such 
assistance may be recovered from the individual's estate. and the estate of the 
spouse. if any. for such aid paid to either or both: 
(a) There shall be no adjustment or recovery until after the death ofboth 
the individual and the spouse, if any, and only at a time when the individual has 
no surviving child who is under twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind or 
permanently and totally disabled as defined in 42 U.S.c. 1382c. 
(b) While one (1) spouse survives, except where joint probate will be 
authorized pursuant to section 15-3-111, Idaho Code, a claim for recovery under 
this section may be established in the estate of the deceased spouse. 
(c) The claim against the estate of the first deceased spouse must be made 
within the time provided by section 15-3-801(b). Idaho Code. if the estate is 
administered and actual notice is given to the director as required by subsection 
(5) of this section. However, if there is no administration of the estate of the first 
deceased spouse, or if no actual notice is given to the director as required by 
subsection (5) ofthis section, no claim shall be required until the time provided 
for creditor claims in the estate of the survivor. 
Idaho Code § 56-218(1) (underline added). 
The Department's claim in cases like this falls under Idaho Code § 15-3-810 and requires 
that, before assets are passed to third parties (not the spouse), arrangements are made for the 
future payment of the Department's claim: 
15-3-810. Claims not due and contingent or unliquidated claims. 
(a) If a claim which will become due at a future time or a contingent or 
unliquidated claim becomes due or certain before the distribution of the estate, 
and if the claim has been allowed or established by a proceeding, it is paid in the 
same manner as presently due and absolute claims of the same class. 
(b) In other cases the personal representative or, on petition of the personal 
representative or the claimant in a special proceeding for the purpose, the court 
may provide for payment as follows: 
(1) if the claimant consents, he may be paid the present or agreed value of 
the claim, taking any uncertainty into account; 
(2) arrangement for future payment, or possible payment, on the happening 
of the contingency or on liquidation may be made by creating a trust, giving a 
mortgage, obtaining a bond or security from a distributee, or otherwise. 
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Idaho Code § 15-3-810 (underline added). The contingency, of course, is the death ofthe 
Medicaid spouse. 
In this case, the entire estate is traceable to property Martha, the Medicaid spouse, owned 
at the time she married George. By rule, the Department makes its recovery only from property 
in which the Medicaid spouse had an interest at some point in the past. IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20 
provides, in part: 
20. Limitations on Estate Claims. 
* * *A claim against the estate of a spouse of a participant is limited to 
the value of the assets of the estate that had been, at any time after October I, 
1993, community property, or the deceased participant's share of the separate 
property, and jointly owned property.... 
IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20. Therefore, ifGeorge had had separate property, that had always been 
retained as his separate property, the Department would not recover from that property for 
Medicaid paid for Martha. 
IV. 
THE IDAHO SUPREME COURT HAS ALREADY 
REJECTED THE PRE-EMPTION ARGUMENT MADE 
HERE. 
The personal representative makes the simplistic argument that federal law only permits 
recovery from the estate of the Medicaid recipient. She argues that since Martha transferred her 
property to George before George died, and George carefully disinherited Martha in his will, 
Martha must now be left destitute on public assistance, and the heirs named in the will should 
share the estate assets free from any claim for Medicaid reimbursement. Obviously, this is not 
what the legislature intended and is contrary to the simple principle of Medicaid recovery. 
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Congress and the legislature intended to assist the Medicaid spouse and protect the non-Medicaid 
spouse. They did not intend to spend taxpayer money paying for Martha's care so George's heirs 
could have Martha's property. Were the drafters of the Medicaid recovery laws so shortsighted? 
No. The Idaho Supreme Court has already considered this question and has upheld estate 
recovery in cases such as this. 
A. The Federal Pre-emption Issue Was Thoroughly Presented to the Idaho Supreme Court in 
the Case ofIdaho Department ofHealth and Welfare v. Jackman. 
In the case ofIdaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 
P.2d 6 (1998), the Idaho Supreme Court upheld recovery from the estate ofthe non-Medicaiid 
spouse. In the Jackman case the Medicaid spouse, Hildor, transferred all her property to her 
spouse, Lionel, in order to qualify for Medicaid. Hildor passed away and Lionel passed away 
two weeks later. Jackman was appointed personal representative of Lionel's estate and the 
Department filed an estate recovery claim. The personal representative challenged the 
Department's claim on numerous grounds including federal pre-emption. Exhibit D.5 The Idaho 
Supreme Court upheld Idaho's spousal recovery law, holding that the expanded definition of 
estate permitted by federallaw6 and adopted by Idaho Code § 56-218(4)(b), together with the 
definition of assets found at 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(l), validated recovery ofproperty that had, at 
any time after October I, 1993, been community property. 
5S0 that the court can see how completely the pre-emption argument was made to the Idaho Supreme Court in 
Jackman, the Department has provided copies of the briefing in the Jackman case as Exhibit D hereto. The same 
argument the personal representative makes here was made by Jackman. See Respondent's Brief (Oct. 8, I997), Section 
IV, p. 16. 
642 U.S.c. § I396p(b){4)(B). 
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The Jackman decision must be read carefully because ofthe way it was decided. The 
final decision is an edited version, altered on re-hearing, of the original decision of the court. It 
is helpful to understand the original decision and the reason for the court's alteration on 
rehearing. In the court's first decision, the Supreme Court held wholly in favor of the 
Department. Exhibit E. Upon Petition for Rehearing, the Supreme Court modified its decision 
because the effective date of the federal law on which they had relied in their original opinion 
was after the date of the couple's marriage settlement agreement. The court, therefore, held that 
recovery would be limited to property that had been community property after the effective date 
ofthe federal law, "OBRA 93."7 Effectively, the court upheld spousal recovery against the 
federal pre-emption argument, but in the Jackman case, the couple's property had been divided 
by a marriage settlement agreement in April, 1993, prior to the effective date of the law. 
The published summary ofthe case correctly captures this two part holding: 
... The Supreme Court, Johnson, 1., held that: (1) ifthe estate ofthe individual 
who received Medicaid assistance is inadequate to repay the full amount of the 
assistance received, the Department can recover the balance from the estate of the 
surviving spouse, but (2) federal law, as in effect when recipient and her husband 
entered into marital settlement agreement transmuting most of recipient's and 
husband's community property into separate property ofhusband, limited the 
Department to recovering any community property recipient and husband may 
have accumulated after the agreement. 
Jackman, 132 Idaho at 213, 970 P.2d at 6 (underline added). Justice Johnson's introduction also 
explains the court's holding: 
This is a Medicaid recovery case. We conclude that section 56-218(1) of 
the Idaho Code (I.C.), as it existed at times applicable to this case, authorized the 
7This limitation is embodied in IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20 cited above,limiting spousal recovery to property that 
had been community property at any time after October I, 1993. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 10 Y:\MRCases\Estate\PerryMlMemorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance.wpd 
000120
  
 
 
 
,,
 
 
 
 
 
 
, li i
1
\  
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (the Department) to recover from the 
available estate of a surviving spouse the balance of Medicaid payments received 
by an individual who was fifty-five years old or older when receiving the 
payments if the individual's estate is inadequate to repay the entire amount. We 
conclude, however, that federal law applicable to this case prohibited this 
recovery, except from any community property the spouses may have accumulated 
after a marriage settlement agreement transmuting their community property into 
separate property of each. 
Jackman, 132 Idaho at 214,970 P.2d at 7 (underline added). Justice Johnson explained that the 
Department was limited in the Jackman case only because the marriage settlement agreement 
was executed before the effective date of the federal law expanding the definition of estate for 
Medicaid recovery purposes: 
We conclude that this definition of "assets" is not applicable to the 
agreement, which Jackman signed on behalf of Lionel and Hildor on March 8, 
1993. The definition of"assets" contained in the 1993 amendments to the federal 
statute does not apply "with respect to assets disposed ofon or before the date of 
the enactment ofthis Act [Aug. 10, 19931." Pub.L. 103-66, § 13611(e). Therefore, 
it does not apply to the agreement and does not allow the Department to recover 
the balance of the Medicaid payments from Lionel's separate property. This is true 
even though 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(4), which applies to Medicaid payments for 
calendar quarters beginning on or after October I, 1993, authorizes the 
Department to recover the Medicaid payments from "other assets." Without the 
definition of "assets" contained in 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(e)(l), "other assets" are 
only those included within Hildor's estate, as defined by I.c. § 15-1-201(15). 
Lionel's separate property, including the community property transmuted by the 
agreement, is not part ofHildor's estate. 
Jackman, 132 Idaho at 216-7,970 P.2d at 9-10 (underline added). 
To understand the breadth of the Jackman decision and why it necessarily applies in this 
case, it is valuable to understand that the Supreme Court's reasoning is based on the interaction 
between Idaho marital law and federal Medicaid law. As discussed more fully in section V, 
below, what property is available for estate recovery is a question of state law, not federal law. 
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Idaho Code § 56-218(4)(b) and 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) provided the expanded definition of 
estate. Then, importantly, 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(e)(1)8 provided as follows: 
(1) The term "assets", with respect to an individual, includes all income 
and resources of the individual and of the individual's spouse, including any 
income or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse is entitled to 
but does not receive because of action­
(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse, 
(B) by a person, including a court or administrative body, with legal 
authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual or such individual's 
spouse, or 
(C) by any person, including any court or administrative body, acting at the 
direction or upon the request of the individual or such individual's spouse. 
42 U.S.c. § 1396p(h)(1) (underline added). Therefore, where a spouse divests herself of assets, 
even where permitted by Medicaid law, those assets are estate assets for purposes of Medicaid 
recovery. 
As noted, above, in Jackman, the court altered its decision because it determined the 
transfer of assets from Hildor to Lionel occurred prior to the enactment of the OBRA '93 which 
included both 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) and 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(e)(1).9 The court remanded 
the matter for a determination of what community property the parties had acquired since their 
marriage settlement agreement. The only reason the Department was not permitted to recover the 
property transferred through the marriage settlement agreement was because of the timing: the 
marriage settlement agreement divided the property before the effective date of OBRA '93. 
~ow 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(l) (the numbering was changed after DRA 2005). 
9See Exhibit D Jackman Respondent's Rehearing Brief, p. 28. 
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Therefore, the Jackman case conclusively holds that in Idaho, the Department may 
recover from the estate of the spouse as long as the property had been community property, 
jointly owned property, or the property of the Medicaid spouse, at any time after October I, 1993. 
v. 
THE DECISION IN BARG DOES NOT CHANGE 
JACKMAN. 
The personal representative bases her claim ofpreemption on a Minnesota case, In r,~ 
Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52 (2008). In Barg the Minnesota Supreme Court found that 
Minnesota's spousal recovery statute was partially preempted by federal law. As discussed 
above, the Jackman case relied on the interaction between Idaho law and federal law. Therefore, 
the Barg holding and the Jackman holding, in which each state's highest court was interpreting 
its own law, is not necessarily inconsistent. 
A. The Barg Decision Did Not Consider the Decisive Issue in Jackman. 
The Idaho Supreme Court, in Jackman, found 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(1)lo significant in 
their analysis. The original decision stated the following: 
Federal law encompasses recovery both from the estate of the recipient as 
well as from the estate of the surviving spouse. The federal definition of asset is 
significant. Federal law includes within the recipient's estate "all real and 
personal property and other assets included within the individual's estate ..." and 
"any other real and personal property and other assets in which the individual had 
any legal title or interest at the time ofdeath ....." 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4); I.C. § 
56-218(4). Under federal law, Hildor's assets would include her income and 
resources as well as Lionel's income and resources. The agreement does not 
affect the status of the assets that federal law considers to be part of the recipient's 
estate because the definition of assets includes "income or resources which the 
individual or such individual's spouse is entitled to but does not receive because 
l~OW 42 U.S.c. *1396p(h)(1). 
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of action by a person ... with legal authority to act in place of or on behalf of the 
individual or such individual's spouse." 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(e)(l)(B). Jackman's 
signing of the agreement constituted action by a person on behalf ofHildor and 
Lionel. Federal law does not prohibit the Department from recovering the balance 
of the Medicaid payments from Lionel's estate. 
Jackman, original opinion, p. 4 (Exhibit E) (underline added). On rehearing, the Supreme Court 
did not retreat from their original holding except to recognize the marriage settlement agreement 
was executed before the "assets" definition of 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(e)(1)(B) came into effect: 
We conclude that this definition of "assets" is not applicable to the 
agreement, which Jackman signed on behalf of Lionel and Hildor on March 8, 
1993. The definition of "assets" contained in the 1993 amendments to the federal 
statute does not apply "with respect to assets disposed of on or before the date of 
the enactment of this Act [Aug. 10, 1993]." Pub.L. 103-66, § 1361 1(e). Therefore, 
it does not apply to the agreement and does not allow the Department to recover 
the balance of the Medicaid payments from Lionel's separate property. This is true 
even though 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4), which applies to Medicaid payments for 
calendar quarters beginning on or after October 1, 1993, authorizes the 
Department to recover the Medicaid payments from "other assets." Without the 
def'mition of "assets" contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(l), "other assets" are 
only those included within Hildor's estate, as defined by I.C. § 15-1-201(5). 
Lionel's separate property, including the community property transmuted by the 
agreement, is not part ofHi1dor's estate. 
Jackman, 132 Idaho at 216-7,970 P.2d at 9-10 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court didn't 
change its mind about the effect of 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(e)(1 ). In fact, by necessary implication, it 
stated that with the definition ofassets contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(1) the transferred 
assets would have been part ofHildor's estate, and therefore, subject to recovery. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in Barg, did not even consider the effect of this important 
definition of "assets." Therefore, the Barg court didn't even consider or discuss the section of 
federal law the Idaho Supreme Court found dispositive in Jackman. 
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B. The State of Minnesota Has Already Amended its Law to Overcome the Barg Holding. 
The Barg decision is an anomaly with limited application. It runs directly contrary to 
other state supreme court decisions such as Jackman and In re Estate ofWirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882 
(N.D. 2000) (copy provided). It is understandable, then, that Minnesota has already amended its 
state law to overcome the holding of its supreme court in Barg. Exhibit F is a copy of changes 
made to Minnesota law in 2009 for the express purpose of fixing the Barg decision. This 
legislation makes it clear that a Medicaid recipient's marital assets, at death, include assets 
jointly owned at any time during marriage, even when transferred by the Medicaid spouse to the 
non-Medicaid spouse. See Exhibit F, Subd. 2b. This is exactly the effect of the Idaho Supreme 
Court's holding in Jackman. 
Obviously, if Minnesota can correct Barg by a statutory change, it is state law and not 
federal law, per se, that creates the problem. The Idaho Supreme Court's interpretation of 
Idaho's existing law already overcomes the Barg decision. 
The personal representative here cites, with approval, the Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae on Minnesota's Petition for Certiorari. II In that brief, the Solicitor General 
argues that Supreme Court review is unnecessary because Minnesota is in the process offix:lng 
the Barg decision through new legislation. In doing so, the Solicitor General recognizes that 
what property is available for estate recovery is a question of state, not federal, law: 
Moreover, although the federal Medicaid Act limits estate recovery to 
those assets in which the Medicaid recipient had a legal interest at the time ofher 
lIThe personal representative claims, without any authority whatsoever, that "Idaho is legally obligated to abide 
by HHS/CMS interpretations offederal Medicaid law." PR Brief, pp. 18-19. She goes on to suggest that Idaho must 
follow the legal arguments of the Solicitor General in its Amicus brief in Barg. ld. This is not true. Idaho is bound by 
federal law and appropriately promulgated rules, not by legal arguments by federal government attorneys. 
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death, the nature and extent of such interests remain largely the domain of state 
law. Notably, Minnesota's Governor has proposed redefining marital property 
interests to pennit recovery ofmedical assistance from the estate of the 
later-surviving spouse in this context. See Governor's Recommendation, 
Minnesota State Budget, 2010-11 Biennial Budget, Human Services Dep 't 132 
(Jan. 27,2009). That proposal has not become law, nor has it been reviewed by 
the Secretary ofHHS. The proposal, however, suggests that Minnesota may be 
able to work toward greater asset recovery consistent with the clear tenns of 
federal Medicaid law. 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Minnesota's Petition for Certiorari, pp. 15-16 
(underline added) (Appendix 2 to PR Brief). Therefore, the Solicitor General clearly recognized 
that state law, not federal Medicaid law, detennines what property is available for Medicaid 
recovery. 
The Solicitor General, in its Amicus brief also discussed the North Dakota Wirtz case, 
and noted that the contrary holding in Wirtz could simply be a difference in state law, and not 
necessarily a conflict with Barg: 
Although its reasoning is not entirely clear, the court in Wirtz appeared to 
conclude that the recipient in that case, despite fonnal conveyance of certain 
assets before death, retained an interest in the relevant property until his death, 
when the interest was conveyed to his spouse through "other arrangement." 607 
N.W.2d at 885 (quoting 42 U.S.c. 1396p(b)(4)(B)). The court did not elaborate on 
the nature of that interest, although it referred to the State's argument that the 
recipient had retained a "marital or equitable interest" in the assets at the time of 
his death, id. at 883, and noted that other courts had interpreted Section 
1396p(b)(4)(B) to reach state-law community-property and homestead interests, 
id. at 885. 
The different results reached by the North Dakota Supreme Court and the 
court below on similar facts thus may reflect not conflicting interpretations of 
federal Medicaid law, but only different views ofwhen, under state law, a spouse 
retains a legal interest in property conveyed to his or her spouse. 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Minnesota's Petition for Certiorari, p. 14 
(underline added) (Appendix 2 to PR Brief). 
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Like the North Dakota Supreme Court in Wirtz, the Idaho Supreme Court has already held 
that Idaho's law pennits recovery under the circumstances of this case. These holdings are not 
necessarily inconsistent with Barg. The Barg decision has limited application to Minnesota and 
has already been corrected by a change in Minnesota law. 
VI. 
GEORGE'S GIFT OF MARTHA'S PROPERTY TO 
HIMSELF WAS INEFFECTIVE TO ELIMINATE 
MARTHA'S COMMUNITY INTEREST. 
In this case, Martha brought the real property of this estate into the marriage as her sole 
and separate property. See Exhibit A. She later transferred the property to herself and to George, 
granting George an interest in the property. Exhibit B. George later transferred Martha's interest 
to himself. Exhibit "A" to Affidavit of Barbara K. McConnick. However, the transfer of 
Martha's interest to George, was not perfonned by Martha, but by George using his power of 
attorney for Martha. See id. The power of attorney, however, contains no provision pennitting 
gifting, much less, self-gifting. Exhibit G. Indeed, the power of attorney includes some language 
clearly prohibiting self dealing. See Exhibit G, ~~ G and H. George's gift to himself was, 
therefore, invalid, and failed to eliminate Martha's interest in the real property. While this failure 
is irrelevant under Jackman, even if the court were to follow Barg. this estate is still subject to 
recovery. 
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A. A Power of Attorney Does Not Support Making Gifts Unless it Contains an Expres~! 
Authorization. 
It is black-letter law that a power of attorney does not grant authority to make gifts absent 
an express provision in the power of attorney granting that power. As stated in 3 Am. Jur. 2d 
Agency § 87, "The authority of an agent to make a gift on behalf of the principal must be 
express." Courts have uniformly supported this view. In Kunewa v. Joshua, 83 Hawaii 65, 924 
P.2d 559,565 (Haw.Ct.App.1996) (copy provided), the court explained: 
Moreover, courts have routinely held that in the absence of express written 
authorization, an agent may not gratuitously convey the principal's property to 
himself. See, e.g., Hodges v. Surratt, 366 So.2d 768 (Fla.App.l978) (agent 
exceeded authority in appropriating for agent's own use funds in decedent 
principal's checking account in the absence of clear language to that effect in the 
power of attorney), cert. denied, 376 So.2d 76 (Fla.l979); In re Estate of 
DeBelardino, 77 Misc.2d 253, 352 N.Y.S.2d 858, 863 (Sur.Ct.1974) (power of 
attorney, no matter how broadly drawn, cannot be held to encompass an 
authorization to attorney-in-fact to make gift to himself ofprincipal's property; 
such a gift carries with it a presumption of impropriety and self-dealing, a 
presumption which can be overcome only with the clearest showing of principal's 
intent to make the gift), affd, 47 A.D.2d 589, 363 N.Y.S.2d 974 (1975). 
Kunewa, 83 Hawaii at 71, 924 P.2d at 565; see also Matter of Estate of Crabtree, 550 N.W.2d 
168 (lowa,1996) (absent express grant in power of attorney, ofpower to make gift, 
attorney-in-fact did not have that power) (copy provided); Aiello v. Clark, 680 P.2d 1162, 1166 
(Alaska 1984) (in the absence of express authority to make a gift, none maybe made) (copy 
provided); Cheloha v. Cheloha, 255 Neb. 32, 582 N.W.2d 291 (1998) (no gift may be made by an 
attorney in fact to himself unless the power to make such a gift is expressly granted in the 
instrument itself) (copy provided). 
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Idaho law is consistent with these pronouncements. In Idaho, powers of attorney are 
strictly construed not to authorize acts beyond those specified. Arthur v. Kilpatrick Bros. Co., 47 
Idaho 306, 274 P. 800 (1929) (copy provided); accord Eaton v. McWilliams, 52 Idaho 145, 12 
P.2d 259 (1932). In the case of Jensen v. Sidney Stevens Implement Co., 36 Idaho 348,210 P. 
1003 (1922), the Idaho Supreme Court said: 
... [I]f an agent makes any profit in the course ofhis agency because ofhis failure 
to inform his principal of facts known to him, or which in the exercise of due 
diligence he should have ascertained for his principal, the profits of such 
transaction, as a matter of law, will belong exclusively to the agent's principal. 
The law guards the fiduciary relation, which the relation of principal and agent is, 
with jealous care. It seeks to prevent the possibility of a conflict between duty and 
personal interest. It demands that the agent shall work with an eye single to the 
interest of his principal. It forbids him from acting adversely to his principal, 
either for himself or for others. 
Jensen, 36 Idaho at ,210 P. at 1005 (underline added). 
Likewise, Idaho Code § 32-912 requires an "express power of attorney" for one spouse to 
conveyor encumber community property: 
32-912. Control of community property. - Either the husband or the 
wife shall have the right to manage and control the community property, and 
either may bind the community property by contract, exctmt that neither the 
husband nor wife may selL conveyor encumber the community real estate unless 
the other joins in executing the sale agreement, deed or other instrument of 
conveyance by which the real estate is sold. conveyed or encumbered, and any 
community obligation incurred by either the husband or the wife without the 
consent in writing of the other shall not obligate the separate property of the 
spouse who did not so consent; provided, however, that the husband or wife may 
by express power of attorney give to the other the complete power to sell, 
conveyor encumber community property, either real or personal. All deeds, 
conveyances, bills of sale, or evidences ofdebt heretofore made in conformity 
herewith are hereby validated. 
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Idaho Code § 32-912 (emphasis added).12 The title company may have recognized this defc;~ct 
when it required the signature of Martha on the closing statement when the personal 
representative sold the real property.13 See Exhibit "D" to Affidavit of Barbara K. McCormick. 
Therefore, even if the court were to find that Barg were controlling law in Idaho, thc;~ 
estate is still subject to the Department's claim: The deed George executed conveying Martha's 
interest in the property to himself, using his power of attorney for Martha, is ineffective to 
extinguish Martha's interest in the real property. 
VII.
 
CONCLUSION
 
The question presented by the personal representative has already been conclusively 
decided by the Idaho Supreme Court in the case ofIdaho Department of Health and Welfare v. 
Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6 (1998). The Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in ~.arg 
has no application to Idaho marital property law. Even ifBarg were applicable in Idaho, this 
estate is still subject to recovery because George's attempted gift of Martha's interest to himself 
is invalid. The Department's claim should be allowed in full. 
DATED this 29th day of January, 2010, 
Deputy Attorney General 
12The Uniform Power ofAttorney Act, adopted in 2008, was not in effect at the time of the transfer ofMartha's 
interest to George, but it also includes the requirement for an express grant of authority to make a gift of the principle's 
property. Idaho Code § 15-12-201(1)(b), (c). 
13Barbara K McCormick signed not only as personal representative for George's estate, but also as attorney in 
fact for Martha. 
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~Ll~ @.rurn.£J
Marche e Premo, Legal AssIstant 
Division of Human Services 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 21 Y:\MRCases\Estate\PerryM\Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance.wpd 
000131
· )j;t  
 ,
 
 
 
 
 
 
WfM.Atlt. ./UtY1-£! 
H i
EXHIBITS
 
A Affidavit of Blaine F. Evans 
B Quitclaim Deed dated 11/1812002 
C Deed of Distribution dated 03/2612009 
D Jackman Briefing 
Appellant's Brief 
Respondent's Brief 
Reply Brief 
Brief of Respondent i
Limited Response to 
n Support of Petition for Rehearing 
Petition for Rehearing 
E Original Jackman Decision 
F Minnesota Statutory Change 
G Power of Attorney 
CASES 
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213,970 P.2d 6 (1998) 
In re Estate of Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 2000) 
Kunewa v. Joshua, 83 Hawaii 65, 924 P.2d 559,565 (Haw.Ct.App.1996) 
Matter of Estate of Crabtree, 550 N.W.2d 168 (Iowa,1996) 
Aiello v. Clark, 680 P.2d 1162, 1166 (Alaska 1984) 
Cheloha v. Cheloha, 255 Neb. 32, 582 N.W.2d 291 (1998) 
Arthur v. Kilpatrick Bros. Co., 47 Idaho 306, 274 P. 800 (1929) 
Eaton v. McWilliams, 52 Idaho 145, 12 P.2d 259 (1932) 
Jensen v. Sidney Stevens Implement Co., 36 Idaho 348, 210 P. 1003 (1922) 
000132
 
/
/
04/08/2008 14:31 FAX 2878848 Clerks Office I4J 002/00:? 
,1 
7745004 
A F FlO A V I T
- - ~ -, - -. - - ­
STATE OF IDAHO 
ss. 
County of Ada 
Blaine F. Evans, being !irst dUly sworn on oath, deposes 
:t. '" ~ ....~.,~~~."'\.""?:«j ~.' 
and says: 
That he wa~ the attorney for Martha Jean Boyle at all 
times mentioned here1n. In that certain agreament by and 
between Martha Jean Soyle and Henry F~ancie Boyle dated 
April 1, 1960, Henry Franci8 Boyle agreed to furnish ~artha , .~~ .. 
J@an Boyle with a reQidance of nar choice to be located'in 
. ,\ .. ~. Aaa co~nty, !daho.:i).J;> ,
;". " 
'~ ..J, •• ~hat thereafter in an aqreement dated the 13th day ofitJ·\ ,"::~~(~.~1II, .• 
January, 1964, by ana between Henry r~anc1~ aoyle ana Martha 
,,~. -.;,1 • 'II' 
:;c,~,~" ' ',' " Jean Boyle, Henry rrancis Boyle a~reed ,that,' the house eelecteC!,.,o_~!8'~,\;-~.", " .. ",',~ , ~ 
. in Boisa, Idaho was the ~eparate property of his wife which 
said agreement was ~pproveo by the Secon~ Judicial District 
Court of the S~ate of Nevada, in ana fo~ the County of washoe 
on the 26th day of March, 1964. That the house sslected by 
Martha Jean Boyle and ref~rred to 1n 9aid agreements and in 
the court decree was and is aescribed Be follows: 
Lot 115 of Col~mbus Park Subdivision No.2,
accord1ng to the plat ~nereo~ f1led 1n the 
recorda of Ada County, Idaho. 
.., oil .~••
. .... ...~ DATED This ~aaY of September, 1977. 
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ADA COUNTY RECORDER J. DAVID NAVARRO 
BOISE IDAHO 11118102 03:52 PM 
DEPUTY Joanne Hooper 
RECOftDED - REQUEST OF IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIUIIIIIIIIIIIII 
AMOUNT 6.00 1021357~~2 
{lwJiA +-f:lLl.~ &r 
LF298-04 
R298-04 QUITCLAIM DEED 
u Ih /\It, ue;flb e~ . ~ 
TillS QUITCLAIM DEED, executed this .d I 0 - day of 0' , 20 ...t ~ tJ 
by first party, Grantor, 1'1~ tlJLA4 iJ~L 
whose post office address is • ,/J d. ,. ~:~£... 
tosecondparty,Grantee, ~tfe~ r~/¥~a,. (J ) 
whose post office address is .:?/?J'; re~yJ t5/J /.5eJ T d~. ?.3 76J ,) 
WITNESSEm, That the said first party, for good consideration and for the sum of 
Dollars ($ 0 ) 
paid by the said second party, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, does hereby remise, relf:ase 
and quitclaim unto the said second party forever, aJl the right, title, interest and claim which the said first 
party has in and to the following described parcel of land, and improvements and appurtenances thereto in 
the County of /?cia 'State of Z::da!tp to wit: 
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This prodUCI does nol constilUte the rendering of legal advice or services. This product is intended for infonnational use only and is nOI a sut4_.i~~I!I!!~-"
 
advice. State laws vary. so consult an attorney on all legal maners. This producl was nol necessarily prepared by a person licensed to practice la EXHIBIT 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, The said first party has signed and sealed these presents the day and year 
first ahov written. Signed, sealed d delivered in presence of: 
71fM -d..Ii...' ()Uk. 
Signature of First P y 
;'1It:< ('l-hCi Jea YL 
Print name of First Party 
Signature of Witness Signature of First Party 
Print name of Witness Print name of First Party 
State of rDtoJ,"\o
 
County of AdC\ .
 
On I I I '&{0 2 before me, Lo..lA. r I e ~ .-rra..u...trWV\- ,
 
appeared Geor,\Q.. ~ ~e.f2..~'-\" 71l()..Y-t~ ~V\.. Pt...el.j
 
personally known ref me (Or proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence) to be the person(s) whose
 
name(s) is/are subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he/she/they executed the
 
same in his/her/their authorized capacity(ies), and that by his/her/their signature(s) on the instrument the
 
person(s), or the entity upon behalf of which the person(s) acted, executed the instrument.
 
W ESS my hand and official seal.
 
.JA 
Affiant Known ofProduced ID 
Type of ID --,=b~L::....-_-r-- _ 
(Seal) 
State of
 
County of
 
On
 
appeared
 
personally known to me (or proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence) to be the person(s) wh,:>se
 
name(s) is/are subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he/she/they executed the
 
same in his/her/their authorized capacity(ies), and that by his/her/their signature(s) on the instrument the
 
person(s), or the entity upon behalf of which the person(s) acted, executed the instrument.
 
WITNESS my hand and official seal.
 
Signature of Notary 
Page 2 
Affiant Known__Produced ID 
Type of ID _ 
(Seal) 
Signature of Preparer 
Print Name of Preparer 
Address of Preparer 
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DEED OF DISTRIBUTION 
!+rfI~2rxf( Ai/lSD BY PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
THIS DEED, made by BARBARA K. MCCORMICK, as Personal Representative of the
 
Estate of George D. Perry, deceased, Grantor, to KARYL HAYDEN, an unmarried person,
 
Grantee, whose current address is 2295 Sunset Peak Road, Boise, Idaho, 83702;
 
WHEREAS, Grantor is the qualified Personal Representative of said estate, filed as Case
 
No. CV IE 0905214, in Ada County, Idaho;
 
WHEREAS, Grantee is entitled to distribution of the hereinafter described real property 
THEREFORE, Grantor quitclaims, transfers, and conveys to Grantee the following
 
described real property in Ada County, Idaho:
 
See Exhibit "A" attached hereto. 
with all appurtenances. 
EXECUTED this/C, day of ~vA. ,20~. 
g~~I!-YVt~ 
BARBARA K. MCCORMICK, 
Personal Representative of the Estate 
of George D. Perry 
STATE OF IDAHO	 )
 
: ss
 
County of_---=41-'~r;oo~	 ) 
On this -2G..- day of iJJ4", d ,20~, before me, the undersigned, a notary
 
public 'in and for said state, personally appeared, BARBARA K. MCCORMICK, known or
 
identified to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument, as Personal
 
Representative of the Estate of George D. Perry, deceased, and acknowledged to me that she
 
executed the same as such Personal Representative.
 
IN WIlNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the day 
and year firsrJjt	 d d ~aboV:;~.. 
~11t1 ~~~ NO~d for Idaho 
2 .. Q~ \ ~ : Residing at Cameren Mer dd ' Idaho 
<of -... M'" ... aan: .a..: y commisSion ~: 88i- 'IB .
'I Q YoLON I	 • _ ........':'" • -.
 
'\ ()'" •••~ CommissIOn Expires' 10"1I11111... _ 
DEEDOF;;i'~~~BYPERSONALREPRESENTATIVE-l . EXHIBIT 
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  DI~ ON BY PERSONAL EPR SENTATIVE - 1 EXHIBIT 
EXHIBIT "A"
 
lot 115 of Columbus Park No.2, according to the official plat thereof, filed in Book 16 of Plats at Page(s) 1065 
and 1066, official records of Ada County, Idaho. 
Exhibit "A" 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO \...:_--~__~~./ 
In the Matter of the Estate of ) 
) Supreme Court No. 23928 
LIONEL MALCOLM KNUDSON, ) 
) 
Deceased. ) 
--------------:)) 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND ) 
WELFARE, ) 
) 
Petitioner/Appellant, ) 
) 
~. ) 
) 
BARBARA JACKMAN, PERSONAL ) 
REPRESENTATIVE for the Estate of ) 
LIONEL MALCOLM KNUDSON, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
--------------,) 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Latah. 
Honorable JOHN R. STEGNER, District Judge, Presiding. 
\V. Corey Cartwright William C. Kirsch 
Deputy Attorney General Attorney at Law 
Division ofHwnan Services P.O. Box 9384 
P.O. Box 83720 Moscow, ID 83843-9384 
Boise, ill 83720-0036 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
EXHIBIT 
o 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
In the Matter of the Estate of	 ) 
) Supreme Court No. 23928 
LIONEL MALCOLM KNUDSON, )
 
)
 
Deceased. )
 
---------------:))
 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND )
 
WELFARE, )
 
) 
PetitionedAppellan~	 ) 
) 
w.	 ) 
) 
BARBARA JACKMAN, PERSONAL )
 
REPRESENTATIVE for the Estate of )
 
LIONEL MALCOLM KNUDSON, )
 
)
 
..... Respondent.)
 
--------------) 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Latah. 
Honorable JOHN R. STEGNER, District Judge, Presiding. 
W. Corey Cartwright William C. Kirsch
 
Deputy Attorney General Attorney at Law
 
Division of Human Services P.O. Box 9384
 
P.O. Box 83720 Moscow, ill 83843-9384 
Boise, ill 83720-0036 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT	 ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
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STATEl\1ENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature Of The Case. 
This is a Medicaid liestate recovery" case. The petitioner/appellant is the Idaho 
Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter I'Department"). The respondent is the 
appointed personal representative of the estate of Lionel Knudson, Barbara Jackman . 
(hereinafter "Jackman" or "personal representative"). Jackman is the adult daughter of 
Lionel and Hildor Knudson, both deceased. 
Medicaid, referred to as lI medical assistance" in Idaho statutes, is a joint State-
federal program that provides medical care to the poor. I Eligibility is based on limited 
income and resources of the Medicaid recipient and the recipient's spouse. Certain 
resources (in this case the decedents' home) are excluded in determining eligibility. 
Where Medicaid pays for nursing care or certain home-based care for persons over 55 
years of age, Idaho Code § 56-218 (Appendix A) permits the State to recover its 
Medicaid payments from the estate of the recipient or the recipient's spouse, after both 
have passed away. This case involves the State's attempted recovery from the estates 
of a deceased Medicaid recipient and her deceased spouse. 
I Unlike Social Security or Medicare, Medicaid is not an insurance program. No premiwns are paid 
for entitlement to benefits. There is no pool which assumes the risk ofloss as an insurer does, Rather, 
Medicaid is a fonn ofwelfare funded directly by taxpayers. 
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B, Course Of Proceedings. 
This matter arose as a claim by the Department against the estate of Lionel 
Knudson for recovery of Medicaid payments made on behalf of Lionel Knudson's 
spouse Hildor Knudson. The personal representative failed to pay the Department's 
claim and the Department brought a Petition for Allowance of Claim, to which the 
personal representative objected. Hearing was held on May 6, 1996, and the court, 
William C. Hamlett, Magistrate, presiding, entered a Memorandum Decision 
(Appendix B) on January 17, 1997, holding the Department was not entitled to recover 
from Lionel Knudson's estate. The Department appealed to the District Court which 
reviewed the briefs filed before the magistrate and accepted supplemental briefs. The 
District Court, heard oral argument on May 28, 1997, and affirmed the magistrate's 
decision by order entered June 4, 1997. This appeal followed. 
C. Statement Of The Facts. 
Hildor L. Knudson, the spouse of Lionel Malcolm Knudson, was a recipient of 
Medicaid. R. p. 25. From about January, 1993, until her death on October 27, 1994, 
Medicaid paid for most of Hildor's nursing home care. In all, the public paid 
$41,600.55 on her behalf. R. pp. 25-40. 
Hildor was eligible for Medicaid because, through a Marriage Settlement 
Agreement (Appendix q, she had conveyed the bulk of her interest in community 
property to her spouse. R. pp. 63-66. Such inter-spousal transfers are permitted by 
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.~	 both State and federal law.2 Indeed, the very purpose of the Marriage Settlement 
Agreement was to impoverish Hildor so she would be eligible to receive Medicaid. 
Lionel Knudson, as the community spouse, received all of the couple's property except 
for an irrevocable burial trust and $1 ,90fr3 in the parties' accounts. R. pp. 63-66. The 
agreement was signed, on behalf of both parties, by Barbara Jackman, who, according 
to the agreement was Hildor Knudson's guardian and the holder of a durable power of 
attorney for Lionel Knudson. R. p. 65. 
Hildor died October 27, 1994. R. p. 67. Lionel died just two weeks later on 
November 11, 1994. R. p. 10. 
On November 28, 1994, probate proceedings were initiated for Lionel's estate 
by the appointment of Barbara Jackman as personal representative. R. pp. 10-18. 
Hildor's estate was not probated. On January 9, 1995, the Department filed a claim 
against Lionel's estate. R. pp. 19-20. 
At the time of her death, Hildor was in possession of a bank account in the 
amount of $1,861.30 and her burial trust. R. pp. 58-61. As stated, above, no probate 
proceeding was initiated. Rather, Jackman obtained the money from the bank account 
2See 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(c)(2); IDAPA 16.03.05.693.01.
 
3For eligibility pmposes, Hildor Knudson's resources had to be reduced below $2,000. See 42
 
U.S.c. § 1382(a)(l)(B). Medicaid eligibility for persons such as Hildor Knudson is based upon eligibility for 
55I or AABD. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(lO)(A)(l)(l). 
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~	 about August 1, 1995, by affidavit.4 R. pp. 67-69. About August 22, 1995, Jackman's, 
attorney paid $1,638.03 to the Department. R. pp. 70-71. The Department had 
previously notified Jackman's attorney that it would accept the payment only as a 
partial payment, not sufficient to satisfy the Department's estate recovery claim. R. 
pp. 143-147 (Appendix D). 
On December 26, 1995, the Department filed a Petition for Allowance of Claim. 
R. pp. 21-22. The personal representative of Lionel Knudson has valued the estate at 
$40,798.35. 
4Pennitted in small estates by Idaho Code § 15-3-1201. 
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ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether Idaho Code § 56-218 permits Medicaid payments to be 
recovered from the estate of the recipient's after-deceased spouse. 
2. Whether the court should have granted the Department's Petition for 
Allowance of Claim. 
3. Whether attorney fees and costs should be assessed against Jackman. 
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ARGUMENT 
Estate recovery has a long history in Idaho, beginning no later than 1943. The 
purpose has always been to permit elderly recipients of public aid to keep their homes . 
(and in some cases other limited assets), but to obtain repayment from those assets after 
the need for them has ended. In this case the personal representative, Jackman, 
intentionally manipulated the estates of her parents to impose the costs of her mother's 
care on the public, while obtaining a windfall for herself. Idaho Code § 56-218 was 
not intended to permit this injustice. 
I. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When a case is appealed from a district court's appellate review of a magistrate's 
decision, the Court makes an independent appellate review of the magistrate's decision, 
after giving due regard to the district court's ruling. Ausman y. State, 124 Idaho 839, 
840, 864 P.2d 1126, 1127 (1993); In re Estate of Reinwald, 122 Idaho 401, 402, 834 
P.2d 1317, 1318 (1992); Swope y. Swope, 122 Idaho 296,298,834 P.2d 298,300 
(1992); McNelis y, McNelis, 119 Idaho 349, 351, 806 P.2d 442, 444 (1991); State Y, 
Woolf, 120 Idaho 21, 22, 813 P.2d 360, 361 (1991) rev. den. (1991); State y. AllisoD, 
112 Idaho 572, 733 P.2d 793 (App. 1987). An appellate court will freely review 
questions of law. Ausman y, State, 124 Idaho 839,840,864 P.2d 1126,1127 (1993); 
Clements Farms. Inc. v. Ben Fish & Son, 120 Idaho 185, 188,814 P.2d 917, 920 
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..... (1991); In re GQeri2, 121 Idaho 26, 28, 822 P.2d 545, 547 (App. 1991) rev. denied 
(1992). 
In this case, there are nQ material issues of fact and the matter presents only 
issues Qf law.' Therefore the standard is free review of the magistrate's decisiQn after 
giving due regard to the ruling of the District court. 
II. 
IDAHO CODE SECTION 56-218 PERMITS SPOUSAL 
ESTATE RECOVERY IN THIS CASE. 
A Estate Recoyery History and purpose in Idaho. 
In the case of State ex reI. Nielson y, Lindstrom, 68 Idaho 226, 191 P.2d 1009 
(1948) (Appendix E), the executor of an estate denied the claim of the State for 
recovery of old-age assistance payments made to the decedent. The State brought an 
action against the executor to which the executor demurred. The trial court sustained 
the demurrer and dismissed the claim, believing the estate recovery statute in question 
to be violative of the Idaho Constitution. The Supreme Court reversed and upheld the 
law, pointing to the valid public purpose behind the estate recovery law: 
Provision ... for recovery against the estates of recipients has been 
part of the law of this State continuously since March 2, 1943, when 
Chapter 119 of the Laws of 1943 became effective. Section 2 of such Act 
added Section 24-a to the Public Assistance Law of the State and read as 
~Before the magistrate, Jackman argued spousal estate recovery is preempted by federal law. The 
magistrate ruled against Jackman on that issue, and Jackman has not cross-appealed. The sole issue, 
therefore, involves the interpretation ofIdaho law. See R pp. 148-154. 
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Section 24-a. Recovery from recipients6• On the death of any 
recipient, the total amount of assistance paid or relief granted under 
this Act shall be allowed as a preferred claim against the estate of 
such person and shall be subject only to the expense of the last 
illness, funeral expenses not to exceed $100.00, and expenses of 
administration of said estate. No claim shall be enforced against 
any real estate or personal property of a recipient while such real 
estate is occupied by the recipient, a surviving spouse, or a 
dependent .... 
Chapter 119, 1943 S.L. [Appendix F] 
Nielson, 68 Idaho at 229, 191 P.2d at 10tO. 
In examining the above provision, the court reviewed 1939 changes to the Social 
Security Act which permitted the State to retain all sums obtained through estate 
recovery.? In doing so, the court noted the logic of recovering such sums after the 
death of both husband and wife: 
A most generous thing for the Congress to do in this: It gives a state, for 
instance Idaho, a much larger amount of money to use in avoiding placing 
the aged and needy in poor-houses, by granting assistance to those owning 
the homes in which they live and enabling them to continue to live in such 
homes until both husband and wife have passed on, after which, of 
course, they no longer require the use of a home. The generosity of the 
Congress does not end there. It also provides more money to meet the 
requirements of the needy and destitute who are not the owners of homes. 
6At fIrst blush, one may wonder why "spouse" is not mentioned in this statute. The difference 
between the original old age assistance and Medicaid, however, is that old age assistance was paid to enable 
people to remain in their homes instead of a "poor-house." The practice of impoverishing a spouse to pennit 
Medicaid to pay for nursing home care did not arise until the I980s. See infra. 
7The 1935 Social Security Act required States to pay Yl of amounts recovered through estate 
recovery (the same proportion as the federal share) to the federal government. Social Security Act of 1935, § 
2(a)(7) (full text available at http://www.ssa.govthistory/35actinx.html). Today, the State is required to pay a 
proportionate share (approximately 70 percent) of amounts recovered through estate recovery to the federal 
government. 
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Nielson, 68 Idaho at 231, 191 P.2d at 1011. Later, the court further expounded on the 
public policy behind estate recovery: 
The statute, in line with modern ideas, makes it possible in many 
cases to avoid placing the needy aged in institutions and contemplates the 
granting of assistance to those who may own the home in which they live 
or other property as well as to those absolutely destitute, if their income 
and sources of subsistence are not sufficient to meet the statutory 
standards. Under these provisions the recipient of public assistance is not 
required to liquidate all of his property. Ofttimes the recipient continues 
to live in his own home, which he is able to preserve for use during his 
lifetime and for the use of his widow during her lifetime after his decease. 
The method of caring for the needy aged has proven far superior in many 
cases to placing the needy aged in institutions. It has not only proven to 
be more efficient and economical from the State' s standpoint, but more 
humanitarian, providing the recipient with a more normal existence, 
freeing him of much of the stigma and many of the hardships and 
disagreeable features of life in an institution. 
Nielson, 68 Idaho at 232-3, 191 P.2d at 1012. 
Several years later, the court upheld successor provisions which permitted a lien 
to be imposed on the property of old-age assistance recipients: 
The old-age assistance law is to be distinguished from so-called 
'poor laws' or 'indigent statutes' in that the old-age assistance act does not 
require that the recipient be a pauper or absolutely destitute to entitle him 
to payments thereunder. 
*** 
The conditions imposed by the statute are not so onerous as those 
ordinarily imposed in private lending transactions. On the contrary, .the 
law proyides a fair and humane plan by which needy aged. who own a 
home, may secure old-age assistance while continuing to occupy and 
enjoy their home, rather than being required to mortgage or sell it, and 
consume the proceeds in liying expenses before receiving aid. At the 
same time it preserves the property as a means of reimbursing the welfare 
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fund. thus giving the recipients the satisfaction of paying their own way as 
far as they are able. and with the least hardship. It also reduces the 
amount which must be continuously provided by the taxpayers of the state 
and nation, who, through their legislative representatives, have voluntarily 
assumed the moral obligation to provide such aid. It is a matter of 
common knowledge that some states have so burdened themselves with 
various forms of public assistance and old-age pensions that the threat of 
insolvency has forced a modification of their plans. In all states the 
burden of such assistance has become a major problem. Various methods 
of recovery have been devised, and perhaps none has been entirely 
satisfactory. Among such plans some states have provided for 
reimbursement by relatives, legally responsible for the care of their needy 
elders. This, however, has been found difficult of application and, in 
some circumstances, unjust. Instead of requiring the relatives to provide 
the support, or to reimburse the state. our Jaw Umits recovery to the 
estatk. or the real property, of the recipient. The relatives are asked only 
to forego. to the extent of such payments. what they otbenvise might 
inherit. 
Newland y. Child, 73 Idaho 530, 537-9, 254 P.2d 1066, 1069-71 (1953) (citati.ons 
omitted, underline added) (Appendix G). 
Clearly, Idaho estate recovery provisions have always had the purpose of 
permitting the elderly to obtain assistance while preserving their homes and other assets 
to reimburse the public after their deaths. 
B. Idaho Code § 56-218 Was Passed Specifically to Recoyer Inter-spousal 
Transfers. 
Idaho's current estate recovery law was passed in 1988. S.L. 1988, ch. 49, § 1, 
p. 73 (Appendix H). 1988 was a significant year with regard to the application of 
public assistance laws to married couples. Hea:lthy elderly persons were under pressure: 
to divorce their ill spouses so Medicaid could pay for the ill spouse's nursing care 
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without depleting assets needed for the care of the healthy spouse. In response, 
Congress enacted the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, P.L. 100-360, § 
303, amended by the Family Support Act of 1988, P.L. 100-485. Among other things,. 
these acts amended sections of the Social Security Act replacing asset transfer 
restrictions in the Supplemental Security Income law with transfer penalties under the 
Medicaid law, and permitting interspousal transfers of assets. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 
1396a(a)(l8) and 1396p (Appendix 1) and notes thereto referencing the 1988 
amendments. These federal changes became effective July 1, 1988. [d. Sometimes 
called federal spousal impoverishment, or FSI, the effect of these changes was to 
permit spouses to transfer assets from one to the other to "impoverish" the ill spouse so 
he or she could qualify for Medicaid nursing payments. 
The same issues had apparently been on the mind of the Idaho Legislature, since 
the legislature beat Congress "to the punch" with the addition of section 20ge of title 56, 
Idaho Code. S.L. 1988, ch. 50, § I, p. 74 (Appendix H). This new section was 
enacted 
to reduce the number of situations in which medicaid regulations as they 
apply to long term care costs, cause either the destitution of the entire 
family, or a dissolution of marriage carried out to prevent destitution. 
Idaho Code § 56-20ge(I). Section 20ge provided for the use of community property 
principles in determining the Medicaid eligibility of a married person. The section had 
to be amended the following year to conform to the federal changes. See S.L. 1989, 
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.., ch. 67, § 1, p. 107 (Appendix J); Opinion of the Attorney General 89-3. Both section 
20ge and the new estate recovery law were passed on the same day. See Appendix H. 
It makes sense that the estate recovery law, passed at the same time as provisions 
permitting spousal impoverishment would be drafted to permit recovery of those 
transferred assets. Logically, the new estate recovery law permitted spousal estate 
recovery: 
56-218. RECOVERY OF CERTAIN MEDICAL 
ASSISTANCE. (1) Medical assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on 
behalf of an individual who was sixty-five (65) years of age or older when 
the individual received such assistance may be recovered from the estate, 
or if there be no estate the estate of the surviving spouse, if any, shall be 
charged for such aid paid to either or both; provided, however, that claim 
for such medical assistance correctly paid to the indivi~ual may be 
established against the estate, but their shall be no adjustment or recovery 
thereof until after the death of the surviving spouse, if any .... 
S.L. 1988, ch. 49, § 1, p. 73 (Appendix H).8 
c. The Langua~e of the Estate Recovery Law, Whjle Archaic. Clearly Anticipates 
Recovery from a Survjving Spouse's Estate. 
Idaho Code § 56-218(1) now reads as follows: 
56-218 Recovery of certain medical assistance. - (1) Except 
where exempted or waived in accordance with federal law medical 
assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an individual who 
was fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the individual received such 
assistance may be recovered from the estate. or if there be no estate the 
estate of the surviving spouse, if any, shalJ be charged for such aid paid to 
either or both; provided, however, that claim for such medical assistance 
correctly paid to the individual may be established against the estate, but 
8This language may have been drawn from Oregon law. See O.R.S. § 413.200. 
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there shall be no acijustment or recovery thereof until after the death Qf 
the surviving spouse, if any .... 
IdahQ CQde § 56-218(1) (underline added) (Appendix A). Reading this sectiQn as a 
whQle, its meaning is clear: if the Medicaid recipient has an estate frQm which recQvery 
can be made, then recovery is made from that estate, but only after the death of the 
surviving spouse; if recovery cannot be made from the estate of the recipient, then 
recovery is made frQm the estate of the surviving spouse. 
Jackman contends that the "if there be no estate" language should be interpreted 
as a qualifier, i.e., recovery can nQt be made from the spouse's estate if the recipient 
dies possessed Qf any property whatsoever. Since it is incQnceivable that any persQn 
CQuid die without any pQssessions at all,9 Jackman's interpretatiQn conveniently nullifies 
the spousal recQvery prQvisiQns Qf the statute. 
IdahQ Code § 56-218, hQwever, is nQt part of the prQbate code. The "if there be 
nQ estate" does nQt specify whether a recovery can be made, but rather, directs an Qrder 
for making the recovery. 
While the qUQted language is archaic, it is not unCQmmQn in statutQry language. 
New YQrk statutes cQntain several similar references describing tQ whom certain 
mQneys are paid: 
9Almost all elderly nursing home patients have some income from Social Security or another pension. 
While most of this is used for the recipient's care, a small portion is kept in an account for the patient's 
personal needs. Even if that were not true, even the meager possessions of a destitute nursing patient, such as 
a photograph or a toothbrush, constitute an estate under the probate code. See Idaho Code § 15-1-201(15), 
(37) (Appendix K).
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If there be no surviving spouse and no surviving child or children of the 
deceased under the age of eighteen years, then to such dependent or 
dependents as defined in section seven of this article, as directed by the 
workers' compensation board; and if there shall be no such dependents, 
then to the estate of such deceased in an amount not exceeding reasonable 
funeral expenses as provided in subdivision one of section seven of this 
article, or, if there be nQ estate, tQ the persQn Qf perSQns paying the 
funeral expenses of such deceased in an amount not exceeding reasonable 
funeral expenses as provided in such subdivision one. 
NY Vol. Amb. Ben. § 10 (underline added); see also NY Work. Compo § 15 and NY 
Vol. Fire Ben. § 10 (containing nearly identical language); United States Steel CQrp. v. 
Workers CQmpensatiQn Appeals Board, 536 A.2d 515 (Fa. 1988) (citing Pennsylvania 
law with very similar language). The "if there be no estate" language is used in a 
context very similar to that here in the case of Penny v. pritchard & McCall, 255 Ala. 
13, 49 So.2d 782 (1951): 
Under the Codes of 1852, 1876, 1886 and 1896, the fees of jurors 
and witnesses in such cases were made payable out of the estate of the 
person Qf unsQund mind Qr, if there be no estate, out of the cQunty 
treasury. Section 2763, Code of 1852; 5054, Code of 1876; section 
3695, Code of 1886; section 1385, Code of 1896. Under the Code of 
1907, section 1385, and that of 1923, section 7293, the pay of jurors is 
made out of the county treasury as under the Code of 1940. The pay of 
witnesses is required by the Code of 1907, section 3681, and by the Code 
of 1923, section 7241, to be paid as jurors are out of the county treasury, 
the same as under the Code of 1940. 
Penny, 255 Ala. at 17, 49 So.2d at 784 (underline added). 
In each of the above instances, the language in question was not a qualifier, but 
rather a designation of the order of priority. In each instance, the "estate" in question 
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~ was either a source or a receptacle of funds. The same is true here. The language in 
Idaho Code § 56-218 is not a qualifier. It simply means that if recovery can be made 
from the estate of the recipient, then that estate is looked to for recovery. If full 
recovery cannot be made from the estate of the recipient, then recovery can be made 
from the estate of the spouse. 
A person whose nursing care is paid for by Medicaid can have no more than 
$2,000 in liquid assets. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(l)(B).lo Therefore, a person who is 
eligible because all his or her property has been transferred to the spouse will never 
have more than $2,000. The legislature was certainly aware that such small amounts 
would pass automatically to the surviving spouse through the probate homestead 
allowance and exempt property allowance. See Idaho Code §§ 15-2-401 and 15-2-402. 
Moreover, since Idaho Code § 56-218(1) specifically forbids recovery while the spouse 
survives, there is never a recipient's Ilestate" to serve as a source for estate recovery 
when a spouse survives. To the contrary, recovery can only be made from a recipient's 
estate if (1) the recipient is pre-deceased by the spouse, or (2) the recipient later 
becomes ineligible for Medicaid due to a monetary windfall such as an inheritance. 
In the ordinary course of things, then, recovery is made from the estate of the 
recipient when the recipient's spouse has pre-deceased (in which case the recipient 
lOMedicaid is a "categorical" eligibility program. Elderly nursing patients qualify based on eligibility 
for SSI or AABD. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(lO)(A)(l)(l). 
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'lllIlllI'" already owns the spouse's share of the property), and (more commonly, since the 
recipient is typically the less healthy spouse) recovery is made from the estate of the 
recipient's spouse when the recipient passes away first. This is what the legislature 
intended. 
ID. 
THE INTERPRETATION PROPOSED BY JACKMAN 
IS UNFAIR TO THE NEEDY AND LEADS TO 
ABSURD RESULTS. 
A. Jackman Intentionally Manipulated Her Parents' Estates. 
As noted, above, Hildor died in possession of $1,861.30 and pre-deceased her 
husband. Lionel, as surviving spouse, was entitled to at least the first $7,500 of his 
wife's property. 1\ Whether Lionel got it is not clear. Jackman obtained Hildor's 
money by affidavit. R. pp. 67-69. Her attorney kept some of the money for his fee, 
and sent the remainder to the Department. Of course, neither Jackman's attorney, nor 
Jackman herself, had any authority to deal with Hildor's estate in that fashion. Idaho 
Code § 15-3-103 requires a legal appointment for a person to assume the powers of a 
personal representative. Jackman was only appointed as personal representative for 
Lionel's estate, not for Hildor's. If, when Jackman's attorney sent money to the 
Department, Jackman was acting as personal representative of Lionel's estate, then the 
11A surviving spouse takes, at least, the probate homestead allowance in the amount of $4,000, and 
the exempt property allowance in the amount of$3,500, irrespective of any will, and ahead of the decedent's 
unsecured creditors. See Idaho Code §§ 15-2-401 and 15-2-402. 
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~	 money had already passed to Lionel's estate, and Jackman was paying the Department 
frQm LjQnel's estate. 
The fact that Hildor had any property, at all, would mean, under Jackman's 
interpretation of the estate recovery law, that the Department could nQt recover 
anything from LiQnel's estate. Then why was the mQney sent? In an effQrt tQ make it 
appear as if the Department had already recovered from Hildor's estate. 
There is nQ questiQn but that Jackman manipulated her parent's estate to attempt 
to reap awindfall for herself. 12 
B. The Interpretation Adyanced by Jackman Is BQth Unfair and Leads tQ Absurd 
Results. 
The interpretatiQn Qf the estate recQvery law advanced by Jackman WQuid make 
it so simple to avoid, that estate recovery would almost never occur. Since every 
Medicaid recipient will leave an estate (as defined by the prQbate code), nQ recovery 
will be pQssible frQm any recipient's spouse. Estate recQvery would Qnly be pQssible 
from unmarried recipients. A married person could simply give all his or her property 
to the spouse, Qbtain nursing care at public expense, and have the property passed Qn tQ 
the adult children. 
Of course, the adult children Qf thQse whose spouses had pre-deceased WQuid not 
stand by and see the Department reCQver frQm their parent's estate. They WQuid simply 
12The magistrate noted., in his Memorandum Decision, that "[i]t is Wlfefuted the estate was 
manipuJated by the personal representative ...." R p. 151 (first fujI paragraph) (Appendix B). 
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encourage and assist their elderly parent to marry a Ustraw" spouse, and have the parent 
transfer all the property to the spouse, with a prenuptial agreement to pass the property 
on to the adult children after the parent's death. 13 
At oral argument before the District Court, Jackman's attorney argued that som(~ 
property, such as the family home, was an exempt resource and did not have to be 
conveyed to the spouse to enable the other to be eligible for Medicaid. 14 Therefore, 
according to Jackman's attorney, the Department would still recover when such 
property was not transferred. All this means is that the Department would only recover 
from the estates of people who can not afford the advice of an estate planning attorney. 
It is manifestly unfair, and perhaps unconstitutional, to condition estate recovery on 
whether the Medicaid recipient can afford an attorney. 
IV. 
THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD BE AWARDED 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS AGAINST 
JACKl\1AN. 
In the case of State ex reI. Nielson y. Lindstrom, 68 Idaho 226, 191 P.2d 1009 
(1948) (Appendix E), in which the court discussed the benefits of estate recovery to the 
13WhiJe some may doubt adult children wouJd engage in such tactics, this is not at all farfetched. In 
this case, Lionel and Hilder may have been totally Wlaware that Hilder gave all her property to Lionel: the 
marriage settlement agreement was signed for both of them by Jackman. R. p. 65. The Department has dealt 
with cases where an adult children have gone to great lengths to hide property from estate recovery. 
l"The Department does not have the power to prevent such transfers since they are specifically 
allowed by federal statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2) (Appendix. I). 
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~ elderly, the court recognized that there was really no argument between the recipient of 
assistance and the State, but only between the State and the recipient's heirs: 
The conflict of interest here is not between the State and its needy aged. 
It is between the State and the heirs, next of kin or other distributees of 
the estates of the deceased recipients. "The right to dispose of one1s 
property by will, and the right to have it disposed of by the Jaw, after 
decease, is created by statute, and therefore the state may impose such 
conditions upon the exercise of this right as it may determine. " 
Nielson, 68 Idaho at 223, 191 P.2d at 1012 (citations omitted). The court reiterated 
this fact in the later case of Newland y Child, 73 Idaho 530, 254 P.2d 1066 (1953) 
(Appendix G): 
Instead of requiring the relatives to provide the support, or to reimburse 
the state, our law limits recovery to the estate, or the real property, of the 
recipient. The relatives are asked only to forego, to the extent of such 
payments, what they otherwise might inherit. As was suggested in State 
ex reI. Nielson v. Lindstrom, the real objection to this lien Jaw is that of 
the prospective heirs. 
The conflict of interest here is not between the State and its needy 
aged. It is between the State and the heirs, next of kin or other 
distributees of the estates of the deceased recipients. State ex reI. 
Nielson v. Lind.rtrom, 68 Idaho 226, 191 P.2d 1009, 1012. 
Having no vested interest, they have no right to complain. In re Smith IS 
Estate, 188 Okl. 158, 107 P.2d 188; 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, § 
228. 
Newland, 73 Idaho at 539, 254 P.2d at 1070-1. This case, likewise, is really between 
Jackman and the Department. 
In this case, Jackman intentionally manipulated the estates of her parents to place 
the burden of her mother's nursing care costs on the public, and retain a windfall for 
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......, herself. She has denied the Department's claim and opposed recovery by the 
Department unreasonably and without foundation. The Department is, therefore, 
entitled to an award of its attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121. 
Because the question is certain to arise on remand, the denial of attorney fees to 
Jackman should also be addressed. A personal representative who brings or defends an 
action in good faith is entitled to attorney fees from the estate, whether the personal 
representative wins or loses. Idaho Code § 15-3-720. This creates a "Catch 22" for the 
Department in cases such as this where the Department's claim exceeds the value of the 
estate, because the personal representative can challenge the Department's claim at the 
Department's own expense. However, in this case, Jackman, having intentionally 
manipulated her parents' estates, has not defended against the Department's claim in 
good faith and should not receive attorney fees from the estate. Likewise, in this case, 
Jackman has taken the actions she has, not for the benefit of the estate, but for her own 
benefit. The estate should not be reduced by attorney fees incurred in Jackman's 
pursuit of her own interests in the estate. Eliasen y. Fitzgerald, 105 Idaho 234, 668 
P.2d 110 (1983). 
CONCLUSION 
Despite Jackman's manipulation of her parents' estates, the Department is 
entitled to recover from the estate of Lionel Knudson. The language of the estate 
recovery statute, while archaic, is not susceptible to Jackman's interpretation and can 
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~ only be read to permit spousal estate recovery under the circumstances of this case. 
The decision beiow should be reversed and the Department's Petition for Allowance of 
claim granted. 
DATED this 8 day of September," 1997, 
v. 
W. COREY C GHT 
Deputy Att ey General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing document were 
mailed, postage pre-paid, to the following: 
William C. Kirsch 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9384 
Moscow, ill 83843-9384 
DATED this 9) day of September, 1997. 
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APPENDICES 
A Idaho Code § 56-218 (Supp. 1997) 
B Memorandum Decision, January 17, 1997 
C Marriage Settlement Agreement 
D Department's Claim Against Estate 
E State ex reI. Nielson y. Lindstrom, 68 Idaho 226, 191 P.2d 1009 (1948) 
F S.L. 1943, ch. 119, p. 228 
G Newland y, Child, 73 Idaho 530, 254 P.2d 1066 (1953) 
H S.L. 1988, ch. 49, § 1, p. 73, S.L. 1988, ch. 50, § 1, p. 74 
I 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(18), 42 U.S.C. § 1396p 
.., 
J S.L. 1989, ch. 67, § 1, p.'107. 
K Idaho Code § 15-1-201(15), (37) 
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{ 13 PUBLIC ASSISTANCE LAW 56-218I 
section are severable. [1941, ch, 181, § 14, p. 379; am. 1943, ch, 119, § 1, p. 
228; am. 1951, ch, 246, § 4, p. 520; am. 1974, ch, 233, § 8, p. 1590; am. 1978, / ch, 74, § 1, p. 148; am. 1981, ch, 121, § I, p. 207; am. 1989, ch, 67, § 2, p. 
"! 107; am. 1995, ch. 214, § 4, p. 742; am. 1996, ch, 50, § 8, p. 147.1 
Compiler's Dotes. Sections 1613(c) and . Section 3 of S.L. 1995. ch. 214 is compiled 
1917fc) and (d) of the Social Security Act, as § 15·5·409a. 
referred to in this section, are compiled 8S 42 Section 7 of S.L. 1996, ch, 50 is compiled as 
U.S.C., § 1382b and 1396p, respectively. § 56·210. 
56-218. Recovery of certain medical assistance. [Effective unt:il 
July 1, 1998.] - (1) Except where exempted or waived in accordance with 
federal law medical assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an 
individual ~ho was fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the individual' 
received such assistance may be recovered from the estate, or ~f there be no 
estate the estate of the surviving spouse, if any, shall be charged for such aid 
paid to either or both; provided, however, that claim for such medical 
assistance correctly paid to the individual may be established against the 
estate, but there shall be no adjustment or recovery thereof until after the 
death of the surviving spouse, if any, and only at a time when the individual 
has no surviving child who is under twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind 
or permanently and totally disabled as defined in 42 U.S.C. 1382c. Transfers 
of real or personal property by recipients of such aid without adequate 
consideration are voidable and may be set aside by an action in the district 
court. 
(2) Except where there is a surviving spouse, Or a surviving child who is 
under twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind or permanently and totally 
disabled as defined in 42 U.S.C. 1382c, the amount ofany medical assistanee 
paid under this chapter on behalf of an individual who was fifty-five (5.5) 
years of age or older when the individual received such assistance is a claim 
against the estate in any guardianship or conservatorship proceedings and 
may be paid from the estate. 
(3) Nothing in this section authorizes the recovery of the amount of any 
aid from the estate or surviving spouse of a recipient to the extent that the 
need for aid resulted from a crime committed against the recipient. . 
(4) For purposes of this section, the term "estate" shall include: 
(a) All real and personal property and other assets included within the 
individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probate law; and 
(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in which the 
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent' 
of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or 
assign. of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy iln 
common, survivorship, life estate, living trust or other arrangement. 
(5) Claims made pursuant to this section shall be classified and paid as a 
debt with preference as defined in section 15-3-805(5), Idaho Code. 
(6) The department may file a lien against the property of any estate 
subject to a claim under this section. In order to perfect a lien against real 
property, the department shall, within ninety (90) days after the depart­
ment is notified in writing of the death of the individual for whom medicai 
~.<~;~~:;.~: ~~"r'I"!I'!'!!!l,"'""'!""!'~-~_ -.-..-.~-..,-,._-~.__ ..,.- .__ _"_ _•._, _ -.._. ..'. 
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56-218 PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND WELFARE 
assistance was paid under this chapter, file the lien in the same general form 
and manner as provided in section 56-218A(3)(a), Idaho Code, in the office of 
the recorder of the county in which the property of the estate is located. The 
lien shall be recorded, indexed, and extended in the manner provided in 
sections 56·218A(3)(a) and 56-218A(5), Idaho Code. In order to perfect a 
security interest in personal property, the department shall, within ninety' 
(90) days after the department is notified in writing of the death of the 
individual for whom medical assistance was paid under this chaptE!r, file the 
security interest in accordance with chapter 9. title 28, Idaho Cod4~. Failure 
to file a lien or a security interest does not affect the validity of clai.ms made 
pursuant to this section. 
(7) The director shall promulgate rules reasonably necessary to imple­
ment this section including, but not limited to, rules establishing undue 
hardship waivers for the following circumstances: 
(a) The'only asset of the estate provides the primary source ofsupport for 
other family members; or 
(b) The estate has a value below an amount specified in the rules; or 
(c) Recovery under the lien by the department will entitle the heirs of the 
deceased individual to public assistance. {I.C., § 56-218, as added by 
1988, ch. 49, § 1, p. 73; am. 1994, ch. 329, § 1, p. 1059; am. 1995, ch. 105, 
§ 1,p. 336.] 
Compiler'. Dotes. For this section 8S ef­
fective July I, 1998, see the following section 
alao nwnbered § 56-218. 
56-218. Recovery ofcertain medical assistance. [Effective; July 1, 
1998.] - (1) Except where exempted or waived in accordance with 'federal 
law medical assistance pursuant to. this chapter paid on behalf of an 
individual who was fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the individual 
received such assistance may be recovered from the estate: or if there be no 
estate the estate ofthe surviving spouse, if any, shall be charged far I>uch aid 
paid. to either or bothj provided, however, that claim for such medical 
assistance correctly paid to the individual may be established against the' 
estate, but there shall be no adjustment or recovery thereof until after the 
death of the surviving spouse, ifany. and only at a time when the individual 
has no surviving child who is under twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind 
or permanently and totally disabled as defined in 42 U.S.C. ·1382c. Transfers 
of real or personal property by recipients of such aid without adequate 
consideration are voidable and may be set aside by an actioriin the district 
court. '.
(2) Except where there is a surviving spouse, or a surViving child who is 
under twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind or permanently and totally 
disabled as defined in 42 tr.S.C, 1382c, the amount ofany m'edical assistance 
paid under this chapter on behalf of an individual who was fifty-five (55)" 
years of age or older when the individual received such assistance is a claim 
against the estate in any guardianship or conservatorship proceedings and 
may be paid from the estate. 
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15 PL13LlC ASSISTA..'JCE LAW 56-218A 
(3) Nothing in this section authorizes the recovery of the amount of any 
aid from the estate or surviving spouse of a recipient to the extent that the 
need for aid resulted from a crime committed against the recipient. 
(4) For purposes of this section, the term "estate" shall include: . 
(a) All real and personal property and other assets included within the 
individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probate law; and 
(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in which the 
individual had any legal title or interest at the time ofdeath (to the extent 
of such interest), including such assets conveyed to asurvivor, heir, or 
assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in 
common, survivorship, life estate, living trust or other arrangement. 
(5) Claims made pursuant to this section shall be classified and paid as a 
debt with preference as defined in section 15-3-805(5), Idaho Code. 
(6) The department may file a notice of lien against the property of any 
estate subject to a claim under this section. In order to perfect a lien against 
real or personal property, the department shall, within ninety (90) days 
after the department is notified in writing of the death of the individual for 
whom medical assistance was paid under this chapter, file a notice of lien in 
the same general form and manner as provided in section 56·218A(3) (a), 
Idaho Code, in the office of the secretary of state, pursuant to section 
. - 1904, Idaho Code. Failure to file a notice of lien does not affect the 
'lIlIIII!tldity of claims made pursuant to this section. 
(7) The director shall promulgate rules reasonably necessary to imple­
ment this section including, but not limited to, rules establishing undue 
hardship waivers for the following circumstances: 
(a) The only asset of the estate provides the primary source of support for 
other family members; or 
(b) The estate has a value below an amount specified in the rules; or 
(c) Recovery under the lien by the department will entitle the heirs of the 
deceased individual to public assistance. [I.C., § 56-218, as added by. 
1988, ch. 49, § 1, p. 73; am. 1994, ch, 329, § 1, p. 1059; am. 1995, ch, 105; 
§ 1, p. 336; am. 1997, ch. 205, § 2, p. 607.] 
Compiler's notes. For this section as ef­ sions of this act. If the certification is noL 
fective until July I, 1998, see the preceding made by the twenty·first day after Lhe ad­
section also numbered § 56-218. journment sine die of the First Regular Ses­
Section 10 ofS.L. 1997, ch. 205 read: "Not­ sion of the Fifty-fourth Idaho LegislaLure, this 
withstanding the effective dates specified in act shall be null and void." 
section 1 through 9 of this act, noLhing in this The Secretary 'of State has so certified to 
act shall take effect unless the secretary of the Idaho Code Commission and thus the 
state shall certify to the Idaho Code Commis­ Chapter 205 became effective as prescribed 
sion that he has received a sufficient appro­ herein.· . 
priation to provide for the development ofthe Section 1 of S.L. 1997, ch. 205 is compiled 
technology required to ,implement the provi- as §§ 45-1901 through 45·1910. 
56-2l8A. Medical assistance liens during life of recipient. [Effec­
tive until July ·1, 1998.] - (1) The department may recover and may 
impose a lien ag~inst the real property of any individual prior to his death 
for medical assistance paid or about to be paid under this chapter on behalf 
• an individual: 
.-., 
,
~.
.} 
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56-218A PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND WELFARE 16 
(a) Who is an inpatient in a nursing facility, intermediate care facility for 
the mentally retarded, or other medical institution, if such individual is 
required, as a condition of receiving services in such institution undElr the 
state plan, to spend for costs of medical care all but a minimal amotmt of 
his income required for personal needs; and 
(b) With respect to whom the department has determined, after notice 
and opportunity for hearing, that he cannot reasonably be expected to be 
discharged from the medical institution and to return home. 
(2) No lien may be imposed on the home ofan individual under subsE!ction 
(1) of this section if any of the following is lawfully residing in such home: 
(a) The spouse of such individual; 
(b) Such individual's child under age twenty-one (21) years; 
(c) Such individual's child who is blind or permanently and totally 
disabled as defined in 42 U.S.C. 1382c; or 
(d) A sibling ofsuch individual who holds an equity interest in such home 
and who was residing in such home for a period of at least one (1) year 
... 
. ,.'	 prior to the individual's admission to the medical institution. 
(3)(a) In order to perfect the lien, the department shall file in the office of 
the recorder of the county in which the real property of the individual is 
located a verified statement in writing setting forth the name and last 
known address of the individual, the name and address of the official or 
agent of the department filing the lien, a brief description of the medical 
assistance received by the individual, the amount paid or about to bEl paid 
by the department on behalf of the individual, and, if applicable, th,e fact 
that the amount of the lien may increase over time. The county recorder 
shall record the claim in the real property records of the county where the 
claim shall be indexed, as deeds and other conveyances are requir,ed by 
law to be indexed. 
(b) The department shaH file any lien under this section within ninety 
(90) days of the final determination of the department, after hearing if 
any, required in subsection (1Xb) of this section, with the exception of 
property against which the department is prevented from filing a lien 
pursuant to subsection (2) of this section. With respect to the property 
described in subsection (2) of this section, the department shall file a lien 
within ninety (90) days after the department is notified in writing' that 
subsection (2) of this section ceases to apply to the property. 
(4) Any lien imposed in accordance with subsection (1) of this section 
shall dissolve upon the individual's discharge from the medical institution 
and return home. . 
(5) The lien, or any extension thereof, may, within five (5) years frOID the 
date of filing for record, be extended by filing for record in the office of the 
county recorder a new verified statement setting forth the information 
required in subsection (3Xa) of this section, and from the time of filing the 
lien shall be extended in such county for five (5),years, unless fully rell~ased 
or otherwise discharged. 
(6) No recovery shall be made under this section for medical aSsistance 
correctly paid except from such individual's estate as defined in subsE!ction 
(4) of section 56-218, Idaho Code, and subject to subsections (3), (5) and (6) 
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PUBLIC ASSISTANCE LAW 56-218A 
:.:::tion 56-218, Idaho Code, or upon sale of the property subject to a lien 
may be made only after the death of such individual's surviving spouse, 
l.y, and only at a time: 
:) When he has no surviving child who is under age twenty-one (21) 
;ars, or who is blind or permanently and totally disabled as defined in 42 
i.S.C. 1382c; or
 
» In the case of a lien on an individual's home under subsection (1) of .
 
lis section, when none of the following is lawfully residing in such home
 
,ho has lawfully resided in such home on a continuous basis since the
 
ate of the individual's admission to the medical institution:
 
(i) A sibling of the individual, who was resid\ng in the individual's home
 
for a period of at least one (1) year immediately before the. date of the
 
individual's admission to the medical institution; or
 
(ii) A son or daughter of the individual, who was residing in the
 
individual's home for a period of at least two (2) years immediately
 
before the date of the individual's admission to the medical institution
 
and who establishes to the satisfaction of the state that he or she
 
. provided care to such individual which permitted such individual to
 
reside at home rather than in an institution.
 
7) The director shall promulgate rules reasonably necessary to imple­

.nt this section including, but not limited to, rules establishing undue
 
r~c;hip waivers, as provided in section 56.218(7), Idaho Code, and a
 
V"ure for notice and opportunity for hearing on the department's
 
termination that an individual cannot reasonably be expected to be
 
;charged from a medical institution and to return home. [I.C., § 56-218A, 
added by 1995, ch. 105,'§ 2, p. 336.] 
~ompUer's Dotes. For this section as ef· See. to see. ref. This section is referred to
 
tive July 1, 1998, see the following section in § 56-218.
 
o numbered § 56-218A. 
56·218A. Medical assistance liens during life of recipient. [Effec­
ve July I, 1998.] - (1) The department may recover and may impose a 
'n against the real property of any individual prior to his death for medical 
.sistance paid or about to be paid under this chapter on behalf of an 
dividual: 
(a) Who is an inpatient in a nursing facility, intermediate care facility for 
the mentally retarded, or other medical institution, if such individual is 
required, as a condition of receiving services in such institution under the 
state plan, to spend for costs of medical care all but a minimal amount of 
his income required for personal needs; and 
(b) With respect to whom the department has determined, after notice 
and opportunity for hearing, that he cannot reasonably be expected to be 
discharged from the medical institution and to return home. 
(2) No lien may be imposed on the home of an individual under subsection 
) of this section if any of the following is lawfully residing in such home: 
(a) The spouse of suc~ individual; 
(b) Such individual's child under age twenty-one (21) years; 
,.; . 
'. 
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56·218A PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND WELFARE 
(c) Such individual's child who is blind or permanently and totally 
disabled as defined in 42 V.S.C. 1382c; or 
(d> A sibling of such individual who holds an equity interest in such home 
and who was residing in such home for a period of at least one (1) y,~ar 
prior to the individual's admission to the medical institution. 
(3)(a) The lien shall be perfected by filing in the office of the secretary of 
state a notice of lien pursuant to section 45-1904, Idaho Code. The notice 
of lien shall include, in addition to the information required by section 
45-1904, Idaho Code, the amount paid or about to be paid by the 
department on behalfof the individual, and, if applicable, the fact that the 
amount of the lien may increase over time. 
·(b) The department shall file any notice of lien under this section within 
ninety (90) days 6f the final determination of the department, after 
hearing if any, required in subsection (1) (b) of this section, with the 
exception of property against which the department is prevented from 
filing a lien pursuant to subsection (2) of this section'-With respect to the 
property described in subsection (2) of this section, the department sh3.11 
file a notice of lien within ninety (90) days after the department is notifie,d 
...... 
in writing that subsection (2) of this section ceases to ap!ply to the 
property. 
. (4) Any lien imposed in accordance with subsection (1) of this section 
:' .. '. 
shall dissolve upon the individual's discharge from the medical imstitution 
and return home. 
...... ;. 
o (5)' No recovery shall be made under this section for medical assistance 
correctly paid except from such individual's estate as defined in subsection 
(4) of section 56-218, Idaho Code, and subject to subsections (3), (5) and (6) 
of section 56-218, Idaho Code, or upon sale of the property subject to a lien 
and may be made only after the death of such individual's surviving spouse, 
if any, and only at a time: 
(a) When he has no surviving c\:1ild who is under age twenty-one (21) 
years, or who is blind or permanently and totally disabled as defined in 42 
V.S.C. 1382c; Or 
(b) In the case of a lien on an individual's home under subsection (1) of 
this section, when none of the following is lawfully residing in such home 
who has lawfully resided in such home on a continuous basis since the 
date of the individual's admission to the medical institution: 
(i) Asibling of the individual, who was residing in the individual's home 
for a period of at least one (1) year immediately before the date of the 
. individual's adnlission to the medical institution; or 
(ii) A son or 'daughter of the individual, who was residing in the 
individual's home for a period of at least two (2) years immediately 
before the date of the individual's admission to the medical institution 
Elnd who establishes to the satisfaction of the state that he or she 
provided care to such individual which' permitted such individual to 
resige at home rather than in an institution. 
(6) The director shall promulgate rules reasonably necessary to imple­
ment this section including, but not limited to, rules establishing undue 
hardship waivers, as provided in section 56-218(7), Idaho Code, and a 
... . . . ' ...... ~.: :.... . ..., •. p, • 
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 19 PUBLIC ASSISTANCE LAW 56-227C 
procedure for notice and opportunity for hearing on the department's 
determination that an individual cannot reasonably be expected to be 
discharged from a medical institution and to return home. [I.C., § 56-218A, 
as added by 1995, ch. 105, § 2, p. 336; am.1997, ch. 205, § 3, p. 607.1 
Compiler'. Dotes. For this section as ef­ sions of this act. If the certification is not 
fective until July I, 1998, see the preceding made by the twenty·first day after the ad­
section also numbered § 56-218A. journment 8ine die of the First Regullll' Ses­
Section 10 of S.L. 1997; ch. 205 read: "Not­ sion of the Fifty-fourth Idaho Legislature, this 
withstanding the effective dates specified in act shall be null and void." 
section 1 through 9 of this act, nothing in this The Secretary of State has so certified to 
act shall take effect unless the secretary of the Idaho Code Commission and thus the 
state shall certify to the Idaho Code Commis­ Chapter 205 became effective as prescribed 
sion that he has received a sufficient appro­ herein. 
priation to provide for the development of the Section 4 of S.L. 199~, ch. 205 is compiled 
technology required to implement the provl' as § 63·3051. 
56-223. Public assistance not assignable. Public assistance 
awarded under this act shall not be transferable or assignable, and none of 
the money paid or payable under this act shall be subject to execution, 
attachment, or other legal process; except that the department may transfer 
funds to another public agency in lieu of payments to recipients, said funds 
to be transferred by such agency to project sponsors for payment as wages 
to said recipients participating in special work projects. [1941, ch. 181, § 23, 
p. 379; am. 1969, ch. 30, § 2, p. 51; am. 1997, ch. 30, § 1, p. 54.1 
.., 56-224. Recovery. - The department may recover the amount of any 
public assistance obtained by any person who was not entitled thereto. If at 
any time during the continuance ofassistance, the recipient thereof becomes 
possessed of any property or income in excess of the amount stated in the 
application, it shall be the duty of the recipient to notify the state 
department immediately of the receipt or possession of such property or 
income. Any assistance granted after the recipient has come into possession 
of such property or income in excess of eligibility standards, may be 
recovered by the state department. . 
On the death of a recipient who has received public assistance to which he 
was not entitled, or who has received public assistance in an amount greater 
than that to which he was entitled, by reason of possession or having come 
into possession of resources which he did not disclose to the department, or 
which had, or which acquired, a greater value than was disclosed, the total 
amount of such assistance paid to such recipient to which he was not 
entitled shall be allowed as a preferred claim against the estate of such 
recipient. [1941, ch. 181, § 24, p. 379; am. 1951, ch. 246, § 5, p. 520; am.. 
1997, ch. 31, § 1, p. 55.] 
56-227C. Subpoena power. 
OplniODS of Attorney Geoeral. Refusal sonable cause or legal excuse- for failing to 
to provide records or documents on the comply with the Department of Health and 
grounds that such records or documents are Welfare's administrative subpoena, OAG 
exempt from disclos~re pursuant to the Idaho 95-6. 
Public Records Act· does not constitute "rea- A document's lack of availability under the 
'.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDIC:U.L e~ici:" 
OF THE STATE OF ID&qO. IN AND FOR ·THE COUNTY OF LA~~ 
1 
In the Matter of the Estate ) Case No. SP94-0353 
of: ) 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
LIONEL MALCOLM KNUDSON, ) 
) 
,Deceased.	 ) 
) 
) 
The State of Idaho, throuqh the Health and Welfare Division, 
seeks to recover Medicaid payments made on behalf of Hildor 
Knudson from the estate of her deceased spouse Lionel Malcolm 
Knudson. This recovery has been initiated by the State's f iliric:r OlE' 
a Petition for allownce of claim against Lionel Knudson's estate. 
The facts are not in dispute. and the parties have exhaustively 
briefed the legal issues. 
The 1ega1 issue submitted in this matter is whether the stat:~! 
may recover Medicaid assistance paid onbehalf of'a pre-deceased 
spouse from the estate of the surviving spouse when the pre·· 
deceasing spouse, who has received Medicaid payments, dies 
possessed of an estate. 
In assistance of discussing the issue presented, the Court: 
finds the following facts:
'.- ., .. . - . . .. 
1. H~+dQ~ ang ~~Qn~+ Kn~q~Qn w~~~ ma~~~~d pe~s.ons; 
2. On S November 1993 Hildor and Lionel executed a MarriagE! 
....... Settlement Agreement which defined their community property and! 
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then al tered the character of those properties making the!m 
separate. Hildor received property characterized as separate in a,n 
amount of approxinately $1,900.00+: 
3. The alteration of the character of the community property 
was done to make Hildor eligible for Medicaid: 
4. Hildor died on 27 October '1994, and at death had received 
public Medicaid benefits in an amount of $41,600.55; 
5. Lionel died on 11 November 1994. His estate was offered 
for informal probate on 28 November 1994: 
6. The estate of Hildor was collected by procedures authorized 
by I.C. 15-3-1201 on 1 August 1995. The residue of her estate, 
$1,638.03 was tendered to the Department of Health and Welfare as 
settlement of monies due under I. C. 56-218 which the Department 
rejected as a full and final settlement: 
7. The Department filed a claim against the estate of Lionel 
on 9 January 1995 for the $41, 600.55 paid as medical assistance for 
Hildor. A Petition for Allowance of the claim was filed on 215 
December 1995. On 6 February 1995 the personal representativ,~ 
objected to the Petition for Allowance. 
8.	 The estate of Lionel had an Inventory value of $40,798.35. 
DISCUSSION 
The initial grounds stated by the Objection to the Petition 
for Allowance was the State's claim exceeds the authority under 
Federal Medicaid statutes, particularly 42 USC 1396p( bl. From that: 
departure point the excellent briefing by both parties addressed 
that profoundity and also impl icated the more prosaic issue of thE~ 
interpretation of the Idaho statute, I.C. 56-218. 
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As a predicate to participation in the Federal Medicaid 
program the applicable Federal Lat-l requires the State enact a plan 
for adminstration, execution of the congressional intent, and fc)r 
recovery or adjustment of payment assistance. Some parts of the 
Federal enactment are mandatory and some are optional. 42 USC 1396 
et. seq. In the cases of recovery, the underlying Federal statu1:e 
r42 USC 1396p(b)(4)1 defines "estate" in more broad terms than the 
probate definition by al"lowing the State the option of includin~p 
..• (A)ny other real and personal property and other 
assets in which the individual had any leqal title or 
interest at the time of death (to the-extent of such 
interest), includinq such assets conveyed to a survivor 
heir, or assiqn of the deceased individual throuqh ioint: 
tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, 
living trust, or other arrangement. 
The state of Idaho elected to exercise the optional form (If 
recovery by enacting I.C. 56-218, which at I.C. 56-218( 4 )(b) 
replicates the above-cited Federal language. 
The personal representative argues the Estate of Budney, 54,1 
N.W.2d 245 (Wis.App.1995) is authority for the proposition the 
Idaho statutory scheme for recovery is pre-~mpted by Federal la~" 
I find that authority unpersuasive. Likewise, the Estate of Craigr, 
624 N.E.2 1003 (N.Y. 1993) is not on point to the present issue a.s 
it did not construe a spousal recovery statute. 
Based upon the specific statutes above cited or referenced, 
and the fact the Idaho law, I.C. 56-218(4)(b) replicates the 
permitted optional Federal statute language, and there is no 
compelling case authority to the contrary, I conclude that I.C. 56­
218 does not allow for recovery in excess of the authority granted 
by 42 USC 1396p, and conclude that the State can recover from the 
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estates of survivin~ spouses under the appropriate factual and 
legal predicates. 
The more prosaic question to be addressed is whether, undE~r 
the facts of this case, recovery is allowed against LionEll 
Knudson's estate under the authority of I.C. 56-218. A critical 
fact in this case is that Hildor died possessed of an estate of 
approximately $1,900.00. It is unrefuted the estate WclS 
manipulated by the personal representative in a manner which would 
leave a residual after estate expenses and payment of final debt:s 
(i.e. no payment of statutory allowances). 
I.C. 56-218 provides in part: 
Recovery of certain medical assistance. (1) Except where 
exempted or waived in accordance with federal law medical 
assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an 
individual who was fifty-five (55) years of age or older 
when the individual received such assistance may be 
recovered from the estate, or if there be no estate the 
estate of the surviving spouse, 'if any, shall be charged 
for such aid paid to either or both; ••• 
This specific Idaho enactment, optional under Federal law, contains 
the curious phrase, "or. if there be no ,estate' the estate of the 
surviving spouse. " The State urges the· definition of estate 
include the Federal definition adopted in I.C. 56-218(4). That 
assertion is beyond dispute as the Idaho enactment replicates the 
wording of the Federal statute. The state then expands' its 
argument to adopt the Federal definition of "other assets" 
appearing at 42 USC 1396p(e)(1): 
The term "assets", with resoect to an individual, include:s 
all income and resources of the individual and of the 
individual's spouse, including any income or resources 
which the individual or such individual's spouse does no~t: 
receive because of ... 
Clearly the Federal law intended an estate to include the incomt~ 
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135 (1990). When a statute is unambigious, it must be interpretl:!d 
in accordance with its language, courts must follow it as enacted, 
and a reviewing court may not apply rules of construction. ~:e 
v, Windmeie:r.::. 121 I 189, 191 (1991). As this is a matter (:If 
significant public policy regarding the recovery of public monies, 
and the issues certainly demand the review of a court of record, 
this Court adopts a most conservative approach and concludes on the 
above facts and law that": 
1. Idaho Code 56-218(4) does not adopt the Federal definition 
of "asset" appearing at 42 USC 1396p(e)(1); 
2. Hildor Knudson had a separate estate of $1,900+ at "the 
time of death". Hildor Knudson had no "legal title or interest" i.n 
Lionel Knudson's "real and personal property and other assets" as 
~ required by I.C. 56-218(4); 
3. The language of I. C. 56-218 (1) stating "or if there be nlo 
estate" is limiting language requiring an absence of estate on th.e 
part of the individual receiving assistance before the estate of 
the surviving spouse may be charged. That conclusion is made with 
full recognition of the state's argument that a toothbrush could be 
construed as an estate, though de minimus. The conclusion is 
further supported by the statutory provision appearing in I,C. 56­
218( 1) detailing the right of the State to set aside transfers 
without consideration. That provision would appear to provide the 
State with a legal method of recovering properties transferred to 
preserve estates for nonspousal heirs, though admittedly 
cumbersome. No such action to set aside the transfer is before thle 
Court and no opinion as to the voidabili ty of the transfer is 
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expressed. 
The personal represent~tive is directed to prepare an order 
consistent with these findings and conclusions and to sUbmit sa,me 
to State's counsel for approval. 
So ORDERED this 11th day of "January 1997. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILlNG 
I do hereby certify that a full, true ;r~"'~; 
correct copy of the foregoing was rr;~U,>~~ 
to:, -J./. :iku'~ ~ pcb......, _ 
ilia..¥) ~C& 
, Deputy C)erk
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KWIAGE SETTLmmN'l' AGREEME!f'l' (COfPY 
,. 
We, LIONEL KNUDSON and HILDOR KNUDSON, husband and wife, 
hereby enter into the following marriage settlement agreement for 
the purpose of changing the character of our community property and 
for the purpose of defining our· mutual rights and 1nterests 
concerning our property. 
1. Our community property includes the following: 
Family residence loc'ated at 331 North Garfield, Moscow, Latah 
County,	 Idaho more particularly described as: 
Block I, Lot 6 of Oylear's Addition 
1986	 Ford Tempo 
Two Irrevocable Burial Trusts at Short's Funeral Home in thE! 
amount of $5,000.00 each. 
West One Account # 0010615402
 
West One Account # 0100426145
 
West One Account # 0010070074
 
First Security # 0281551186754
 
First Security # 0281551186753
 
Personal property and household effects 
2. We hereby change the character of the above-described 
community property to separate property by dividing the value into 
two parts as follows: 
LIONEL KNUDSON shall have as his sole and separate 
property personal property and household effects now in 
his possession; the community residence fully described 
above; 1986 Ford Tempo; the irrevocable burial trust in 
XARRIAGE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
....... 
Page 1 of 4 
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his name; all but $1,900 in the following bank accounts 
West One Account # 0010615402, West One Account # 
0100426145, West One Account # 0010070074, First Security 
# 0281551186754, and First Security # 0281551186753 
HILDOR KNUDSON shail have as her sole and separat1e 
property personal property and household effects in her 
possession; the irrevocable burial trust in her name, and 
$.1,900 from the above cited bank accounts. 
3. We further specif ically agree that the income, rents .. 
issues, profits, capital gains, and other earnings or increases on 
our separate property as described above and the proceeds from any 
disposition thereof constitute the separate property of the person 
owning such property and are not community property. The forgoin9 
also shall apply to all property that may be separately acquired 
hereafter by either of us in any manner whatsoever. 
4. This agreement shall not disqualify either of us frODl 
serving and acting as personal representative, guardian, 
conservator, or trustee of the other I s estate if so appointed by a. 
court or if so designated or nominated by the other. 
S. Notwi thstanding the provisions of this Agreement, either 
of us shall have the right to transfer or convey to the other any 
property or interest therein that lawfully may be conveyed or 
transferred during his or her lifetime or by will or otherwise upon. 
death, and neither of us intends for this agreement to limit or 
MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT Page 2 of 4 
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restrict in any way the right and power to give to the other or to 
receive from the other any such transfer or conveyance. 
6. This Agreement shall be construed and enforced in 
accordance with the laws of the State of Idaho even though one or 
both of us may now be or hereafter'becomes domiciled in anotha~ 
jurisdiction. 
7. If any provision of this Agreement or any right waived or 
retained by it shall for' any reason be invalid or unenforceable, 
the other portions of this Agreement nevertheless shall continue tlj 
full force and effect. 
8. This Agreement shall take effect upon its execution by 
both of us. 
DATED this &. day of 
JLJ..d.o.uiio~() 'L/ 
HILDOR KNUDS N by her 
yuard,ian, B ARA JACKMAN 
;y: l)O-Lb evLtc 
STATE OF Idah ) 
) SSe 
County of Latah } 
On this -&:.. day of ~ , 1993, before me, a Notary 
Public in and for the State of Idaho personally appeared BARB~~ 
JACKMAN, guardian for HILDOR KNUDSON, known to me to be the person 
whose name is SUbscribed to the forgoing instrument, aru~ 
acknowledged to be that she executed the me. .... .~~~ ..";.i•.:::'\~
•'\1 13 l .i (J .~ -';;' 
~~~. '. ~:..,>i·;~·\ 
~ '"I • • •• ' ".'1'.:. 
. - .-. .. ~ ..~-
.: .. I;' ~:-..•. I.n :.~ ' 
Notary Public for I.d:al1~/I.~··-- ':: .... , .: ;,};: 
Residing at Moscow ... · '.. ;. ..: r.: :1 . .':, 
My Commission Expires ;9./.23/93"\: !:,';
•• ,," • 'It.­
rj !!. , \.' ~.'. r.. ..;.i· 
,. 1. .' ", .. ,.:1'
HARlUAGE SE'r'rLEHEN'l' AGREEMENT Page ;). ...of...,+, ..:..'" 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) SS. 
county of Latah ) 
On this W-- day of ~ , ~993, before me, a Notary 
Public in and or the State of Idaho personally appeared BARB~~ 
JAC1<MAN, holder of LIONEL KNUDSON's Durable Power of Attorney, 
known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to th,! 
forgoing instrument, and acknowledged to be that she executed thl! 
same. 
WJ.lliam c. Kirseh;' ':'),­ l~ n "'.' '.. . 
Notary Public f~r ~Idaho.·' _ : .,. 
Residing at: Moscow'!',i" ;.•,,,\'~"'; 
••	 ..... ""', \, ...L. _# . ' -, "­
My COmInJ.ssJ.on .Ex~n.r~~:., ", .' /' .'):.
9-23-93 "..:/' ; \~~ .. 
". ..:•• , I. \ \\.­ J~ 
""f,. '., 'J :'1.~'~~F· 
.. ·IIJ...·~ l ..~·· 
'.... 
:395109 
NO. --~~==-::N:o:----AT TliE REQUEST vr ~ 
DATE I HOUIt 
~r,)S"'S--'n	 \\, \ ~~ ~Mlt,"""? M. 
SUSAN PETERSat 
LATAH COUNTY RECORDER 
fEE $ \s:::;. .00\>'\1< BY :;=.... oecc .(~ 
' ....~ ......"="'--\ 
~\ "<0 ~~~ ~ 
~O~O~ ~ ~~'~~..::> 
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ATTORNEY GENERAL
 
JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH
 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
 
CHIEF OF HEALTH
 
AND WELFARE DIVISION
 
ANN COSHO
 
Deputy Attorney General­

Health and welfare Division
 
450 W. State - 10th Floor
 
Post Office Box 83720
 
Boise, ID 83720-0036
 
Telephone: (208) 334-5537
 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF	 THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE )
 
OF ) Case No. SP 94-00353
 
)
 
LIONEL MALCOLM KNUDSON,	 )
 
) CLAD! AGAINST ESTATE
 
) (I.C. § 15-3-804)
 
Deceased.	 ) 
) EXEMPT: I.C. § 31-3212 
---------------) 
COMES NOW the State of Idaho, Department of Health and 
Welfare, by and through its counsel, ANN COSHO, Deputy Attorney 
General, and hereby makes	 claim against the above-captioned estate. 
This claim is based upon the Claimant's statutory right to recover 
the amount of	 medical assistance paid on behalf of Hildor L. 
Knudsen, as set forth at Idaho Code § 56-218. The Claimant has 
paid medical assistance benefits on behalf of Hildor L. Knudsen in. 
the amount of $41,600.55	 as of December 24, 1994. To the extent 
CLAIM AGAXNST ESTATE - 1 19
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that the Claimant is obligated to make further medical assistancE3 
payments, it reserves the right to supplement its claim in thi~~ 
proceeding. 
DATED this day of January, 1995. j? ~ iUJ~' 
ANN CO"SHO 
Deputy Attorney General 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO 
ss. 
County of Ada 
Dora L. Morley, being first duly sworn, deposes and states: 
that I am the Claimant's Estate Recovery Specialist; that I haVE! 
read the above and foregoing claim against the decedent's estate 
and know the contents thereof; and that, to my knowledge and 
belief, the facts stated therein are true and correct. 
,~ d :77~Dora L. Morley 
Estate Recovery Specia!~stI.··..·.."" ,"
ti~1 '... • ~SUESCRIBE~~ oAi~ before me this & day of January I 
1995. / ~ OT....;..~\ ~ £]a ­
= • ~ A-t \ .. IIi * i _._ J--: 5~U ..rYI G j.J7..~ 
S 'J-a c; *" i Notary Public for .Idaho 
';. ~~\. 11 Ll l; Residing at: e,<1'IA--L . ~"-1l-.,,,.........-:oi· Corcunission Expi~es: Cilz.3/2..cco .
 
'~ 11 OF rn~V' ...~ r ' 
," i~ .,~ 
"·,,".¢dTIPICATE OF HAILING 
THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES that duplicate originals of' 
the foregoing CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE were mailed first class, postage! 
prepaid, on the &~ day of January, 1995, to: 
William C. Kirsch Latah County Clerk 
Attorney for the Estate Magistrate Division 
PO Box 9384 PO Box 8068 
Moscow, ID 83843 Moscow, ID 83843-0568 
CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE - 2 20
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68 IDAHO REPOnTS 
marks complained of by the Company, re­ MILLER, Justice (concurring and dis­
spondents insist that by such instruction senting) . 
226 
" the court impliedly instructe-d the jury not 
to consider the remarks, and that "It must 
be presumed that the jury followed and 
obeyed" the instruction, It is just a little 
difficult .to understand how respondents 
could be: right in both instances. 
[16] As pointed out by the court in 
Bandoni v. Walston, supra, that: 
"While a large discretion is allowed an 
attorney in prese~ting his case, neverthe­
less, where, in doing so, he oversteps the 
bounds of propriety and fairness which 
should characterize his conduct as an officer 
of the ~ourt, such conduct, where not cured 
by a proper instruction [as in the case at 
bar], may, if proper and timely objection is 
made [as in the instant case], be ground 
for a new trial or for reversal of the judg­
ment by the reviewing court." 
(17) It appears to us justice win best 
be served by granting a new trial. That 
will put the parties, respectively, back in 
the position they occupied at the time of 
the original trial and give each party a 
chance to present the case anew to the 
court and jury, and, at the same time, will 
avoid the danger of doing appellant a grave 
injustice. 
The judgment is reversed and the cause 
remanded with directions to grant a new 
trial. Costs awarded to appellant. 
GIVENS, C. J" and HYATT,]., concur. 
I concur in the first fOllr specifications 
presented in the majority opinion, but dis­
sent to the fifth specification reversing the 
judgment for the reaSOn that the asstrted 
inflammatory and prejudicial remarks of 
respondent's attorney 10 the jury arc nut 
sufficient to warrant a reversal. 
BUDGE, Justice (dissenting), 
I cannot concur in the opinion as written 
in the above entitled case, therefore dis­
sent. 
191 P.2d 1009 
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Laws 1941, c. 181, § 1(m); Laws 1947, c:. 
237. 
3.	 Paupers €==>3 
The granting of aid to its needy aged is 
a well recognizcd obligation of the state 
and is a governmental function tending to 
promote the public weI fare. 
4. States ~119 
The statute authorizing assistance pay- . 
ments to needy aged persons and reCOVf:I'y 
of such paj'ments out of esrates of needy 
aged persons is not unconstitutional as giv­
ing or loaning credit of state. I.c.A. 
§ 15-609; Laws 1941, c. 131, § l(m); Laws 
1943, c. 119, § 2; Laws 1947, c. 237; So­
"""'cial Security Act, §§ 1 ct seq., 2(a) (7), 
3(b) (2), as ameudcd. 42 V.S.c.A. §§ 301 
et seq., 302, 303(b) (2); Canst. art. 3, § 
19; art. 8, § 2. 
5. Paupers ~43(1) 
The determination of eligibility of appli­
cant for old age assistance does 110t de­
pend on whether applicant will Ica\'c all es­
tate whell he dies. Laws 1941, e. 181, § 
I (m); Laws 1947, c. 237. 
I\ULLER, J., dissenting. 
Appeal from District Court, SecOlld Ju­
dicial District; Clearwater County; A. L. 
Morgan, Judge. 
Action to recover old age assistance paj"­
ments by the State of Idaho on the relation 
of N.. P. Nielson, State Auditor of the Slate 
of Idaho and another, against Nels Lind­
strom, executor of the estate of Frans G. 
Magnus, deceased. From an order sustain­
ing demurrer and dismissing action without 
leave to amend, the plaintiff appeals. 
Reversed with direction. 
Robert E. Smj'lie, Atty. Gen., and John 
A. Carve~, Jr., J. R. Smead, and Robert B. 
Holden, Assr. Attys. Gen., for appellants. 
State laws providing for such recoveries 
appear to QC contemplated by the federal 
stat lite. 42 V.S.c.A. § 303(b) (2) (B), 53 
Stat. 1361, (1939). 
The power of state legislatu res is plenary 
in the matter of succession to property by 
will or inheritance. The right is created 
by the Legislature, which may at any time 
abolish it. Bankers Trust Company v. 
Blodgett, 1922, 260 V.S. 647, 43 S.Ct. 23.3, 
67 L.Ed. 439; State v. ]\{ollier, 1915, 96 
Kan. 514, 152 P. 771, 773, L.R.A.1916C, 
551; In re Bevilacqua's Estate, 1945, Cal. 
App., 161 P.2d 589. 
Recovery provisions are creatures of 
statute. As such, they have been generally 
upheld. Slate v. Whitver, 1942, 71 N.D. 
664, 3 N. W.2d 457; Hawkins v. Kansas 
Social \-VeHare Board, 1938, 148 Kan. 760, 
84 P.2d 930; Department of Social Wel­
fare v. Wingo, 1946, 77 Cal.App.2d 316, 175 
P.2d 262. 
The Constitution of the State of Idirhn 
prohibits the loan of the credit of the stat" 
to private individuals or corporations. 
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68 IDAHO REPOUTS 
Consl., Art. VITI, sec. 2; Consl., Art. 
VIlT, sec. 4; Consl., Art. XII, sec. 4. 
The prohibition of these constitutional 
provisions is primarily directed against the 
combination of public funds or credit with 
the capital of private persons, corporate or 
natural. The activities held prohibited 
have generally involved the element of en­
terprise, or profit-making private scheme'S. 
There can be no recovery of money paid 
for old age assistance under the common 
law. City of Worcester v. Quilln. 30~ 
Mass. 276, 23 N.E.2d ~63, 125 A.L.R. 70]. 
\Vithouc st:ltutory authority there can be 
no recovery of money pnid for old age as­
si~tance or relief. In re Humphries' Will, 
125 Misc. 62, 210 N.Y.S. 253. 
The loan of the State's credit is prohibit­
Atkinson v. Board of CommissiOllers of . ed to or in aid of any individual. At­
, I 
Ada County, 1910, 18 Idaho 282, 108 P. 
1046,28 L.R.A.,NS, 412; School District 
No.8 v. Twin Falls County :Mutual Fire In­
surance Company, 1917, 30 Idaho 400, 164 
P. 1174. 
The term "loan" in the cited constitution­
al provisions has been construed to mean 
a transaction which creates the customary 
relation of lender and borrower. Bannock
'Ii; Coullty v. Citizen's Bank and Trust Com­
. 
pany, 1933, 53 Idaho 159, 22 P.2d 674. 
JJ 
The above cited constitutional provisions 
have been held to be a bar to actiolls of the 
Stat~ and other political sllbdivisiollS ollly 
, when faith or credit is pledged. Indepeud­
i' eltt School District NIl. 6 v. Common 
f:,. School District No. 38, 1942, 64 Idaho 303,f 131 P.2d 786; Hansen v. Independent
.' 
f School District No. I, 1939, 61 Idaho 109, 
c;S P.2d 959; SchOOl District No.8 v. Twin
., 
f:
, FalJs County Mutual Fire Insurance Com­
pany, supra. 
Samuel F. Swayne, of Orofino, for re­
spondent. 
kinson v. Board of COllnty Commissioners, 
18 Idaho 282, 108 P. 1046, 28 L.RoOA.,N.S., 
412; i\lcDollald v. Doust, 11 Idaho I~, 81 
P. 60, 69 L.R.A. 220; White v. Pioneer 
Bank & T. Co., jO Idaho 589,298 P. 933. 
The making of payments upon appJicatio-;;" 
for old age assistance under the statutes, 
coupled with the provisions for repayment 
and restriclions as to transfer of property, 
is contractual relationship. Consl. Art. 
VIlT, Sec. 2: Hawkins v. State of Kallsas . 
Social \oVeliare Board, 148 Kan. 760, 84 P. 
2d 930; Jn re Beuingaso's Estate, 165 Misc. 
459, 300 N.Y.S. 951; In re Black's Estate, 
ISO .Misc. ~33, 269 N.Y.S. 511; In the i\b.t­
ter of Katie Long, 2~2 App.Di,·. 781, 174 
N.Y.S.427. 
The mere acceptance of old age assist­
ance does not gi"e the State the right to 
reCover the payments. Tn re Humphries' 
Will, 125 Misc. 62,210 N.Y.S. 253. 
SUTPHEN, District Judge. 
The State of IJaho, on relation of its 
State Auditor and Commissioner of the De­
i 
'.": I 
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partment of Public Assistance, brought this 
action against the executor of the estate of 
Frans G. l\'fagnus, deceased, to recover 
amounts paid in old-age assistance to dece­
dent during his lifetime and does not in­
volve in the slightest what should be taken 
i':lto consideration in the initial a ward of 
old-age assistance; therefore, authorities 
involving such questions are not in point 
herein. 
The complaint, In brief, sets forth: 
that Frans G. 11agnus· d,uring his lifetime 
'-'Ide application for and was granted old­
......,; assistance; that commencing in March 
1943 the Department of Public Assistance 
paid him, in monthly installments each 
month to and including july 1946, the Sllm 
total 0 f $1,651; that Frans G. Magnus died 
testate August I, 1946, leaving an estate: 
that respondent was duly appointed and 
qualified as executor of the estate; that ap­
pellant duly tiled claim with the eXeClltOr 
for the amount of assistance paid; that the 
executor rejected the claim, and this suit 
properly ensued as provided by section 15­
609, 1. C. A. Idaho Trust Co, v. Miller, 16 
Idaho 308, 102 P. 360. 
The trial court sustained respondent's de­
murrer to the complaint and dismissed the 
action apparently accepting respondent's 
contention that the alleged transactions be­
tween the State and deceased amounted to 
a loan and that such a loan is unenforceable 
because repugnant to the inhibition con­
tained in Section 2 of Article 8 of the Con­
stitution of this State that: "* * * the 
credit of the state shall not, in any manner,
 
be given, or loaned to, or in aid of any in­

dividual, asociation, municipality or corpo­

ration."
 
'[I] Under the common law no reco\,­
ery o( money paid by the State for old­
age assistance was allowable where pay­
ment was not made by accident, fral,ld or 
mistake. City or" Worcester v. Quinn, 30 I 
Mass. 276, 23 N.E.2d 463, 125 A.L.R. 707. 
Thns, any right the appellant may ha\'e to 
recon~r in this action must be based upon 
OUr statutes. 
Pro\'ision, however, for recovery against 
the estates of recipients has been part of 
the law 0 f this State continnously since 
:March 2, 19-U, when Chapter 119 of the 
Laws of 19~3 became effecti\'e. Section 2 
of such Act added Section 24-a to the Pub­
lic Assistance Law of the State and read 
as follows: "Section 24-:1. Recovery from 
recipients. On the death of any recipient, 
the total amount of assistance paid. or re~ 
lief granted under this Act shall be allowed 
as a pre ferred claim against the estate Of l 
I 
Sl1Ch person and shall be subject only to the 
expense of the laSt illness, funeral expenses 
not to exceed $100.00, and expenses of ad­
ministration of said estate. No claim shall 
be enforced against any real estate or per­
sonal property of a recipient while such· 
real estate is occupied by the recipient, a 
surviving spouse, or a dependent, but the 
Statute of Limitations shall not begin to 
run against such claim so long as the col­
lection thereof is prohibited, as hereinabove 
Ii 
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68 IDAHO REPORTS 
!provided. "Such claim shaH be made by the 
<county or, in cases of cooperative assist­
::ance, by the State on behalf of aU partici­
)pants contributing to such assistance," 
Chapter 119, 1943 sL 
By an Act (Chapter 237, S.L.194i) the 
1947 legislature repealed the above quoted 
section and in lieu thereo! enacted the fol­
lowing provision for recovery from estates 
of recipients; "Section 24-a. Recovery 
From Estates. On the death of any recip­
ient of old-age assistance, the total amount 
of assistance paid such recipeint under this 
act may. in the discretion of the State De­
partment, be allowed as a claim against 
the estate of such person after reasonable 
funeral expenses, the expenses of the last 
illness, and the expenses 0 f administering 
the estate have been paid. No claim shall 
be imposed against any real estate of the 
recipient while it is occupied as a home by 
a surviving spouse, or against any personal 
property of less that $100.00 in value. The 
State Department shall certify. to the State 
Auditor the amount recovered from each 
estate as above provided, and a proper dis­
tribution thereof shaH be made by the State 
Auditor in proportion to the amount of as­
sistance contributed ~y the state and the 
federal government for such assistance." 
Chapter 237, 1947 Session Laws. 
Thus, in view of the statute, the ques­
tion before us is whether the granting of 
old-age assistance under the terms and con­
ditions of our Public Assistance Law (S.L. 
1941, Chap. 181; S.L.t943, Chap 119; S.L. 
1945, Chap. 109; S.L.1947, Chap. 237) falls 
within the inhibitions of Section 2 of Ar­
ticle 8 of the Constitution of the State of 
Idaho. 
It is insisted an action cannot be main~ 
tained against the estate 0 f a deceased re­
cipient for the recovery of the amount of 
assistance granted such recipient during his 
Ii fetime. Old-age assistance began in Au­
gust, 1935, by the enactment by Congress of 
the Social Security Act, Title I, Chap. 531, 
Act of August 14, 1935, 49 U.S. Stat. at 
Large, p. 620, <12 U.S.CA. § 301 et seq. 
Section 2 provided for old-age assistance. 
P;,\ragraph (7) of Subdivision (a)-a part 
of Section 2 of the Social Security Act­
read: "(7) Provide that, if the State or 
any of its political subdivisions collects 
from the estate of any recipient of old-age 
assistance any amount with respect to old. 
age assistance furnished him under the 
plan, one-half of the net amount so coHect­
cd shall be promptly paid to the United 
States. " 
It will bc .,otcd paragraph (7) did not 
. make it manc1atory upon a state or any po­
litical subdi\'isioll of a state to collect any­
thing whatsoever from the estate of any 
recipient of old-age assistance. That para­
graph simply provided that if a state did 
collect from the estate of a recipient of old­
age assistance, then and in such case, one­
half of the net amount collected should be 
promptly paid to the United States. Thus, 
the state \ViiS left absolutely free to deter­
mine whether it would, or would not, col­
000189
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lect from the estate of a recipient, but if it 
decided to and did collect, then it was made 
mandatory that one-half of the net amount 
collected should be promptly paid to the 
United States. 
About four years after the enactment of 
the Federal Social Security Act; to wit, 
August 10, 1939, the Congress amended it. 
By the amendment, paragraph (7) above 
quoted, was omitted; but a provision of sim­
ilar import was included in the amendment 
in that by paragraph No. (2) of Section 303 
(b) U.S.c.A. 42, it was and is provided as 
follows: "Provided, That any part of the 
amount recovaed from the estate of a de­
ceased recipient which is not in excess of 
the amount expended by the State or any 
political subdivision thereof for the funeral 
expenses of the deceased shall not be con­
sidered as a basis for reduction under 
clause (B) of this paragraph." 
In other words, by that amendment, the 
Congress still left a state absolutely free 
to co11<.:ct from the estate 0 f a deceased re­
cipient if it chose to, but provided that any 
part of the amount recovered, not in excess 
of the amount expended for funeral ex­
penses should not be considered as a basis 
for reduction under clause (B) of the same 
paragraph. 
The sole purpose of omitting paragraph 
(7) above quoted, from the amendment of 
1939, was that Congress intended that a 
state should no longer be required to pay to 
the United States one-half of the net 
amount of whatever was recovered by a 
state from the estate of a deceased recipi­
ent of assistance. A most generous thing 
for the Congress to do in this: It gives a 
state, for instance Idaho, a much larger 
amount of money to use in avoiding placing 
the aged and needy in poor-houses, by 
granting assistance to those owning the 
homes in which they live and enabling them 
to continue to li\'e in such homes until both 
husband and wife have passed On, after 
which; of course, they no longer require the 
use of a home. The generosity of the Con­
gress does not end there. It also provides 
more money to meet the requirements of 
the needy and destitute who are not the 
owners of homes. 
Morgan v. Department of Social Securi­
ty, 14 Wash.2d 156, 127 P.2d 686, is cited 
in support of the contention that a state 
cannot recover from the estate of a de­
ceased recipient of old-age assistance. It 
appears the opinion in that case also cov­
ered the companion cases of Laura M. 
Camfield and William L. Jacobson v. The 
Department of Social Security of the State 
of \l/ashingtol1. The question was' not pre­
sented to the Washington court in the Mor­
gan case, supra, as to whether the legislature 
of the State of \Vashington could, or could 
not, under the Washington Constitution, 
provide for the collection or recovery of 
assistance granted a deceased recipient in 
his lifetime. That this is true cannot be 
questioned, because all three at the above 
named persons were very much alive, mak­
ing application for and demanding assist­
1
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232 G8 IDAHO REPORTS 
ance under \Vashington's Senior Citizens 
Grants Act, which the \Vashington court 
passed on, 
While the humanitarian purpose of our 
Public Assistance Law, which grants as­
sistance to the deserving and needy, is not 
directly attacked, it is, however, indirectly 
~ttacked upon the ground-among others­
that the law is unconstitutional; because, it 
is argued in effect that the transaction by 
and through which Frans G. Magnus, now 
deceas~d. was grahted assistance, creat~d 
a debt which amounted to a loan-hence, 
was repugnant to the inhibition conlained 
in Sec. 2, Art. 8 of our Constitution pro­
viding that: "The credit of the state shall 
not, in any manner, be given, or loaned to, 
or in aid of any individual, association, mu­
nicipality or corporation."'. 
[2] The grant of old-age benefits under 
our Public Assistance Law appears to be 
unconditional as far as the recipient is con­
cerned. It creates no obligation on his 
part to repay public assistance to which he 
was lawfully entitled. There ar~ no provi­
sions therein which condition the grant Oil 
ei ther the non-ownership 0 r property or 
the ownership of Jess than a prescribed 
minimum of properly. 
If respondent is right In his contention 
our Public Assistance Law is unconstitu­
tional, even though it creates no obligation 
on tlie part of any recipient of relief to re­
pay any part of the relief granted, it WOUld, 
of course, carried to its logical conclusion, 
mean the legislature would be powerless to 
provide for any relief whatever to the de­
serving. and needy, and that would be sim­
ply absurd. 
[3] The granting of aid to its needy 
aged is a well recognized obligation of the 
state and is a governmental function tend­
ing to promote the public welfarr. Ala­
meda County v. Jamsen, 16 Cal.2d 276,106' 
P.2d J J, 130 A.L.R. 1141; 41 Am.Jur. 690. 
[4] Thl\s, its character as to all eligible 
recipients having been determined to bc 
public rather than private. it follows that 
the grantinj5 of such aid is not within the 
constitutional inhibitions unless the recov­
ery features of the Jaw above quoted made 
the law subject to such inhibitions. Wil­
liams \'. Baldridge, 48 Idaho 618,284 P. 203; 
State v. Snyder, 29 Wyo. 199,212 P. 771; 
Alameda COllllty v. Janssen. s~pra. Un­
doubtedly the state has the authority to pro­
vide for public assistance for ils needy 
aged, and the gO\'eTllmental nalure of the 
service determines its character as not giv­
ing or loaning the credit of the stale. Sup­
piger v. Enking, 60 Idalio 292, 91 P.2d 362. 
The law (19.t! S.L., Chap. 181 at Scc. I, 
Subd. (m) defill~s that: "(m) 'Ne~dy aged' 
shall meall any persoil 65 years or older, 
whose income and sources of snbsistcnce 
are insuA'icient to supply him with the com­
mon necessities of lire commellsurate wit~ 
his needs and health, ... ... ..... 
The statute, in line with modern ideas, 
makes it possible in many cases to avoid 
placing the needy aged in inst~tutions and 
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contemplates the granting of assistance to 
. those who may own the home in which they 
live or other property as well as to those 
absolutely destitute, if their income and 
sources of subsistence are not sufficient to 
meet the statutory standards. UnJer these 
provisions the recipient of public assistance 
is not required to liquidate all of his prop­
erty. Ofttimes the recipient continues to 
live in his own home, which he is able to 
preserve for use during his Ii fetime and for 
the use of his widow during her lifetime 
after his decease. This method of caring 
for the needy aged has proven far superior 
in many cases to placing the needy aged in 
institutions. It has not only proven to be 
marl' cflicit:nt and economical from the 
State's standpoint, but more humanitarian, 
...... pro\'jding the recipient with a more normal 
existence. frl'eing him of much of the stig­
ma and many of the hardships and dis­
agreeable features of Ii fe in an institution. 
[5] These recovery provisions, supra, 
ha ve nothing to do with the determination 
of the eligibility of any applicant for assist­
'me.... \Vhether he will or will not leave all 
estate When he dies makes not one iota of 
difference. The benefit received by the re­
cipient who leaves an estate is no more 
than that of the recipient who happens to 
have none. 
In thl' light of our determination that the 
granting of aid to the needy aged by the 
State does not fall within the inhibitions 0 f 
the constitution against giving or loaning 
the credit of the State to an indi\'iduaJ, it is 
difficult to see how the recovery feature,s 
of the Public Assistance Law can be said 
to be giving or loaning the credit of the 
State. 
The liability of the State is in no way in­
creased by the presence of these recovery 
provisions in the law. The State does not 
oblig;\te itself to do anything more because 
of such provi~ions. However, it does re­
ceive the b~nefit of the provisions in ques­
tion and should. it seems, be classed a recip­
ient of crcJit rather than the giver thereof. 
The conAict of interest here is not between 
the State and its needy aged. It is between 
the State and the heirs, next of kin or other 
distribntees of the estates of the deceased 
reCIpIents. "The right to dispose of one's 
propaty by will, and thc right to have it 
disposed 0 f by the law, a fter decease, is 
created by statute, and there fore the state 
may impose sllch conditions upon the exer­
cise of this right as it may determine." 
Bankrrs' TruSt Company \', Blodgett, 260 
U.S. 647, 43 S.Ct. 233, 234, 67 L.Ed. 439, 
quoting Id., % Conn. 361, 114 A. 104, 
Respondent says, however, that: "To 
sustain the repayment of old age assistance 
by virtue legislatllrc plenary power to regll­
late descent and inh~ritance. is to violate 
Section 19 of article 3, of the Constitution 
of the State of Idaho because this (is) 
class legislation, placing burdens on the 
aged-ncedy not imposed upon other rccip­
ients from the State." 
The section of the constitution last re­
ferred to prohibits the legislature from 
.... 
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passing local or special1aws in certain enu­
merated cases, among which is listed: 
"afleeting estates of deceased persons 
* * It" and "changing the law of de­
scent or succession." 
The repayment of old-age assistance pro­
vision of our Public Assistance Law ap­
pears to be gen~ral rather than special in 
its terms, as it operates upon all the aged 
needy and their estates in like situations. 
"A statute is general if its terms apply 
to, and its provisions operate upon, all per­
sons' and subject-matters in like situation." 
Jones v. Power County, 27 Idaho 656, 150 
P. 35, 37; In re Bottjer, 45 Idaho 168, 260 
P. 1095. 
"A special Jaw applies only to an individ­
ual or number of individuals out of a single 
class similarly situated and affected, or to 
a special locality. A law is not special sim­
ply because it may have only a local appli­
cation or apply only to a special class, if in 
fact it does apply to all such classes and 
all similar localities and to all belonging to 
the specified class to which the law is made 
applicable. Mix v. Boarcl of County 
Commr's, etc., 18 Idaho 695, 70S, 112 P. 
215, 32 L.R.A.,N.S., 534; Hettinger v. 
Good Road District No.1, 19 Idaho 313, 
318, 113 P. 72\; In re Crane, 27 Idaho 671, 
at page 690, lSI P. 1006, L.R.A.1918A, 942." 
Ada County v. Wright, 60 Idaho 394, at 
page 403, 92 P.2d 134, 138. 
"The rule is that before a legislative en­
actment will be held to be unconstitutional, 
it must clearly appear to be so." Bannock 
County v. Citizens' Bank & Trust Co., 53 
Idaho 159, at page 176, 22 P.2d 674, 680. 
The case, therefore, will be reversed and 
the trial court directed to overrule respond­
ent's demurrer t~ the complaint. COSts to 
appellant. 
GIVENS, C. r, HOLDEN, J., and 1\1c­
DOUGALL, D. J., COI\C\Ir. 
MILLER, Justice (dissenting), 
On August 14, 1935, the 74th Congress, 
Sess. I, Ch. 531, enacted the Social Securi­
ty Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 301 et seq. Title I 
ther.:of provided, "Grants To States For 
Old-Age AsS;Sta!lce." When used in Title 
I of said Act the term of old-age assistance 
means money payments to aged ind'ividuals. 
Section I of said Title made an appropria­
tion and the sums appropriated and made 
available under said Act were to be used in 
matching payments with states which ~a'd 
submitted pl,lIls to be approved by the So­
cial Security Board as established by Tille 
VII of the Act anc! under state plan for 
old-age assistan"ce. 
Section 2 provides for state old-age as­
sistance and subsection (a) thereof is as 
fOllows: "(a) A State plan for o.1d-age as­
sistance must (I) provide that it shall be 
ill effect in all political sllbdivisiol1s of the 
State, and, if administered by them, be 
mandatory upon them; • • ." 
Other provisions of subsection (a) arc 
ellumera ted. 
----------------~-_..~
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Paragraph (i) thereof is as follows; 
.. (7) provide that, if the State or any of its 
political subdivisions collects from the es­
tate a f any recipient. 0 f old-age assistance 
an)' amount with respcct to old-age assist­
ance furnished him under the plan, one-half 
of the net amount so collected shall be 
p'romptly paid to the United States." 
From section 2, subsection (a) it mani­
festly appears that the State plan for old­
age assistance is mandatory and must con­
tain certain prescribed requiremcilts in or­
der to entitle a state to "Grants to States 
for Old-Age Assistance under the Social 
Security Act." \Ve particularly invite at­
tention to paragraph (i), which authorized 
'iWU state to cullect from the estate of a recip­
ient of old-age assistance any and all 
amounts paid under the plan, In other 
words, any right :mcl authority of a state 
to collect from the estat~ of a recipient of 
old-age assistance must come from and 
throllgh the provisions contained in para­
graph (i) aforesaid, anJ. without such au­
thority a state is not entitletl to file a "alit! 
claim against the estate of a deceased recip­
ient or maintain an action for any am,)\lnt 
wh:ltsoever, irrespecti"e of the manncr in 
which an estate of a recipient of old-age as­
sistance was acquired, that is, whether the 
recipient had co\'erc:d up property or in­
come at the time of making application for 
assistance, or after being awarded assist­
ance he had come into property and in­
come which he did not report and which 
was sufficient. to provide him in snch man­
ner that assistance was no longer neces­
sary. 
The complaint in this case shows that it 
is an action in debt. It also shows that the 
deceased (Frans G. Magnus) was paid the 
aggregate sum of $1,651 for old-age assist­
ance, and that no part of the said sum has 
been repaid to the state, and that there is 
now due and owing the state of Idaho the 
said sum of $1,651. 
The statutory provision under which the 
action was commenced and is sOllght to be 
maintained is as follows: "Section 24-a. 
Recovery From Estates. On the death of 
any recipient 0 f old-age assistance, the total 
amount of assistance paid such recipient 
under this act may, in the discretion of the 
State Department, be allowed as a claim 
against the estate of such person after rea­
sonable funeral expenses, the expenses of 
the last illness, and the expens~s of admin­
istering the estate have been paid." 
In the caSe of State ex reI. Dean v. 
TIrandjord et aI., 108 Mont. 447, 92 P.2t1 
273, 279, being a mandamus procecdil)g 10 
compel payment of full amount of monthly 
old-age assistance, it is said: "\Vhcn the 
whole subj eet of relief for the aged indi­
gent is taken imo consider~tion, when the 
history of federal alld state legislation is 
given proper effect. when the national 
plans and the subsequently enacted state 
plans of the different states are understood, 
it would seem that none of the state plans, 
including our own, were ever devised to 
stand or operate without the cooperation 
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of the federal government. [AuthorityJ. 
If this be true, and we think that it is be­
yond question the outstanding theory of the 
whole matter, then it is obvious that our 
law must be construed. /101 as a/l ;/Id"pe/ld­
ent Act, but in COlljunction with thc feder­
al ACI, Ihal is, Ihe Iv.lO Aels P11llst be admill ­
lslcr£'d 10gdll£"r as a ullified code (If lows 
cll<lclcd by COtlgress and 111': stat.: l,'gisla­
Illre for Ille complele and co",prcllells;~lc 
cOlilrol of thc STlbj"cl," (Emphasis ours.) 
We have indicated that authority for any 
activity by a state incidellt to recovery or 
the collection of payments from the estate 
of a deceased recipient was embodied in sec­
tion 2 of Title I of the Social Security Act 
as originally enacted. Section 2, of the 
original Act, was subsequently designated as 
Section 302, and the provision contained in 
paragraph (7) of section 2, as originally 
enacted, was repealed and in the case of 
Morgan v. Department of Social Security, 
14 Wash.2d 156, 127 P.2d 686, 693, it is said: 
.. It is evident that there is a conAict hetwee!1 
the provisions of the FeJeral act and those 
of the state statute. In the portion of the 
Federal act above quoted is found the fol­
lowing: '(a) A State plan for old.age as­
SiStiUlce must .. .. .. (7) effectivc July 
I, 1941, provide that the State agency shall, 
in determining need, take into consideration 
any other income and resources of an in­
diviuual claiming old-age assistance.''' 
Accordingly, any former provision that a 
state or its political subdivisions might col­
lect "frofT! the estate of a recipient of old-
age assistance IS no longer authoriz~d b:: 
the Social Security Act, anJ; which is tb, 
oilly source of authority of states and/o: 
their political subdi"isions, any claim of the 
state against the estate of Frans G. i\l:lg. 
nus, deceased, or the commencement of an 
action against Nels Lindstrom, the exeeu·· 
tor of his estate, is a nullity, and cannot be 
sanctioncd, 
In support of the statement that any at­
tempted rccovcry is a nullity because unau­
thorized by the Federal act, we here men­
tion that there is also, another reaSOn why 
110 recovery :s permissible and that is that 
the actioll was a direct action addressed to 
the original rather th:ln the appellate ju­
risdiction of the court. Thus, \\"e arc con­
frontcd with tll'O propositions, (I)' that no 
recovery can bc h:ld for the reaSOn that 
there is no authorization therefor by the 
Federal act, and (2) that the court had no 
jurisdiction in that the only right the court 
had in the premises was undcr and through 
its appellatc jurisdiction. 
In the case of Bowen v. Department of 
Social Security, 14 \Vash.2J 148, 12i P.2d 
682, 684, it is said: 
"I\t thc time the constitution [State] was 
adopted, civil procedure was gOl'emed by 
the practice act of 1881. Code of 1881, p. 
35 Section 1, chapter 1, prOl'ided that: 
'The common law of England .. .. * 
(Lc'A. iO-116) and the organic :tet aud 
laws of \"lashington Territory shall be tlte 
rule of decision in all the courts of this 
/. 
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Territory.' And § 2 provides that: 'There 
s~alJ be iu this Territllry hereafter but one 
form of action [I.e.A. 5-101] for the en­
forcement or protection of pri\'ate rights 
and the redress of private wrongs, which 
shall be called a 6z:il actio/l.' * * * 
. "It hardly requires argument to demon­
strate that the court proceedings provided 
for in § 9 of chapter 1, Laws of 1941, the 
senior citizens grants act, do not come with­
in these provisions of thc practice act of 
1881. Thc cOllrl proccdillgs provided for 
in that oct (Ire 1I0t cOllllllellced il~ any cOI/rt. 
TI'L')' 11<1'··f tlrcir illceptioll ill tlrc departlJlcnt 
of .wciol sallrity, lind find their 7('ay to the 
('ollrts through 11ppcal-llot by !('ay of the 
iSSIlGIICC of Sll11t11IOIIS. [Emphasis ours.] 
"further than that, the functions now ex­
erciseJ by administrativc bodies under 1eg­
is1:lti,'c authority were practically unknown 
to Amcrciau jurisprudence at the time our 
constitution was adopted; and, so far as we 
can ascerta in, they were wholly unknown 
to Ol\r territorial jurisprudence. To say 
that court proceedings arising out of the ex­
ercise of such administrative functions are 
civil actions in contemplation of the limita­
tion On this court's jurisdiction, contained 
ill § 4, art. IV, of the constitution, would 
make that prOVISIOn 'e:<press purposes 
which were never within the minds of the 
people in agreeing to it.' People v. Hard­
ing, supra [53 Ivlich. 481, 19 N.W. ISS]. 
What pertinent anthorities there are on the 
subject lend support to thc view that court 
proceedings ,flowing from controversies 
~ arising before administrative bodies are In
 
no sense civil actions as they were under­

stood at common law.
 
"Colonel O. R. McGuire, a member of the 
American Bar Association's special com­
mittee on administrativc law, in an article 
published in 26 Georgetown Law Journ:.I, 
574, 589, says: '. * * administrative 
hw is a separate and distinct branch of the 
law, It is not common Jaw, equity, or ad­
miralty law * • .'" 
The case of i\lorgan v. Department of 
Social Security, 14 Wash.2d 156, 127 P.2d 
686, 692, 70S deals extensively with Title I 
oi the Social Security Act, and the adoption 
of the plan submitted b)' the state of Wash­
ington through the pro\'isions of initiati ve 
141, :l.ud in accordance with the rcquire­
ments of the act and the approval of the 
Social Security Board as provided il} Sec­
tion 302 of the Act. Contained therein' it 
is said: 
"A transcript of the minutes of the meet­
ing of the federal social seCltrity board at 
which illitiative 141 was cousidered, con­
tains the following: 
.. 'Section Three, suhsections (g) and 
(h), of Ihis iniliali\'e measure are in viola­
tion of the prO\'isions of the Social Secu­
rity Act, whieh became effective, JlIly I, 
1941, in that the state agency may disre­
gard certain "income and resources" in de­
termining whether an applicant is eligible 
for old-age assistance; and may also be in 
violation of present I)' effective provisions 
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 '
e ~
 
l ll
L -
  
l1 -
I
-
e !l l f' i
(I lllell llY ll l
r IW'· f I l l l li e artll e i
C;(Il l'Cllri/)" I ci t 10 I
l I ugiz ,1ppcal-1I01 I
I l JtlllOlI
-
le -
l:lti,·
n
lll
l
oll
-
-
n
ovisio '(
-
Lhoril
-
 
-
e
 
 
"law 
l -
y -
I
1.n e -
Q -
ll -
clt rel
n -
t t t -
-
c l 1
-
-
ly 
 
 
 
";.':: 
J;' 
.. 
~ . 
STATE \'. LINDSTnO:\r	 239 
CIte ... 68 Idaho 226 
<....; to allow recipients certain income and 
.sources, and independent of Grants-In­
Aid. which was not provided for in Title I 
)f the Social Security Act, and that such 
leemingly inconsequential provIsIOns as 
:ontained in subparagraphs (g) and (h) 
:ue in violation of the Social Security Act, 
due evidently to the closely knit adherence 
to the coopcrati\'e legislative effort of state 
and national governments in carrying out a 
public purpose common to both. I f the 
hoard lleld that the pro\'isions contained 
in subparagraphs (g) and (h) which al­
lowed certain income and resources not al­
lowed by the Social Security A.:t to be dis­
regarded in determining the amount of as­
sistance to be awarded a recipient then 
there is no need to speculate as to what 
.-said board would hold on the question of 
the validity of the state of Idaho to file a 
preferred claim against the estate of Frans 
G. Magnus, deceased, or to institute a suit 
in the District Court against his eXecutor 
under the provisions of section 24-a, supra, 
for the full amount of Grants-In-Aid law­
fully paid Magnus as a recipient of old-age 
aSSistance, instead of handling it as a de­
partmental matter in accordance with law, 
or that the State might assume that any 
such provision was legal since paragraph 
(7) providing for reco\'ery as contained in 
-the	 original Social Security Act had not 
been Ii fted therefrom and is still contained 
therein. 
The majority opinion states that, "The 
granting of aid to its ncedy aged is a well 
recognized obligation of the state and is a 
govt:rnmemal function tending to promote 
the public weliare." In support of such 
statement we are cited te the case, of Ala­
meda County v. Janssen, 16 Cal.2d 276, 106 
P.2d II, 130 A.L.R. 1141; 41 Am.Jur. 690. 
Said caSe deals with an Act of the legisla­
ture of California of 1929, providing finan­
cial assistance to needy aged who met cer­
tain requi remenlS, and whose property did 
not exceed specified values. There were no 
matching funds available or involved. It 
is of no assistance in determining whether 
a state may col.lect any or all of the amounts 
paid a recipient of old-age assistance. 
The majority opinion treats the Public 
Assistance Act as the only legislation in-' 
volved, and that Section 24-a, Session Law.~ 
1947, as the sole and only measure of deter-I 
milling the right of the State to reCOver any 
payments made to recipients of old-age as­
sistance. Said opinion does not take into 
account that payments of old-age assistance' 
is a cooperative function and that without 
such cooperation the State would be power­
less to act. 
In the case of BowclI v. Department of 
Social Security, 14 Wash.2d 148, 127 P.2d 
682, a proceeding wherein thc respondent 
Bowen made a d.:mand upon the Director 
of the Department of Social Security of 
the State of \Vashington, to increase his 
award of $34 a month to $40 a mQnth and 
demanded "a fair hearing" under the pro­
visions of section 8, p. 7, of the act, which 
provided that said hearing should be had 
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not more than 30 days a fter the receipt of 
notice. More than 30 d:lys having elapsed 
Bowen gave notice of appeal to the superior 
court of Grays Harbor county. A motion 
to quash the nOlice of appeal was interposed 
by the department and the Supreme Court 
in passing upon the matters involved said: 
"To the extent, at le:lst, that it is composed 
of 'federal matching funds' the fund from 
which 'Senior Citizens Grants' are paid is 
essentially a trust fund, for the proper ex­
penditure of which the state department 0 f 
social security is responsible to the federal 
government." 
The fact that 24-a, Laws of 1947, author­
izes a recovery of all amounts, without 
reservation, thereto fore paid recipients 0 f 
'old-age assistance, it is apparent that the 
'payment of assistance to recipients, which 
may subsequently be recovered, must be 
:characterized as a loan, Otherwise there 
could be no provision for .recovery, and 
under those conditions, of course, would 
be offensive to Section 2 of Article 8 0 f 
the Constitution which inhibits the loaning 
of the credit of the state to any individual. 
In the case of Burguorf et al. v. Depart­
ment of Social Security, 14 Wash.2d 209, 
127 P.2d i09, practically the same ques­
tions arc involved as in the case of Mor­
gan v. Department .of Social Security. I 
quote therefrom, not so much for the pur­
pose of showing that grants-in-aid to reci­
pients unuer the Washington Public As­
sistance Act, as embodied in initiative 141, 
must be made in accordance with the pro­
- ._-­ ----------­
visions of the Social Security Act and not 
in accordance with the state Act allowing 
income and resourCeS in addition to the 
payment of sums for old-age assistance, 
but more particularly fOI' the purpose of 
emphasizing a matter heretofore pointed 
out, that is, that any controversy between 
a recipient and the department of social 
security must be determined in the first in­
stance in the department and find its way 
to the courts only through appeal and not 
by way of issuance of a summons. In this 
caSe the uepartment hau deducted ~Il from 
each of the recipients because 0 f home 
ownership, combined Jiving and the use of 
water without payment. The recipients 
sought a hearing before the Pierce County 
\Ve!f:lre Department which recommendeu 
the deduction and the recipients being l!:s­
S:ltisfied with the amounts of grants, rec.­
ommended by the County Wei fare Depa.rt­
ment, requested a fair hearing thereon 
be fore the director of the state department. 
The hearings were had, and therea fter the 
director approved the recommenuations o'f 
the Pierce county weI fare department, and 
awarded e:lch applicant a grant in the sum 
of $29 each month. "The recipients, being 
of the opinion tha.t they were each entitled . 
to a grant in a greater amount, appealed 
from the departmental orders to the supe­
rior court for Pierce county. A fter a 
hearing, .the trial court reversed the depart­
mental orders, and remanded the cases to 
the department, with instructions that each 
grant should be increased, and payment 
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thereof in the increased amount be made 
retroactive to date from December ~, 19~0. 
From these judKmel1ts the department of 
social securitr has appealed. The cases 
han: been consolidated for hl.'aring before 
this court." 
The ju<1:!l11ents ill the cases at bar were 
re\'erseu Wilh instruclions to enter jud~­
mellts affirmin~ Ihe orders 0 f the depart­
ment. 
In the case of Halsell ct al. v. Depan­
ml'nt of Social Security. I~ Wash2d i09, 
127 P.2d il I, something 0 f the same prop­
osilion as cOIHaineu in the case of Burg­
dorf v. Department of Social Security, 
,...,. supra, was up for Ul.'tcrmination. The 
Gra)'s Harbor count}' welfare uepartment 
recommemkd that a grant be made to 1\lr. 
Halsell of $30 per month, anu that a simi­
lar grant be made in favor of ~(rs, Hal­
sell. "The recipients. being uissatistieu 
with the recommend.tlion of the county 
\\'el fare uepartmenl. relJuesteu a fair hC:lr. 
ing bcfon: the director of the uepartment, 
which hearin!: WaS granted and the testi­
mOllY reduced to writing. Based upon 
the recon.! so madl.', the director rendered 
his ueeision June 19, 19~1, affirming the 
ac:ion of tbl: count)' wd fare department, 
anu a wardiUK :l grant to each recipient in 
the amount of thirty uolJars per month. 
Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the 
uirector, the recipients appealed to the 
superior court, Where the mattl:r W:lS 
hearcJ upon the record made before the de-
G.~ lu,\ lIu-lli 
partment, 110 ne\1I' evidence ha \'ing been
 
olTered by either party."
 
The controversy grew out of the fact 
that each reeipiellt sought a g'rant oi ;S40 
and therl.' was deducted from said amOUllt 
$i because of home ownership, and $3 be­
caus... of comhined li\·ill~. 
Further lJuolinK from Halsell et al. v.
 
J)cparlment of Social Security, supra:
 
". • • III accordance with the con­
chlsions of Jaw, the coun entered its de­
Cree rt:mandill~ the proceeding to the de­
partment, with tlirections to revise the 
awards b)' eliminating therefrom the tie­
uuctions allo\'e referred to. From this de­
cree the tlcpartmellt of social security of 
the Slate of \\'ashilll,"ton has appealed 10 
this court," 
"The trial court was evidentl}' of the 
O(lllllon that the del!llctions a!Jo\'e rcferretl 
to, made by the director, were not in ac­
cordance with the pro\'isions of initiati\'c 
HI. • • • 
"We ha\'c <Ietermilled this question con­
trary to respondents' contention. As stated 
in our opinion in the eOl1solidated cases of 
~lorgan et al. v. Department of Social 
Security, (I~ Wash..2t1 13f)], 12i P.2d 686, 
we arc eonvincetl that initiati\'e 141 by its 
own terms muSt bc construed in connection 
with the F edera! statute, and that certain 
provisions of the state statute arc not in 
harmony with the Federal laws and must 
be disregarded." 
[
I, 
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The judgment appealed from was revers­
ed with instructions to enter judgment af­
firming the order of the department. 
In Vol. 42. Am.Jur., p. 698, sec. 254: 
"The Federal courts have established 
a set of principles known as th~ 'primary 
jurisdiction doctrine: developed in cases 
construing the Interstate Commerce Act 
[49 U.S.C.A. § I et seq.], but given general 
application to Federal administrative bodies 
other than the Interstate Commerce Com­
mission, and applied by the Federal courts 
in relation to state administrative bodies. 
[\\"oodrieh v. Northern Pac. R. Co.; 8 Cir., 
71 F.2d 732, 97 A.L.R. 401.] 
"The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is 
that the courts cannot or will not determine 
a controversy involving a question which 
is within the jurisdiction of an adminis­
tratiye tribunal prior to the decision of 
that question by the administrative tribunal, 
where the question demands the exercise of 
sound administrative discretion requiring 
the special knowledge, experience and ser­
vices of the administrativ~ tribunal to de­
termine technical and intricate matters 
of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is es­
sential to comply with the purposes of the 
regulatory statute administered. The prin­
ciple is derived from a consideration of the t· 
.1 nature of the question and of the inquiry 
~ i and the action required for its solution. 
.JJ' The courts will not take jurisdiction even 
! 
temporarily, pending an investigation be­
fore the administrative tribunal, so as to 
grant an injunction against rates alleged to 
be unreasonable or discriminatory. The 
doctrine is applied in the face of statutes 
which expressly purport not to abridge or 
alter existing remedies on the ground that 
such a provision cannot be construed to 
continue rights which would be absolutely 
inconsistent with the statute:' (Innumer­
able aUthorities are cited in support of the 
foregoing doctrine.) 
In support of the doctrine that an action 
may not be instituted in a distriCt court be­
cause of a controversy arising before an ad­
ministrative department, we cite the case 
of Pet~rson v. Livestock Commission, 
il,(ont., 181 P.2d 152, 157, wherein it is 
held: 
"It is generally held that astatute wh ich 
attempts to place the court in the place of 
a commission or board to try a matter anew 
as an administratiYe body is unconstitution­
al as a delegation to the judiciary of non­
jUdicial powers. A few of the many cases 
so holding are the following: Steenerson 
v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 69 Minn. 353, 
72 N.W. 713; State v. Great Northern Ry. 
Co., 130 Minn. 57, 153 N.W.247, Ann.Cas. 
191iB, 1201; In re Hunstiger, 130 Minn. 
47~, 153 N. W. 869; State ex rei. Dybdal v. 
State Securities Comm., 145 Minn. 221, 176 
N. W. 759; State Board of Medical Regis­
tration v. Scherer, 2?1 Ind. 92, 46 N,E2d 
602; In re Fredericks, 285 Mich. 262, 280 
N,W. 464, 125 A.L.R. 259; Mojave River 
11'1'. Dist. v. Supreme Court, 202 Cal. 717, 
262 P. 724; Borreson v. Department of 
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"Statutes providing for appeals somewhat 
similar to that under consideration have 
been held valid by interpreting them as not 
granting trials de novo in the full sense of 
that expression but as con ferring authority 
for the court· to pass upon the lawfulness 
only of the order of the board or commis­
sion. Examples are: ;\'[organ v. Depart­
ment of Social Security, 14 Wash.2d 156, 
...,27 P.2d 686; Investors Syndicate v. 
Hughes, 378 III. 413, 38 N.E.2d 754; Lloyd 
v. City of Gary, 21.J. Ind. iOO, Ii N.E.2d 
836. 
"The only proper questions that may be 
tried by a court on appeal from an order 
sueh as the one here involved is whether 
the commission acted capriciously or arbi­
trarily or without jurisdiction or authority 
under the law. People of State of New 
York ex reI. X ew York & Queens Gas Co. 
\'. :\lcCal1, 245 U.S. 345, 38 S.O. 122, 62 
L.Ed.337; State \'. State Board of Equal­
ization, 56 l\lont. 413, 185 P. i08, 186 P. 
697." 
Since the majority 0plnlOn has been re­
",ritten, there is included therein the case 
of City of \Yorceste-r v. Quinn, 304 l\'lass. 
276, 23 N.E.2d 463. 125 A.L.R. 707. I fail 
to see wherein said authority is of any as­
sistance whcn applied to the majority opin­
ion. I will reier to said matter later. 
Referring to the c~se of Alameda Coun­
ty v. Janssen, supra, that was an action in 
mandamus to compel Janssen as Chairman 
of the Board of Supervisors of Alameda 
County to execute certain releases of liens 
and cancellation of restrictive agreements 
with respect to real property of the recipi­
ents of financial aid granted under the pro­
visions of old-age security act of the state. 
In 1937 the California Legislature amended 
sections 2224 and 2225 of the Welfare and 
Institutions Code, into which section 4 of 
the Old-Age Security Act had been incor­
porated, to eliminate the provisions of such 
liens as well as the provisions making the­
aid a debt of the recipient to the state and 
county. Section 2225 was amended to pm­
vide that, "all liens and mortgages hereto­
fore created under the provisions of said 
chapter are hereby released and the board 
of supervisors of each county * * ., 
arc hereby directed and authorized to exe, 
cute and record appropriate instruments 
of release." Janssen, as chairman of the 
board of supervisors, refused to execute 
said liens and releases on the grounds that 
it \'iolated section 31 of article IV of the 
Cali fLlrnia Constitution, prohibiting the 
legislature from making or authorizing any 
gi ft of public money and also tha t it dolat­
ed prohibitions in the United Stales aml 
California Constitutions against the pas­
sage of any law impairing the obligation 
of contracts. The court in passing on the 
question, construed the constitutional pro­
vision as follows [16 Ca1.2d 276, 106 P.2d 
,
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of this cOllrt? Is it because of there being 
a public assistance act, or because the leg­
islature has seen fit to amend said act by 
including therein a provision for a re­
covery of the amount 0 f assistance paid a 
reCipient, Section 2"-a, supra, is not a 
part of the substantive law of this jurisdic­
tion, But, to the contrar)', is purely pro­
cedural, and, incidentally, is the first re­
sort in an attempt to establish a collection 
agency of the Public Assistance Act. The 
majority opinion observes, "[f respondent 
is right in his contention that the Public 
Assistance law is uncon5titutional, even 
though it cre:ltes no obligation on the part 
of any recipient oi reliei to repay any part 
of thc relief gramed, it would, of course, 
carried to its logical conclusion, mean the 
legislature would be powerless to provide 
for any relief \\'hatever to the deserving 
and need}', and that would be absurd," 
From the foregoing, it is made to appear 
that section 2+.a is superior to all other 
phases of the Public Assistance Act. I 
know of no one who asserts, or insists, 
that the payment of old-age assistance, in 
the first instance, violates the credit pro­
vision 0 f section 2. article Vll[ 0 f our con­
stitution. It is the enforcement or attempt­
ed en forcement 0 f the recover}' provision, 
written into the law, that is the "fl}' in the 
ointment." \\-ithout such r·ecovery pro­
vision no one would contend that the act 
is offensive to the constitution. The en­
forcement of the recovery provision, how­
ever, is questioned and objected to because 
GS·\O:\HO REPOll.TS244 
__I 
14J: "Section 31 of article IV of the Cal­
i fornia Constitution prohibits the legis­
lature from making or authorizing a gi ft 
of public money or thing of value to any 
individual or corporation. The next clause, 
however, provillcs that nothing in this sec­
tion shall prevent the legislature from 
granting aid pursuant to section 22 of ar­
ticle IV which amhorizes the granting of 
aid to indigent aged, Therefore the re­
lease of a lien by a county, pursuant to sec­
tion 2227 0 f the \Vel fare Code, does not 
constitute a "iolation of section 31, article 
IV, if (1) it is a gift of public money or 
thing of value, or (2) it is a grant of aid to 
indigent aged under section 22 of ~rticle 
IV," 
It will be observed that section 22 of 
article IV 0 f the Constitution, authorized 
the granting of aid to indigent aged. We 
have no such pro"ision in our constitution 
and it was b~eause the liens, mortgages and 
contracts established an existing debt, that 
Janssen, even in the face of section 22 of 
article IV, a foresaid, and the legislation 
that was enacted, rdused to sign releases of 
the liens that had been incurred by the 
recipients of aid to indigent aged. The 
majority opinion recites, "Thus, in View 
of the statutes, the qllestion before us is 
whether the granting of old-age assistance 
under the terms and conditions of our 
Public Assistance Jaw * * * falls with­
in the inhibitions of Section 2 of Article 
S of the Constitution of the State of Idaho," 
What brings the question to the attention 
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its en forcement.o f necessity shows that the 
payment of old-age assistance to a recipient 
is in the nature of a loan. If it were not 
in the nature of a loan it could not be re­
cOI-ered and the contention, as I sec it. is 
chat section 24-a. the recovery provision, 
is unconstitutional amI a nullit)" and there­
fore incapable of enforcement. 
1 submit that before the State can re­
cover from the estate of a deceased reci­
pient of assistance there must exist an ob­
ligation on the part of the estate to pay 
"~ amount sought to be recovered. In 
....",er words, a contractual oblig;\tion In 
some form or manner between the State 
and the deceased recipient, during his Ii fe· 
time must be establishecl. In speaking of 
said matter, relative to the right of a 
state to reCO\'er from the estate of a de­
ceased recipient of old·age assistance, the 
Social Security Act of August 1~, 1933, 
49 U.S.Stats. 620, Title 42, U.S.c..-\. §§ 
,301-306 was mcntioned in the case of 
City of \Vorcester v. Quinn. supra [304 
:'lass. 276. 23 :-..'.E.2d 465], and therein it 
is said: 
"This act of Congress prodded for the 
grant of Federal funrls for old age assis­
tance to such Statcs as should adopt an old 
age assist:mce plan containing certain re­
quirements, one of which was that 'i f the 
State or an)' of its political subdivisions col­
lects from the estate of any recipient of 
old-age assistance any amount with respect 
to otd-age assistance furnished him under 
tht: plan, one-half of the net amount so 
.' 
,\ 
,.' 
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" 
collected shall be promptly paid to the 
United States.' ,.. ,.. • The only mat­
ter cOI'ered by this pro\·isioll of the act of 
Conl;r~ss and by our own statute which 
incorporated it was to prol'ide for the 
app,)rtiollmcnt anJ distribution of suc!l 
proceeds as may be realizcd from the estate 
of a recipient of aid, and both enactments 
left untouched any liability upon the pan 
of the estate of a recipient to reimburse 
the city, .-\ statute is to be iairly and rea­
sonably construed anu its scope is not to 
b~ ('x tended by construction beyond its 
apparent limits. [Citinl; amhuritiesJ, 
"Both Congress and our own Legisla­
ture were content to let that liabiliL)' con­
tinue to n:st upon the principles \If com­
mon law and to share in th~ proceeds of 
actions where payments had heen made 
thrOllg-h ;lccident, fraud or mistake. The 
mere right to share in one half of the net 
amount collected from the estate of a rcci­
pient oi aid, withollt establishing any obli. 
gation upon the part of the estate to pay 
aud without creating an)' new remedy, 
must be construed to mean that the collec­
tion from the estate must be had by present 
remedies under our existing Jaw. This 
conclusion is also supported by the rela­
tionship existing between the Federal and 
State gO\'ernmcnts in the establishment and 
maintenance of old age assistance. ,.. .. ,.. 
"Report No. 613 of the committee on 
ways and means recommended the passage 
,.of thc social sccurity bin (H.R. 7260). The 
ibill then contained s. 206, captioned 'Over­
", 
f ' 
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! 
I· payments during life,' which provided that 
'If any recipient, through errOr or other­
wise, has recei ved	 benefit payments in ex­
t 
cess of the amount to which he is entitled, I 
) and dies before such overpayments have been adjust~d,' then his estate shall repay 
I 
a certain amount to the United States. In!
i 
,..	 the same report, at page 17, it appears that 
i	 the purpose of this section was to secure 
from the State one half of the Federal 
contributions paid to recipients from whose 
estates the State has recovered on account 
of payments 'because those persons had 
been defrauding the State.' The commit­
tee on finance, report No. 628, recommended 
the adoption of bill H.R. i260 containing 
said s. 206, and gave (page 29) the same 
explanation of the purpose of this section 
as did the committee On ways and means. 
It is clear that Congress merely proVided 
for r,'imbllrsement from till: estate of aII: 
d 
decellsed rc:cipiel.t wllo IIad l"rou9" crror 
II or fraud rcceived ov.rp"ymcllts during !lis life tilll'". And the only purpose of our 
Legislature in enacting that portion of 
what now is section 4 of c. 118A relative 
to reimbursement, other than from bond 
or mortgage, from the estate of a reciIJienl 
oi aiJ, was a declaration of, the public 
l! policy of this' Commonwealth that when
,',
f
J •	 recovery was had one half of the proceed~ 
.
• 
r
~ . would be paid to the national treasury.
,', [Citing authorities]. 
t!	 "Under that law there can be no reo 
4: 
'1'	 covery where pa)'ments were not made by 
~ II . 
,1
i ' 
~Jl'i.,
" 
• _ • I 
accident, fraud or mistake." (Emphasis 
ours). 
If it is said that Section 2~-a furnishes 
the right of the State to recover from 
estates "the total amount oi assistance 
paid" to a recipient under the act (Ch. 237, 
La ws 19~7), and that the applicant for as-, 
sistance was in formed of the provisions 
of the act and acquiesced therein anJ there­
to, there is then established the relationship 
of debtor and creditor and Sec. 2 of art. 
8 of the Constitution, extending credit to 
an individual,' is violated. And, again, if 
it is saiJ there is no violation of the credit 
provision of the Constitution, where then, 
we ask, is the obligation upon the part of 
the estate to pay.	 If the recipient of aid, 
during his lifetime, did not consult and 
agree, expressly or impliedly, to repay the 
amount paid him, how can any obligation 
attach to the estate. With these observa­
tions must we not conclude, that the only 
recovery that is permissible "rests upon 
the prillCiIJles of common law and to share 
in the proceeds oi actions where payments 
have been made through accident, fraud 
or mistake." There is another matter I 
feel Jisposed to mention, and which our 
legislature seemingly overlooked in enact­
ing Sec. 2~-a, supra, and is unnoticed in 
the majority opinion, and that is this: This 
! •. ' jurisdiction is one oi the eight community 
property law states. All property acquired 
after marriage by either husband or wife.. 
(Sec. 31·907, 1.c..-\.) is community prop­
erty. 
000204
,.-
=:"
"r 
I' I
I 
 
 
 
 
 
: .
f ' 
 
 
  
 
I  
t  
-,  
 ' ., 
• - • I 
 
-
 -
 
 
Ii,
-
 i
 
c -
t:
ic n:
tee on finance, report No. 628, recommended provision of the Constitution, where then, 
the adoption of bill . . i260 containing e ask, is the obligation upon the part of 
said s. 206, and gave ( a e 29) the sa e the estate to pay, If the recipient f aid, 
explanation f the purpose f this section during his lifeti e, did not consult and 
as did the co ittee n ays and eans. r , r ssl  r i li l , t  r  t  
It is clear that ongress erely provided a ount paid hi , ho  can any obligation 
for r,'i bllrsc enl fro  1/,,· eslate f a attach to the estate, it  these observa-
deceused rccipielll ho had Ihroll9h error tions ust e not conclude, that the only 
r fraud rcccived ov.rpllYlllcll/s durillg his recovt:ry that is per issible "rests upon 
lif  timL',  t  l  r s  f r t  rinciI l    l   t   
  t:     
lI8 t:
t ke." 
. t
icJ  
 
 
y
cJispos
-
,
- ._ -
STATE Y. LINDSTRo:.r 247
cu" ... 88 JdQhl> 2:6 
;;;.~­
Hu~band and wife are equal partners 
in community estate. Kohny v. Dunbar, 
21 Idaho 258, 121 P. 544, L.R.A.,N.S., 1107, 
Ann.Cas. 191JD, 492; Peterson v. Peter­
son, 35 Idaho 470, 207 P. 425. 
\Vife's interest in community property 
is vested intcrest of same nature and ex­
tent as that of her hushand. II'luir v. Poca­
tello, 36 Idaho 532, 212 P, 345. 
No distinction is made between husband 
and wife as to degree, quantity, and nature 
~ or extent of interest each has in commun­
ity property. Ewald Y. Hufton, 31 Idaho 
373, 173 P. 247; Peterson v. Peterson, 
.supra. 
Upon the death of either husband or 
wife, one-half of all community property 
shall go to the sllf\"iYor, subject to the 
community debts, etc. In case no testa­
mentary dispusition shall have been made 
by the deceased husband or wi fe 0 f his 
or her half 0 f the community property it 
shall go to the survivor, (Sec. 14-113 I.C 
A) subject to the community debts, etc. 
A recipent of old-;lge assistance cannot 
create a liability against the community 
propeny without the husband or wife, if 
.such there be, joining in the encumbrance 
.incurring such liability. 
In the instant casc the doctrine of prim­
ary jurisdiction is particularly applicable 
for the reason th'lt section 24-a, Session 
Laws 1947, providing for a recovery from 
a recipicnt of old-age assistance places 
the discretion thereof within the state 
~ .department, an administrative jurisdiction. 
The demurrer to the complaint says that 
it does not state facts sufficient to consti­
tute a cause of action. The trial court sus­
.tained the demurrer without leave to amend 
and dismissed the action. In so doing the 
court was right. He had no original jur­
isdiction of the controversy and could en­
tertain the same only in his appellate capa­
city. Furthermore, Section 24-a, Session ~, 
Laws 1947, was void in that there is no iii • l- .....:.. .. . ", 
pro\'ision for recovery under the Social r.-!!I!!!!!!!'_ 
Security Act which is necessary because 
of the cooperative functions and efforts 
of gO\'ernment and stale Jaws. The afore­
mentioned state statute is not in harmony 
with the Federal social security laws and 
for that reason must be disregarded as all 
acts 0 f the Social Security Act, and the 
Public Assistance Act, must be administer­
ed tOl;echer as a unified code of laws en­
acted by Congress and the state legislature 
for the complete an~ comprehensive con­
trol of the subject. "The matter in the 
final analysis brings us to the fundamental 
proposition that the 5ubj ect of relief in 
its \'arious phases, as provided by law, was 
strictly within the scope of legislative au­
thority. That branch of the government 
very properly and necessarily assumed the 
function of pro\'iding the amount to be ex­
pended for that purpose, and the manner 
and method of distribution. The judicial 
department has neither power nor inclina­
tion to usurp that authority. If inadequate 
provision has been made for the meritori­
ous necessities of the un fortunate people 
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of the state, we may sympathize personally 
but we are powerless to intervene official­
ly." State v. Brandjord, supra [108 Mont. 
44i, 92 P.2d Zi9]. 
Plaintiff's action is instituted under the 
provisions of section 24-a, supra. The rec­
ord shows that the first payment of old­
age assistance was made in i\'Iarch 1943, 
and that Magnus died about August I, 1946. 
The Departmeur of Public Assistance. evi­
dently in construing section 24-a, supra 
says, no claim may be filed against a home 
while it is being used as a residence by a 
surviving spouse. There is nothing in con­
nection with the application for old-age 
assistance, or otherwise, that discloses that 
said applicant in becoming a recipient, 
either expressly or impliedly, contracts to 
repay any amount paid him by the state. 
Section 24-a, supra, in the instant case. is 
retroacti ve, both as to the 1947 act and, 
likewise, to the Act of 1943. There is 
nothing in the complaint, or the record, to 
advise us as to whether there is a surviv­
ing spouse in this case, nor, as to the nature 
of the estate, if any, of which Magnus was 
possessed at the time of his death. The 
"Creditors Preferred Claim," tiled by the 
Department of Public Assistance of the 
State of Idaho. In the Matter of the Es­
tate of Frans G. Magnus, deceased, recites, 
"The undersigned creditor of Frans G. 
Magnus. deceased, herewith presents its 
claim against the estate of said deceased 
with the necessary \'ouchers to l\els Lind­
strom, executor of the estate of said de­
ceased, for approval as follows: * * ." 
The Department of Public Assistance of 
the State of Idaho granted and paid old­
age assistance to said deceased, as per 
the following itemized statement (following 
is the monthly date and monthly amOunt 
paid Magnus as per the creditors preierred 
claim which is attached to and made a 
part of the complaint.) "This claim is 
made and filed as a preferred claim against 
said estate under the provision of Section 
2, Chapter 119, Idaho Session Laws 1943." 
It will be observed th:H the record disclos­
es that the complaint was subsequently 
amended to show that the :lmount claimed 
to be due and owing to the state of Idaho 
was under the provisions of the Public 
Assistance Laws as amended by Section· 
4, Chapter 237, Session Laws 1947, and the 
provision contained in the claim as being 
under the Laws of 1943 was not stricken 
therefrom.· The record also discloses that 
the defendant's demurrer to the plaintiffs 
complaint was argued and submitted for 
decision, and sustained without It.:a\'e to 
:lmend and the action dismissed September 
26, 194i. That there was a stipulation 
allowing the amendment showing that the 
action was prosecuted under the proyisions 
oi Section 4. Chapter 237, Session La ws 
1947, nunc pro tunc by interlineation and 
withollt the same having previously been 
submitted to the trial court asking that 
the complaint be reinstated. 
We submit that the order of the trial 
court sustaining the demurrer and dismiss­
ing the action should be affirmed. 
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.228 IDAHO SESSION LAWS C.119 '43 
knowledge of the real purpose of the public assistance pro- . 
gram' and the administration thereof. 
. (d) To recommend to the State Department of Public 
Assistance such rules, regulations, policies and procedure, as 
in the judgment of the Council, shall increase efficiency,
effect economy and generally improve the administration of 
',. .. public assistance. _ _ ~.: 'o;{:.:':",:,:, ...... (e) The Commissioner of Public Assistance shall pro­
. mulgate all necessary and proper rules and regulations gov' 
.. erning the procedure of the County Council of Public 
., Assistance.· . 
. (f) Nothing herein is intended, nor shall be interpreted, 
to prevent the right of appeal or limit opportunity for p­
fair hearing before the State Department of Public Assist­
ance as provided by Section 16,' Chapter 181, Idaho Ses­
sion Laws of 1941; nor as preventing the State Department 
:.·~.:.i.:.r':'~'~"l::i.'.;.:,:.:::~:'.:,'~ .~~:~~:~ ~~~~:~m~:~!:~~~:~~;::yTS::
..'~::"··,...•... 
- ~. • , 
, 
emergency eXisting therefor, which emergency .is hereby 
~f~~:"":.';":_ . ..... declared to exist, this Act shall be in full force and effect 
.',q,'.;.:.~~~'(.;.... ;. -', ' from and after its passage and approval. 
:70'4~)""') ,', " ­~i~\~~-~" Approved March 2, 1943..' 
:S~;'\" ". 
~~iii"~'" 
·ltd. tG .' . -;~.L:·45'(1stE-S) CHAPTER 09
"-:1::-82 Sec.1·,'" .
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of Public Assisb;mce from administering the public Tsist-
ance laws of this state as a single state agency. . 
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AN ACT 
AMENDING SECTION 14 OF CHAPTER 181, IDAHO SESSION 
'" .. , ,LAWS OF: 19:i1, PROVIDING THAT PUBLIC ASSISTANCE 
.. - •.. '. SHALL NOT BE GRANTED TO ANY. PE~.gON .A.SSIGNINQ 
.. OR TRANSFERRING HIS PROPERTY FOR THE PURPOSE' 
. ,;: :. ",:OF .RENDERING HIMSELF ELIGIBLE FOR ASSISTANCE; ... 
~Dm~tr:" :,:/·:;.~·,FURTHER AMENDING ~HAPT'ER 181, IDAHO . SESSION } ... ! .. , . 
. .. :. "LAWS OF'1941, RELATING' TO PUBLIC ASSISTANCE BY'-:'" . I . 
:::'''··::ADDiNG FOUR NEW SECTiONS IMMEDIATELY' FOLLOW-':.:;·. ;, 
: .. .' ',. ,:I.NG-.S.ECTION 24, TO BE NUMBERED .. SECTIONS 24~a;~24-b7'<;: " 
.,.~ ': ::24-~·':A.N'D'24-d, 'RESPECTIVELY; PROVIDiNG ;FOR~E-~.'··· . 
:'I., ,~. _-fOYE'*i' 'F~Q~ 'RECIPIENTS OR 'THE ESTATE"S.- OF ~R~;:\:.~~r,. " 
CIPIENTS IN CERTAIN CASES AND THE DISTRIBUTION' .'. 
OF S'UCH RECOVERIES; DEFINING 'FRAUDULENT ACTS', ; 
ni'SE~URING PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND' PROviDING ' .. 
" ',": 
.' i ~" , 
I 
t 
PENALTIES THEREFOR; FIXING'THE EFFECTIVE DATE 
OF THIS' ACT AND DECLARING AN EMERGENCY. 
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
SECTION 1. That Section 14, Chapter 181, Idaho Session 
Laws of 1941, be, and the same is hereby amended to read 
as follows: . 
. r • 
, 
r
, 
t 
:L"~4:i e. \19/1 
.ec, 2 (24,,/ 
repealed' . 
S.L. '47 c. 23i i 
.e<:. 3 p. 586. I 
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SECTION 14. AWARD OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE. 
Upon the completion of the investigation, the state depart.:
ment 'shall determine whether the applicant is eligible for 
public asistance under the 'provisions of this act, the type 
and amount of public assistance he shall receive, and the 
date upon which such public assistance shall begin. Public 
assistance shall be paid in the manner prescribed by the 
state department. Public assistance shall 'not be granted~, 
under this act to any person who has made an assignment ; 
or transfer of property for the purpose of rendering himself .: 
eligible for assistance under this. act. I 
SEC. 2. That Chapter 181 Idaho Session Laws 1941, be, 
and the same is hereby amended by adding four new sections 
thereto immediately following Section 24, to be numbered 
SeCtions 24-a, 24-b, 24-c, and 24-d, respectively, and to read,
as follows: ' 
SECTION 24-a.-Recovery from recipients. On the death 
of any recipient,the total amount of assistance paid orre-· 
lief granted under this Act shall be allowed as a preferred" 
claim 'against the estate of such person and shaU &e sub­
tributionthereof shaU be'made by the State Auditor in prQ-:':'::',";" ~~c;:~~~~ .., 
ject only to the-expense of the last iUness; funeral expenses 
not to exceed $100.00, and expenses of administration 0/
said estate. No claim shall be enforced' against any real 
estate or personal property of a recipient while such real, 
estate is occupied ~y the recipient, a surviving spouse, or a' 
dependent, but the Statute of Limitations shall not begin 
to run against such claim so long as the collection thereof is 
prohibited, iu hereinabove provided. 
.... Such claim shall be made by the county or, in cases Of, 
cooperative assistance, by the state on behalf of all partici- . 
pants contributing to such assistance. . .... 
SECTION 24-b. D~tribution of recover.ies. The ~~a,te·.ii,·s.i.~'.43·~:ml 
Department shall certtfy to the State Audttor the amount ,'·i."". 2 (24b) I 
recovered from each estate' of recipients, and a proper ,di{J7';:"'s~~~~1~c, 237 
portiO?~ . to the amount of assistance contributed by tl!'€"··. :"~;':;'~h.'?' 
state, the counties and the federal government for Such .," ': ,: .
assistance. . . '., .,.., ,'. 
C.1l9 '43 
't!f;..~,-,~,.,.;., 
.' .. 
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SECTION 24-c. Fraudulent Acts-Penalty. Whoever 
knowingly obtains, or attempts to obtain, ·or aids or abets 
any person in obtaining, by means of a wilfully false state-
ment O·r representation, or other fraudulent devices, assist-
ance or rel-ief to which he is not entitled, or assistance or 
relief greater than that to which he is justly entitled, shall 
be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof 
shall be fined not more than $900.00, or be imprisoned for 
not· more than six months, and be both so fined and im-
prisoned in the discretion of the Court.,.. 
Whoever sells, conveys, mortgages or otherwise disposes. 
of his property, real or person,al, or conceals his income or 
resources, for the purpose of rendering him eligible for any 
.. form of relief, theretofore or .thereafter applied for and re-
ceived, to which he would not otherwise be entitled, shall 
be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof 
shaLL be fined not more than $900.00, or be imprisoned for 
not more than six months, or be both so fined and imprisoned 
at the discretion of the court. , . 
... ~ Every person who· knoWingly aids or abets any person 
. in selling, conveying, mortgaging o·r otherwise disposing of 
his p'roperty, real or personal, or in concealing his income 
or resources for the purpose of rendering him eligible for 
any form of relief, theretofore or thereafter applied for and 
received, to which he would not otherwise be entitled, shall 
be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof 
shall be fined not more than $900.00, or be imprisoned ·not 
more than six months, or be both so fined and imprisoned at 
the q.iscretion of the court. / .. .. ' 
SECTION 24-d. EFFECTIVE DATE-EMERGENCY. 
An emergency existing therefor, which emergency is hereby 
declared to exist, this Act shall .. be in full force and effect from and after its· passage and approval. 
Approved March 2, 1943. 
CHAPTER 120 
(H. B. NO. 158) 
AN ACT 
TO AMEND CHAPTER 20, TITLE 39, IDAHO CODE ANNO-
TATED, BY ADDING THERETO TWELVE NEW SECTIONS, 
NUMBERED CONSECUTIVELY SECTIONS 39-2021 TO SEC--
TION 39-2032, INCLUSIVE, WHICH NEW SECTIONS AU-
THORIZETHE DETACHMENT FROM·A ·STATE HIGHWAY 
I \ 
I I 
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NLWLAND v. CHILD	 :;::1 
c;le .! ~ 3 lol.bu 5JU 
Cniled Slales in amOlll1lS reeo\"c~ccl by Si';lall(~ pro\'lslUns of Public ,\ssi,tallcC ,
 
./

Slale wilh n'spccI 10 old-a;:<: a,;:,:anCI.: b.\\". I.C ~§ 56-2UI et seq., :C>-20::, :()... II 
:urnishcd, when prac:ical "pl'ra::·;n of :0;-.	 Ii 
.j~Ialc plail was Sl\c!l Ihal pru ral:l ,~...:.~c 'Ji 5. S,,,;IOII Security :lnd Public Welfare ~]I ,I
 
~cco\"l'rics ,!II<: h'deral S'0l'<:~nmr~: \\'::IS In I·jew ui iact Ihat ~ralllillb oi aiJ
 
.::e,!ilnl 10 i:s a,'cullnl in ;::11,' :1::1<: ;;.::J ::S [0 :he n,·ni." a~':cl is ::I wdl rc(u~niHJ
 
.:ontrihuliuns rcdnce,] :l,clJr'::n;::y. ,:::Ie lJb!j~:lli'J11 oi the ,Ialc allll is a ",uI'crn­

: !
:'llhlic :\:isi~tall(C La'" W;I~ ::.. : ,..::'.;l·C: :Ill':Hal innc:iun lenJillg" tu prulIIlIle pnulie
 
:0 alP.:k on ,;runnd tbl it ,ltd nL: ~pc- we~bre. I'ruI·j"illn of I'llulic :\s"i,ranee
 
.::ficalJ~' pro"i,:e ior p:lymcnl ui ;)~O ~:It:l L.lw iur lien ulJOn Ihe rl'al propcrty vI
 
,n::lre Jirrct :0 il·cleral :':01·Crtl,r.l·:'r. ::.,,':al re(:piel1ls is e(JI1sti[\1liulI:dl~' juslifiable uy
 
~l"" ccuri::-' ;\e:. ~~ I <:l ;l·'I·, .;, b " ~" as the pnulic purpuse uf prlJn!lllilll: Ihc curn­
;,:nenucJ, 4.1 t:.S.C.:\. §§ ,;lll cl ,l"] , ,;.'3,b) ltlon wdi"fe. I.e. g S6-:?IU, 56-Z24;1; 
,~), C"nst, ar:, S, § 2. 
:!.. Con,U1ullonal L:lW C=8i 6, SIOIte, ~119
 
The rj~hl IU own ;;'1:.[ l·n.I"~· ;.:,:'·ale Jla l,lic' a"si,I:III<:I' law IS sa\'cd from
 
;:~..per:y is lund:lmel1lal. :lnd i, ,1Il,' 0: :!It: .:,,/diCI wilh .:"n,liwrillll:i1 pro\"isiun Ihat
 
::alura', inhcrenr anl! :1l.lliln~I,le ~::,:':1!S endir Qf stale ,hall IlOr, in :Iny ll1:Jl1l1l'r,
 
be :.:il"<'lI. ur luallcd lu, or ill aid oi all)'

'Ji iree 111<"11. which Prl·.l::,u-l",i ,',,;:,::tn­

illriil'idll:ll, hy f.1CI Ihat sl1ch J,)Sislancc is
 
'.:UIIS. (Ullsl. ;lrt. 1, SS I, IJ i te. 1 =''''''
 
fur pUlJlic purpu)c ui prulI1ul in" the ':UI11­

.i':~4a. 
"mOIl \\"cl f~re. te. ~§ ;&-210, ;&-224;1. 
:!. 
3.	 Con,Ulutional Law ~8i (unst. art. ,~, § ::!.
 
The illl:,laIII l'l1l:1I r:o.:hl III <)\\"~ :In,1
 7. Paupers ~3
 
,·:,juy privalc prll\,l'rty. althllll:,:h a l1;,::lral.
 En'lI as tu P;I\IPcrs :1ll.1 in'[i~ents, lh,'re
 
:::n,'rent ant! :llali"nahlc r::;:u ui ir"c ::1ell,
 IS no ClJllslitllli'JIIal ur cunllnulI·lalV Ul1l)"
 
:; $nl>.il·':1 III ~1'a""lla"lc lil:lIlali,,:1 alld ~~'.!u­
 rnting' IIlltJII the slalc to prv\"iJe suppurt. II !l::.:iun by Ihe ~t:llC in Ihe inleresl; uf the 11\11	 any ul,lil;al:un ui slate iu such respect j t i'1'7111110n wdiar,', ;111(1 allY <tallltl' ill1V,;llIl; is moral rather Ihall a l11a:ld:ltury Olle, :.Ind 
I I,
a ~imil:l:illll U;'''1\ ~lIch r:::ht mll"l L,· ,up­ ri~ht lU re.:..il·c Stich a"j~I;lIlcC is a crea­

j .. )~Il'\1 h~' Iha: pur!,'),C.', (oJl"!. art. :. H lurc of ~l:llllll', whil'h rna)' lIc l'xtendeJ,
 
l. 13; I.e. ~ .:, .... .:.14a.	 diminish",!, contliti l ll1e,1 or :lllru!:"all't1 uy II' 
Ihe	 'q~i:";llllre. I.e. ~§ 56-210, 56- 224a. ~, SoclOiI Securt1y and Public Welfare ~.t3 
8. SoclOiI Security and Public Welfare c=nOne is not rl'\llIir"d I') bl' a ;I~';:,er
 
III \·je\\" uf fact that stale has no

'r ab'tllllll'ly ,:l'slillllc as a I'rC,re<1IlI'::~ 10
 
1l1:11l,lal'Jry oIJli~:lliun. eilhC.'T constitulional
~c<:eillt oi payll1ctlls ull11er lh,· oi.[·;jJ;"'; J,S· 
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6, SIOItes ~119 
J' l.lic· a",;,I:lI1Cl' la  IS sa\'e.! fro  hc ri!o!hl tu o n :;'1:.[ ,·n.I"~· ;.:-:'·:lle 
,   c iUllti:lml:nt , '1ll Ill" ' ' "I1:li~1 t c Il lllrillll:iI ll  
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.)  e: Ill'1  )In'''':>'''tl''; c', : ,::II1-
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or b)' C0l\11\1011 law, to prll"idc ,;1I1 
'
1'"r: h,) 
ils citizclIS, Olle who :tsSl'rb ri,:hl h> .IS­
sislallcc ulld,'r st;ltlll,·S. Il1I1"t ':"lIlply \\ ilh 
0111 rca>ollahl.: :tud IIlllldi"uilllill;\tllry (.m­
c1ilions implJscd by tlte k~i,;lati,'c aulhor:lY. 
I.e. §§ :Ii-210, 50-2!~a_ 
9. Constitutional Law 0=42 
The )lff»peeli\'e h.. irs oj p'.:il';,'ut .,i 
old-age as",stallce, h;I\':II!o:' \111 "",1",1 IIl:a­
e,t ill prll"l'rty lJi the r,·cil'i,·nt, hal',· :111 
ri;.:ht IlJ Cl10lpiaill ')[ li"l1 prll\'i~i"l1 ,n' ,,:.1. 
;I;':e assi~tallcc 1;1\\'. 1.(. ~§ 51>-~IIl, :"l­
22~a. 
10.	 Constltullonal Law ~191 
Social Security and PUblic Welfaro 0=31 
Apl'li'::lIioll oi li"l1 prll\,j,i"lIs oi "jd· 
a!o:'': assislallc,' prll\';sill:l' IIi I 'II lob,' ,\,,:,:­
:ITICC I.aw to r,'c;"i"ll!> 'Ii ;Iid I'fi"r :')
i 
am,'ndmclIl IlrO"idill!o:' iOlr 1i"1I, ,':lilli' '1 ':"11' 
slitUle a rClr'J~p,'cli\'e ill\':I,illll "i :l \,,'>:~<l 
ri~ht, ~illcc rl'eipi,'l1ls <Ii lllol.ao.:~ .b~i>l:ll:ce 
call "~lIllire 110 ,'.:sICt! ri~111 Ih~rdO. 1.\':. 
~~	 :,;.-210. :1i-22·b. 
I J.	 Constltullonal Law ~208(I) 
Thc 1q.~i~lature has Imla,l ,Ii,,'~e· 
lillllary pll',','r I" O1;II,e da-~il;":lli"II'; "[ 
pcr';',lIs alld property ior all I'lIrpll~"" whi,,:t 
it Illay lawfully ';""k III a':c"lI1l'l;~h, alld ""J 
11>11;': as Ihc das,;li"alillil" are l,a,;",1 .Ill >.ll1;e 
k;.:irimalc grUllll,1 oi c1irT,'n:II"c 1>,'I'\"l"':l 
I'cnol1s or ohjecls cbs,i,;",!. al1d hear ;l 
reasonahle relation 10 Ihc k;.:i"lali"e pur­
pose, and arc not unn'a"'llI:L!,le ,lr :uhilrary. 
the:' do nOt ,'io/;Ile Ihe cOl1:'lillllioll. LOll:':. 
art. 1, § 2, 
REPO&TS 
12, Cllnslllullonal Law ~208(16)
 
SocIal SfCurlly :and Public WOlf:are ~31
 
I II ,·jew oi i;ICt that ol<!-:l!o:'e pfovisions
 
of	 Pllhli.: ,\:'SiSI;lII~C I-,w clJllll'mpbte that 
11l'l'lly .1".'" Pl'r!"'11 ,hall rc.:ci\'e :lssistanee , , 
=h.. (ordill~ hJ illdi\'idu~,1 n":l·ll~. ,,·ith rCg:\rd ,~ 
10	 r""'llrc,'s a\'.1ilahr.. to him from what­
,'\'~r ,""f,',', ill~llIoIill!o:'. hy p"rtinent regu­
1.1Ii"II, p"r';"lIal prt1p.. rry or such person, 
I'rOl\'i,illll i,'r li"lI 1I1'''" r".,1 property of 
r,'~il'i.·nt oi qld-:n:,' ;1~~i';lall.:e is not dis-
I' '~:ll\lllatllry as 1'l'l\H"lI p,'r,;olls oWlling real­ :j 
ly :a1,,1 :h",,~ .lwni,,!: 'llIiy pcrsollally, since I 
I~;c 1"'~-"II:d:~' '1\\'11,'0( ha,; heen lakcn into 
'·"Il-i,i.'~;111,'II. I.e. §~ :0-210, S6-Z2-1;i; 
"
I'L'Il-1. ,Irt. I, ~ 2. .' 
J', 
13, Slatutu C=77(1) 1 
.\,::,'110111:.. 111 IIi 1·'.~1 I,) rllhlie A~i~t. .. I. 
:1I1.::e L.lw, I'~.)\'idilli: illr li"l1 a!:,ainst realty :'1\I 
0:' rn';pi,'III'; oi assi"t;ln.:e, ~ing by its' ~ ~ 1"~1Il, :11'1'1 i.::d,lc a like to all p.:rsons, 'I 
rhrl'\ll..:l-:',lut lhc 'St:lt~. \Vlt., c("n~ within the ..:. 
rl'''!,''':::''c '::!:l~S,'S Iher"in pro,'iJ.. J for:" ~:.. 
alld 1"'::11: ha ",.( 111"'11 :l rt'a~llnahlt: c1::assi.··"-.', 
li,',Hi"n willli:! :11I111llrily oi tllc !,·;isl:lturt, ..~ ,'. 
;:' nlll \·:.,L,rin: "i consl;tnl;.)n,,1 inhibition" ,.,~ 
:'lL;::lin!'1 1",':11 ,'r ~l""'ial 1:Iws, I.e. §§ 11)-": '\ 
Ill.i. 1l'-11 P. .;Ii-.!I!J, :c}-.!2-1, 56-2!-b; >:': _ 
C.'II,I. :\rt, j, ~ I'). '., " 1 
..... '.\, I 
l.s.	 Social Security and Public Welfare c=>32", .• '\1 
-	 -':::11 l'nl\'i~i"l1 'II 1'151 ;lI\I,'l1<!I\ICltt to ~t>: .. ";;>'i 
.	 ,\. ';!. i 
Ii.: ,\'~I~:;I1!':': I.aw, n·l:lli,'c 10 lien on ~~:: '. :i 
Iy ,It n"':l'i"l1l; oi llld'a~~ .,SSiSI:tltCC:, is DC!f:. ~: 
ill .:,'nll:.:t WI::), alld wa~ Hot rqlt:ak.J by "-1;e~" 
pr.",i,inn ~nl""\ln"lIIh' ,·n".::r~J .,1 s::antC •~.;:. !~:. 
Si'lll. \lr0\'idill;: for ;""o\'\'r)' oi assi~t~'~:~-
000212
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~,,";) c l l.! :i"lali\' I'lIr, 
ll IIl1n·a"' l;!I,I.: I t ,
l.!Y 1I0 \, l ) c o::un; t n, l,
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' a e a  
  ic ;lcl o ' -:,c r  
 u c ;siSl;lI cC LlW ClII!t' c :\
IWl"II , ;:"01 p, ,'' s/t;)11 eo :ci\' .ssist c .
a,"·..:ordi l~ du~,1 ' . 
 ,' I ',, ,"\il l 10 :l -
'\"c lIr,', n.: udil !-:" lI -
lIillll  .. ~ IlrI'l'l' .:
l ll\"i,j 1\ 1 '"11 ,ll 
·~jl';.'1II ,,101-:1\ ,' " ~I:lIlCC
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I all. ".: \\·lIill!.!' I1i I' SIIIl:llt
;o: " r"JIl:!I:~' \ Irec :lk~1I
"') I, t- n, , .- 4 - • 
r 
tull!! (t
, \1 1,' 101 ,'1 I".~ I n c -
I IO ~ IW. .,\";dill!o!" n l'n :l !:l :; :l
.
, 
: l lS ~~i"I;lIlo: ll ·.~ 
1"~Il1, :11'1'1 i,:d,l..: :l IiI.:..: t  :Ill .:rs s.. _ 
" lI !I-:',1 :U\!  )tn~
, I' o:: a"sl s t ,' ll · ,.   
:11101 ' :1" ),;)"," Illh'" a n'a",lll hic assi ... ···.· 
.lI ll" ir :1 ; 1 1lri I e 1,·;i I3  .  
i , " ' " ,li\'c n ':Il\l~lit\ li')\lal ',
:lL!;lill~t .,,':.  ,'r ~l',','ial b\\"s, I. .  1)..··.-
\ U, l'-lll-', , r r .!24.
,ll1;o.t ~ . J. 11). . ... ~.~;.-
l. , I l :urlt  :lin   ai   >32 .•. ,·.t.
I ,..\" i JlII ,. t' ! " : lll,·\ldm.:ll Put -: 
..... \. 
l c . ,,": I IO C 'L re:al~ : 
t  "i r ... ·:I';,·III I l,),:t  ,lssisl:\II <!f:
' "IlIl:, wi:!! .111,) :t ~·pcaJ.. · 
I'r'''';,;''11 ,1I1'''''ln<'lIIly ,·naO::I..:J .,t antI! .;
;<IlI, 1,r \'i i n'l'O\'l'ry :;:;i~t~ 
NEWLAND v. CHILD 
"::1'" =-. 7~ hl3ho 3~O 
paid :1) one not entitkc.l thereto, by :ne:l.ns oi 
a I're:erred cbim a~aillsl his eSI:lte. ~ince 
<lili'e~enl e!a~scs oi recipientS J.rc dealt 
WI:!I. I.e. ~~ 11~lllJ, Iu-Ill~, :6-210, 
:l)-':':-t. :1:,..~-t;I: COli st. art. 3, § 19. 
15. Soel31 Mcurlly and Public Welfare <:=31 
.\rm:n,::nCllt to Puhl ic .\:,:iI,t:II:CC L.1 \V 
pr"\'~,:in~ ior j\ltl~ment li~'n on rC:l.i:y of 
rcei\':.:nt I): ohl-a~c assist:tllcc anc.l ?ro\'j,l­
in~ :or cc~:itieate oi total an1011llt o>i lien 
·,in1<"1. r.::iclnscs k~;:il:lti\'e in~l'~~ :h:tt 
'~:I	 :i::,mld be ~lIhject to rl'lea:ie lI~O:l ?J.y­
m"n~ <.l i :t:::'lI1nt oi ccrtiri'J.tc. in ::-::lOl:cr 
?rll\":.;cl( b\" lJ.w ior rel,'ase ot :I. :1I':~' 
:nnlt. and :s not "ciecti\"e in :hat ::1) ;>ru­
\"i~iun :S :1~:.,k itJr rc1ea:ie oi licn ::1 cas.: 
oi s;u;,iac::llrl I'n'Jr tu '\calli Iii ~ec:?ie:lt. 
1.c. ~3 1(..... : IIJ. 11)-111~. :'i-':IO, ;,)...~~, 
:'),·':2-1:1.; (ll:lS!. :lrt. .3, ~ I'). 
16. COlltrach C=9511. J} 
TII he \·"i.lahlc I"'calls,' <'If '[lIrc~;:. :In 
.-,::rc,·:1:'·llt r::\l:'t l".r .I\lly he olttainni h\' 
::l":lIIS of p;c,,;nrc hrllllt.:ht to hcar. hut 
t:,e a£:"~l',·ll1l·::t \1:'..:1 i mu,t Ite ulljus:. un­
.:on;c:t1n"l,k. elr ilk~:". :,"" it canr.ljt be 
pr,'die:;:,',1 U?,'ll d,·mallds which ."lre l:!.',\'­
i'.ll. or the :hr.:at to "I) th:lt whie:t the 
":~mal1,l:Il~ p:lrty h,1s :t Iq~al right to ~o. 
Ii. Social Security and PUblic Wellare C=JI 
In \·jew Ili iJ.ct that delll;l1Il( at ,:ate 
iur ficrI UpOIl ~cal prllper:y oi .,Id-:l\::e re­
c:pil'l1t :s h" :ul. i:lir :111<1 jllSI, there e:l.lI 
be nil (;l/ro~ .)r bll:,ine,,; e"IllI'"l,i":l in· 
"oi""J ;11 thc ellJlJ.illill~ oi lien. I.e. H 
•....,..>-.=l\1 c~ seq .. :r>-2lJ~, ~1)-2rJ;". 
Kibler &: D,·,be. X,1lllpa, for appellants. 
, 
"1The Slat.: oi Llahn is cnjoillcd by onr 
.:ollstitlltioll irom h':lIlin::- it~ crec.lit ill th~ 
aid oi allY illdividual. In lhis CJ.S': the 
a~rel'llIC:ll "Exhihit A" cr,';llCS a dl·till;I'~ 
cul1lractll.il relatillll>hip bclween thc I,ar­
tics. The a~recmel1l ,t:lt,·s that it is ;;i\"cll 
ior thc pllrl'0:ie I)i "<cellrity" ior re·im­
bursc:mcnt oi :1.11 .ll.l a;::oe a,;si~l:tllce pay­
l11ellts receil"cd aiter .rul~· 1st. 1931 all,( :I 
"plclh:e allli a,:si;"~lml·I1l" oj all "ri~ht, title 
:Inri interc>t" ill :lncl to dc:scrill"cf rcal prf)l'­
eny, hut n.ll Iimi:l"ll to the tkscrihecl prop· 
er!}'. Thc trall~ac:ion under the pro\'ision!' 
°i Ch:t[lter H;". 19: I S"s~ioll L1WS, tllll~ 
hecame a" :i,:cllr:ty" :r;'Il~actil\n all(l as sllclI 
:L "1I10rl:::a::c" Upoll thc I'r"l'crty ior the :tel­
\',1nc,'I1\Cnts made lIy the 5t:lte .,i {d:th'l j,lr 
,,1,1 a~c a:'si~tallec with malehcd Slatc :In,\ 
Federal [-'11",10. If Ih" rr0l'.,rty was at· 
!cll'lll.:d tl) be ~1l1.1 Or ,li'!,,,.e,1 IIi prior to 
.J.::tlh 'J i al'pdlallt~. a l1Ietho,1 oi iorecillsurl: 
was pro\·id"d. and :I mcth",\ oi re-payment 
to Ihe :;lall: ill Ihe c\"ent oi .Ieath. This 
l'url'lJrtcd IHlsiness IraIlSal:li'l1l, .1Ith'lII~h 01,­
tallied IInd.:r hll:iincss eoml"lbion, create,1 
the emlOl1Iary ret:.tif}n~hip oi lender all.1 
horrower. ;\rticle S. :O;cc. 2. Idah,) (.JI\­
stitllti.J\l; Chapt.:r l~i. I~I~ I ~c~~illn L,1WS; 
ll:lI1no<:k LlllllllY v. Citi7.ClIs Bank &: Trllst 
COll1pany, :.; 1<1:1h,) I':'). li5, 22 P.2,1 tii-t: 
::)t:llC \". Li\lllstrulll. liS ld.lIlo 226, 191 P.2c.1 
lOU'1. 
III Ilbllo it is :III .:stalolishcli g'1I:lTalllCC lli
 
onr constitlltion th:lt C\'cr)' person has m­

aliclI:d.llc riolns JlIrin~ his lifetime: to ;lC-
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c it c. f "c c, l11 ,
.: lai :li t cst:l , I:),I' Id o e ne Oll
"ili·.:~.: t c ~  :l e ,k c n u n  ):Illi ::' ..lit n 
\\" , "~~ II 'I' 'I' 'I I I I' I ,'~ llot ny 11111\'11 lI  ,  I 115 :l ~  1C
I , !:"'2.:!-t \  on , , , :I~re"I11C:ll ,';ncs .),'rillit,
15. Soel3' Mcurlly and Public Welfare <::=31 C<lntractll.11 r.:iatiull>hil' between thc I,ar· 
.\mel1,::nCI\t to Puhli.: ,\:':iI>t:U:cc L.1w tics, Thc a~rcc!llcnt :;tatl's that it is ;;i\'clI 
pr,,\'~,:in~ ior j\ltll!l11ent li"l1 on rC:l.i!y of ior thc pllrl'0:iC ot "<c':lIrity" ior rc·im· 
rcei\,:.:11t I): o\tl-:l~c :lssist:lllcC anc..l ?ro"i,l. !JlIrsc:ment oi :1.11 .llll :1;::'<: a~si~t:lllcc pay· 
in~ :or ct'~:iri'::ltc oi total an1011llt o>i licn IllCIHS reccil"ccI :litcr .r\ll~· 1st. 1931 allcl:l 
',ink'1. t"!::idnscs k~;,;hti,'c ill:l'~! :!1:1t "ple'h:c :l11I! :I,:si;"~lm"nt" oi al! ··ri~ht. tidc 
a d lltcrc~ n I ti s l."d t':1f np-
rt il I :l't "'~crihed
r e :tI1 :lc n l)
I) apt ,  Q~ \ "I\\"s
\Jt:c:lm~ :I .. ;':cl r:! :.n;aclit}1I \ I :IS ne l
morl: ,,: u n e l'rt pert c 1<1· 
."lIlC,'llleIllS Ill:l.!c h c Slatl! t I ah,) it
"I I !! ,~i~tal C:t: t.: c.1 e 111 1
fll"'lo. op
t": l1 l1 l1 o:<I o l! t)I, 'I',,< .,
I! a l1dlall :I mel ,l j \IlSll
~1 ,: 'JIlI,j c \ c lc:l~c "P0 1 :lY' 
,'Il: 1 !'l\l f l :l !'! nr
)v t:e l l I:lW :I,c \ t .
l'll! :I ti ddc l vc ll ~r · 
5 : 'I!c d..:a:i": f ~
':::" 'TI,) . lh ,I r<:c:ili" :1I  
1-; , ' III~. ~ .:!IO ,)... 2.:!~. 
. '. 0 1,1 1t)
oft (
 0 ""i,I:I!'!.: 1,,'C: II,, ... r I ure 1
1,'ans ':":'lI !! ,
c :I£:,~c· '\ ,'::t it:,d Illll~ h II/ ll~ · 
e'''''c:t1n'llt oJ ll'~:", lud llr." ..:
· ·. ?,111 oI,· el ,'lTel: .',\"· 
".l ,(1 :L c ,
,:cl11: I1,I: I~ 1 . I I! .
ri u rt >J  
"j 0 :l \lI11 o s l!
e i "1'''11 '::l1 t c f ·a!! !! · 
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110 : I O ';IIC,' ':', l\'lIl,il/:1
w : e oJt. :lilli\l~ t Ikll
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t n c evc ,\c
p pu i lsinO:S5 t l s ~ti' \ •. 1Ith'lII · 
 n nnol n:i ~ ("IIII'II\';i ll t!.'II
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l! , .: c , e .>11. 
wtilJII 1 , ~i()11
B: IlIlOl Cou lty \l n
ompa Idal1l' 1>.2tl
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u u l: Ill-
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quire, possess anJ enjuy property. The re­
quireJ cXl'cution of the "Exhiltit :\" J~ a 
conJitiun pr... cl·,knt to n'cej\,il1!.'" iurtJ1l'r ,old 
agc assistance ailer .lilly lsI, 1~'~I, is in d... · 
n)~"tiull oi sllch eUII~!IlllliUII,,1 ri;,:i11. lly 
allu\\'ing ll.:rSOllS rCCl-i\-ill~ u10l a1:e ;l~~:st· 
ancc to control ;IIlJ enjuy tll\:ir u\\'n I'rIlV' 
crty, fac:lit:ItCS, the pulllic inler.:st amI \\"el· 
bn', ant! "iJs the in<!il:l'lIl a~<·t1 'IS \\'<·!I a~ 
a Jirecl grant oi mun<·y. Uy [,.,·111g' ;01,1,' tu 
sell the prul,crty ur uI.taill lualls till-n'ull, 
it is possible fur ,Jir"ct ;lid to he <'!:lIIin"ted 
for a tim.:. and the jlllolic trc:"nr:.. r ... li,·\· ....1 
to the cxtent [hat the recipient is rdil·\"l·J 
I oy e.':<:rcise uf bis inalil'nabl" ri~ht tu ~un· 
('	 trol his o\\'n propl·rty. Artidc I. Sec, I, 
Idahu CUII:;titmion: :\l:Imcd:t CUllllty v.i 
I
 .Ianssen. 16 Cal.2J 2:'6, 1M P.21! 11, 130 A.
 L.R. I HI, 1147; 11 Am.Jur., Cunst.uw. 
I 1145, 1146 allJ 1147, § 3.3::. 
I To achie"e constitutiollal IIl1i iurmilY re­'Illires th;lt a ~aw O/Jl'r:lIl' ;llike upun all \\'ho cume within the scupe uf ils pro\'i:;ium.
I j	 Such uniiurnlity Jucs not appC.oar as to j all persuns a5 a cJ:iSS whu n'eci\"(~J the 
"ariulls types of puolic assi,.t:lllcc. Herein 
a ~pecial class is sinl;leJ Ullt, i. e., thuse re­
ceiving' "ulJ ;11;<: assi~tancc" who own ~l';11 
estale, ur some intercst Iherein, Su 
Jur., StatllteS 76, § 5~; UiJ; \'''lUU ell::ll 
Co, v. O1apman. 4: hl;lhu 3~O, 
45; Slate \'. Lillllstroll1. ~ I<laho 226. IC)I 
1'.211 1009, anJ (:is''S citeJ as tv 
and special laws. 
j 
Rul'er: E. Smylie. :\lty. Gen., a.nd \Vil. 
liam I r. Hakl·S. :\s~l. :\11)", Gen., fat re­
~Ptlllllc:nt. 
Till' ril:ht to dispuse of onc's property' 
;!ih"r ,i<':Ith is a rig-ht created lly statute, a.nd 
the Il'~isla[llre may illlpuse Slid! cUIll..IitioDS 
lI(llJlI lhe ,·xer.:i~c ui the ri~ht as it sees, 
:il. ::::.1<: .·x rd. ~il'l>ull \'. LinJstrom.:; 
I'.'~~. {., 111;,hu ':':1;, I~J\ I',.!.I tOOl}; Bankers '",. 
" . 
T . 1'1' "' '" T ~ ,rll~: \..U. \'. • O<I~l·tt. _tlu ......~. 
Ct. 2.13, ,,;- LEd. ';..i~l" 
Th" h-~I~latllre has thl' ri~ht pl'r~II'h ;II1U ulljects ior the pllrpose of ler-' 1\" ", 
lsl:lti\ln \\ h:ch cl.ls-llieatillll will not be U~'1 ­
~ct 1I11!c,., it is pa11lahly arhitr:try. Crom v.~ " 
Frahm. 1~1_'lI. J.i (d,dlo 314, 19.3 P. 1013;·1, 
:5talc ,', Ldl,,\\,ay. 1~'116. 11 1,laho i 19, lW', 
p, .!:, 4 J..IL\ .•~.~., 10'), 114 AIll,St. 283;': 
Hie: \\"lllld Cilia I Co. \', L·h;lIJ1l1:tn. 1927. ~~" 
j,bhu .:''il !, .!tlJ 1':45. .' 
•• 
l'ru\"isiul1s fur the re':II\'l~ry of moner~: 
~ranll"\.l fur puhlie assistaJlce (Iurpo:iCs f~:" 
th ... c,t;lte ui Ihe r~cipi~llt a ftet l.kath aiel.; 
nul \I\1o,;UII,til\ltzunal as b,'inl> ;1 luan of th~~c 
~t;lI<:'s creJit to an illJi"iclll;11. State .y~::. , 
LllltI~lr"II1, I'.QS. f~'\ Id;lho ~6, 191 P2d:': 
I\).~); \\"alll>cr~ ,.. L't:th I'llhlio: \\'df~'" 
(ull1m:~~iun, 1~4'.J, 11~ Clah ':42, 203 P.2d,", .' 
,)' ­
~ ,-,,! S ' 
""', "" • ,I 
',;' 
to c1a.ssify \ " " 
' 'l".~ ~ 
.," 
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\ ' , _, !u;. ':ti I ' 1(1)( ankers'~·.·
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lq:.,lalllrc ~ l ssi
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I l1k,.s l\lab l. l
,  01;1110 1 ;,  
t . tlwJY, l III , II I  
2 . LI  ,~ ,~., Iln m. SS if
'0)001   , ' I I J , , ,
'il
\' iun c cI,,'ay 
antl-J c l pll ose
e ~> L c t c lt J cr I .k i!:l '
o! IlculI,titutz ~ " , e
I C'S i vid LI J  
I l l q i t .2  
, : ' ! r~  . I l 1'lIloli. Wd
l l. ll t .
 , rll~ ('
;\I'I"'lIalll~ arl' hll~b:ll1d 
rl'cil'ients oi uIJ·;\!:c :ts~i"t;\lICC umler 
Siale Public .. \ssi~t:lllc(, Law, Thi~ lO1.w, 
, 
, 
, 
NEWLAND ~. CHILD 
Cito! ns ;3 (tJullo ii~l) 
ae~,"\ in 11'l~I, er~atcs the state Dc?artmcnt 
oi !'~Ihlic ,\~SiSI;lllce as the agency of the 
stal~ governmcnt to cooperatc with thc 
fClk~al ;:'<l\'crllmcll[ in c:lrrying out the 
purl")S,'S "i i.:d.:r:d anu statc acts ;Jcrtaill' 
in~ :0 pnl,li.: assistancc, and proJviJin; thc 
tcn~;. conditions and means oi ,arryil1~ 
into cIT,-(\ the puhlic assistancc tl1.:rc;lI 
pro":dcd i<lr. Th.: 3ct provitl"s th:l: ." ruhlic 
:I,,,i,,:ancc shall bc awarde,l 1I1:,:a this 
;1':: :0 p... r;ons atlc! i:lmilics .... ho do ~ot h:\\"c 
.'lcomc all,i :IV;\ i lahk rcsoll rce S SII r.=.,::cnt to 
·..-r.ro\":lic a rca,oll:lhl.: stalhl.'r<i I): hcalth 
;lnd ",'cll.kin!.;"", I.e. § 56-))5. :Ill'! :'urtllcr, 
that .)!,\.;\t:c :I'Si,t:III':': ",hall he :lwa~rk<l tl) 
nee,::: p'"Or1e whl) ha"c :ltlaitled t:-:·: al:<: of 
1,3 YC:lrs". mll,iect 10 ~crtaill li::,.:~ati"t1'. 
I.e. ~ :6-:~Ll;-. ~c~ti<ln :t>-21I), 1.(;, pro­
\" ;etC'~ : 
-The anHluut of :l~sistal1cl.: whi.:~ O1:1Y 
rce'pn:nt ,hall he elicihie to rc'=c:'"c 
"h"l1 hc ,lctcrmin,:u. ill aeC<lr'i~ncc 
wi:':! thc rules allu r':~lIlati<lllS 'Ji the 
st..:.; dcp:lrtment, with dlle n'~:I~'! tl) 
his rl'<tllir':1111'Ilt5, and the (Iln.;:ti·J115 
e:xistinl,: in his case, aml to the ir.eCllllc 
an': rcso\;rce~ a\'aiJaol.: to him :'~I)m 
\\'hatcver ;,)1\rce, ;11111 whic!1 ,.i:a\1 he 
"u~cient. when addeu to the i::c'lmc 
al:': fl'~,lI\rc\'~ dct<:rminc.[ to be ;a\,ail­
abie: to him. to [Irm'ide him \\'::h :l 
n::i~'l11ahk ~\1bsisten.:c ':lI111jla:illk ·.... ith 
• • II 
The: :let inrth.:r provides for an ~p{lli­
o• ..,.ation hy ;J. l'r<J~Jlecti\'e rccipi<:nt, 3n in­
vcst il;:ltiol1 by thc d.:partmel1t of the cir.
 
cumstancc:s I)i the applicant, a Ikternlina· ,
 
i 
lion or eli~ibiljty, and the lype all'\ alllonnt .i 
oi public assistancc in case ,)i an a\\':I"1. 
As IlriKinall)' cllactcl\ the act prl'lVillcl1 : 
{or rc:co\'Cry oi any pufllic a~~istancc paid	 ! 
.ito allY persoll who w.1.S not clltitlcll therelo. I
 
and ;or rc:covcry from thc cstatCS Ili .(c·
 1 
cC:lscd rccipielllS under ccrt:lin couditi'lI\s i 
\awi in the ,liscrctioll oi the state ,krart ·	 
.1 
1 ;llICIlt. { 
In lfl~1, the ruhlic :\~5istancc Law was 1 
amclllil'd hy atldin:':" thereto. § ~rl-~.!~;\. l.e.. I 
the matcrial parts .)i \\'hich an: as [IJII,)\\,;: I 
"Er";eCll\'C July I, 1~~1 :Ill old·a::!:': 
as,i~I;111(C :lwanlclt ullrler !IIi; ac~ ;.) 
pcrSllns n\\'uin~ rcal pr"pcrty I)r any 
illtr.:r\'>t" 111 n'al p"'l'cr;y sh:lll I,,: 
suhject tl' reco,'cry. :'uc!l reC\l'"cry 
shall hc accClll1pli,h"d in aCClJrf!;IIlCC 
wilh the i'llIow;lI;: I'ro"isi,lIts 10 be 
cli"..:cti\'e thcr,'aiter: 
"I a) E.1.eh rccipient O[ or ,1.pplic:lm 
for .,"I·"~c assi,IOlIiCC \\"11.) owns rc:ll 
prop,·rty Ilr any imer,'sts in rC:ll pmper­
ty sh;dl he n:'lnirc,1 to elltcr intI) :I;rce­
nl"IlL in thc manlier :l11f\ [orm I'fl,,..:rih. 
ed hy the statc departlllcllt 1Iy WIIlC!l 
lhe reeipicllt sh:lll :I\.:r<:c th:lt :;nch Tl':l1 
prl"ll'crty or :111)' int<:n'sts ill rl':ll l'rol'" 
crt)" has heen :I,,~il-:llc(1 as security t<>r 
tho: rccl)\,cry oi all o"I.:I~c :lSSlSt:lIlCO: 
thereafter awarl!l:d to him. .. • .. 
"(I» Up.,11 m:lkilll; :111 :l\\':lr<1 I)i "I·l­
a!:c :lssist:lllce thc statc dcpartlllcllt 
o
...
,. 
I. 
1 
I 
I 
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shall forthwilh file such :Igreement for 
r,'.:urdillg' wilh tile COlllllr rr:.:ord,'r uf 
the: cOllllly in ",hidl Ihe rl':l1 pr"l'l"rty 
<h'~crihl'll ill slI.:h a~n"'II1l"lIt is ,itll;ll",1 
;111.( lhe filillg' :11111 rl'l'''rdill~ ui '''.:h 
:1::rl'l'll1l'llt ,,11:&11 h:I\'': the ~anll' ,'Il·n·t 
;\> a lil"ll h.l' jlld;:lIh"l1t Ull ~aid ro'al l,r"I!" 
,'ny, From th" time "i lili,,:.: "i '1ll'1I 
a;: n'"III "II I all oj the r,':11 l'r''1 ...T:~· 
llwn·jll ,k"crilot'd ,11:dl hI' :\IId lI...·"me 
cll;lr;:"d Wilh a 1:":1 i"r all .",i'I,lll'C 
rt"t'i\"t'd loy 1!1l' :'I'I,II,':lIlt :" l1l'n':11 
pr,,,·j,kd, "hil'h Et'll ,hall ha,,' I'r:"rlty 
"",'r :111 11 liT t'l:1J r.( ... I l'Ilt',,:n!,r:,lI,'L'S, 
• • II 
Ti1l' sn'ti'lIl ;\1'0 l'r,,\'j,kd i'lr Cl'r:;,iCl­
t:":1 hy Illl' .(,'partll1l'lIt. 111'"11 rt"llllt·,t. ,Ii III,' 
:Ill:d :a1l1,,1II1l paid :1 r"l'iplt':Il, :11\.1 i'lr whidl 
:l 1i"11 is cla;III,'d, tel Ihl' dat" "i 1111: .:crl1ll· 
tr:.nsil..'r vi thl:' I'rIJpt"rt~· prior tv n.',:il'i,-u:-:" 
,1<-:lIh: :tlltl for 1':'ynH'1I1 "\II "i 11ll' ot:ll'" 
of tkccas\'ll r,'cil'i"l1l:i, 'lIhj,'el III a prlur 
ell"mllti"n uf $JUl), .-\11 rl'l'U\','r:t'S arc r,·· 
'1l\irl'tI to he .It-pusit,'d ill the Cuul'l'r:llin: 
\\'l'lfarc: Fllnd ill tile Slate tn'a,"ry, This 
illne! was er":lI,'d loy th\' ,l:lll' lq,:; ,1:11 IIr,' as 
a nlt'allS uf illrlhl'ril1:': Ih,' ,1I111,,'r:Il;t111 he­
:Wt't:1I the ~t:lle :11111 it'daal ~"\'l'rnllh'lIl~ 
;n nl:.th'rs ui I'ultlic a"I"I;III"I', F"dnal 
and "laIc fllnc!" approprialt'd anc! :I\'ailal,lc 
iur puhlie a""i,lal1l',: arc ,t.'l""itl"l1 111t'rt'in 
:\1111 payml'111S to re,il';I'IIl,' arc ma.!e lhae· 
from, 
[11 r,',l"ra1I:"ralll' 10 til,' "1:1h', (,'r '1101­
:tge assj~tall<:t: art' made under lh,' P~IJ­
vi~;ol\s of Tide t oi Ihe X:ll;:,I:,11 Sol'i:lr 
~t'(lIrity Act. 42 ti.5,c..-\. § 301 et scq~ 
\\'hile Ihis act it" ..1i mali," no I'r'l\'isillll 
iur n"\'t',",:ry frl)l~. till' prtll',-ny or ~s.atC's. 
oi d'T""""\ rt·(:l'i"l\l'. it .lilt'S rt"ll1Irc lhat 
the fnl"r:l! J:1l\"'f1111h'lll he rt';lII!lIIr;cJ fot", 
It:" ;o.h~~rc: '.IE' ;L11)" f,"t:lu·,"ril":'i Ina.h· under 
,1..1<' 1,11\' I,,' :! .... pr"\'I,i'lll 111 :'<"l~:i"l1 303, 
-.'" ;o.t1!I~l·\·~ :nU ," J,.! II whil"h rn"'1dl'S that. 
1':1\ :lll'nl' :al,~:nu;: :., II:.' 't:~:,' irl1:l1 the 
l1:1t:"I1"1 ;':'I\'I'r:::'"'nt, ,),:111 I", "r,',in.:n! by a. "7.,, 
:"11111 ,''1U1\ .1I,·ut to :I~~· iJ!'II :-.1::1 ~h.lre to ",:,<"'­
\\ I::,h :Ill' l'II:: ...1 :'I:llt" " "llnllaloly ~mitl~ :-. . 
,.,1. :" ,1.-:.-rlllilll"1 I", :11,· ,\.JIII:ni,tr:l:or. of 
Ih., n<'l ,':"""1:[ 7"l"\'l'r"d ,!lIr:lI:: ,lily prior 'j
'1':,If:,'r loy :h,' :'Iate or ,1Il~' j",1;:i,':l1 sub- ....~ ..' 
di\ :,j"I' :11l'ft'"i Wllh r"'l"'':: III ol,t-:t~· ';}-. 
:"'1,1::11,',' illrlll,l1l'oi und .. r til<' :'::Ile pl:tn~':',,~~ 
• ." In ;1,al;1I ~lpl·r:l::'II1. ulld~r:',":­
a:.:r,·,'n,,"ut ],"1\\4"\"11 dll~ I ..·,J,-"r:l~ ;l11J ~t:lte-.;,i.'.. 
t:"\Trllt1h"l:t:o.. 'hI,- pr~. ra1:l ~h:lrC' oi re--..... t 
" ":H\","r:,·~ l~lh' r.,.. tl1\" inh-r:ll ,,:,u\'\"rnm('l1t is.::~ 
'fI'.lill'l1 1" il~ a.:el1l1111 in tlh' wdi;He fllnd," 
a 1101 il" >1.1>""1"1'111 ""III rilllll i, 'II ~ r~lIced"
... 
;~"l'"rdill::ly, Tlh"r" i,. (had"r,'. 110 merit;' 
ill :11'1"'11.1111" allad,; 111"111 It", 'l:lt~' 1;,,,.: 
"II Ilw ~rtllll1d lhal it dUl'~ ""1 ~pl'ciric;\lI:f" 
pr'I\'"I,' i"r I':I~ tnt'lI! ,,j thl.' pro rata $h:u~~ 
dir",·t to till' inkral ;::.l\'t·rllllll'l1't. ' 
1'I"i'lIilf" ,,11.,;::,' lhal tl1l'y \H'r" 
m:,rri ... J al \ ',a1.I" "II, ill I 'a 11\',11\ ClJllnty~'
. :. 
I"all", :'qllL'IIII,,'r I. 1Iltl"; lhat 
cllildn'l1 \\ a,' I.. 'm tl,,' i""lIl' oi ,,:aid m:lr.;;· 
ria;::": Ih,ll th,'\' :lr" ;-') alld ;"11 \"I':l.r~ oi~: 
. • r.··· 
r",,""'l; .... ly: al1<1 Ilwy .,\\'11 a" th('ir so),r: 
,·"tm:lIl11ily I,rulll·rtr l','rtaill fl':11 (,~I:\tejJi' 
;,;r 
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Cort \\'il 19r
\\' Il .: III )"
I C ll w !, l
ih\"\l SlIdl ','n 1 l lll;II"1
/'. I illg" . " 1~ j lI.
,:: ~I'I1ll"1Il a,'. I l h  l '
1 ' y ;:IIh"111  " ;oI n' -
I l l1l" oj ll ' j Il 'h
:.  rt"'l11   I ':.!   r '
IIWrt'in , l,, " ;.11 ;\11.1   nrn
har;:.·" willt 1' j ,i'I,III':
,'.:"i ,'" h l!ll" q l !t l 1, h,'f(':n
''''il \\ l1il'  "II 1t:I'" 'r: .. tl
1I",' all lll1r,·t:l dl'l1 <:"Ill'II:III'r:,I""'
 
il\ l'l'lilll ,<1' !, ll"i j'1 'nil c -
1:,, II l<  "l'jI;Jr lh'nl \,11 'l l"', ,j h
"I:t! 111111 11 1 I' iol ,·.:il' l I lIId " ",
a li" .:Iailll"" I ) l,' j c l '
lt P ·  .... l'i\·I1:·~
i u 11111 (1 ,\'I11<'lIt lit n tilt 01 11'"
( ~asl'l\ !,; III'; I  II! "':1 I"
!:"rnJll 3 O ,\ <:"rlJ r:('~ '-
<Jllirl'd < l' il,'<!  I c p, ali",
"-':I ll Il l I rt' ,
l d c I ,'t! h I , I t : I i I;, I ;IS
1I ,'OII1S n crill; ':1II'I" : lillll -
\\,( CII l l: I IIC \1 " 'I\', lll\ I IS 
ll ' JllIh .: 'I~ :III"". l'
ln ~ l'rll r;:'I,·c! lld ; \
b c ,,~ ~la l " n: '\.'I,.,,;Il' \1l'rt';11
; <:lIls 10 c.:ip;l'I I .: .: I c-
. 
F,·,ll'r J ,,:-r l" Ih ~I:l"'" ., -
l i~ta l": .: I I'~I -
i  C ;II;:,I:. I ri
"(lI IY :\':1, .:q
.: :" l~  J )
j '\''', "I~ n ' . 
j 01''1'"" ,.1 n',ll'i"I1" , 1111'S "I mn: I
I .: :t1 "\'l'rlllIll'l ·i llllClr;l:t! Cot
J[~ : d allY rt· :IH·\·ril·~ d,
~I ,It, . \ w I' " lll III n~:i  
I l l·\·~ , il'
I':" h'lI ll'~:lIl1  ' 11:.' ' I ' nl:!
11: 1:,,11,, ' , ','r: II III It:dl · jll ,, 
'" 12 II- p!'11 ... ~,,, 
"I: , 1 ...   1:,"  '1l11lal '
'I! 1, d.': <'fi i  111"1 ,v  I .. , . 1 111:1: i, I :1 ,
th., IWI ,t::lllllin :",n:.'\Tft'd dllr:a:: .lIIY prior .~_ 
p:.<r b ~Ial.: l I , "i;; :1\ Sll~ ',:, j 
.Ii, !~i~111 ht'rt", wu t· ... i't·~!
,I,I :lh' lrm,I ... .j ll  Il
 
... 
,'ro',lil ... 1 
;ll d t~ ~uh~t.·'IU'·11l l·'lIltrihn i'll1
: l'.:"rdi l :ly, I ... r
'11 ,11,1111,' :1 1I a(\" 
I ... "" 1d I l  .. ,,~ - \ $I',·.:iri 31 
"vlIl j ..  ; II"1 1 I l' 
l'\'1 10 Ih, fer . :"",' ·II I,
l' :l lIilr~ all.';: " :" ll'Y ,n' ,' 
1Il:lrri 1  . .1.1,\<,11.
d h .. , lll'I o Illll"
hildrL'lI ,'r,' " rn Ih
;I\ ,' I I .·y ;Irl' <l n y,·:t  
"I ','I;\'l'l ; ;1 1. Ill'Y ,' \'II ~ e
",,1111:11 11;1)' ' "p,'ny ("rl n'
NEWLAND v, CHILD 
c.:~:iS ;: I_tnho 5':0 
: l':IY oi Cal,lwcll, wh:.:h th,'y oc,:.:;;y as 
.ir :\L'm.:: :hat th~~' m:lde :11';>1;0:;;:'1 to 
. D~~:lrtmen[ oi PlIhlic :\>:'::'t:lI1'~ anJ 
rc :l\\":\r,~cJ, :lIl,1 h:l\'c bccn p:l:d, ",:';-,1::': 
;i:'l:lnc.:, se\'cral years prior :') Ih~ ;":1 
,"ll,imcllt: th;lt in JII:1C, 1l)~1. t::~ ·k· 
'ldanl, :lS ~-0mmi:,~ion.:~ of :~e Dc-; .. r:­
'llt oi rublic ~\,;:,isl;lIl.:e, .kn:::tI1'l.:c :::a[ 
"Y ,'se,'lIte :In,1 l!elin'r :0 the ,kpa:-::::e::t 
c ::tl:'~ecm"I1t prll\'id",J i"r ill lhc :~': I 
::en,i::I"ll!. c~,,::ttil1:; ::t li":l III'''n :he:r ~':al 
'\\' :lS 'ccur:l\' ior the r,'~o\'c;: 'l: 
IW' . '. - b . : 
1)'I1I\'n:,: tlh'rc::tller to c 111;1.:" 1,-. :,:~::1, 
.1 pain ,Ii h"::l~ ,k:li,',j :::rtlh'r ::t"";'::'::':~ 
i:,'r ,Tilly I. 1'):1: th::tt l'""y w"rc wi',~,,'1: 
l":Ol1ll' dj rl'~t)u.r\:l·:i ~ll prl.vid..: ;1 :\.. :t:=,·,:-~:.i't: 
:wd,1ni ,)r' Ih'a!th ::tnJ w"I!,h,'in:.: :"Ir .~::,:,:. 
:I\'c,:: .,;o.l th:i!. hn:::tllsc .j: ':l1ch :I""'~.,:::: 
l!': :'l1C~1 cllmilld:,illl\, tl11':: ,'s ...::::",j :.::11 
l"::\"l'fl": ~hl' ;J:.!:"l'l'l1h.·tlC (IJl··.I~ill~ ::,\.. lr .-i:ti 
,':,; ;lr"l'l':ty :I:' ~el'nrLIY ill: the r,,:mh,::,.:­
ll':~: t-l :til a~~::-:~:lnt.:...: ;';lynll":Il:, r...·..: ...·i\·c..: 'j:. 
hl'::: :.::,.: .lilly i. 1'.1:1. 
[2,31 The !'):I "I::ttll:e is :lIUC';~': 
t[1":1 ,';;r:'Jtls ,:,,::,,"~tlI::"II:d ~r"l\tllJ;, F::;:, 
11,')' :l'::'C~: It \';"bl,'S :trt, l. ~ I. 'Ji ..r:: 
,t...:quir::".~. PI,~:-= ...·-::::-il1~ and p7'')h· .... ti:·.~ prr..;­
~r:y"'. ~pl··:ifl~::;;-,". tb.::r Cl'l:~l'''ti,,:: is ~;.... : 
h~ a:,,,,'::e.[ 1;,'n ;oIa.:es :l c!·l\lc! 11\,":'1 th":r 
itl~ wh:e~ r":;I1":':::' th"ir r::,:nl III (0111',,;. 
't:~~In~hi.:':". or Ilt:: ...·r\\·i~c di~~l,) ... ...: 1)[ tlil'"::'" 
'r"ren~', ~\ppl'~!.1nlS iurrhc: a~~(rt :~.~ 
.~ ·,:t oi :he la\\' :, t'l ,Jerri,'c them 'li tl1<':: 
..~::y ;,l~,l tl1l' l'nj'Jy:nclIl :hen'oi, wit~· 
out JlIe proce~s of law, in \'i'llalioo of art. 
I, § 13, IdalIa Cnmt. The ri!-=ht to 0\\11 :lI1J 
cnjoy pri";\lc property is il1ndanh'lllal. It 
is aile oi the natllr:ll, inhcrelll ::tn.! i:l:l1jen­
a"l.: ri~hts ui irec mcn, It is n"t a ~iit oi 
onr cOIl~t;ltlli"ns, hec:ll1sc it exi,:t~'r1 h... i"n: 
Our COlIstillUions l'mhr:l':C ;lnd 
procl:lim il as :lll es:,cntial in onr 't1I1':"l"itln 
of ire,·dlll11. II :\m.Jnr.. ClII,litnti"Il::t1 
La\\'. ~ .B3: ~llanll \', lJaII;I:', III T"x, 3:'1, 
2.i: :-;.\\" ,~\.I. I') ,\.I..R. !.i,'-I;". This ri:.:ht "i 
rr"I',·rty. Ihlln::h "i slI.:h hig-h "r,[er, is 
IIn'e:lh,"",,,s 'lIh,i"cI t.) r";I'''lIa'''e limita­
li"l1 •• 11,( r"':':llblitlll Ity th.: ,I:lle in Ihe ill­
l,r,',I, IJi the '"mIll" 11 \\',,1 iarc, Ind",',(, 
a ,tatnt ... ill1l"J,:in~ :IIIY lil11it::ttioll IIpon the 
ri~ht 11111,1 I,c sl1!Jl'"rl"d by 'lI.:h I'ur;""", 
St:lle \'. OIll;\l·ch'l'I'iaria. 27 Idaho i'Y;, 
I:~ 1'. 2~1: :?~i L',S. 3·13..;X S,C'!. 323, Ii.! 
Id;lh" ;".J, 2;".! P. ;-Oi: D,'nnis \', ~ltI""s, [S 
\\';I"h. .~3;, 52 P, .t,.., ~) L. RoO \. .il).!; 
\\'y", 1:,-:, 53 P,:?,l I, Ill/) .\,J..I~, :.;.J: I,; 
c.J.:-:'" l""lIslilllti"lIal La\\', § "ll.!. 
[4] The o!d.a~e assi:--tance /;IlV is tn II': 
,Ji,ting-uishe,l ir,"n ~o-'::lllc,1 "pour 1:I\\'s" 
'lr "jl1'li;:"1ll Sl:ttntes" in 11I;lt Ih..: 'lld'a~': 
:I,:~i,taut:e :lct dill'S not re'lnir..: tll:lt III" 
re.:ip:":1l II, :l pallper or :lh""llIll'ly '!.·"li­
fUI.: III ,'mille hilll III p:lylll"nl" Ih ere1llulcr. 
:-=l:tle ,'x rd, ITdl'l1lt:ycr \', ~hroy,·r. Ohio 
'\I'P'. ;~ \'Y.2d 7/,1; L<:i~h v, ClIlI1'r f)i 
Puh/i.: 11,';"lh & C'haritil'S of L:l\\,n:nc\', 
-'Ill ~(:ISS. 3.J.1, 37 N.E,2Il IOli; Warren 
...... ,~-
,,' 
:-=rrr·.······.~ 
L' 
f 
l 
i ' i 
I I,
.'f 
...;..-r;. 
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·,0/:1111, ;).s ,:oJmmi ~ionc~ c r  · 
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;). 1I.:!i ' .lcpa:-::
;\\!~e~m"! ll\,id,'01 '1 t ,
ll,i::,,'nl ";\lin:; 'I i,, , "1''11 :~
. , ;).s ll t" "co\,c:-  ,
 ' ,'  
'Y lIl'II S lJ",rC:1. IIc C III:.': .,-,
• ,-: '  . .i.,,} w 1.",,;, . :,:~ 
u.r\:l·:i , ti  ,i't! 
. 1' w l l\I \\'en " ll ' '" ;:-:,-;0:'
:, ":l, \lI e I "·c,' :: 
n. ~IIC!' .:o ;1II1"i' I. h" ; ·   :,·.! ~ rI
\ 'r 'l  hl.· !:"l'l'l1 .'U l ··.I!! :" 
I llp .. ~ J.~ "lt ,,~ c ~ lol:~:' ' 
t O .:...: ll' l'(I.:i\,\.,c :
; ~ ,~ '):
<.illC ro.:.:  ;\ ;\r ,
<lallo o c ! l own ; \
), l1da ' It lr
 II r;).1 I rC ;\II ! I;).l .: · 
ll! e e . 1I,'t ;\
u ,:ol il 1tilll\s, c ;).u "t~'r1 e  .. re
l l t lliollS , lII ; I Il
l;). t :1.S ;),11 ' lll ll ll :II lCI'I";1I1I
i c,·dolll 11 ,Jllr. oIII:' itlltillll;\
, ,U 1':\1111 J l .~. 111 ,' 1 1,
.i':  , . . l I -, hi~ Iii
pr"lk' l ll~ IIi c l,!' Ilrd .
·o. ~:h"'.· ~ "l je l, :,,:o l llic -
t oll .,1 01 ':':lI/;lIil lI c 1; I ll t c l' 
ll e IllJ "ill!-! llly mit:1. n 111'1)1\
; mll,[ upp"rt".! ,"c jl ,,,,,
:IIC , I 'chc\,\, ' [ l!
~..! , , ,;x .c.-I . ( '
100:lh --l '. p, "lIl1 ". IIl e .
,-';7  . , 3,  .. ';I , :
c ~ ,;\,11:<: ~ ll1,'.c.;!': 'Y I~,"; 1' 2,1 1111) , .  .. I~ ~, -l i
t[1I\:1 \';,r:I u  ~'J~:!'t~tl1~:')II:d ~rl)t1ud~. F::-~:. C I' . . . I r ' 
" .. ~" l,JlI>\lll1t'"II:l .a\\',  ,,(l_, 
h.·), I:'~ . ,: .. r,'s . I '
Ull=-~:~1:!:1)11. \\"~!...:h ~~t..:LI;kr\.·~ as 1I\1C' .,i :.:-: flld, c ~si,t:1.l\cc \  [,,
ol ll 'II:,ht.:,1 'llll ·c;).lIe.1 lJ ; ,
· ~. p, \ !' P7' (ti:  .. - r)  ltli;!'.:l  s1a lltcs·· tha tllt! ,)r ·  
: :~'' _ :-:!"":it'!(;, : .• ,. e I)I lI ,,:: ::- • ;. , all':c 'H' \l n:' lIir ;. .he
" ·: .: li" J! c t 'l1I 1 " "1 e'::
c ,':;\I':c " e . t '" ,
l \!,:". t) ::\'r\\'i l').';~ l' :-
c JlPI'! 'l\rs llrth ~ ;\~~,  !
,· (I w ; i "e \'
 ~ i !. il ' jIJY:III:1 c
c l'i :\ llc ;). u c u all t <I,·,ti· 
t.lle 101 t c ;l l l~lI ~ t cllllde
tat n: . .:IPII l:Y.: " lly" ,
. 1 1'., ' ,2<1 ei orn' .
l' l ,:dt ;). \, :ll ,
" I' ; -1 ,[ \\' c
i 
\. 
,-
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COllnt)" \'. Decatur COllllt)·, 232 Iowa l.i 13, 5 
:\'. \L.'L! 3-17. 
[5.61 \\'e held in 51:11e ex reI. ~il·l"nn 
\'. Liud,trom. 68 Idaho 226. 191 P.:,l \!I()l). 
1012, th:lt "The J.:rantin~ olf aid 10 its 
net{J~' a~ed is a \\"cll n'~lll:lIi~I',l "hli:,:atilll\ 
oi the "'atc and is a .~'l\·I·rnl1ll'lItal i1lllClilln 
tendin!: to promote the p1lhlic \wILlrc." 
..\nr limitation upon lhe prlll'crty r;:.:hls of 
rce:pi"J1ls in Ihe applicatioll 'li Illl; li"n law 
is anl1'ly 5111'porled h~' a p1lltlic 1'1Irp"~c. 
namel)" to promote the "commun \\'1'1 i:He." 
Pn·:lmhle. It is thi" fl1I1IIic flllrI'U"" 1'1 which 
all lJ"ndici:lrics mmt lu"k to j1l,tiiy Ihe 
payme1lts thcy n:ccive. It is this puhlic 
pnrpo~e which s;1\'{'s the emire p1lhli.: as· 
sistance law from direct conllict \\'ilh ~,·c' 
lion 2. art. S. !.!aho COll~t., pru\"i.tinlo:' lhat 
"The cretlit oi the ,;laIc ~hal1 11111. in any 
manner. hc goi,",.·n, fJr loan"" 10, or ill aid 
oi any intli\'i'l1l:ll. • • ... State ex reI. 
:--:ieboll \'. Lind"trom. s1lpra; ..\1:\1"",1:1 
CUIIIUY \'. Janssen, 1(j Cal.1,1 :!;'(" 100i 1'.::,1 
11. 130 ..\.L.R. 1H1; ~lor~all \'. 'kpt. oi 
5ul'ial 5ecuritr, 1+ \\'a~h.2J 156. 11; 1'.2.1 
tj..')f,: Lus :\nge1c~ Conllty v. 1.., FII""Il'. ~ 
wl.:?d ~;U, 129 P.2d 378; Ild\'erilll::' \', 
I);l\'is, Jut L:.S, 61'J, 57 S.Ct. ~ltH, Sl LEJ. 
P.81 The "obli~ation of the statc" 
reicrreJ to in the Lindstrom ca~c is to bc 
ullJ... rstooo as a moral rather thall a manda­
tory obli~ation, The: theory of the :\mcri. 
CJn political system is that the ciliz ...n Sllp­
pons the state, not the re'·crse. E\'ell JS 
." .,.~.',B.EPORTS 
10 pallpcrs :11,,1 intiig-c1l1S. Ih ... re is no con- .,. 
"1:lIIli,,":l! or ,:oll1J:lol1·I:\w dUlY n'stilll; IIpon '::', 
lhe )1:11 ... to I'r,'\'i'lc >lIl'l'ort. Th... recipient i(" 
h:l, "" \'e~tl'd ri~hl to a"i"tallce payments. i' 
l)1IIh,' ':ulltr:try, his ril:hl thado is elltirely __ : '.':. 
.'\ .:r'·:llur... oJ ,1:lll1t .... :\" slI ... h it is subject,'~ :':;: 
10 lJ,·ill~ "':<:1"11'1.-". dim;ni"hl'd, cOl1l1itiolled :,.' :':' 
or ahr"~:ltc.l 1.~· Ih ... k).:i"lal1ln:. T LI entitle, ~ ",~ 
him IU .L'S,·T! slI ... h ri~hl. hc nmst comply:. f:..:. 
"'lIh :lit Tl'a",'l\aloh' alld lhllhii,crimillatory., ~:~ Il·;. 
cOII,lili":I, ilill""".,j ;.y till' 1",,:i,I:lli\'e author-. ,.: . :
",
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Iili". 3': ~.\\':.1 21>2: ;O:c"Io"y \', Fair, iO'., ': ~ 
I ' 
I )hi" '\;'1'. ,~l. ~~ X.E..!.! \.i'.I: Division of, .: 
:\id ior :hc .\::ell. ,·tc., \'. 11"1(:111. 143 Ohio:':" ..... 
~t. 1:'Ii. 54 ~. E.2.1 ;")0: 1: ..\ flnl>. SIS :\,L.R.?- .. 
~11.!: 4ll .\I11.Jur.. !'(,II"ill1l', § i, p. 966­
'"\\'h:lt a\'I',,1/.1I1I; aPfl";lr entirely to ~"(;~~. 
O\"l'r~,,,,k i" :h ... :act Ih:\t till'\" ha\'e no 7,~t : ' 
.. "; r 
"r~h'" ril:hts in nld ~,,:.c hc:ncrits Qr·~...~~ .. 
in :111\' tlllla iorm oi rdid, The state'-: ::~ 
m:ly. ';IS it ha~. l:r:llll Slich bell ... rits, but~'L ' 
~ •• ~ 'L' ~ 
it i" flot rnillircd to Jo so. In gn.nt.~..:·'.· 
inl:" lh"1ll it may illlp""e "lIch con.1itions"':!. \; 
a~ it <l...'l1'" i,r"l'cr :111J jll~t. If:l per- rooi: '.~ 
~)/1 :1.:',;"\'1,, :I J.:ralll. he muSl accept it'.~;~:'~ 
~lIhH'<:: III Ihe cOllllil iOIl":' Dimke Y. \'"r(' 
. . . -- -"~'.':: .. 
Fiuke. _'1101 ~lillr:. _".1, _"..IS :-;.\\. I:J, llt7=:'''''~ 
paJ.:e ;")..;.,::.~~ 
,::~,< 
[91 Th,' .:'Ol1diti'l1l" impo"eJ b~' the s~(:' 
ute arc :IOt so Ol1aO"" :IS thost ()rttinanlyj"
~' 
illll"I",,<! ill privale ICII,lil11: tranS3.eti~~, 
.~ , 
On th~· (lIl1lr:lry, the: !;IW provide:s II fall"" 
:md huma11" plal1 by which l1 ...edr a~, "'~~ 
own :l hom .... 1I1:IY sccl1re old,age: assi~~$f 
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while continuin~ to occupy and enjoy :heir 
home. r:lther th:m being requin:d to ::!I)rt· 
;;:I~e or sell it, and consume the proc~5 in 
li\"in~ cxpcnses bciore recei"ing 3id. ,\t 
the ~ame time it presen'es thc prl)pC~l" as 
a m~al1S oi reimbursing the wcl i:lre :ancl. 
thus l;i"inb thc rceipiellts thc satisiac::on Ili 
payllll: :heir OWII way as iar as th~:' arc 
~blc. :ll'.d with the least h;lrdship. I: 3:;1) 
redll,"s the amulIllt whieh nlllst b.: co::::::u­
uusl~' i'~'J\'ideci hy the taxl'a~'ers oi thF ,:at~ 
oj nat:oll, who, thr')\1~h their Ic:,,';!:.ltjve 
'.,re,entati\·cs, have "olulltariiy a,;o;:ned 
t~c mural ob!il::ltiull to ?ru\'iJc sUc~ aid, 
h is a mallcr ot common knowled~~ :!lat 
,vmc states h3\'c so burdcned them~:\'es 
w:[h \'anuus torms oi public assistanc.: an,! 
ui.[.a!=e ;u:nsiolls that the threat of :=-<01. 
\',:l,y has iorced 3 mud:rieation oi :hcir 
pians. III all states the burden oi suc:' as­
si:tallcc has become 3 1113jor pr1lhlcm, ':J.r· 
jOll~ methods oi reCO\'cry h3\'C been <ie\'":scd, 
;ll:d rc~:-,;IPs 1I0llC !las been emirely !J.tis. 
i:acIMY. .·\mollg such plalls some ;:.o:es 
ha "e provided ior reimhursemcnt b~' ~c!a· 
t;\'e~, k:.=:111y responsible ior the ca~c I)i 
their neeuy duers, This, however, has ;;":en 
iv:,!l\u ,!dicult ot applic:ll:on and, in !'JmC 
c::'llmst:lnCl's. ulljuS\' Instead of rl·qu:::n:: 
the relatives to pro\'idc the SUl'purt, r;~ ~o 
re:tnhllr~l' the Slall:, our law limils rl:C7\'cry 
to the c~t;lte. or the rl:al property, 0: ~he 
rc.::p":nt. Thc relalivcs arc asked on;: :'l 
iore;;u. to the e:tt,~nt oi $uc:t (l;'\ymcms. -:;-hOlt 
they olherwise might inherit, ,\s was !'''~­
l,ed :n St:1te c:.."C rd. Xielson v. Lindst;om,
......, 
the real ohjection to this licn law is that of 
Ihe prospeclive heirs. 
"The conflict oi interest here is not 
between the St3t~ :1nll its ncedy 3~e'l. 
It is Il\:twecn the Slale alld the heirs, 
nc:tl oi kin or other distriblllees oi the 
e,:J.tc5 oi the deceased reeipiellls." 
Stale ex reI. ~iclstJll \'. Lindslrom, ri-i 
Id.•l1o 216. 191 P..?d 11)1)1), 1/)12. 
Ila\'il1;;- ntJ \'estet! interest, they ha\'e no 
ri\:hl ttl complain. In r~ Smith's Eslatc, I~~ 
m.1. !::;l, 10; P.:?d ISS; 16 c.rS" COllst:tU· 
1:"lIal 1_'1W, § !.!.,!, 
[101 Al'pd!:lllts :llso contenrl that, since 
Ihcir ,lalUS as c1ii;'ihle r«:ipiellts ot tllrl·a~e 
3ssislance .....as cSlahlished 3n,1 reco~nized 
prior to Ihe 1931 amendment, the al1plica­
tion oi [he ncw jHo\'ision to Ihcm wtJulri 
constitute n:trtlsllccli\'e in\'asitln oi 3 \'cSled 
ri!:,ht. .-\s alrcad~' n'lle'!, recipi"ms can ac­
qllire no \"c~tt<1 riy;;ht ullder thc statule. The 
let;i~latllre may mtllliiy the cOlldititllls tJi 
assi~laltce. or delly it 3ltogether, 3t J"ny 
time. 
[11) It is also ctJnlell.lerl that appcllants 
arc 'il-niee! cfjll:ll proteclion of Ihe law, .\rt. 
I, § Z. ItI:lhtl Ctlll~titlltitJll, The CtllllClllioll 
is that they, as owners tli n";'\1 prll(lerty, are 
discriminated al;airlsr, in that they arc re· 
fjllired to gram 3 lien UJlon their propcrlY, 
whereas Ileelly a~e,1 wl1l) h;\\,c flO real e5­
late, hut may own persollal prtJperty, 
arc ~rantell ;'lid withl)nt sllch rCfjllirelllellt. 
and 3re therdore preferred. It is reetJ~­
nized that d~e ICl:islatllre has bro:lt1 dis­
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,l1  at  ,  · .: ,  . lda n OII tn n .  contcntiol1 
::cll :;t:\nc,'s, nj st. I s:  f r,' ::: :: is t t t , s rs nt 'al rl,pcrt . r  
t  rdati\'cs t  r vi  t  I'Pvrt, 0::: t  is ri i tc  !; irlsr, i  t t t  lr  rc· 
re:tnhl\r~l' t  51:11e, r l  li its rC \' r  fjllired to rant a lien upon their property, 
to the c~:;lte, r the rcal property, : :he r s nccll  a..:e.  l l) :\\'e 110 r l s-
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Ilk '" the Ilbj,'(tiulIS made. Sial" I'X rd.. rl 
:\i,'!sun I'. J.ilhl~lrlll11, /~'i Idahu 2':11. 1~11 1', 
~d IflO'); lIa\\"kills \'. :'1:Lt" "i I\all~as ~t>­
-:i;,1 \\'di:lrc Il,'ard. 14;0; ioi:all. ;-,~I. ,'4 1',.:.1 
~I.lO; I.tlS :\II;;-"I,'S L'lll1l1y '". ~"-:lIr:IY Fir,t 
Xat. Balik tli Lus .\II~rk~. :-!4 ('.11,.\1'1'.':.1 
::i:-, I'JI P,2,1 i~: \\':L1I1"'rg- \'. L'lah 1'11],1;.: 
Welfare (<.1111111 .• 11;; L't:lh ~4.!. ":0.; P..!J 
... '" 
i3 IDAHO REPORTS~,IU 
crl'tioll:Lry Iluwa 10 Ill:lkc c:I:l~~iri'::lli"l1~ 
oi I'l'r~"I1S al1d pr"l'l'rrr hJr all pur­
pos,'s whi.:h it Illar b\\'illily ~<'l'k to :Ie· 
cUllll'lish, S<.I 10'1;.;' as the ,'!:,,:,i 11\: a Ii.lI1> 
arC' IJa~,·.r IIpon :'"t)lIh." h·;:itl111:lh: :.: rlJll 11,1 qi 
oIi,T,'r<:lll'': hl'IWl'l'1I thl' pl'rSulIs <.Ir 'lh,i'·':IS
, 
), .:!a~~ijj,'d, :Ire' nul 1II1r'::I,ol1:d,k' ,Ir ~rhilnrr, 
anti 'I",'ar :1 r"l':,:,,4HlalJlc r"l'!;ll\1)11 In ~lh.· JI·;,:l~. 
1~1l1\"l' pllqlu~l'. su\."!, ,"·!:1.,,;::,111l·:lli"I:~ ,Ill nflt 
,'j"l:\tc III<' ':1l1l"tit:lIiOI1, B::: \\''''101 1,...111;,1 
(<.I. ", Cha1'1ll:1I1, 4~ I,]:dl" ,..-:/1. ~/·.i [', ~,;: 
j{",.".: ". L'ity lli l'OI-::11.:II", ;-n l.iah.1 31.\. 
21X P,.?,l li~~: S:,lll' ,', E,'alls, ~.l 1']:11", 
:0, ~43 I',?!l ;-~..;; ~ll ~\m,Jur,. ::il:'ll::"', 
S ::::, p. ". 
r121 Our public a,si"tal1ce: Jaw C"l1h·m·
 
pla\l's th;\[ all lIl'l'dy a~,'d 'h:,l1 r,'.:ci,',· :LS­

1 ~j~t:.IH:l· ;1~~IJrdil1~ :., ~hc iUlb"idu:d Ih" .. d ·d

. 
l·ach. "wil h dlle rl';::Lnl •• (U the
,j 
il1l:ulI1<: :LII,I n·s"lIr.:l', ;l\'ail:d",' I,) him ;r'ltll 
-:r{ whal",'Cr ~1I11n'e", J.L. § ;;1-......:1". L'II,kr 
: ; ilS pr'I\'i)i'"1S :anJ 1I11,!<'r the n';:Il':It:"I1S 
" 
\\'hiell it all!~ll.Iri~,'s. l'er,I.lI1:ll pruperty, as 
'\\."(,;'11 ;IS no:d prlJtJ~rt,,··,)\\"n,,:d ...~- Lilt.: n·..:ipi ..ollt 
'~ 
'I
, is lakell into eOIl,i.lcr:l1illll in .lcl,'rll1illillL: 
" thl' type :Llld amUIIIII<.Ii :I,~i~I:LlII:I', ~,l lhat ;111 
arc Ire:lte<l i:lirly alld wilhlllll .Ii,-:rilllllla­
" liun. classiliC:lli"lIs nllt '·lIll1rra· 
933; Dill1ke ", [-,illl,;,-. ':11'1 ~rillll. :'1, ~~1.~ ~. 
\\'. ;-.~: "'"llll' 1~'''lIl\Y ,'I,',. ", :'Ilyhn·. 1~9' 
:\"1,, IIIi", .;~ :\,\\',':d ':h':: III r,' l'l'illion of 
lh.. ,TlI:'ti.:,':'. ~:: :'\,IT. ;;"..:. I;;~ .\, '!I;"; :\n­
II". ~ll .\.T..I~. ~ll':; "\III1U, 1':5 AI_R. i12. 
[131 :\l'l'dl:lIlls fllrlh"r .:nl1\l'I:,I,hat the 
1"."1 .\<;t i~ a I<.lea I alld ~1"'Cl:L1 law l'iolati"e 
<.Ii ;Irt, 3. § I~l, IJ:L1l1l ("I"till1t:,'n. Since 
loy il~ :crll1:' it is :ll'l'li"a1>I,' alik.: :0 all pcr­
,,,IIS lhrlln:..;h"nl thl' ,I:tt,·, \\'ho ':l.me within 
111l' n"I"'':: I I'e d;I~:'I'S 1hl'r"jll TH' 'l'i,kJ ior. 
:LIId, :h.: .-I,I~:,ili,·ali"lI hl'ill~ n';""l1ahk·. anl.! 
witllOl' th,' ;L1llh"rity oi Ihe k;:l,I:l!ure, it 
i~ lI"t :11 :lllY ~l'me a 1.11';,1 "r " ...·o:i;11 law, 
\\',,11:11 th,' 11l,·.lIIill~ oi the ",l::;tiult:on. 
~l:'ll' ,',-': rd. :'\id""1 Y. Liu,blr":tl. snpra. 
[141 l:•• l1lpl:Lillt i~ ai,,, l1la.il' th:lt the 
prll""h"" ,Ii I he I".q :Ll1h'l1<il1:l'::l. § :c).. 
.2':~;I, 1.(,. an: ill .:on,li.:t with. ;111<; :h,·rl"iorc 
r"I"'akd h~'. Lh:ll't.-r ~4" oi \~:,' :::l's~ion 
LI\\:' lJll".~I, ",hieh \\':J~ 1':I,s,'d l.y ~h.: :'arne ' 
,,''''\1111 oi th.: Iq~i,lal1lr,·. hut ,,:r"nlll.:ntly 
10 ~ ~h-~~~.l. Le. L-h,;Iptt.·r .!~". 1IJ.= I Lau,'s. 
;1lI11"1<ls ':"rtail1 ~"eli"l\s tli til" j'"hlic _·\s­
~i~lalh:e I.a\\'. il1.:ludill~ § :-I;"~":J, Lt:. This 
last ,,'':Iillll 'S tltl' IIlIe ",hi"h or:;:I1;:lIly pro­
,'idl'd i'lr rl"'tI\'l'r~' IIi 1'1Ihli.: a,,~~::\I'."C llb­
1:lilll'd Ity :l pl'r:""1 ",h" \\'a$ 11": "lltitl~1 
lIh'n·t". Thl' :1I111'\\lhl1l'l1t :hl.ll"! :'1 it by 
Ch:Ll'll'r ':~(i, prll\'id,·s f.'r 
,"dt aSSi,I:Lllo.:C', 1':lid "' 
thl'r,'to, hy 111l';II'S oi a 
a~:lill~1 his ,"tat.:. Tt is 
n'adil1!o: or" 111l':'': t\\'1l ~.·.:tiUll:' :':al 11:,'y 
arc not 1U c'lI1l1ict. Th.·y .It-al with l.!ii· 
'I''1 
.If"
the: ~,·':.I",·ry of 
"11" :1": ,·IIlilk.1 
l'r,'i.·~~,'.1 cbim 
•.Ih\'i.,,:~ in'rn :a 
I 000220
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l'ach, " ilh dnc rC;::Lrtl  10 thc rl \'l>hJl1,. ,Ii Ihc 1".'-1 : IIh·n,illa·::t, § :c>-
il1l:ulIlc and n·,our,.:, ;I\'ail:.!,]l· t" hi  ;r,nll .2':~;I, I.C .. :In: ilL '"lLlli.:! wilh. :\111; :h"rl"iorc 
,,, ,,, ,IIl n'':''  I.e ~';"'':I''.
ts )\'i); ns and Ltllll ' lt :u';u:llns
w ci inuri~,·s. ~ 'l ll:11 "rIY. :IS
' ( ~rt,,··')\ "n, :d u~  .. ..:i il.·u
:1 "l1 lO c I,i,lnaLi,," , "fmilLil1
lit.: I c lI1 LL 11U ""i~I:L!Il l ; ) I :
': LI,," u o ,li,.:rilLl1 1;L· 
e li n I e o \·u ll'
iJlc to) I  ... ,) l'(!iun~ c l' l'!\: t:l  
,\i,'l lI , :'l l ll, lt / I 'l .
';, '] · C ;L\'I. :!~ ~ . "s~iun 
\\, t , \\' .: was P:L ,. It. ~3m
" ~" 1I1 II Ih~ ,l:L I ', ilI Llr""q lc
( .!~  r. ,;l h'  i
:lI1Wlh ,,' l i., " cli n I IlL .·\ -
~I:LII':c :l " .:llI ~ ',;"2..! , I.e, 
~! "· ... I ,,., is Ihc "., ... w ,' I::Ll -
\ .l,·" " ':l'CI " ~' " I'lIhli ~~:; t"  oi>-
,( ], \ r"r~''' w ,, 'Ititl~1 
!lIt' I,'  ... Il'\\l1111CI 1 ;l\l.k, ,
2'] Ifl '); lI:Lwkills \'. :::I; I,' oi I\all,as d· h: l'l,'r ':~(i, f1rll\'i",·~ f,'r Ihe ~"""'\'l'ry f 
cial \\'c\i:lr\: Il"ar , 14;-; I\::lll. :-'~I, .~ '.':,  ~1Ll"11 ",i, : IIl: , ';li./ III ,UL,' : : ,·lllil .  
~'.lO: Lus :\I1;;"'ll'" '"l11ly \'. ~"C1Lr:IY Fir~t Ih,'r,'to. hy 1Ill';lIIS i :I I'rl'i,,~~,"1 cl:!.i  
t. n  oi T.1I~ " ". :o!4 (".11.,\ ' '.':.  :L~:lill'l i:; ,·'I:LtC. t i, ,.II>\'i,,,:,. i ,m :a 
'. 1')1 .:!,I ;-~; '; Il'r ' ' '  'n],li. n'adin!o: i 111l'''': I\\'ll ~"':liUl'" :':;11 :,'  
l  (UIllI1 ,.  ~ 'I:l  :!~.!, : ,; .':  t: t 111 ,1II1 it:t. .·  ,r. :\I \\'i:11 Ji -
Nl:Wl.AND v, CHILD ,i-H 
C~:1!' :1.9 ':' 3 hJ:dIU 530 
terc'n! cla~scs oi reCIpients. Ev~:: are, 
therdore. valid alld etTec:in', ::.:.ti :here 
is Ilu implied repeal. Sll>rscth -... 5~J.te, 
72 Idaho .j.9, ::!3t) P.::!ll 10.14; E.." ?arte 
D;dton,72 Idaho 451. 243 1'.2J 5~, 
. [is] It is abu cunt"Il,lc-J :hat ~ :->-~.j.:L 
is ueiective in th:\! 110 l'ro\·j;ion :; ~adc: 
therein iur the releJse 0 i the lien :7; .:.:l:iC u i 
satisiaction thc:reoi prior to the ':'J.:;" oi 
thc' rccipient. To this we think :: :s :lIr­
ti(1~'lIt to say that it being' ~i\'<':l IIl<: :::c':: <.ii 
'ic'n by jllu~l"lI!, an<1 :il\h~l·c:iljn ': I ;>ro­
"""uin!:, lor a cl'rliticate by the ':I';.:.:-::-:oent 
oj the Il'tal alll'Julll oi the li":l ,:::':::1<:,1 
tlwrennder to the datc or the cc~:iric:.:c, :.nJ 
that: 
... • • :lny per~on ,it."J.lilll: w:::,. 
the reei\llcl1l may rely upun ~uch e::-::5. 
,'Jtc as C:\'iucl1cin~ the am"UIIt v: :::e 
,,~i>ting- lien a~ainst the rI:al ",t:.:e Cli 
the re<:; pictlt" • 
the kgislature intc:ndc:d that it 5he.-~:'': be 
subject to rdcase by the de\l:lrlmc::: :;?U n 
payment of the amonllt of the ccrtif.n:c. :n 
the manner pro"idcd by law jor the ~~!c:lse 
oi 3. judl,:ment. under §§ lU-li 13 ;>::.. 10­
1114, I.e. Coole Y. ~Iassc:)', 3S Idar.1) ~r;'+, 
220 P. 1088.35 A.I_R. 2(~): ~lt. \'jew :'::;~al 
Tel. Co. v. Interstate Tc:l. Co., S5 ~CJ.no 
5l4. 46 P.~J i23. 
[16.171 L.'lstly, :J.ppellants eOIl[cr.c :!:at 
the lic:n ill;rc:emeDt was obtained bj' the .;;.:c 
!>~. Jur~ss, spl'eilically "business eon1i'1l1­
SiUIl," ;111<1 for that rc';IiOIl is unelljorceaiJlc. 
This CUflh'lltiofl is likewisc \\'itl1l.lut Inc'rit, 
To bc ,'oieia!>!..: hcc;lus" oj Juress. all a~rc'c­
In,'1!t mllst nut unly ~ obtainc,) hy nl<:an'l 
ur the pressure brlJlI~ht to b,,:tr, hilt lfte 
:q.:n:l'nl<:l1t il~I'1 i 1I111~t be unjust. III1Clln· 
;ciulla"!<-, or ilk:'::l1. The "s':l'nce uj ,jllrl'~S 
is the ,lIrr"II,i"r to IIllb \\' i ul ur UIlCOIl;,;i<lll­
all!.: dc'lll;llhis, It <::1I111"t he pn:dil'J.led :11'011 
,lc'l\l:lllds which arc Iawilli. ur the Ihrl'at 
:0 Ju Ih:\[ whie!l the Jl':nalldini: 1':lrtl' has 
a 1.-;: a I r;g-ht to do. Inland Enljlire I~c­
:':I\l'ri,'s \', J"1I1'~' Ii') Idahn 33.5, :!1I6 P..!" ,:\,1; 
::taIT"nl v, 1":1".1. 70 [.1:1110 331, 211:l I',:!,] 
.i.kS: lb::lp Hlltl"ill~s C"rp, ,', Xorth\\,,,~t 
Blllldilll-: Lu.. I!',.j. \\'ain, 'ilH. .j. P.:!.! :07, 
79 .-\,L.R. li::l; R:lIJcr \'. Barner. 172 O.r, 1, 
l.iQ 1'.2.[ I.3lJ; .\nn</l:lti'lll. Ilusincss ("m. 
f,"l,illll. 7Q .\.l..lt 655; 17 :\m.Jur,. Dllr,"', 
~~ 4, 6, antI 7; 17 C.J.S., Contracts. § 1;"2, 
iJa:..:;c ::J2. 
:\s \\'c' have notl'd. the demaml oi the state 
for a lil'lI ul'nn the rc::J.1 propcrty oj old-il!:"e 
recipi<:llt:i is la\\'illl, iair and just, Hencc, 
thc:re is no duress ur business cumpulsiuu IU­
,'uhc:d. 
!IIJ,l;mc'n! atiirmed. 
XU CUSIS ;dlul\'cJ. 
PORTEI~, e. J.. and GIVE:;..1S, TIIO~I­
AS anJ KE.E.TO:\, )J" CUllcur. 
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CHAPTER 49 
(H.S. No. 451) 
.,'.;:l 
~ .... ' AN ACT
 
iit!TING TO HEDICAL ASSISTANCE; AMENDING CHAPTER 2, TITLE 56, InAHO
 
',-')' CODE, BY THE ADDITION OF A NEW SECTION 56-218, IDAHO CODE, TO PRO­

J~ VIDE FOR THE RECOVERY OF CERTAIN MEDICAL ASSISTANCE; AND REPEALING
 
'~'.' SECTION 56-224c, IDAHO CODE •
 
.'1".,.:

Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
l' '; SECTION 1. That Chapter 2, Title 56, Idaho Code, be, and the same 
i. hereby amended by the addition.thereto of a NEW SECTION, to be 
kDown and designated as Section 56-2lB, Idaho Code, and to read. as 
,follows: 
'~ 
56-218. RECOVERY OF CERTAIN HEDICAL ASSISTANCE. (1) ~edical 
.,.,.istance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an individual 
'¥bo was siKty-fLve (65) years of age or older when the individual 
: received such assistance may be recovered from the estate, or if there 
be no estate the estate of the surviving spouse, if any, shall be 
"cbarged for such aid paid to either or both; provided, however, that 
. claim for such medical assistance correctly paid to the individual may 
,be established against the estate, but there shall be no adjustment or 
recoverY,thereof until after the death of the surviving spouse, if 
any, and only at a time when the individual has no surviving child who 
I, under twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind or permanently and 
totally disabled. Transfers of real Or personal property by recipi­
eat. of such aid without adequate consideration are voidable and may 
be:8et aside by an action in the district court. 
~,~', (2) Except where there is a surviving spouse, or a surviving 
~ild who is under twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind or perma­
Ilelltlyand totally disabled, the amount of any medical assistllnce paid 
~der this chapter on behalf of an individual who was sixty-five (65) 
Jear. of age or older ~hen the individual received such assistance is 
'-.:claim against the estate in any guardianship or conservatorship pro­
.- ~eeclipgs and may be paid from che escace. 
';:' (3) NOthing in this section authorizes the recovery of the alllQunt 
. ~f tJlyaid frolll the estate or surviving spouse of a recipient to the 
..tent that the need for aid resulted frolll a crime committed against 
.~. recipient. 
"', SECTION Z. That Section 56-244c, Idaho Code, be, and the same is 
hereby repealed. 
Approved Karch 21, 1988. 
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(b) Where both spouses are applying or are covered by medical 
assistance, the same method of counting income and resources shall 
be applied to both spouses and utilized to determine the liability 
of each for the cost of medical care; however, for any month for 
which either spouse receives a supplemental security income pay~ 
ment or a state supplement under section 56-207, 56-20B or 
56-209a, Idaho Code, or for which an application is filed and sub­
sequently approved, the methodology of the supplemental security 
income program shall be applied. . 
(c) The presumption of the availability of income under either 
the community property or supplemental security income method 
be rebutted by either spouse. 
(d) The department of health and welfare shall furnish to eac 
medical assistance applicant who is aged, blind or disabled, 
clear and simple statement in writing advising them of the provi, 
- -c:.;.:. 
RELATINC TO MEDICAL ASSISTANCE UNDER THE MEDICAID PROGRAM; AMENDING I 
CHAPTER 2, TITLE 56, IDAHO CODE, BV THE ADDITION OF A NEW SECTION 
56-20ge, IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE A PROCESS FOR DETERMINING MEDICAL I 
ASSISTANCE ELIGIBILITY FOR HARRIED COUPLES; AND REPEALING SECTION 
32-915, IDAHO CODE, RELATING TO A WIFE'S DUTY TO SUPPORT AN INFIRM' It 
HUSBAND. ! 
~Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
SECTION 1. That Chapter 2, Title 56, Idaho Code, be, and the same 
is hereby amended by the addition thereto of a NEW SECTION, to be 
kno~ and designated as Section 56-20ge, Idaho Code, and to read as' 
follows: 
56-20ge. ELIGIBILITV OF MARRIED COUPLES FOR MEDICAL ASSISTANCE 
UNDER THE MEDICAID PROGRAM. (1) It is the intent of the legislature 
in enacting this section to reduce the number of situations in which 
medicaid regulations as they apply to long term care costs, cause 
either the destitution of the entire family, or a dissolution of mar­
riage carried out to prevent destitution. It is further the ihtent of 
this legislation to protect the community and separate property rights 
of a married person whose spouse applies for medical assistance 
regardless of whether they are living together. 
(2) (a) In determining the eligibility of an aged, blind or dis­
abled married individual or of a couple for medical assistance 
under title XIX of the social security act, the amount of income 
and resources to be counted as available to such individual or 
couple shall be calculated in accordance with the community prop­
erty provisions of chapter 9, title 32, Idaho Code, or should it 
be to the advantage of such individual or couple, in accordance 
with the methods utilized by the federal supplemental security 
income program under title XVI of the social security act. 
:. 
74 IDAHO SESSION LAWS 
CHAPTER 50 
(H.B. No. 562) 
c. 50 
AN ACT 
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:his section. 
y provision of this section or the application thereof 
n or circumstance is held invalid, such invalidity shall 
ler provisions or applications of the section that can be 
~ithout the invalid provisions or applications, and to 
rovisions of this section are severable. 
~. 
_d. 
That Section 32-915, Idaho Code, be, and the same is 
I 21, 1988. 
CHAPTER 51 
(S.B. No. 1402) 
~ 
AN ACT 
~E BEAN COMMISSION; REPEALING SECTION 22-2919, IDAHO 
~NDING CHAPTER 29, TITLE 22, IDAHO CODE, BY THE ADDITION 
SECTION 22-2919, IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE FOR THE DEPOSIT 
URSEMENT OF FUNDS OF THE COMMISSION; AND AMENDING SECTION 
IDAHO CODE, TO STRIKE OBSOLETE REFERENCES • 
. by the Legislature of the State of Idabo: 
That Section 22-2919, Idaho Code, be, and 
.ed. 
the same is 
.li' 
I " I 
"f 
2. That Chapter 29, Title 22, Idaho Code, be, and the 
y amended by the addition thereto of a NEW SECTION, to be 
ignated as Section 22-2919, Idaho Code, and to read as 
DEPOSIT AND DISBURSEMENT OF FUNDS. (1) Immediately upon 
moneys received by the commission shall be deposited in 
eparate accounts in the name of the commission in one or 
or trust companies approved under chapter 27, title 67, 
s state depositories. The commission shall designate such 
t companies. All funds so deposited are hereby continu­
-riated for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of 
is can be withdrawn or paid out of such accounts only upon 
~er orders upon such accounts signed by two (2) officers 
y the commission. 
right is reserved to the state of Idaho to audit the 
commission at any time. 
Or before January 15 of each year, the commission shall 
t~e senate agricultural affairs committee, the house agri­
~lr, committee, the legislative budget office, the state 
. the division of financial management, a report showing 
000224
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. . . descMbed iii. ~ under subchapter XVI or the State plan approved under.partA or subchapter IV . ~ 132 
.. '.J 
I
, 
. ~ ~' 
, " 
". ~ 
."-.
'.-. 
_.<'~. ,~'~ .. ;.. "~'~" 
: ';. :::'. ~~'~.' .. ... -.. -:.';; 
.PUBLIC HEALTH'~ .WELFARE 
..' .', . r.~. : .. ',.: I .' I 
JiI ·1396a.""State plan. for medical aiaistance· ;,:,.: .,. :. - ~.~ :-I-~. ':-..} ... 
.+.: ' ..... ,' .... \ .. : ...... ,I:.. , .... :._ .'. . . . ~~. . • . 
'Ii
.. ;..; :~.' :: . I: _' .. : •.. ;.i 
··;i\.-· ~:· (a) Con~~~::,~:·;·.;:.'~t :~.:/~ .} ~~; :.<::': . ~' . :~1:.~: ..'~~ 
.' ,~.: .. ~ .. ~~ .~: ~ '.:' :~~ ... :..... ;;
';. A State'plan for medicallUlBistancil.must-- ·:i .. ~ 
: .. ;.. .. :,:'.(1) provide ~at it shall be In effect in aD political subdMsioils of the State. uid, it ~' 
.- 'administered by them; be uw~datoiy upon them; " .." ,' .::' ".' .,~;. '~~ 
.'- '. : (2) provide f!>l- nnanclaI:llai:t!dp.tion by the State .equal..to not Ies8 than 40 per '~: 
.,; centum of the non-Federal share or the expenditures- under the plaJi. with respect to 1 
which paymenta under section ·l396b of this title are 'authorized by t,hi8il\l~~ t 
and, efl'ect:ive July I, 1969, provide for financial participation by the State equal.to :: 
aD of such non-Federal share or provide for distribution of funds from Federal or ~ 
State 80urees. for can-ying 'out the State p1lin, on an equalization or other buis " 
.; .' which will IIIlSUre that the Inck of adequate funds from local 80Ul"l:e8 will. not result ~ 
.j, :'in lowering the amOllJlt,-' duration, BeOpe, or quality'of care rmd services availabJe j~ 
; """imdu'the plan;'-.J" .. :~~~ ·."::"..;r ::"~ . ":~' "<',':'J.-," __ ' .'.': "" ." • ~ 
.:j::-- .. ,(3) 'proVtdeJ'l!r~~tIngan'opportunity for a fair hearing before the State agency ~ 
.:; :.. to ID1 individl..al whose claim for medical assistance under the plan ill denied or ill E. 
not acted upon with reasonable promptn.ellll!.:. ;.~.' ,- ...".";.,,. ;,:c.~'·, ... : ·""c.••. M 
(4). provide (A) such methodaof administration (including methods reladDg to the ~
 
:-. eatlWliahment and.maintenance of per80lIDel standards on.a merit basis, except that ~
 
". the:SecretaryahaD exercise no lIl.lthority with respect·to the selection, tenure or lY
 
· '!:. office. and c:ompeusalion. of any Individual employed in accOrdance with· such ~
 
"<':. methods, and including provision for utilization of professional medical persoll!li!l'm l'i
 
.: '. the adminisfratfon and, where administered loc:aIly, 8u~on'of adlninistritfonof f
 
the plan) 18 are found by the Sec:retary to be neee!l88l'Y for the proper aDd efficient },
 
::~'I" operation of the PIan;:J~) for. !:he ~ and etr~e uae.of.paid subprofessional ):'

'. . BtafJ, with partieular~~pha8la on..~e full-time. or part-time employment..or recipi­
..... . . enta and other persons of 10w.lneOme. as c:ommnnity serviee aides, in the ~l,
 
· tration' of the plan. and for the .~. of nonpaid or partially paid volunteen In a IIOeialj
 
": ' &erviee volunteer program in providlng services to appl!eanta and recipients and in f
 
. :' 888iBtlng any adviBorycommitteea established by the State sgenc:y, and (C) UIat'l
 
',. '. each State or local· officer or employee ;who ill responsible lor the ~ditule ~of «
 
IlIlbstantial amounts of funds under the State plari; each Individual who· fonnerlyw
 
· 'wu such an officer or employee.- and eac:h partner of Ilum an omcer or emploYee j;
 
· '.. aha\l be prohibited .from· c:ommitting any ad., in n!lation to any activity under the'1
 
.... plan, the c:omrnission of which,' in cOnnection with any activity c:oneerning the UDited C
 
· '.': States Government, by an officer 0,' employee of the. United States Governmem, an ~
 
individual who was sUch an officer"or employee, 'or a partner 01 such an officer or ~
 
. employee Is prohibited by section 207 or 208 ofTitle 18; '., .,.-:~ .. , "~' J~ w.~ ?S
 
" ,'. (5) either Provide fo~ the dliahmeiit o~ d~gn&tio~'~i~ ~~ Sblte .~10J
 
'. 'administer or to supervise: the adminilItration of the plan; or .provide for thel
 
· establislunent or designation of s' single State ageney to administer or to supervise 
. the adminis,tratio~ of. the .plan,'except that the detennination ?f eligibility for 
medieal ls8istanee under the plan shall be made by the State or local 'a.geney 
,. 'administering the State' plan approved under subchapter I or XVI of this ehapterI 
(msofar lIII it relates to the aged) if the State ill eligible to participate in the State; 
plan program established under subchapter: ~ or ~ chapter, or .by. the agency,,1 
..,.. .. or aaencies administering the supplemental aecu.rity inc:ome program eatahlished 
._ r I 
I 
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;~ " ~iIl chap~':~i~ Sb 
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., •.•. ,.:,., (6). p~that the 
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': ..,:::: (8) providethk· aD i· 
'.. under the p1all;a.iaIl h 
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·Note·2 
w
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LIC HEALTH AND WELFARE 42'§ 1396a 
: (16) provide for inclnsion, tD the extent required by regulations preac:ribed by the 
Secretary, of proriaiODS (conforming tD such regulationa) with respect tD the 
"~'I'fumishing of medical· BSllistance under the plan tD individuaIB who are reaidents of 
'.
 
• ,_ :the State but are absent therefrom; ,
 
"k (17) exeept 88 provided in irubsections (1)(3), (m)(3), and (m)(4) of this section,
 
}, include reasonable standards (which ahall be comparable for aD groups and may, in
 
, : 'IICCOrdance with standards prescribed by the Secretary, difl'er wlth respect tD
 
"'income levels, but only in the case of applicants or recipients of 888istance under the
 
~;v plan who are not receiving aid or aasistaDce under 8IlY plan of the State approved 
~ 'under subchapter I, X:, XIV"or XVI, or part A of subchapter IV of this ehapter, and 
, v;with respect tD whom supplemental security income benefits are not being paid 
,; : under subchapter XVI of this chapter, based on the variations between shelter costs 
" (a,t;in urban areas and in rural areas) for determining eligibility for and the extent of 
, ~. cmedieal lIlllIiatance under the plan which (A) are consistent with the objectives of 
: ~thiB subchapter, (B) provide for taking intD account only such'income and resources 
f;~88 are. 88 determined in accordanee with standards presl!ribed by the Secretary, 
;~"lavailable tD the applieant or recipient and (in the case of any applieant or recipient 
{:'~"who would, except {or lnc:ome and resources, be eligible far aid or assistance in the 
';~.form of money payments ,under any plan of the State IIpproved under subchapter I, 
~!llE.x. XIV, or XVI, or part A of subchapter IV, or tD have paid with respect tD him 
t'')9I'lUPplemental security income benefits under subchapter XVI of this chapter) as 
,:lb:WOuld not be disregarded (or set aside {or future needs) in detennining his 
i!O·r.eligibility for such aid. ·assistance, or benefits, (C) provide for reasonable evaluation 
,it' of any such income or resources, and CD) do not take intD aecount the financial 
i3,i '1' responsibility of any individual for any appliCBDt or recipient of assistance under the 
'.•..plan Unleas such 'appllcaDt or recipient is such individual's spouse or such individu­
-1',·~,al'S child who is under Bge 21 or (with respect tD States eligible tD participate in the 
.' '. State; program estab1iahed under subchapter XVI of this chapter), is blind or 
,~,permanentlyand tDt.a1ly disabled, or is blJnd or dlsabled as defined in section 13B2c 
ir:~~ll"of this title (with respect to States which are not eIiglble tD participate in such ~no :' program); and provide for flexibility U! the application of such standards with ~b!",.respect tD income by taking !nto account:. t:Xcept to the ~t prescribed by the 
~..jl\;.' Secretary. the costs (whether In the form of 1IllI\U'BlIce pl'l!!ll1Ull18, payments made tD 
'~6,(',.the State under section 1396b({)(2)(B) of this title, or otherwise and regardless of 
~~latj whether such eosts are reimbursed under another public pr'OgnIII of the State or 
~!d . political subdivision thereoCJ ineurred for medical care or far any other type of 
.~nimedial care recognized under State laW; ,
 
~;:, (18) comply With the provisions of section 1396p of this title with respect tD liens.
 
~~, acljustments and recoveries of medical assiatance corred.ly paid, transfers of assets,
 
'<J'!..-~ and treatment of certain trusta'" ,,',': ,. : .. '. '
 
I 
.~\ ' . 
lib!.h$;' U9»rovide such Safeguards as inay hi! nece8B8l')' tD' assUre that elig2bility for 
~""eare and services under the plan will be detennined. and sucli care and services will 
~~ . be provided, in a ma.nner consistent with simplicity of administration and the best;l': interesta of the recipiena.; " 
~f1ir., (20) if the State plan includes medicalll8llistaqce in behalf of individuals 66 yean! 
~: .:. of Bge or older who are patients in instltutions for mental disease&­:!~.::~',;,i.'. (A) "proVide for havini in el!ed such ~t8 or other lUT8JIgeDIents ""!th 
if~.-".. State authorities concerned with mental diseases, and, where appropriate, WIth ' ." ..:.' stich institutions, 88 may be neeeBll&l')' for cairylng out the State plan, including 
,~ , .. arnmgein.ents for joint planning and for development.of alternate methods of 
..... care, arn.ngements providing llB8UnJ1ce of immediate readmittance tD institll­; t~t:;·~,../ tions where needed for individuals under alternate plans o{ care, and 1UT8Jlge­
. ~~". '.:'. menta providing for acceaa tD patientn and facilities, for ftmIiahing information, 
£
 
Im'~... and for making reports; :', J . ,." .... ~' .. '. .' '". .: . 
~ -"m)"pnWide for an individUal plan for eacIisiJch patient to usure that the 
,r. .',;, ,! iristitlltional care provided tD him is ill his best interests, including, to that end, 
,I',:: 888lIl'lIJIce9 that there will be initial and periodic review of his medical and 
• other needs, that he will be given appropriate medic:al treatment within the 
~'.' :.,:: , ,institution; and that there -will be a periodic, detennination of his need for 
::,,:,', ,.:- c:ontinued trea1ment in the institution; and :' ·f., . 
',hl:. 
Ii:,. 
;: ,1 
,: ::i 
i.::" 
(C) provide'for the development of alternAte plana of care, making maximum 
utilization of available resources. {or recipients 65 years of age or older who 
would otherwise need care in such institutiODS, including appropriate medical 
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',-42: § J396p 
•• ., ,"; " .: •••• '.' •• - ..... '101 if" ... ','" I.' -,' 
Acijustment or recoVery of medical 888lstance' correctly paid under a State plan 
'.' -, .•.... - '-":'. _'J.,!- IIII,.:. • .'.~..:-"",- •• • ~ ••• I: • ..... ',. 
(1) No ad,ju.stIDent orniearery of any medical asaistaDce correctly. paid on behalf of 
indMduaI under the State plan. may ,be made,·euept·that.the State shall seek 
.V'II4:ljuartmlmt'· or recovery of any medical.8.IIIIiataDee" correctly, paid on behalf of an 
IndiYiduiBl under the State plan in the case of the tallawiDg individuals: . , 
:,,:'257 
. ' 
, , 
 
 
 
 
.•. ' :.?{,:,<,~'2:?·:.:·/.J ...• 
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;,.'1 . ~ .;' .:. .t;.: -; . '.: '":\ 
- - '. :~.",::~!.": L~~ ..."~~. 
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I I ~ 
':'.42:"1 1396p :':'PUBLlC.HEALTB AND :WELFARI(
I ;C(A) In the eaae or au individual-described in· subeeetion (a)(1XB) 01 this section,~ . 
.. '.' .... the State lIhaIt aeek adjustment or recovery from the Individual's esta~ or upon sal~ , 
':.;"of the property subject to 'alien imposed on account 01 medicalllS8fatance paid '011 . 
· ~~.'.~~~l~~(~~~ ~ :-.~,.~ .. ~ :.; '.~; ~.~~:.~:~ ..~' ""t'~I:I.~I,:\ ~."..;' '.~~~"~.' .. J :".,. ·.~~ri~ .rl: 
., '~,:·:·.,,:(B) In the ease-.ot.an. individual who was 66 years 01, age OJ~ older when' ~H
.,:.1 :·iridiv1dua1. reeeMldnch :medical lIlIllilItanee. the State IIha1I ~lk· adjustment~_or 
':': :""'~:reeoVeiy'!rom the individual's l!Ilt8te, but only tor medical'assistance corisistmg or-~" 
· :....; -.:.;' . d)' D~:taeI1ity BerVices, 'home and co~unity-bssI!d seJ:vieeil,1 and re1Ite':l . 
· hospita1aud prescription drugeervi~, ~ ., ;: :.'''::. ".. ,1. .' .~ ...+., .-l.~~.,~~ 
"... ,'" .. _~i~). a:.~!.~ ~th~ State, ariy i~ or.eervl~. under t.~~ ~~te pl~~~~;
 
· . (CHi> In Uie Case ill'8niadividual whow received (or is entitledI to reeeive)
 
· benefits under awag-term care iDBurance policy in colllledion with wfUCh UlM!ta 0:.'
 
· l"eBOID'l:e8 are ctisreprded in the manner described in claUBe (if);ellcept 'as provideol
 
. : in such clause. the State IIha1I seek lUijustment· Or recovery tl'IIJJI 'the Ilndividual~ I
 
"..., :Jfty0n ~tl~intermedicalasaiBtan~ ~d.o~ behalf ~t the individuall~or ~~:
 
·-' " an ~ f!!. cmg-. . ~ sernces, ..[ ,' .• , .•. , " .... '.':' l' ",,".TI ,

'
, .,'.... (Ii) Clause (i) abaD DOt apply in the eaae 01 an individual who received medleal 
aaaiBtance under a State plaD 01 a State which had a State plaD amendment 
approved as ot Hay 14, 1993, which provided tor the disregard ot any assets or. 
~ "iJ .~:i ~!:~::".-'" ~1::~ ." .....":'~~.; .; .:~~;r::~."..... '. ..' :..: I ~':":',:: ~ i:,.
.• I .,. 
(I) to the extent that payments are made under a !ong-t.en:n care inaurano~' 
': ... : '. polley;';or '::).,:"::"1' .,:.": .... :~ :,' :'J;. ,.; .j..... : :", •.: -.I ';'," .. ;:l;i, 
(ID beeaase an indiVidual haa received (or is entitled to lreceive) benefits 
: ' :. ~er"loDg-tenDClIle~~poliCY, .",".' ",' . . .' I': .; 'jr': 
·....(2)-Any··icu~~fcir·~~·~der paragraph (l):iDay be'Dwlll only ~ ..t1;:.. 
....~ea~.~!~e. in~~':':"':'s.~~ 8~use~ !t ~y, an~_o~y at a time::-.. I.' .;::;e:,j(. 
.- (A) "when heliait JiOt;~ 'Child who'fa 'imder age 2l,"or(wftJi .respect bl 
States eligible to participate in the State program"' established W1der~ subchapter. 
XVI 01 this chapter) iabJiDd or ~ntly and totally disabled, or (with respect til '. 
'. . States whieb areliontigibleto participate in such program) is blind or' dfaabled II(
.:'. ;..::.~e1!ned m.~,.~ 0I.~ title; and' ,'I.: :' ...• ~•. ~ > ....1. ,: .• : ",~, "":IB' 
. . ',". (B) in the ease '01 a' Hei! on an liIdividlial's home under subaei:tion (a)(l)(B) ot this 
• -.-..i;.8eetlo11, when-=: I.ll;'.:;r...i. .I:i"'ul;,~:·~ ....;: ~J: ·l'_~·. ·;.~t:·~''Jtn .~.' _..<.. ~. '.~"L't'~~~' . ':"~:~h: 
.. .. .._.~ .... (i) DO sibUng ot th.e Individual (who WII8 residing in the individual's home tcf I 
~ ":. ; < .a..per1od·oI at least one year immediately before the date of the' individua;l's, 
'.::' , . .-~'tID ~e.,!J1edIcallnstitutlon),:and ,," '- ..." '·-"·'·.·:r .:: '11., 
.; •• • .. ' .... •1 .~J .... r_ .~:. ... .~. I'.. .' ., ,.' 1,""6 \ ~: - . - -,. ' .'i'" . ~~ 
'. . (if) no son or daughter ot the Individual (who was residing in the individu8I',( 
home tor a period ot at least two years.in:!med!ately before ItI!ejdate 01 .~f 
:. ." individual'a admission to the medical institution; and who establishes'to th!." 
....- . >i:atfst'ac:tioil:of the State that he or she. provided care to such iJtdiVidnaJ ,~cl!~· 
. permitted such individual to reside at home rather than In an !lnatitutioDl, 
.':';'. fa 1aw1UlJ¥ reSiding IDlIllch ,home ,who ~·.~~Y·resiQed· ~',~:cls h~me 'o~~l: 
,.:;'.' :·,·contlnuous· ..baaia sincet.he ..date ..01 the· individual's admission 1;0 the mediCld 
.r ..: iJUltiblti~, ":~;I-;:_-:?; .~::.".;~ . ;~.~.: ..:~ ~::,~ ..~':::,.:::;,,;:: .. : . ',';'::.:; .. ·..... i~; ;:. :~~!.; 
.. (3) The State agenc:j' shall'establish proeedares (in accordance with sl~dards 8J*li'
 
fied by the Secretary) under. which the agency shaD waive the applic:ationol. ~~:
 
. subsection (other·than : paragraph (l)(C»'>it such application III'Owd W'ork an "undl1~.
 
,bardship~ ..~~~~~~;. ~ ~t~~.estab.~~ ~..t:b.e Secretary.I.~.;,./ \~f~ 
(4) For piu,:i08eS Of this" iiubsedloD, .the term ."estate", With respeet tol. a' deceased 
.. individual-. . .;'"~'C:;~ :::: ; ,:; .:_:.:. - i·.,,;:~.·,1.:!.':n[·· 
: :,:: '.~:: (A)"sh8Dincll1de all reaI'and peisonal property and other BSBets included withiD 
'..... :: the' Individual's estate, as defined fo~ purposes ot State probate laW; l~"': )i\!!il!l 
. .' (B) may include, at. the. C?ption of the State (and a.tJall !nclude, in th!! case ~()a;m 
I • individual to Whom' paragraph' , (l)(C)(i) 'applies), any' other real and' petlIODid . 
'. property and other lISlIets in whidr·the individual had.any legal title or interest ~~ . 
"the time ot death (to the extent ot such..interest). ilu:luding'such aaselta.'conveyedJ~ 
a SW"i'ivor. heir, or assign' of the deceased individual through joint teUaDl:Y' tenanCY."' 
in common, 1JIU'Vivorship, lite estate, living trust. or othu an;mgement,:!:':':;Il, .~i!Ilt I 
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lLlC· HEALTH..AND WELFARE .42 § 1396p 
"aldIII'.1nto aeeoUDt adain tnuud'en.ot aueta ,':'~!:q 'ro' ::' ': :':" :, ," 
'(A)"uI'Ora~~to!inf~ttbe'ieqU:hi:iii8irti'ot tIii8"~cin'ror ~ ot seet!on 
'(8)(18) ot thla UtIe, the State plan must provide that I( an iaBtltutlonalized 
iduaJ or the spouse of IIUdl aD ,1DdividuaI (or. ,at the option of _ S~te, a IIOJIinatltu· IUzed IndMduai or the spouse ot such 811 Indfvfdual) dlIIp0Be8 of assets tor leu than I
narket value on or after the IDok-back date Ipecl1!ed In IIUbparagraph (BXO. the 
~'
'dual Ia lneHgible tor medfeal UIistalice tor services described In subparagraph .. I . : , . (or. In the CIIll8 of a noaiDstftatfonaJized 1ndlvldua1, tor the services desc:ribed In " ,) . ',-, 
'ngraph (exu» cfuriIlB the period begfmililli' on the date spec16ed in aubPIII'IIi1'8Ph -~ ..... ~. '.- .. ~ .........
 
' ', :.;.
,d equal to the number 01 mODtb8 apedfted !D mbpar8lt8ph CE).. , , ",: 1'-·" .':,'.' " .', ' 
U)The l00k.ij8clc'diie'~·iD!'Wi·~pii-8grBphla_ date that fa'86 montM i' 
I the 0I8e ot.payinentB from." tni8t!ir pOrtIons of a tnJst ~t are treated as lIlI8et8 
1ed of by the IDd!vfdaal purllWIllt to 'Jiarairaph (3)(A)(W) 'or (3)(BXif) ot lUbaec:t:ion 
this aec:tIon, eo months) before the'datupeeUied InClaWle (ill. ",.. :" . 
Th~'~'8~'~'~;cl~!;~. ~'~~,;::~,\ :.~,~;;;'::~' ,':' .', ' 
(I) &II Inst1tu~DAIi:ed Individual Ja.. the 1!nt date u 01 which the Individual both 
811 1n.Bt1tut1onalfzed in.di9idua1 &lid hal _ppUed tor medlal aaaistanc:e under the
 
tate plaD. or .....1 e'- """1 ·r..... ;,.' ..·•· .. J' r... : '_..~. .
 
(0) a iIoiunltitutloD&Iized '~uA1Ia"the date' on"whlch the individual applies
 
r medfea1 "ei-tance lIZldsr the state:P1an:or. I( later., ~e date 011 whlch the
 
dfvidual dlIIpoaea of8IIIIeta tor II!8I ~ ~,~k.et !8!,lJllo.... .; "
 
'.' "'he aemce.ll .deseribed 'In this subparagraph with respeet to 811 InatltutfoDaltzed
 
. lr'e the tollowing: :~ :::'; ;, '~:,:, "~.! , ..
 
"lm"NIU'lI1ng taclllty lI8Z'Vflle8. -- :' ;' , . ; ot(m A level esre~m ,811)" fnsUtudim equivalent· to that of nurinng ladllty
 
l'V'feeI. . ·~......... JC.~ ..... ... ,···~:.lr " ••:.. 1 •••••
 
(IlJ) Home or'CODlDDmfty·bailed lerriees tumlahed Wider a waiver sranted under "j t
 
b~ ee) or Cd) of sectlDnl396n otthia title. ;.;"~'~;:4 ::·t '!.~. :.t .~. :: . ~
 
I 
I:I!' ~ I, 
, P:. 
i,l; . 
1 
The semces dac:ribed'!D'W...ubparagraph wfth respect to'S noninatitutlonallzed . '~' j ~
 
uaI are aeivieeI (DOt lDeIudfq 811)' aerv1c:e8; desc:ribed In c:l8use (f)) that are I r
 
ad In paragraph (7), (22)i or'(24) at aec:tIon lS96d(a) of th1B title, and, at the option '," ,
 
tate, other long·term,care .88r'Yices tor which. medical, ,aasistanee fa otherwise 'Iir., 
Ie Wider the State jUA to individuala requirlng lang-tenD, care. • :'}lI'hedate-a~fD Ws'SubparBgraph fa the 1!rat day ot the tIrst month during .. ~kf 
" which aaaetB bIrv8 been tnnaferred tor leaa thaD lair market ValUll IIlId which ;li'l' . 
t 0«lJJ' In any other periods otlneUglbfPty under thiuubeec:don. ; ::" .... : ';~"i~l~ . 
j wtt!i~fe8peet to -~'.;tnstitiItfoD8lized IndMdu8('the:rnlimber ot DJOnths of :: l~tl:1 .. 
:uty Wider th1I aubpariiraph tor'lD lndMduai shall be',equal ~ . '., .';' i"i:;'- \: . 
I> the tot8I,"eumuIadVV' uncom"pen8&ied ~aiiie ~ aD assets ,tranaterred by the ':q~I': ~a:~:b'1~:7~ ,~n',~J,~.:,~i~,I~~~'-,~~. a~d In ;~~~i; 
m 'the avei'aie DlOnth1y:eoet to .private patient 'of nUrsing tacillty lIl!l'Yieea In Uj"'" 
State (or, at the opdoJl of the State, in the communRy In which $e Indivtdual fa :~~ ~#, 
itu~naUzed) at ~e time of application. .. ' 'il ;,~. 
lItb ,~"to .a DoDinstitutionall.zed indMduBJ,' the number.of months of ': I~' 
......F""w I., ;1~. ~~.,;~. ~~~:f~.-:!:,_~~~ ...~,:p~: ~ ,~~. ~:a ilf~~'l';i] 
J the tOtal, 'cilJlllilative' Uncompen.8atedviJue ',ot In _til tranaCeJTed by. the .~ j' ',j 
vidual (or lDdividual'a 'sPoWMl) oli or after the look-back date)ped1Ied In ',. j! 
)aragraph qJXll, dfvfded by . , , ,-" : 'I' 
D the average moutlll.y:co8i 'to aprivate patferit of nuioalng facility aervieea In t:'I·~;Ji. ~~~~) ~~~ot=~ th~ ~~ ~ wh,i~,tJ!e ~ualfa ~ ('~ n~ 'ot mo~tbii ~ ,::_i,_-s:.Wty· oth~e d~;i Wtd~ ~UBe ,'CI) or [I i111:1' 
- ~\,;, ~ to the dI8poea1 of_~ ~,ahaI1 ~ i-edu~.:,.:,:~ " ~~" ;;C~,",:~ . ',: .. 
J In the case at perioda of·lDe1fgibiUty determ1Ded Wlder clause (I), by the i;i. ,l j 
ber ot months of iDetigibility applicable to the individual WIder clauee (Ii) u a !~~ ~'I 
't of mch disposal, aDd .,',.. .. ., JI' 
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ivldual (or IndMduafs epouae) 011 or after· the' look-back' date aped15ed fD 
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(U) in the ease ot periods. of ineJisibility. determiDed UDder clause, (ill;. by .the 
,·;,.<.nmnber of DlDDtbs.ot.lneligibil,ity applicable to the iJldividual wul~ clauae' (i) as .• 
. _. u1t of Ch .1;"";':".1 ., . " ..• , .• , ' , ~•. J... I .. • ,. 
.•.•.; .. l'ell ,au .....~ )~::'::'-t ;~Il;:-. '.::5" "':); •.•. ~,iJ .:;;.~: .~..!.::': ri:.: )(r~:iL'\'::f(;l 
(2) An iDdMdual 9han not be ineligible tor medical 888IBt8n-:e by reason or p8ragraph '. 
(1) to the extent tha~ '. -<....:i ~;.:·~.l;'.·!:1ro ::.: illIl\·':.• ;.',.:~ ":" ; ..r~ .::':; f;;:';"~'::::':·~"'~;ii!.·:'L."j!~ 
'.':: . ;:'(A) tiie'Baset8tninsl~'wen;i. :h~mer'iind twe~tO-the hOuii!';wu trinsf~~ 
';:·':~::::'~I~:i::~~::~;~~;~$~~~:~~:~~::'~!~:;~~ri~::i '~S;';~~: ;~~J~!,;,.:t13~~~~" .: 
(Ii) a dWd Qhucb.individual who (1) iaunder age 2l•.or(ll[) (with ~ped;,~'~" 
.' .. .. . States elIgibL: to participate in. the. State Pl"Ogr'8ll1 estab~ed under subchapter' . 
.: ":. XVI ot.this'~) isblbld.'or'·permanentlY.and-to;any disabled,l Qr:.(with~·,: 
..: ... : • '"rea"pect. to'States wbieh' ani.Ji~t eligible' to' ~pate In sudl program) Ii bllrid,· r~ 
. .. - or dlaabled as defined fn eedion l382e Q,tthiB OOe: ."-. ....' , ':1 /":"'~~ ~: 
, (iii) a sibUng'oi'SuCb u1diviqUai'~~·ha.i'~~~ti.~~ Ili~~'h~~~'~!"'~' 
.' who was residing in Siieh individual's home' tor a period at at least one"year1f~ 
~a; ':.:::~ :::~~~~~~ ~~ ~~.f~e .~~~~~~~~;.~~.~ ~~~Jtl} 
. . I - ., 
. (fy) a son or daughter ot such IlIdMdual (other than a c:hild dlisCrlbed In .1 . 
. ' 'clauae'(b1) 'Who'wu'residfng'in sUcl1lndividaaJ's home tor'a peziod;ot at least~'~ 
two years immedlately before the:date the IDdividual becomes an inat1tutional. ~~ I 
ized individual; and who' (is: determined by the- State) pruvided eare to sUcb.ii 
. indivi~ ~ ~.1IUCh indMdual to reside at hoale,~er. th!U1 1lI',~ 
such an iDstitution or Cacili~ .'." ..~ .... L .:.;._~ "\"J"'."'~I I' ~ r ~ ...... ..., .... III 
al) the aaseta- " "_.>:-~ .::;;::-.: I" ;~i 
-: (l) wen· tnnaterred to the. iDdivldual'8 .spouse or to another ~or:. the aolI~~ 
benefl.t.at the IlIdividual'8 8pouse,' ". .. .. i .,~ '. :~:: 
.' .... :." "(If) were.~~.tromthe ~~~'~ spo~:to'8IIOther tor the 8OL~: 
benefit or the Illdividual'8 spouse,. ';' .' ;.~".i. :;';:"-:.: ":'. > '." I! ..,. :~~":i~:':;' '. :;I~ 
.......: .. :.: (iii) were:tnnafened'. to,·,.or.;to:Ja ,tnJat (Including 'a:Jr'Wlt described tilt 
.... ,.;:: subeed;ion ,(d)(4>.or ..thissec:tion) establiahed,: solely tor. th,!! beJ1efit"O!,;:.r.!JB:' 
.. : ".'. iDdividuara child deseribed III subparagraph- (AXti)(n), or ~; .;,...... I j ;~r.:-r:lE.'~b;~;: 
~ (iY) were trUaterred to a trust (including atruat deseribed iii BUbsectioti~ 
(d)(4) ot thla llI!ctfon) established solely tor the benefit. or an mldividUal under E6,' 
'.~-.:" :-years.ot.aae "w~Ojis;~~ (8!I ~~._in ~n .~~)(3~::~~_~.~tJE)~: 
· . :~." (C) a aatialaetory.Bhowing· fa:made to the State (m ~! withregulatioIW;; 
promulgated· by the· Seenrtary) that. (I) the' tndividuaI intended to· dispose- or t'Je
 
... 8111eta either a lair market value, or, tor other valuable c:ollllideration. (ii) the asaeta ~
 
., were tzanslemid -exclwiiveljr ·tOr":a:pUrpoBe'··other:'.than.'to: quiWtYl·tor.. inecn~~;
 
'. ~Ce;.or ~~1 ~ aasetB:~~.~;l;,I~:te¥_~·~ke1:.vall;le.~ve bee,e;. 
". ~.~~.~th.e~~~uaI:~~~~·:.' ,.,~: ....~;"_.::,~.r.:~ :•. ;~.~":·:·.'·:·~:·::;,:·::~·.t ::;'~':;, -.. !<!4f! 
(D) the State determi:iles. Wider'prOCedures ·eStab1iahed by th,! State (bflCCln-:i 
•. danee with 8tan~a~ by th~ Secretal'y), ~t_the den~rclt ellIP'bl:Iity·wo1ud. 
~.'.work aifundlieO'liai'dshipu'determined on the basis Qt c:riterla 'established by 1;!Je 
10 ·,'-Seeretary;······......~ ..~ IC ....._._· .n. J:;' ""~':~"';'~:'~';:ti',1 ~ ...~ ••• : ••':'•••. ~; ..~' :7;... ,:.~..•.•~;~~ ~,~.:'.~!.: .~. 
.. (3) for purposes ot this 8~n. bt'U;;'~e ~t U;.~as8~t ~..ti:i'·W;·~dividual.1n 
. .commQn ''lJith another ~'cin' or 'peraQU in:." -joint" ',~ey. 'tenaney hi' ciommon, ;91' 
similar arrangement, the aSset (or the afJ'eeted portion"Qt suc:h 8lIlIet) 8ball1be considered 
· to'be ~erred by such individwdwhen any action is taken, either-by such·.indiviCnial 
.iJr bY ~Jothe, perso~; that ~~eeS'or.~~~ Silc:h individual's OwnerBhip or contr!?1 h~IJUdi·.~~~· .... ·•• I.~.••:I,.•.. :.Ll, .. _~~_'l ,~,. ';'-' l~.~~~~~.~.;;;.~~~~~~:<~...\~~., ;~lrJ:;~~~;~~;/[;.~.: ;_.* 
\; ,(4) A ~ta~. (incll:ldfng a State which baa ejected treatment under EleCtion 1396a(l:) of 
,tbia title) may notFOYide.tor !I:DY. periOd. at ineligibility for an ~al ~ci~ to· tfansler 
or resources tor less than fair mai-ltet ~ue'eXi:e~ in ~ce .~th·this liub·iII!C':!on. 
..In the case of a tnnafer by the IPOuse or ali indiVidual which reSults fin 'a-peno:! of 
ineligibilitY tor med1c:8l'IsBIatanc:eunder • 'State pIaU for Such IndividLUl1, a State ilball. 
UBing a reasonable methodology (as speci&dby the Secretary), apportion such peri,MI of 
· lneliglbility (or any portion of such period) amOIlg ·the indi'ridual lIZld the indivUl.ual's
"lliIIooIIlJ' 
:spouae it the spouae otherwiae:bftomea elfgib1e' tor. medieal:aaaiatanc~·Under.the State 
plan.' ., ".,. ..... ... , . :_'. :~'.';' C~t:: ·;~:..:C::;'i ..::~: ;'·.. 7·.!i~.!·~ .. 
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In this mbsectl.OD,· the' term "resOUl'\3". has .the meaninggiveD such.term in 
I 1382b of this title,.without regard to the excIn8ion described in subeection (a)(l)
f. . . 
_.:.ti iaa~.~,.i::i:i Itt I!' ::!'~n~;',: ~i!.:":.c"r ~.::':!~ .; ;;·:.·.i~.J~Cr.'~~·~ '~f"':- fl ~~,
 
:.ea~ent··it~·amOUntl·.:;lj~:'I;.i'~~:;·:~::o ;.p~.~."1~r')·~i· l:i~;~"~ -c:~· .~}: . ,'.:
 
:' i' -. ~ f".- :-; . ,•.•. - ... :. 'i ,-' ('~ - .. "h ,:.:,...... .: ~':".' .. ' . 
For PIU'pOlIe8 of deteriilii1ing an lndivi.du81's eligibility for,' or amount o( benefits 
Ii State plaliUrider thiII'iiilbChiliterrilubject to'paragrBph (4),'the rUles specified in 
'8ph'(S) sluilI aPply·to·&'. trust established by such individual .•.. '. :. '..;, ... 
~'··fll. .' ·.;';(".~'::""'-':l .. : . '.... r"...... , .'" • t ':aJ.- ....... - '.!' .. ' 'Ir ~.. .; •• ' ." , '. --,.•
 
A) Fo~ ParPoses ot"tIWi- suJ:iaedion, lui individual 8haI1 be' eollllidered to have 
shed attuSt ifliil8etsOfthe Indivl.dual were WIed to form aD or part or the eorpus 
t:rtI8t iind illlliy of the following individuals establlahed suclJ b'u8t other than by
::_' ;..;::,-:: ' ~.:. 'l·.~:::~ "0 • : ..:i·,~ ..; .: . 
(I) TbeindiviciUaL" .'.' .. ;,., ..,...:J~.",.·~;~,·.i" ..;'.· ..<·· 
(II) ·'rbe·~·.~·~ '>:::~.;~$ :'. '.~. ~ :.. '; ~ '.' ..... :,. " 
(m) A persoii,"btclnding'a' eourt or adminlstrattVe body,with'lega) aUthority to 
:t in p\aee of or oil behalf of the Individual or the individual's spouse. ' 
(IY) A person, including any eourt or administl'ative body, actlng at the direetion 
"upon the request or the individual or the indMdual'upouse. ..C";· ... i .". 
In the ease of a tniat the cOrpU!l or which includes lI88l!ts or iIi'lndividuai (as 
lined under' subparagraph (A»' llIid IllIII!tB or any other person or persons, the 
'0118 of thhI' subsection sha1l apply.to the portion of the tl'II8t attributable to the 
of the individual .; :;':\;::".-::;:';::' ::.~: .., :, .•: .•.'; :,~:,·.I.·,: .:;·'.·:~: ..:i:··:! .. 
Subject to paragraph (4), this subaection shall apply without regard·to-=-:. 
<i)~e;purp0&e8 ior Which atZUst·is·eatabllslied; ': ::'.::'.: :Ii; .:':' '_.: 
,.~ ·f ., ••• ' •••• ~ •• '.' ' •••••~ .. I.d ... ".J. .. 
whether the trustees have or exerdBe any discretion liilder the trust, 
'.i....t) .. ~~ 'OD When.Or·,WIiei.hU:~~iiciDa ~Y'?e~.~e from the 
ust, or ....' ' . . '. . .~~: .:..:.;~.;~";~.' ..~: '~;J!J~ru l; ... !l 
.~~~:~~~~~.~~.~~!~?~~~~~.~~~.~~ ,-:•. ;";"'-? ;:~-~ 
A): futile esse or. ~Ie truBt--.: ..•. ';::~ .; ...,.~ ··"r.;,·.;·· :";'m;-!:'~:!. '.1;" '. '.;: 
(I). the eollJua or the t:rt*;8haD b8 eoJisidered reioarc:es available to the indivtdu­
~. ::'. ?J.~;r~ ....:._.•·.·.: .. ~~..:.:H.r:~....~ ·.r.: .:J i:Lil;-r::)::i ~J':' :::1 .:·.~.::~ .. !td :""~:':": •., :' .• ',' 
(m payments from the trust to or for the benefit or·the individual shalJ be 
,udered Ineome or the Individual,~: ~..:.i~·l '~.:.; '.' ::,;- .. ,,;-,_-<;"::: .-:" L"(m)· my other payments from the t:rtI8t Bhall.be CODSidered·asaeta disJlCllled or by
Ie Individual for JlIUl108e8 of subsed:ion (e) of this sed:!on.,..,,-::·.·· , 
In 'the esse or an irrevocable trUst- . 
(I) if there' are aiIy c:In:IimstaDee8 under ~hicli payment from the"truit -;,o'wd be 
~e to or fOl: the benefit or tbe lndIv.Idaal, the pOrtion of the corpua from wII1dI, or 
.e Ineom.e pa the .~ua. tJoom which, payment to the Indlv:idual eoul~ be made shall 
J eonsidele!i re&Ourees ~e~_~ ~divjd~ ~.~ ~L~'~~ portion 
. the eorpu8.~..iDeQm~::.J ."~':"':;b~u 1··'f~'.,··.. \·:.t":I~:.,ir""· I iii _;,.,: ••••••~ • •', .. - ..4· '1' 
. (~). to Or for the ben~t"of 'the individ~ M' jj!·.;:on.iderelftiicOinfi: or the 
. mdividual. and .··r.~"·~~:r o!"'!::Ii:-;.i·,-:'·~.:=-' :J.:'; ~ .• 1.. ~,;·:t;'·.-:i~'I· .~:'. ':.1 !.':,. . 
.. en) for any other purpose, shall be eoDBidered a transfer: of lI8IIetll by the 
':"buiividualliuQjedtil subsection (e) orthis'sed:ion; and ~ I:' ' . 
•• ~ • .;.:.j":. 'I-'~' ...•~ ':1; :.:.~ " " "J : "~'-.~-;.'"":~ •• ,,, , (ii) any portIDn of the trust from whicl:i, or siIy Ineome on the.corpus from which, 
\. payment. eould ~der ~ cireumstaDeea be made to the individual shall be 
.1lBidered, as of the' date of estab1islm:ient of the trUst (or. 1f·1ater. the date on 
hicli payment 'to' the IndMdu8lwis· foreclosed) to be:lI8IIets .dispoeed by the 
<iividualfor purposes of BUbeection (e) or this sed:!oD,·and the ~~:or. the trust 
lall be determined lor pu1P08e8 of sueb· subseetlon by including the amoUDt ()f Illy 
.yments made !'rom such ~on or the trust after such date. • " 
. . .:..a· . •._ '. _' ~ ~.: ':".0 ~tI ~"" ~ ... • ::·.!:.:.a.s ' :.: 
l'hilI SUbsediOD Bhall not apply to.anY of the followilig trusts: "';;"l. .;.,j . ;:~:- . 
(Al 'A triist 'eontai¢ni the 8B8eta' 'or miiIdMdual" under age 66 who- is disabled 
s defined in'section' '1382e(a)(3)= of 'thiii'title) and' 'which is eStablishecf'!or the 
'·.ohuc:h·lndfvidual by a·panmt.;:grandpai'ent., 1~.~.orthe.iDdMdual, 
'"I..."'tUt if the State wiD ~ all amoUIItB ~g!xl. ~e trust upon the,death 
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I t­
." ot aueh individual up to an' amount equal to the total medical 1lIlIIiatan~ paid on}:: 
. '.. behalt ot the individual \Ulder a State plan under this mhehapter.:.u:'·: ,.",,"i;' ,"l.· ..~.,:i( 
(B) A b'ust estabUahed in a State tor the benefit of an Indlvidlli8J iC- I .;., "'I"u:r: 
.. ' (I) the b'ust 1a compoaed only ot pen8ion. SocIal Secmit;y.:8nd o~~ m~; 
.. '...>. ~ the individual (~ ~~~ ..~me .lnl~~ ~J~. \:; ".~~r ...:,' i·" ': : ;,.;( 
....--"'. "(il) the State will receiveaB amcnmta ~ ID the tnst upon the deatb~ 
of sucll individual up to an ~ount equal to the ~tal ~: ieejet.in~.~ .Oil 
, . behalt of .the individual under a ~tate plan under this IIOhehapter. aDd' ~ , "1.' 
" '. " " ~;,,~ . ..: '., '.,i.i;.; .••. r, le''''''':l ~111 ,····.. t • 
.. '~ , (ill) the State makes medical aaaietanee available to lndi9iduala described bl 
.. ,~,' eec:t1on 1396a(a)(lO)(AXIi)(V) of thla title, but does' nofliialte sucll asslst.anCl· 
available to Individua18 for .nurmng' taCility' seivteell lDlder sec:tlOJi 
. 1S96a(a)(10)(C) of this title•. ', , ., ..: ;'. . . .L .';':~~; 
.	 ·.i:: "':' : ;'"\I:~ ,,:.!~ L •. , . 
(e) A trust containing the 8811eta of an Individual who is dlIIab1ed (88 defined h 
~o~ 1~a)(3) of this Utle) that ~ the .fo~ ~.~~~?~~~.. \') ;. I~ I ;.:~; 
(I) The trust 1& eetablfahed and manapf by a nonprofit aa~n.~ .,-"" ,.f.' 
UI) A lIepIr&te aceolD1t \a maintaiDed tor each beneftriv:r of the trust, bllt, 
for purpoaes of iJNeatment and JIl8D8Il!DlllDt' of 1\mda, the truat,' pools cbelle 
" ~ ...• :: :'.:: ··~:'..:r:.· '~" .' .. :••/' 'r;:: :.• ".: ..~:.; ·~ft~· ' .. ··1,~·a·~·: 
. .' (W) keounts In the b'ust an estabUahed solely for the bene& of Indlvtdalls 
who Ir'e dJlabled (88 defined In aectfon l3ll2e(a)(3) of tbia tttle) by the parent, 
gnndpllJ'l!!lt, or legal guardian of such individuala, by such ~Ddfviduala, .orbJ,a 
.c:ourt. ~~-.- .. ; ; "_1;:: I~::'. :".-- ..-:~' ;.-1. r",~'" 
(Iv) To the extent that amolD1ta remaining In the beneficillrY's ,lCeOunt upon 
the death of the beneftd8ry are not retained by the Ilu8t, th,e trust pays to fhe 
State from sucll remaining amounts In the 8CC01DIt aD amounl~ equ8l to the total 
. amcnmt of medicsllllllliatance paid on beha1t of the bene1lriaJoy UDder the Stllte 
plaD under this rabc:hapter. .' .. . . . >." . 
. .. . •.• ~. ,. ....' . oI" : -'.. ' '/' .: .' (6) The State qeney BhaII eetabliah procedurea (In 8ceordanee witb IltaDdards spue:!­
fted by the Sec:retary) under wflfch the agency WI1ve8 the applieat{oll of tbfa auheeetion 
with respect to an Indlvidual If the lDdivIdual establlahes that sw:h:.ap~t1on ~u1d 
work lID undue bardship on the tndlvidual 88. determined on the' ba8ia ot ¢tI!rla 
established by the Seeretary•• ;'. .' "J:: ~cl;'. :~: '~':1::':: :,~j ':' .. ..l!, .-,;;::{;/::i:i I 
(6) The term "b'ust'" Includes any lepllriaUmnent or devfee that Ill, sfm[Iarto a t1~ 
but Includes an IIInwty only .to:meh extent..ilru:Hu such manner' aa.'ithe8ec:re(~ 
:~~d~M,. ~.' ". '::.'.:~.::~ .:-~:,t 'i;;:~!:;;~;£~;~~.::··:,~:;~'.::~;:,::~~i:~r~{>,· . 
··:..~~.aeedon,.the~o~d~~applT-: i;•.. , ,.:: ".C: .,•.".--;... {: 
.:" : .. (1) The term "aaaetB", with respect to 'a:ldridividua!, . includEs 'BIl iJlcome anC 
. '.' _urea of the Indtvldua1 and' Of the \nd1vldua1'11 spouae; lncludtng:'any 1ncoII:.eOI 
reaources wbicll the Individual or such IndMdual's spouse ill entitLed/to but 'does no 
.....! receive becaQae of don--:· ',,::;;;:;,:.1::: ~'iJ.;'; :i~: ..,." ',.~: :c': ',c, ;; y'. I.. 
. (A) by the Individual or sucll individual's spouse, . ;.,:.:; .i",.."i:i,';:1u;} . . ' 
;: ..... ;':~'."... , .. ;.' I... • ~f. "J.' :~!"J~ •..•• ,.. • .... : •• ,; ~r'"I 
.	 '.' <B) by a peraon, incilidiDg' a" court or administratlve bOdy, .with \eg:' 
". ,authority to,act In place ot or on behalt of the IndMdual or' liucl1lndlvidual' 
-,", r., spouse,.or· · L ' :,,·~I: : ,',. :.-':' ,':, .' '., ,[ ::';, . 
..~~ ',",L ..'.::(0' by InY ~~. iDcl~db;g:~';;;urt' or ~ti;e'b~y~ iCtmii "t fr­
.r,; .• ··:direction or. upon the request .of the Individual orsucll Individual's 1111008' 
~ .. _>. ':(2rThe term·~come".baa the ~~ iNe~ ~clI term~in ~~~D·'l. IIf th 
.;. ·tItle-·... ~ ...:. ·.;7:~.~:~·.:!,: ':: ~.)t.~.: ::.,:: : '"":.:.-.~' ."':, ~·":~::':r;.:'~i. ~;-.- ;l:':!~fl:t:T;;'!~!·. ':: ..' ,:.I.;d~: 
. (3) The term "In8'titUtioii8iiied 'in~;''-means' lin IndividuaFWbo'1a':im: In}: 
dent in a l1lU'8ing facility, whola:an Inpatjentin a medica1ilUlWution and wi 
... , . ;,; reapect. to wbo~ payment is ,made ~ on a 1evel ot care provided in.a DIU'Bi: 
,,: facility, or who Ia described In·seedon 1396a(a)(lOXt\.)(U)(Vl) of thil!I' title... .. 
.: -,:::;; (t), The'term "noninstitution8llzed indmdua1~ .~eaiIa ~ Jndioiid1aI ~;'g a:: 
".:. "'ot the semeP specified in subeection (c)(l)(C)(iil of thIa eeetion,;.l.: )i T'li:'.·J ,~." 
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'(5) ·The tenn "resources" has the meaning given such tenn in section 1382b or 
"is title;' without regan! (in the case of an iDstitutionalized individual). to the'
 
·d~oii.described in subBeCtion (a)(]) ohuch sec:tion.:- ""r, '''~:' .~~ .·;:l' :
 
'. ' .' i." .• ~ :" ',,' . '. ;'•.J.' ., .".: • • •.' '.' \, .' . ~ I 
4. 1935, c. 681. Title XIX,. 1917. aa added Sepi 3, '1982. PubL.·97-218, TltIe I•• 1m). 96
 
'0. Iiod amelIded Jan. 12, 1983, Pub.L. 97-448, l1t1e m, •.SlJ9(b)(21), (22), 96 Stilt. 2410: Dec.
 
7. Pub-I..' lOO-2ll3. l1tJe IV. t 4211(h)(I2)(A), 101 stat. lll3O-:iO'1; Dee. 22," 1987. Pub-I.. 
" Title IV; .• 4211(h)(12)(B), aallDlellded July 1. 1988. PlIh.L. l()()...:J6O, TiI.Ie IV, § 411(1 )(8)(1), 
:. 800; July 1. 1988, Puh.I.. 100-360, Title m.• 303(b), 1112 Sial. 7~ Oet. 18, 1988. Pub.I.. 
" Title,VI, .• 608(d)(I6)(B), 102 Stat. 2417; Dec. 19, 1989. Pllh.I.. ~01-;l9" Title VI,' 
e)(l), 103 Stat. 2271; Aug. 10. 1993, Pub.L. l00-M, Title xm. H lS6l1(s)lD (c), 13612(s) ~ 
Stat. 622lD 628.). ':- :" : ..<. ' ,..,. " •. :. '.: :'::,::,;,;. ";" ..'·,Z .',c'-:b~ 
,U~~::'·' L 'r.·)",!,i ~'1~"'· ..; .... ( .' -." ~ ...... _ .. '~:I .'1 1.':... ~::,~~~~~.ol~~:r\G":\J"~ :, 'I 
'., .' ...••. -." ,-.,·.H,ISTORJCAL AND STATUTORY N~ ~.'.' .,,:,.~'.;t;·J ~:.: :.,..;./ '!. I 
n Nota and LecWadge Reporq .", ,: 
A..:ta. H.' 'RePort No. 1~11l uu:I 
Anlerenee Report No. 103-213 see 1993 
ie Cong. and Adm.. NI!WB, P. 378. 
- .
,1CIIW
 
Ameftdment&. Subilee. (b)(l), . Pub.L.
 
• 13612(1); lawred threshold age lD'56 
for iDdivIduaIs trom whom the State will 
1dlald estate recoveries. and expanded 
medicaid aenlI:es for whlch I"l!CUYerY it 
ougbt, IDcluding'estate reeovery' !rom 
'1"Ies of loq-term care ~ :. 
". (b)(3)... Pub.L.. 103-M, • 13612(b). 
~:.(3).:. ':: '.. . 
.• (b)(4). Pub.L. 1~. § 136l.2(c), 
~. (4). : . . 
"_. (e)(I).. Pub.I.. l00-M, § 13611(a)(l), 
'y rniaed par. (1). Prior lD the ameM­
'1) read u foUowa: 
'1,.....I'rder lD llleet the requ!rementa or 
1""'lrectioD (for P\IlJlC*I of III!dlon 
:-I)(B) of thla tltJe). the State plm must 
for a period of ineligibility for IlllJ'llinr 
avfcea 8Ild for a level of CIIll! In 1 
. .stitutloll·equivalent lD that of nuraing 
,Meea and for IIeI'Ylcea under sect10D 
of thiI title in the caM! or an lnatltudOD­
.JiriduaI (u d~ed in' panagrap/l (3)) 
whose IlpolI8e, at any time during' or 
, 3O-mODtb period Immediately before 
the Indtridaal beeomes 8D inldtutlonal­
'lidual .(II the individual fa entitled lD 
aMlstaMe ""der die State plan OD 8l1eh 
II the lDdlVidual ia IlOt 10 endUed, the 
individual appIfea tor lOch lIIIIIiIItancIl 
InltituUollllllzed iIIdlvidual cllspoeed of 
for leu·thaa falr market value. The 
iIIel/gibi1ity ih.aIl begin with the IDOllth 
sueb rl!IIOI1l'l:etI were trNuIferred and 
lei' or '1IlOIlths lD such period shall be 
he leaer of- ' : ...., 
So IIIOIItha;iIr " ,,: 
ii) the total uncompensated lIlI1ue of 
<IW'Cel! 80 tnDaferred. divided by (ii) 
J'3llll COIlt, lD a private patienfat the· 
the application, of tUlraini facility Ber­
the St.at.e. or, at. State option. in the 
jty in wIticlt the lDdividuai ia inatitu­
~.~ . ;-l.~T:•. • 11.;"•. :. '::.'r 
:, .. (c:)(2XA.l. . Pub-I.. 103-M, 
)(2)(A)., BIIbsdtuted ."_w" for ~ 
'. "(B) the'l'8IOIIJ'el!lI were lnnIIt'em!d en lD or 
~ (or lD aother for Wt 80Ie beD.etlt of) the
 
lndividual'a spouae, or (ii) 'lD·the lDdt9ldual's
 
dIiId deM:rihed in aubJlll'llifallh.(A)(U)(O);"; ,
 
. .
'Subsei .' .(cX2)(C)." PuIi.L. " , ' '1~ '~'."- ' 
§ 13611(&)(2)(0), aubeUr..ted -_18" 'for "re­
" ~~~ ~d~·cl. (~; ;" ~;,:~;:"',.;~ ..:' ..•.•.! 
Subeec.· (e)(2)(l»). • '. Pub.L. ... 100-M,
 
t 13611(s)(2')(D), pDenIly amended.- auhpar.
(I». PrIor lD -mment auIlpir. (Il) read ~
 
foDOWlI: : '~ .... ": ;: '~.'..:, '.:, .. -,:: ::'.:: t ~~'i:: ~J
 
U(D) the State determines that denial of e1igi­

bility wvuId wwX aD IIIIdlie hardahip." . -" " .
 
Subeee. (c)(S). Pub.I.. 100:00. 
• 13611(a)(2XE), generally amended par.(3).
 
Prior lD &meIIdJnent par. (3) read u follows:
 
"(3) .1D this subsection, the term 'izistitlitioD"
 
aIlzed IIldMdual' meaDlI aD individual who la aD
 
inpatil!Jlt in a lIursing faeility, who Is an izIpeo­

deDt In & medicIII lnltillldon aDd with respect.lD
 
'·whom pIo}'llWl1ls lIIIde baled on a level otCllll! 
provided lD a.lJ1IJ'IIia&. CI1l:iIity. or .who. Is de­
IICNed In II8CtioD 1396aCaXI0)(A)(ID(VIr 01 thla 
~tJS:~;~-~' ~~)(~).~;<,·;·~h.L:· '>i~, 
§ ·13611 (aX2)(F),: added provisIOIl8' relaIiIIi lD 
appartkIIlmeDt of period of lDelllibility amonpt 
apouaea.. ::' ':':'3•. '. ~... :" : . I~' :. ,-;-:'-:. ~.Il! 
.. Subeee. (.n.' PlIh.L. loS-M, t' 13611(b), added 
lIIIhaec. (d).' . .: 
." .•• ,. .! .:.... "'''._~', _ J 
Suheec. (e), . Pub.I.. 1lB-66. f. 13811(e). added
 
subsec. (e). ' .. -- . ·.i ,. ;.~
 
Efrectift Daie. -",-;': =:~ -:: .- ;-,.;.. . 
" ":~,,.::, : )- -.:"~..
 
".1993 AcU,' Section 1S61I(e) 'of Puh.L.· 10l1-M
 
pnmded that: ". :.. "!'.:-':. ....
 
: "(I) The -mnelll8 made by ·this iedion
 
[imendlcg IIlIbaee. (e) and eDiding 1ubaec:L' (d)
 
aDd (e) of thia sectiOll and amending leetfona
 
1396& and .139IiH or thla title]. abaII apply,
 
mept u provided In tbiasuhlectioA. lD pay.
 
menw ander title XIX of the Social Security Act
 
. [\hill. IUbehapter1 for olendar Cl.uarters begin­

IIiIli OD or after Oc:lDbu I, 1993. without regard
 
lD wh1rt.her or llot lIDaI regulatioDl lD cutY Out
 
. IIIch ametll!Jllenw have heeD promulgat.ed by

suclI daSe. • . .•. 
"(%) The ameadlllellw made by thia sec:tlon
 
(amending subeee. (e) 8Dd enactiDg subsecs. (d)
 
and (e) of this section aDd amendlDg sectioDl
 
, " (e)(2)(B)." Pub.I.. 1~.· 1396& 8Dd I39IiH of ~ title] shall not apply­~2XB). plleJ'lIIly amended par. (2)(B). ', .. U(A)' lD';'edieIl UlIiII~';"pr<Wid~rror IIeI'­
'.! ,mendment par; (2)(B) read u follows: "9ic:es ~be!!!re.~ 1. I~;';,:·.: . 
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.;,~....: .' HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
 
..-..
raeviatoD Nota and Legislative llepon. 
. Senate Report No. 97-494~;l .,82 Ad.
 
'~d' House Conference Report No.
 
(97-760, see 1982 U.S.Code Congo and
 
. dm.News, p. 781.
 
•..•	 i983 Act. Senate Report No. 97-592 
Jf~d House Conference Report No. 
.'97-986, see 1982 U.S.Code Cong. and 
.Adm.News, p. 4149. 
&:;i987 Act. House Report No. 100-391 
T(j>arts I and II) llJ\d Ho= Conference 
", . pOrt No. 100-495, see 1987 U.s.Code 
· 'COng. and Adm.News, p.2313-1. 
'. Y~"1988 Acts. House Report No. 
05(1) (II) d H C nf(\ol.; 100-1 , an ouse 0 erence 
· l~~port 1~61, see 1988 U.s.Code Congo 
. 1and Adm.News. p. 803. 
".. . 
;'. Senate Report No, 100-377. House 
Conference Report No. 100-998, see 
,. 988 U.S.Code Cong, and Adm.News, p. 
7J~" . 
'~1989 Act. House Report No. 101-247.
 
House Conference Report No. 101-386,

and Statement by President, see 1989
 
. U.S.Code Cong. and Adm.News, p. 1906.
 
I:i:l::'.
 ~catlODJI '
 
. :Pub.I- 100-203, Title . IV, 
'§i4211(h)(l2)(A), Dec. 22. 1987, 101 Stat. 
J33G-207, provided that subsec. 
'(c)(2)(B)(i) is amended by striking out 
"skilled nursing facility, intermediate 
· care facility" and inserting "nursing fa. 
Jl!QlitY. intermediate care facility for the 
'_ mentally retarded" in lieu thereof, and 
--Wb.L. 100-203, Title IV; 
~t4211(h)(12)(B). Dec. 22, 1987, 101 Stat. 
~133O-207, as amended Pub.L.. 100-360, 
ti I IV § 4 1(/)(3)(1) J J 1 1988 102 
00 l.lt e • 1 , u y, ,ASfjji.- 803, provided that subsec. 
•	 (e)(2)(B)(ii), is amended by striking out 
~ ~lIed" each place it appears, which 
-,amendments could not be executed in 
.....~iiew of complete amendment of subsec, 
. e) by Pub_I.. 100-360, § 303(b). 
• J:,.
-; .endmenu . . 
1989· Amendment. Subsec. (c)(l). 
_fub.L. 101-239, § 641l(e)(l)(A), inserted
 
-=-zgrwhose spouse," following "an inslitu­~oita1ized individual (as defined in para·
 
_lVaph (3» who....
 ~$'ubSec. (e)(2)(B)(i). Pub.I.. 101-239.
 
,f:64ll(e)(I)(B)(i), substituted "(i) to or 
~in (or to another for the sole benefit 
~ rill the individual's spouse, or" for "(i) to 
..tor: to another for the sole benefit of) the 
j1
~)"J • 
community spouse, as defined in section 
1396r-5(h)(2) of this title..". 
Subsec. (c)(2)(B)(iii). Pub.I- 101-239, 
§ 6411(e)(l)(B)(ii). struck out d. (iii) 
which contained material relating to 
transfer of resources to person other 
than a spo= for less than fair market 
value. 
1988 Amendment&. Subsec. (c)(l). 
Pub.I.. 100-485, § 608(d)(l6)(B)(i), sub­
stituted "period of ineligibility for nurs­
ing facility services and for a level of 
care in a medical institution equivalent 
to that of nursing facility services and 
for services under section 1396n(c) of
this title in the case of an institutional. 
ized individual (as defined in paragraph (» h . d' -"-- th3 w 0, at any lime Urtng or '.ncr e 
30-month period immediately before the 
date the individual becomes llJ\ institu­
tionalized individual (if the individual is 
entitled to medical assistance under the 
State plan on such date) Or, if the indio 
\idual is not so entitled. the date the 
individual applies for such assistance 
while an institutionalized individual" for 
"period of ineligibility in the ca.se of an 
institutionalized individual (as defined 
in paragraph (3» who, at any time duro 
ing the 3G-month period immediately 
before the individual's application for 
medical assistance under the State plan". 
Pub.t.. 100-360, § 303(b), substituted 
provisions establishing a period of ineH­
gibility for institutionalized individuals 
who, at any time during the 3G-month 
period immediately before the individu· 
aI's application for medical assistance 
under the State plan. disposed of reo 
sources fer less than fair market value 
for provisions. for denial of medical as­
sistance for any individual who would 
not be eligible for such assistance except 
for such disposition. 
Subsec. (c)(2). Pub.I- 100-360, 
§ 303(b), substituted provisions that an 
individual shall not be ineligible for 
medical assistllnce by reason of par. (I) 
to the extent that the resources transfer. 
red were a home and title to the home 
was transferred to certain individuals, 
the resources were transferred to (or to 
another for the sole benefit of) the com· 
munity spouse. or the individual's child 
who is blind or permanently and totally 
disabled, a satisfactory showil18 was 
made to the State that the individual 
4ft, ~ ,	 763
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42 § 1396p 
intended to dispose of the resources d· 
ther at fair market value or for other 
valuable consideration. or the resources 
were transferred exclusively for a pur· 
pose other than to qualify for medical 
assistance, or the State determines that 
denial of eligibility would work an un· 
due hardship for provisions which em· 
powered States to establish periods of 
ineligibility in excess of 24 months in 
any = in which the uncompensated 
value of disposed of resources exceeded 
$12,000 or the propeny was disposed of 
for less than fair market value. 
Subsec. (c)(2)(A)(JJ). Pub.I- 1~8S. 
§ 608(d)( 16)(B}(") d ed 1\. esignat eltistingprovisions in part as suhels. (1) and (m, 
respectively. 
Subsec. (c)(2)(A)(iii). Pub.I- 1~8S. 
§ 608(d)(I6)(B)(iii), substituted "the in. 
dividual becomes an institutionalized in­
dividual" for "of the individual's admis. 
sion to the medical institution or nurs­
ing facility", 
Subsec. (c)(2)(A)(iv). Pub.I.. 1~85, 
§ 608(d)(16)(8)(iv), substituted "the in· 
dividual becomes an institutionalized in· 
dividuaJ" for "of such individual's admis· 
sion 10 the medical institution or nurs­
ing facility". 
Subsec. (c)(2)(8). Pub.I.. 1~85, 
§ 608(d)(I6)(B)(v), designated existing 
provisions in pan as d. (il. added d. (Ii), ~, and struck out "or the individual's child 
I who is blind or permanently and totally ,. 
disabled" follOWing "section 
1396r-5(h)(2) of this title.... 
Subsec. (c)(3). Pub.L. 100-485, 
§ 608(d)(l6)(8)(vi), qualified definition 
of "institutionalized individual" to pro­
vide that inpatients in medical institu­
, ' tions must be those with respect to 
whom payment is made based on a level I' of care provided in a nursing facilitY, 
,
I 
and included within the definition per· I
i sons described in section 
! . 1396a(a)(I0)(A)(ii)(VI) of this tide. 
Pub.I- 100-360, § 303(b), substituted I 
I	 definition of the term "institutionalized 
individual" for provision that in any case 
where an individual was ineligible for 
medical assistance under the State plan 
solely because of the applicability to 
such individual of the provisions of sec. 
tion 1382b(c) of this title, the State plan 
could provide for the eligibilitY of such 
individual for medical assistance under 
the plan if such individual would have 
SOCIAL SECURITY Ch. 7' 
been so eligible if the State plan require· 
ments with respect to disposal of reo" 
sources applicable under paragraphs '(I) 
and (2) of this subsection had been. ap­
plied in lieu of the provisions of section 
1382b(c) of this title. -, 
Subsec. (c)(4). Pub.I­ 100-360. 
§ 303(b). added par. (4). . ,;. 
Subsec. (c)(5). Pub.L. 1()()...48S. " 
§ 608(d)(l6)(B)(vii). added par, (5)., " ;: 
1987 Amendment. Subsec:' 
(a)(I)(8)(0. Pub.I.. 100-203, . 
§ 4211(h)(12)(A). substituted "nursing 
facility. intermediate care facility for the 
mentally retarded" for ·skilled nursing'
facility, intermediate care facility".. , ) 
1983 Amendment. Subsec. (b)(2)(B). 
Pub.I.. 97-448. § 309(b)(21). substituted 
·who· for "and" preceding "has lawfully" 
resided'·. ~.( 
Subsec. (c)(2)(B)(iii). Pub.I- 97-448.:, 
§ 309(b)(22), substituted in subcl. (I) 
"can" for "cannot" and deleted from 
subet. (IV) the introductory word ".W::' 
Fifectlve Dates ._. 
1989 Act. Amendment by Pub.I­
101-239 amending subsec. (c)(I) and' 
(2)(BXi), Oi) and striking subsec:. 
(c)(2)(8)(iii), applicable to transfers oc· . 
curring after Dec. 19, 1989, see section 
64ll(e)(4) of Pub.I- 101-239. set out as a . 
note under section 1396a of this title;! 
1988 Am. Amendment by Pub.r.:­
1CJ0-485 effective as if included in the: 
enactment of Pub.I- 100-360. see section' 
608(g)(1) of Pub.L. lQ0-48S. set out as a 
note under section 704 of this title. ,\ 
Amendment by' section 303(b), of' 
Pub.I- 100-360 applicable to resourceS . 
disposed of on or after July I. 1988, 
except that such subsection. as' so 
amended, shall not apply with respect to 
inter·spousal transfers occurring before 
October I. 1989, and to payments Under' 
this subchapter for calendar qUa.r1ers be- . 
ginning on or after July I. 1988 (except 
in certain situations requiring State leg­
islative action), without regard to wheth­
er or not final regulations to carry out . 
such amendment have been promuJ· 
gated by such date (with an exception 
for resources disposed of before July I, 
1988), see section 303(g)(2), (5) of Pub.I­
100-360, set out as a note under section 
1396r-5 of this title. 
1987 Act. Amendment by Pub.I..' 
100-203 applicable to nursing facility 
764
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IDAHO SESSION LAWS 
, CHAPTER 61 
(U.B. ,No. 117) 
AN ACT 
~~~AID ELICIbILITY FOR HARRIED PERSONS AND TO PENALTIES 
,FER OF PROPERTY; AMENDING SECTIONS 56-20ge AND 56-214, 
1, TO COHFORM WITH SECTION 303 OF PUBLIC LAW 100-360. 
d by the Leaiglature of the State of Idaho: 
1. That Section 56-20ge, IdahO Code, be, and the same is 
ded to read as follows: ' 
e. ELICIBILITY OF HARRIED COUPLES FOR MEDICAL ASSISTANCE 
MEDICAID PROGRAM. (1) It is the intent of the legislature 
ing this section to reduce the number of situations in which 
regulations as they apply to long term care costs, cause 
~"~he destitution of the entire family, or a dissolution of mar­
'ried out to prevent destitution. It is further the intent of 
;isration section'to protect the community and separate prop­
ltg, insQfa~ch rights are not specifically preempted by 
la~l of a married person whose spouse applies for medical 
:e regardless of whether they are living together. 
(a) In determinin3 the eligibility of an aged, blind or dis­

I married individual or of a couple for medical assistance
 
, title XIX of the social security act, the amount of income
 
resources to be counted as available to such individual or
 
e shall be calculated in accordance with the community prop-

provisions of chapter 9. title 32. Idaho Code. or .hould it
 
I the advantage of such individual or couple, in accordance
 
the methods utilized by the federal supplemental,security 
~ program under title XVI of the social security act. 
Where both spouses are applying or are covered by medical 
tance, the same methOd of counting income and resources shall 
'plied to both spouses and utilized to determine the liability 
ach for the cost of medical care; however, for any month for 
either spouse receives a supplemental security income. pay­
or a state supplement under section 56-201, 56-208 or 
9a, Idaho Code, or for which an application is filed and sub­
ntly approved, the methodology of the supplemental security 
Ie pro&ram shall be applied. 
The presumption of the availability of income under either 
ommunity property or supplementsl security income method may 
butted by either spouse. 
the department of health and welfare shall furnish to each 
~ lIledical assistance a'pplicant who is aged, blind or dia­
, a clear and simple statement in writing advising them of 
rovisions of this section. 
CD The provisions of paragraphs (a) through ,Cd) of this 
~bsection shall continue to aeply on and after September 30, 
l?89, to married couples who are living together. 
i"', 
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SECTION 2. That Section 56-214, Idaho Code, be, and the same 
hereby amended to read as follows: 
56-214. AWARD OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE -- INELIGIBILITY UPON TRANSP t . 
OF PROPERTY. Upon the completion of the tnvestigation, the st. t: 
department shall determine whether the applicant is eligible for pu 
t .lie assistance under the provisions of this act, the type and amou 
of public assistance he shall receive, and the date upon which su 
public assistance shall 'begin. Public assistance shall be paid in t I 
manner prescribed by the state department. t" 
i!l Pub~~e-ass~stanee Aid to dependent children shall not. 
granted under this act to any person who within six (6) months rl 
to applying for Or at any time during which such assistance' 
reeeived l has either made an assignment or transfer of property f 
the'purpose of rendering himself eligible for assistance under th 
act, or who ~ divestsed himself of any interest in property withO 
adequate consideration which interest or proceeds therefrom could re 
Bonably be expected to contribute to the support and maintenance , 
such person and his family, except that any person who is ineligi~ 
for public assistance due solely to Such assignment or transfer sh~ 
000237
(3) proyision of this section or the application t 
to circumstance is held invalid, such invalidity 
not affect other provisions or applications of the section that 
given effect without the invalid provisions or applications, 
this end the provisions of this section are severable. 
1.
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IDAHO SESSION LAWS 
~",,":'~~d: 
a showing that such person has caused such property 
• or transferred back to him; or 
a showing that the person to whom such property is 
transferred has, subsequent to such asslgnment Dr 
subsistence and medical care costs e~clusive of any 
Ir support, of such person or famity, according to the 
assistance standard, equat to, or in excess of, the 
of the property so assigned or transferred; or 
S a showing that the subsistence and medical care 
ouch person, according to the department's a,sistance 
'bsequent to such assignment or transfer, equat or 
market value of the property so assigned or trans­
ility for old age assistance under section 56-207, 
lr aid to the blind under section 56-208, Idaho Code, or 
manently and totally disabled under section 56-209a • 
•all be determined by continuing to consider as available 
that was transferred prior to July 1, 1988, until such 
.lly accounted for under the provisions of section 
the social security act as such section read on June 30, 
ibility for medical assistance under section 56-20gb, 
hall continue to apply the regulations of the director of 
nt of health and welfare concerning transfer of property 
ations read on OctOber 29, 1988 to transfers that occur 
1, 1989, to persons other than to the spouse of the per­
S or applying for medical assistance, and to interspousal 
t occur rior to October 1 1989. 
provisions of sec~ion 1911 c of the social security act 
by public law 100-360 and further amended by pUblic law 
s hereafter amended shall apply as of July 1, 1989, to 
assets other than to the spouae, and as of October 1, 
sfers between spouses, e~cept that such provisions 
at have been fully accounted for under aubsectlon 
ny provision of this section or the application thereof 
on or circumstance is held invalid, such invatidity shall 
her provisions or applications of the section that can be 
without the invalid provisions or applications, and to 
provisions of this section are severable. 
h 27, 1989. 
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15·1·106 l:~It"OR.\1 !'\{OllATt cont 
I 1:"1·106, C..hoon v, s.-.. ton. I {}'~ I.Ltho .~;!. 
riJJ I',::d tj()7 I 1911I,. 
1S-1.106. Effect of fraud Ilnd eVl1llion. 
thp unnouti..d p4l1)' "'nd. ;u.'C"nJinel)". lin ~~. 
!Jon orrkmll '"ppropn:lll' ,~c:tion "'~lllrul U,r
Fr;lud upon th.. ('QUr1. p"rprlr:llo, of thl' (':lud· ..·u ;&\"lIil"bll! undu 
Tlm..hn..... of ;u~'lon. tiu.. __lJon. C..hoon \', Stollton. IO'.! :Idllho ~::. 
Ii:l:l P::<I riO:' 11~1I11.YnlIud L"pon du' C..urt. 
nil' 'lu... llon of ,,·h.. th.., ~n ...WI,. m3Y bf' 
l'1"Op"n...t for r...lu,... of 111.. p"tIIOn;o1 r..p,......,n· TIm..lln.... of AnJQa. 
loIu\'" oC :Ill ...ut.! 10 nou6' th.. h",,.,. ..nd \\1\..,... thr lirul.aavuntil\c :a.nd d"'tnbuw.1 
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• ."uld ~pplv undr, , \ ...·\·IOJ, r'·('OCulI'. thr C1llZlmrnnolnf'nl a(!bP ~ III 1~-:'6 - .. 
th.. l ..quII:", zn.a:r !n-.. l "Urc.. I,OIU o( 1.aC'Jl o( .,th,n Lh.. t'WO ,!",Ar luzuc.t.oft p'.r-i CIW" 
noUO' Dr f~"UI" to duel_ ,..1rY"nl IR(Dt'1ft,lI. I.a.IDrd .n u.... .....-tMwI. C~ v. s.,..~. 10'2 
hon .... (u»d upon U- C1lun or Idaho .s..::.liJ.J f'z.d 60:' '19ft1'.C1)luUIUl.l~ ... 
15-1·107. E\'idence Q.5 to dl'Bth or status. 
PJooof of t.-. __nt o( o.-.oppr.al":lJ)no' droomoood 'u.rr.n.al ot 
")'""'( o( lou' l"qulrrmrftU undr, ) 41· Inal \4 ralJlblwh a pnm.a !..an.. C~ 'or d<'<1Ar' 
1:...1'9 C'.annac t.. ~nr ",'Tpa~r th= th. t1'qlll"" ~ lhor brndia.u,.·J bwband dud "u .~. 
mrnu ~or "'l..:IbluhU\l; .. pnm.a f;JC1 .. ~..- of o"nt \4 ~utu tr 1'"»( o( u.. \UIO~"r t 41, 
dralh "nd.., Ihu N"C'1.atI. Tham.u ,. John 1.'i0J9. 'Thom.u v, John II..-Jl MUl. W.. In-_ 
lfolllC"«Jl )'Ul. f..f.. lru 1;... IIJ 1d.11'lD 9/;,741 Cd. UJ Idaho ~. 7.1 P.~ -::w 'CL A~ 
I'z.d ~J4 ,CL App 19!i7· 19t'\~ I 
n.... ,n:onzul.lon (urnuhnJ '" lhr -:;l..:I~' 
Purr 2. D£nsmo~ 
U·I·201, Gt!nl'naJ deflnitionlL - Subjl'ct to 3ddition.ll dc6nitioru 
ronLlinttd in the !IubKcquent ch.lpt('n! which lire :Jpplic~blt! to lfpt.'Cinc 
ch.lpt'-"" or ~rt.". 3nd unh:Jl" the contest OUlt,·N·i.~ roquir1."ll. in thi.II rode: 
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12' ·Aul:Trlcntcd clfLlte· ml.'3n." thc l."flt.ate describt..td in &C.'Ction 15-~!·202 of 
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I J' ·lkncficiary: a.." it rcl.lt'-'~ to trwt bcncfici.lri~.incJud~ iI penon \...ho 
hot.. any present or futurc inter!..,.t. \'l.,.k-d or rontin~cnt. lind 111Ao il,cludl'll 
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or any mOn! remote dCl&Ccnd.1nt, 
(M ·Claims: in respect to l'1It.1h.'S of dl.'CCdcntJI 3nd prot.cet.ed persona, 
incJudcJl liabiliticll of the dl.'('(,'Cicnt or protcdc.'Ci pcnlOn ""heLher arilling in 
ronlract, in tort or othc,...·ilM.·. :Ind liabilitit..,. of Lht! CIlt.1te which :Jri!1C at or 
after the dCl1th o( th~ dl.'Cl.odcnt or :J1kr the appointment of a conM'rvat.or. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The issue presented in this case is whether the Idaho 
Department of Health and Welfare may recover Medicaid assistanCE! 
from the estate of a recipient's spouse when the recipient died 
possessing an estate. The petitioner/appellant is the Idaho 
Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter "Department"). The 
respondent is Barbara Jackman, the personal representative of the 
estate of Lionel Malcolm Knudson (hereinafter "Jackman"). 
Jackmar. is the adult niece of Lionel and Hildor Knudson, both 
deceased. ' 
Hildor L. Knudson (hereinafter "Hildor") received medical 
ll'-'	 assistance ("Medicaid") from the state of Idaho for about twenty­
two months prior to her death in October, 1994. The value of he!r 
estate, after funeral expenses and legal fees, was paid to the 
Department pursuant to Idaho Code § 56-218, which permits the 
Department to recover Medicaid payments from the estate of a 
recipient. Hildor's spouse, Lionel Malcolm Knudson (hereinafter 
"Lionel"), died in November, 1994. Unsatisfied with its recovery 
from Hildor's estate, the Department is attempting to also 
recover from Lionel's estate. The Department's attempted 
The Department is mistaken in identifying Jackman as 
Lionel and Hildor's daughter. Compare Appellant's Brief, p. 1. 
with R. p. 6. 
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recovery is contrary to its regulations, state law, federal law 
and federal regulations. 
B. Course of proceedinqs 
The Department brought a Petition for Allowance of Claim 
against the estate of Lionel Knudson for recovery of Medicaid 
payments made on behalf of Lionel's spouse, Hildor Knudson. R. 
pp. 19-20. Jackman objected that, because the Department had 
already collected from Hildor's estate, its claim against 
Lionel's estate exceeded its authority under state and federal 
law. After a hearing, william C. Hamlet, Magistrate of the 
District Court of the second Judicial District in and for the 
County of Latah, found the Department was not entitled to reCOVE!r 
,_...,	 from Lionel's estate. R. p. 158. The Department appealed to the 
District Court, which reviewed the record and supplemental briefs 
before hearing oral argument. R. p. 175. District Judge John R. 
stegner affirmed the magistrate's Memorandum Decision. R. p. 
176. 
c. statement of the Facts 
Hildor L. Knudson, wife of Lionel Malcolm Knudson, lived the 
last few years of her life at the Moscow Care Center, Moscow, 
Idaho. In December 1992, an application for Medicaid was filed 
on her behalf with the Department. The eligibility process for a 
married couple involves the reporting of income and resources tel 
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the Department and complying with the Federal Spousal 
Impoverishment Act (FSI). Under FSI, the community spouse is 
allowed to keep various items of exempt property (one's home, 
car, and personal belongings) and a Department-determined portion 
of the couple's assets. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a} (1) (B). The 
institutionalized spouse is allowed to keep only $2,000 of non­
exempt resources. Id. 
Hildor was found eligible for Medicaid as of January 1, 
1993. Both state and federal rules required her, as the 
institutionalized spouse, to transfer her interest in all but 
$2,000 of her non-exempt resources including her interest in 
community property to Lionel, the community spouse, through a 
'tit"	 separate property agreement entitled a "Marriage Settlement 
Agreement ... 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(f} (1); IDAPA 03.05618.07. 
Interspousal transfers of exempt resources are not required, but: 
are expressly allowed. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(p} (c) (2); IDAPA 
16.03.05.693.01. Hildor and Lionel entered into a Marriage 
Settlement Agreement on March, 1993. R. pp. 63-66. The 
Agreement was recorded in the County of Latah, Moscow, Idaho and! 
forwarded to the Department. Hildor received Medicaid payments 
for her nursing home care from January 1, 1993 until her death on 
October	 27, 1994. R. p. 25-40. 
In February 1993, Hildor was found to be an incapacitated 
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and protected person in Latah County Case No. SP-93-0004. R. pp. 
48-49. Barbara Jackman, Hildor's niece, was appointed guardian 
of her person and conservator of her estate. Id. When Hildor 
died, Jackman notified the Magistrate Court. Then, pursuant to 
Idaho's procedures for small estates, Idaho Code 15-3-1201, 
Jackman collected Hildor's personal property by affidavit. R. 
pp. 67-68. Jackman paid Hildor's funeral expenses and her legal 
fees and then forwarded the remainder of the estate ($1,638.03) 
to the Department. R. pp. 70-71. Finally, Jackman filed a 
closing inventory. R. pp. 58-59. 
Lionel Knudson died on November 11, 1994. R. p. 10. He was 
not a recipient of Medicaid. Probate proceedings were begun on 
November 28, 1994. R. pp. 10-12. Jackman was appointed personal 
representative. R. pp. 14-15. Lionel's estate was valued at 
$40, 798.35. R. p. 149. In January, 1995, the Department filed 
a Petition for Allowance of Claim against Lionel's estate for 
$41,600.55. R. pp. 19-20. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Does Idaho Code §56-218 permit recovery for Medicaid 
costs from the estate of a surviving spouse when the recipient 
spouse dies possessed of an estate. 
2. Whether the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare 
regulations allow for recovery of Medicaid costs from a surviving 
spouse's estate when the recipient spouse dies possessed of an 
estate. 
3. Does Federal Medicaid law allow the state to recover a 
recipient's Medicaid costs from the estate of a surviving spouse 
beyond a tracing of the recipient's assets owned at the time of 
death. 
~W'	 4. Whether Respondent's attorney fees and costs are to be 
assessed against the Department. 
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I • STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This court makes an independent appellate review of the 
magistrate's decision, but should give due regard to the district 
court's rUling. Ausman v. state, 124 Idaho 839, 840, 864 P.2d 
1126, 1127 (1993). If the magistrate's findings of fact are 
supported by substantial and competent evidence, the findings 
should be upheld. Id. This Court freely reviews questions of 
law. Id. 
The Department has not challenged any of the magistrate's 
findings of fact. Appellant's Brief, p. 7. This matter presents 
issues of federal and state law. 2 
'1lI11t'	 II. IDAHO CODE § 56-218 DOES NOT PERMIT RECOVERY FROM THE ESTATE 
OF THE SURVIVING SPOUSE WHEN THE RECIPIENT SPOUSE DIES POSSESSED 
OF AN ESTATE. 
A. The Department has collected from Hildor's estate for 
the Medicaid payments made on her behalf. 
Jackman, as custodian of Hildor's estate, complied with 
Idaho Code § 56-218 by paying to the state all funds remaining in 
her estate at death following payment of funeral and estate 
2 The Department asserts that Jackman may not raise the 
federal question. Appellant's Brief, p. 7, n. 5. Jackman 
prevailed before the magistrate and district court and seeks no 
affirmative relief. Jackman argued the issue before both lower 
courts and may properly raise the issue before this Court. IRAP 
§§ 11(f), 15(b); W~lker v. Shoshone County, 112 Idaho 991, 739 
P.2d 290 (1987). 
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administration costs. R. p. 149. Idaho Code 56-218(1) states.: 
[M]edical assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf 
of an individual who was fifty-five (55) years of age or 
older when the individual received such assistance may be 
recovered from the estate, or if there be no estate the 
estate of the surviving spouse, if any, shall be charged for
 
such aid paid to either or both ....
 
At death Hildor had an estate valued at $1,902.30. R. pp.
 
59-59. She had no interest in jointly owned property or property 
sUbject to a right of survivorship that would pass at death to 
her husband or anyone else. R. pp. 152-153. Just prior to her 
death she did not have an interest in any "life estate". Id. 
All of her estate, after funeral expenses and legal fees, was 
paid to the Department of Health and Welfare within a reasonable 
time following her death. R. p. 149. The funds were accepted by 
the Department. R. pp. 70-71. Nothing of Hildor's estate passed 
to Lionel or other successors or heirs. 
Idaho Code § 56-218 authorizes recovery "from the estate, or 
if there be no estate the estate of the surviving spouse". 
Hildor had an estate from which Idaho has recovered all that 
remained following payment of her funeral costs. Idaho is not 
permitted under this statute to recover from the estate of the 
surviving spouse since the recipient had an estate. 
B. The clear lanquaqe of Ie § 56-218 preconditions 
recovery from the estate of a survivinq spouse on the 
absence of a recipient's estate. 
This case presents a simple issue of statutory 
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interpretation, which always begins with an examination of the 
literal words of the statute. Matter of Permit No. 36-7200, 121 
Idaho 819, 822, 828 P.2d 848,851 (1992); Local 1494 of th~ 
Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Couer d'Alene, 99 Idaho 
630, 596 P.2d 1346 (1978). As explained in Magistrate Hamlett's 
thoughtful Memorandum Decision, the clear language of I.C. 56­
218(1) does not permit the Department to recover Medicaid 
payments from the estate of the recipient's spouse when the 
recipient died possessing an estate. R. pp. 151-154. Because 
Hildor died possessing an estate of $1,638.00 which the Deparment 
has already collected, it may not further collect from Lionel's 
estate. 
Idaho Code § 56-218(1) specifically limits the Department to 
recovery from the estate of the Medicaid recipient unless there 
is no such estate: 
[M]edical assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf 
of an individual who was fifty-five (55) years of age or 
older when the individual received such assistance may be 
recovered from the estate, or if there be no estate the 
estate of the surviving spouse, if any, shall be charged for 
such aid paid to either or both .••• 
(emphasis added). This language is also reflected in the 
Department's own regulations which provide that "If the deceased 
recipient has no estate, recovery shall be made from the estate 
of his surviving spouse." IDAPA 16.03.09.025.15. This language 
is unambiguous and, as held by the Magistrate and District Court:, 
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does not allow for recovery of Medicaid payments from the estatE! 
of the surviving spouse if the recipient spouse died possessing 
an estate. R. pp. 153-154, 176. 
This Court has repeatedly held that it "must assume that the 
legislature means what is clearly stated in the statute. II ~atter 
of Permit No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho at 822, 828 P.2d at 851; 
Sherwood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 254, 805 P.2d 452, 460 (1991). 
The language of Idaho Code § 56-218(1) may only be logically read 
to allow the Department to recover from the estate of a surviving 
spouse only if the recipient left no estate. Effect must be 
given to every word and clause of the statute. Matter of Permi1~ 
No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho at 823, 828 P.2d at 852; Wright v. Wille~, 
1II•• ,	 111 Idaho 474, 725 P.2d 179 (1986). Since the statute is 
unambiguous, this Court must follow the law as written and therE~ 
is no occasion for the application of the rules of construction. 
State v. wiedmeier, 121 Idaho 189, 191, 824 P.2d 120, 121 (1991); 
Sweeney v. Otter, 119 Idaho 135, 804 P.2d 308 (1990). 
The Department argues that the language II or , if there be n() 
estate," is archaic and does not have its clear meaning. 
Appellantls Brief, p. 13-14. The Department cites no authority 
for this proposition. The Department refers to similar languag€~ 
in various non-Medicaid statutes of New York and Pennsylvania, 
but fails to recognize the clear meaning of the language in each 
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example. Id. In all of the statutes, the language designates to 
whom benefits would be paid upon the death of a covered 
individual. See NY Vol. Amb. Ben. S10; NY Work. Compo S 15; NY 
Vol. Fire Ben. S10; United States Steel Corp. v. Workers 
Compensation Appeals Board, 536 A.2d 515 (Pa. 1988) (Appendix A). 
All have nearly identical language. ~ In each example, the 
language is exclusionary. If there are surviving dependents, the 
money goes to them. If there are "no such dependents, II then the 
money goes to the estate of the deceased and "if there be no 
estate" to whomever pays the deceased's funeral expenses. 
Contrary to the Department's assertions, none of these statutes 
contemplate an "order of priority" in which part of the benefits 
would be paid to the dependents, some to the estate, and some to 
the payers of the funeral expenses. All of these statutes 
condition the payment of benefits to each SUbsequently-named 
party on the absence of the prior party. Each is similar to IC § 
56-218 1 s use of "if there be no estate" as a qualifier. 
Even if the Department's interpretation of S Ie 56-218(1) is 
plausible, it cannot be preferred to the clear meaning of the 
statute: 
A well-settled rule of construction is that the words of a 
statute must be given their plain, usual and ordinary 
meaning, in the absence of any ambiguity. Higgins v. 
Westergard, 100 Idaho 687, 604 P.2d 51 (1979); Nagel v. 
Hammond, 90 Idaho 96, 408 P.2d 468 (1965). The plain, 
obvious and rational meaning is always to be preferred to 
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any curious, narrow, hidden sense. Id. 
Walker v. Hensley Trucking, 107 Idaho 572, 573, 691 P.2d 1187, 
1188 (1984). There is no ambiguity in IC § 56-218(1). "A 
statute is not ambiguous merely because an astute mind can devise 
more than one interpretation of it." Matter of Permit No. 36­
7200, 121 Idaho at 823, 828 P.2d at 852. The proper reading of 
the language of IC § 56-218 is consistent with the Magistrate and 
District Court's interpretation of IC § 56-218. The Department 
may not recover from Lionel's estate. 
c. Neither the history nor the purposes of Idaho's 
Medicaid laws supports the recovery of Medicaid payments 
from the estate of the survivinq spouse. 
1. Idaho has historically not authorized spousal 
estate recovery. 
''II'' The Department contends that the history of estate recovery 
of old-age assistance payment in Idaho supports the ability of 
the Department to collect from the estate of a Medicaid 
recipient's spouse. Appellant's Brief, pp. 7-10. Nothing cited 
by the Department supports this contention. The o1d statutes 
discussed by the Department are not Medicaid statutes. See 
Chapter 119, 1943 S.L. (Appellant's Appendix F). 
Moreover, to the extent the authority cited by the 
Department is analogous to Medicaid law, it refers only to 
"recovery against the estates of recipients." state ex rel. 
Nielson v. Lindstrom, 68 Idaho 226, 191 P.2d 1009 
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(1948) (Appellant's Appendix E). All of the authority cited by 
the Department indicates that it has never had the authority to 
recover from the estates of recipient's spouses. In Lindstrom, 
the statute discussed by this court provided that lion the death 
of any recipient of old-age assistance, the total amount of 
assistance paid such recipient • • • may . . • be allowed as a 
claim against the estate of such person ... " 68 Idaho at 230, 
191 P.2d at 1013. Similar language is used in the statute 
reviewed in Newland v. Child, 73 Idaho 530, 535-36, 254 P.2d 
1066, 1071-72 (1953) (Appellant's Appendix G), which led this 
Court to hold that "our law limits recovery to the estate, or the 
real property of the recipient." 73 Idaho at 539, 254 P.2d at 
1070-71. Jackman has never contested the ability of the 
Department to collect from the estate of a Medicaid recipient. 
The old cases and statutes also undermine two keystones of 
the Department's arguments. First, the primary thrust of the 
Department's arguments is that the recovery provisions would be 
nonsensical if the Department might sometimes be unable to 
recover Medicaid payments. Appellant's Brief, pp. 17-18. This 
Court in Lindstrom made it clear that such provisions have never 
created an expectation of recovery from every recipient, only an 
ability to recover where authorized. 68 Idaho at 232-33; 191 
P.2d at 1015-16. Second, the Department has argued that the "if 
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there be no estate" language is only a corollary to the 
provisions requiring that the Department may not recover from the 
home (or other exempt assets) of a deceased recipient while they 
are still being used by the recipient's surviving spouse. R. pp 
20-22. This analysis is belied by the existence of similar 
delayed recovery provisions in the old statutes that make no 
reference to recovery from a spouse's estate. 
2. The purpose of Idaho's spousal impoverishment statutes 
is to protect the estate of the survivinq spouse. 
Speculation about the intent of the legislature in enacting' 
IC § 56-218 should not override the statute's clear language. 
Matter of Permit No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho at 824, 828 P.2d at 853; 
unity Light & Power Co. v. Burley, 83 Idaho 285, 361 P.2d 788 
(1961). To the extent, however, that this Court considers the 
purpose of the statute, it should affirm the holdings of the 
Magistrate and District Court. 
The Department asserts that the legislature specifically 
passed Ie § 56-218 to allow recovery from the estates of 
recipient's spouses, but the authorities the Department cites 
support the contrary. Appellant's Brief, pp. 10-12. The 
Department does not refer to any of the legislative history of IC 
§ 56-218. Id. Neither of the session laws cited by the 
Department refers to an intent to maximize the state's ability to 
recover Medicaid payments or to allow recovery from the estates 
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of surviving spouses. Appellant's Appendixes H, J. To the 
contrary, both session laws explicitly state that the legislature 
wished to protect spouses's estates: "It is further the intent 
of this legislation to protect the community and separate 
property rights of a married person whose spouse applies for 
medical assistance regardless of whether they are living 
together." S.L. 1988, ch.50, § 1, p. 74; S.L. 1989, ch.67 § 1, 
p. 107. 
III. THE DEPARTMENT'S REGULATIONS DO NOT ALLOW FOR RECOVERY FROM 
A SPOUSE'S ESTATE IF THE RECIPIENT DIES POSSESSED OF AN ESTATE. 
The Department's own regulations adopted to enforce IC § 56­
218 explicitly forbid its recovery from Hildor's estate. In the 
Idaho Administrative Code, the Department has adopted provisions 
for recovery of medical assistance "pursuant to sections 56-218 
and 56-218A, Idaho Code " through "the filing of liens against 
property of deceased persons, and the filing of liens against the 
property of permanently institutiona~ized recipients." IDAPA 
16.03.09.025. These provisions are contrary to the Department's 
position in this case in several respects. 
First, the Department's regulations reflect the language of 
IC § 56-218 in placing a condition precedent to recovery from the 
estate of the surviving spouse. IDAPA 16.03.09.025.15 states: 
"If the deceased recipient has no estate, recovery shall be made 
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from the estate of his surviving spouse." If, as the Department 
contends, the statutory language was poorly drafted and contrary 
to legislative intent, surely the Department would not have 
adopted essentially the same language. Because Hildor had an 
estate from which the Department recovered, it may not recover 
from Lionel's estate. 
Lest the Department claim any ambiguity in its regulation, 
another provision is even more clear. IDAPA 16.03.09.025.20 
states: 
Limits on the Department's claim against the assets of a 
deceased recipient shall be sUbject to sections 56-218 and 
56-218A, Idaho Code. A claim aqainst the estate of a 
survivinq spouse of a predeceased recipient is limited to 
the value of the assets of the estate that were community 
property, or the deceased recipient's share of the separate 
property, and jointly owned property. Recovery shall not he 
made until the deceased recipient no longer is survived by a 
spouse . . . 
(Emphasis added). No part of Lionel's estate was community 
property or jointly owned property or Hildor's share of separate! 
property. R. p. 152. JUdge Hamlet found that "Hildor had no 
'legal title or interest' in any part of Lionel's estate at the 
time of her death. Id. The Department has explicitly acquiesce,d 
to this finding. Appellant's Brief, p. 7. The Department is 
barred from recovering from Lionel's estate by its own 
regulation. Further, this regulation reflects the Department's 
understanding that it lacks the authority under IC § 56-218 to 
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recover from Lionel's estate. 
The Department's regulations highlight the important 
difference between the tracing of assets from the recipient's 
estate and a direct claim against the separate property of a 
surviving spouse. IDAPA 16.03.09025.03(c) and IC § 56-218(4) (b) 
define the recipient's estate to include only that property and 
assets "in which the recipient had any legal or beneficial title 
or interest at the time of death. 1I IDAPA 16.03.09.025.18 defines 
"assets in estate subject to claims ll to include only those assets 
"the deceased recipient owned or in which he had an ownership 
interest. 11 The Department is entitled to trace these assets that 
the recipient owned at the time of her death into the estate of a 
surviving spouse. The Magistrate specifically held that Lionel's 
estate contained no such assets of Hildor's. R. p. 152. The 
Department cannot make claim to separate property of the 
surviving spouse. 
IV. FEDERAL MEDICAID LAW DOES NOT ALLOW IDAHO TO RECOVER 
MEDICAID BENEFITS PAID TO THE DECEASED SPOUSE FROM THE ESTATE OF 
THE SURVIVING SPOUSE. 
A. Idaho is required to comply with the federal 
government's Medicaid requlations as a condition of 
participating in the Medicaid program. 
The Medicaid program is optional to the individual states. 
Under the federal Medicaid Act (42 U.S.C. §1396, et seq.), states 
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that subsidize medical treatment of the poor are provided federal 
funds to defray the costs. As a condition of participating in 
the program and receiving these funds, states are required by 
federal law to promulgate legislation that complies with the 
federal mandate. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (18); Harris v. 
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980). This court held in McCoy v. 
State of Idaho. Department of Health and Welfare, 907 P.2d 110 
(1995) at 112 that: 
Each state's participation in Medicaid is optional, but once 
a state voluntarily elects to participate in the program, it 
must comply with the requirements imposed by the Act and 
applicable regulations. 
See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 289 n. I (1985). 
B. Federal statutes and regulations allow states to 
recover Medicaid only from the estates of Medicaid 
recipients. 
State medical assistance programs must comply with federal 
Medicaid statutes in order to receive federal grants of money. 
specifically, 42 U.S.C. §1396(a) (18) mandates that state 
programs comply with the provisions of 42 U.S.C. S1396p with 
respect to liens, adjustments and recoveries of Medicaid 
correctly paid. The relevant portion of 42 U.S.C. 
§1396p(b) (1) (A) reads as follows: 
(b) ADJUSTMENT OR RECOVERY OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE CORRECTLY 
PAID UNDER A STATE PLAN. 
(1) No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance 
correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State 
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plan may be made, except that the state shall seek 
adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly 
paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the 
case of the following individuals: 
(A) In the case of an individual described in subsection 
(a) (1) (8), the state shall seek adjustment or recovery from 
the individual's estate or upon sale of the property sUbject 
to a lien imposed on account of medical assistance paid on 
behalf of the individual. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The clear meaning of this federal statutory prov~s~on is 
buttressed further by federal regulations found at 42 C.F.R. 
433.36 (h). The relevant portion of these regulations reads as 
follows: 
(h) Adjustments and a recoveries. (1) The agency may make 
an adjustment or recover funds for Medicaid claims correctly 
paid for an individual as follows: 
(i) From the estate of any individual who was 65 years or 
older when he or she received Medicaid; and . • . 
(Emphasis added.) 
Neither 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) 's plain language nor that of 
the regulations state that recovery may be made from the estate 
of a surviving spouse. To the contrary, the plain wording of 42 
u.s.C. § 1396p(b) and 42 C.F.R. 433.36 (h) allow for recovery 
only from the estate of the recipient (individual). Congress 
has provided that recovery of Medicaid costs can only be made 
from the estate of the individual/recipient. 
The united states Supreme Court in K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier. 
Inc.,	 486 U.S. 281, 291-192 (1988) stated that 
"[i]f the statute is clear and unambiguous, such language 
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must be regarded as conclusive, and 'that is the end of the 
matter, for the court, as well as the agency, must give 
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress'" 
(Quoting Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
467 U.S. 837, 842-843 (1984)). The federal statute expressly 
limits the recovery authority of the Department. Even if the 
State of Idaho has authority not preempted by the federal 
statute, IC § 56-218 should be interpreted to not conflict with 
the clear language of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b). 
C. Congress specifically rejected legislation that would 
have allowed Idaho to recover from the estates of surviving 
spouses of Medicaid recipients. 
Congress specifically rejected a provision in the federal 
law that would have allowed states to recover from the estate of 
~~~	 a surviving spouses. This proposed legislation, which was 
rejected, was part of the 1993 Omnibus Reconciliation Act (OBRA) 
which contained amendments to the Medicaid recovery statutes and 
was passed in August 1993. See, H.R. Rep. No. 103-111, 103rd 
Cong., 1st Sess., 208 (May 15, 1993) reprinted in 1993 U.S. Code 
Congo & Admin. News 535.
 
The language rejected read as follows:
 
•.• (c) (i) The program provides for the collection 
consistent with paragraph (3) of the amount not to exceed 
the amount described in clause (ii) from 
(i) the estate of the individual; 
(ii) in the case of an individual described in 
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subparagraphs (B) (ii) from the estate of the surviving 
spouse; or ... 
Subparagraph (B) (ii) refers to an individual who receives 
nursing home or other long term care services and is married at 
the time of receipt of said care. It reads as follows: 
(ii) in the case of such an individual who was married at 
the time of death, when the surviving spouse dies. 
This statute would have clearly authorized states to recover 
from the estate of a surviving spouse. Congress could have made: 
this authorization mandatory or optional. Congress obviously 
knew the issue. Instead the final bill allows only for recovery 
from the estate of the recipient of Medicaid. 
D. courts have limited states's ability to recover 
Medicaid payments from the estates of surviving spouses to 
the tracing of assets owned by the recipient at the time of 
her death. 
Federal statutes regarding recovery of Medicaid from estates 
have been in place since 1965. The vast majority of the language 
these statutes have not changed since originally enacted. l,ittle 
litigation occurred in this area, however, because it has only 
been since OBRA 1993 that states have been required to have 
recovery programs. The 1993 amendments also expanded the ability 
of states to trace assets of recipients that transfer to spouses 
upon the death of the recipient. In several recent decisions, 
courts have held that states may only recover Medicaid payments 
from the estates of recipients and traceable assets in which the 
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recipient had an interest at the time of her death. 
In the Matter of Estate of Budney, 541 N.W.2d 245 (Wis. App. 
1995), the Department of Social and Health Services for the State 
of Wisconsin made a claim to recover it's Medicaid costs from the 
estate of the surviving spouse of a Medicaid recipient. R. pp. 
112-114. The Court of Appeals held that the state statute 
authorizing recovery of medical assistance benefits from the 
surviving spouse's estate exceeded the authority provided b~' the. 
federal Medicaid statutes. The Budney Court held: 
Because the statute does not counter the initial blanket 
prohibition by specifically authorizing a State to recover 
medical assistance benefits paid on behalf of a recipient 
from a surviving spouse's estate, we conclude that § 
49.496(3) (a), STATS., which allows such recovery, exceeds 
the authority provided by the federal statute. Accord 
Matter of Estate of Craig, 82 N.Y. 2d 388, 604 N.Y.S. 2d 
908, 624 N.E. 2d 1003 (1993) (Federal law does not expressly 
provide for recovery of Medicaid payments on behalf of a 
predeceased spouse from the secondarily dying spouse's 
estate) . 
R. p. 114. 
The logic of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals' decision i.s 
supported by the united states Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit's holdings in Bucholtz v. Belshe, 114 F.3d 923 (9th cir. 
1997) and citizen's Action League v. Kizer, 887 F.3d 1003 (9th 
Cir. 1989). Although both cases concern the interpretation of 
the term "estate" in the pre-1993 federal Medicaid statute, the 
relevant portion of both decisions is not changed by the 
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substance of the 1993 amendments. 
The Ninth circuit rulings make clear that "under 42 U.S.C. § 
1396p(b) (1), states •.. may not recover medical assistance 
amounts 'correctly paid on behalf of an individual' except, as 
relevant here, 'from bis estate.'" Bucholtz, 114 F.3d at 925 
(emphasis added). Federal Medicaid law expressly limits "a 
participating state's ability to recoup benefits." Kizer, 887 
F.2d at 1006. To the extent a state statute "seeks to reach 
further than § 1396p(b) (1), it cannot stand." Bucholtz, 114 F.3d 
at 925. 
In both cases, the Ninth Circuit held that, under the then 
existing definition of estate in the federal statute, the 
"II~"	 California Department of Health Services could not recover 
Medicaid payments from recipient's property held in the form of 
revocable inter vivos trusts. Bucholtz, 114 F.3d at 928; Kizer, 
887 F.2d at 1008. The 1993 amendments expanded the definition of 
"estate" to allow states to recover a broader range of assets in 
which the recipient had an ownership interest at the time of 
death. The 1993 amendments did not make any additional 
provisions for recovery from the estates of surviving spouses, 
except for the tracing of property interests of the recipient 
which transferred to the spouse upon the recipient's death (i.e. 
community property, joint tenancy, and property held as a tenant 
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in common.) 
Recent United States District Court opinions confirm that 
states may trace assets the recipient owned at the time of her 
death, but may not make any other recovery from the estates of 
surviving spouses. In Demille v. Belshe, 1994 WL 519457 (N.D. 
Cal. 1994) (R. pp. 127-142), the United states District Court for 
the North District of California explained: 
The federal statute allows the state to recoup its expenses 
only from those persons who are holding real or personal 
property in which the deceased recipient held a legal 
interest at the time of death. See [42 U.S.C. §] 
1396p(b) (1) (requiring state to recover from decedent's 
"estate") and § 1396p(b) (4) (defining "estate"). The amount 
of expenses the state may recover from such persons is 
capped by the amount of decedent's interest in the property. 
§ 1396p(b) (4). In otber words, the federal statute only 
contemplates tbat tbe deceased recipient's assets will be 
traced, not tbat other persons can become liable to pay over 
tbeir own assets. 
R. p. 133 (emphasis added). 
V. FAIRNESS AND REASON DENY THE DEPARTMENT'S CLAIM TO RECOVER 
MEDICAID PAYMENTS FROM THE ESTATES OF BOTH RECIPIENTS AND 
SURVIVING SPOUSES. 
The Magistrate and District Court's holdings preserve the 
ability of the Department to recover Medicaid payments from 
recipient's estates, while preserving the integrity of the 
surviving spouse's property rights. The Departments objections, 
even if persuasive, are almost purely policy arguments which are 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 23 
....,,,
 
000270
'1,--",' 
'111101'" 
  
h
h h
h
h
not so compelling as to overcome the language of the statute: 
This Court has stated that when the language of a statute is 
definite, courts must give effect to that meaning whether or 
not the legislature anticipated the statute's result. Uni1~ 
Light & Power Co. v. Burley, 83 Idaho 285, 361 P.2d 788 
(1961). Moreover, "the wisdom, justice, policy, or 
expediency of a statute are questions for the Legislature 
alone. . . . It is the duty of the courts to interpret the 
meaning of legislative enactments without regard to the 
possible results." Berry v. Koehler, 84 Idaho 170, 369 P.2d 
1010 (1962). 
Matter	 of Permit No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho at 824, 828 P.2d at 853. 
A. Jackman and the Knudsons have acted in qood faith and 
in accordance with the law. 
The Department's ad hominem attacks on Jackman and the 
Knudsons should not credited. Appellant's Brief, pp. 16-18. The 
insinuations are false and the arguments are newly raised on 
.,,_.	 appeal. The Department has never previously questioned the 
legality of the Marriage Settlement Agreement, Hildor's 
application and eligibility for Medicaid, Jackman's management of 
Hildor's estate, or Jackman's management of Lionel's estate. 
Hildor and Lionel's estates have been managed in strict 
accordance with state law and the Department's regulations. 
The Department has admitted that the Marriage Settlement 
Agreement between Hildor and Lionel was not only legal and 
proper, but required by law. Appellant's Brief, pp. 2-3. Any 
and all interspousal transfers are permitted by Medicaid. 42 
U.S.C.	 § 1396p(c) (2) (C). Further, federal and Idaho law require 
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the institutionalized spouse to transfer her interest in all but: 
$2,000 of non-exempt resources to the community spouse followinSr 
the state's agency finding Medicaid eligibility or lose Medicaid 
eligibility. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(f) (1) and IDAPA 03.05618.07. 
IDAPA 03.05618.07 reads in part: 
... The long-term care spouse must state in writing, his 
intent to transfer the resources to the community spouse, 
within the protected period, before he can be Medicaid 
eligible ..... Resources not transferred to the community 
spouse by the end of the sixty (60) day protected period are 
counted available to the long-term care spouse, toward the 
two thousand dollar ($2,000) resource limit, effective the 
date of entry into the facility. 
The Department, having required Hildor and Lionel to enter into 
the Marriage Settlement Agreement, should not now castigate them 
for doing so. 
The Department contradicts itself in casting aspersions on 
Jackman's management of Hildor's estate after recognizing that 
she acted ethically and legally. Compare Appellant's Brief, pp. 
2-4 with Appellant's Brief, pp. 16-17. Jackman was legally 
appointed Hildor's guardian and conservator prior to her death. 
R. pp. 60-62. The Magistrate specifically found that Jackman 
properly and legally collected and distributed Hildor's estate. 
R. p. 149. It is absurd to suggest that Jackman was not acting 
for Hildor's estate in reimbursing the Department for Medicaid 
payments made on Hildor's behalf. Payment was tendered to the 
Department because it was entitled to recover from Hildor's 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 25 
000272
 
 
estate	 under IC § 56-218. 
The Department's contention that Jackman "manipulated" the 
Knudson's estates is irrelevant. The Magistrate concluded that 
Jackman was able to pay Hildor's debt to the Department because 
she did not use the statutory allowances to drain the value of 
Hildor's estate into Lionel's estate. If the Department were not 
set on collecting from Lionel's estate, it might commend, rather 
than condemn, the actions of personal representatives that 
provide for the reimbursement of Medicaid payments from the 
estate of the recipient. The United states Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit recently held that there is IInothing sinister" 
in people lIutilizing the options that our sophisticate system of 
"IIIi"	 property law" makes available to Medicaid recipients and their 
spouses to protect their estates. Bucholtz, 114 F.3d at 928. 
See also Kizer, 887 F.2d at 1008 ("Congress wanted to encourage" 
the shielding of assets from recovery by use of joint tenancy 
and, even if such action is taken "merely for reasons of 
'shrewdness,' there is nothing improper or inappropriate.") 
B. The Department's ability to achieve reasonably expected 
recovery of Medicaid payments does not require confiscatin~l 
spousels estates. 
Medicaid is a medical assistance program for low income 
members of our community. There is almost always a significant 
spend down depleting both community and separate property 
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resources prior to a spouse being found financially eligible for 
Medicaid. Potential recipients are required to private pay for 
their care costs that arise during the spend down period. Both 
federal and state law require the transfer of assets to the 
community spouse as a condition of the receipt of Medicaid. 
The result of the eligibility process is that once Medicaid 
eligibility is reached the state's expectation of there being an 
estate of any substance to recover from is small. The reality i.s 
an expectation to recover from the recipient's personal needs 
account (the up to $2,000 personal exemption) and any interest 
the recipient retained in her home, if any. There is really very 
little else the recipient can legally possess and be eligible for 
Medicaid. The eligibility rules established by Congress and the~ 
state purposefully and intentionally limit the value of the 
recipient's estate. Certainly Idahors legislators anticipated 
the de minimis nature and value of the recipient's estate and 
enacted legislation with this in mind as reflected in I.C. § 56-­
218 (1) . 
The Department's arguments about the amount it could expect 
to recover from a recipient's estate are contradictory and 
confused. The Department has argued that every recipient wi.ll 
have an estate, but that it will be insignificant. Appellant's 
Brief, p. 13. It has also argued that, because recipient's 
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estates will normally "pass automatically to the surviving 
spouse," there will never be a recipient's estate. Appellant's 
Brief, p. 15. It has also argued that single recipients and 
recipients without estate planning will leave substantial estates 
for recovery. Appellant's Brief, pp. 17-18. Whichever of theSE! 
arguments is accurate, if any are, the Department has given no 
reason for this Court to conclude that the legislature did not 
foresee and desire this result. 
The Department's arguments about the potential for abuse of 
the recovery provisions and the effect upon those who do not plan 
their estates are similarly ineffectual. The legislature in 
passing the spousal impoverishment provisions enunciated a clear 
'11'" preference for the preservation of recipients' marriages. 
Although the Department worries that the proper interpretation of 
IC § 56-218 may encourage fraudulent marriages, it overlooks the 
impact that its interpretation of the statute may have in 
encouraging divorces to protect the separate estates of spouses 
from recovery. similarly, many state laws, including the areas 
of probate and taxation, have different effects on those who do 
or do not plan their estates. The Ninth Circuit recognized this 
fact and dismissed its importance in Bucholtz: 
[PJeople who engage in proper estate planning often achieve 
results different from, and better than, those obtained by 
those unwilling or unable to do so. Those results often 
flow from the form of holding title to property. 
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114 F.3d at 928. 
C. The vast majority of Idaho's sister states do not 
attempt to recover Medicaid payments from the estates of 
surviving spouses. 
The premise of the Department's arguments is that a Medicaid 
recovery statute is absurd if it does not provide for recovery 
from the estates of surviving spouses. Not only is this premiSE! 
unfounded and contrary to the clear language of the statute, but. 
it is also contrary to the judgment of the overwhelming number clf 
Idaho's sister states that do include surviving spouse I s est~ates 
in their Medicaid recovery scheme. 
All states participating in the Medicaid program have some 
type of program to recover Medicaid payments from recipient's 
estates. The overwhelming majority of these states make no 
provision for recovery from the estate of the recipients 
spouse. 3 Alaska stat. § 47.07.055 (1996); Ark. Code Ann. § 20­
76-436 (Michie Supp. 1995); Colo. Rev. stat. Ann. § 26-4-403.3 
(West Supp. 1996); Conn. Gen. stat. Ann. § 17-83g (West 1992); 
Del. Code Ann. Liens § 5003 (Supp. 1996); Fla. stat. Ann. § 
414.28 (West Supp. 1997); Ga. Code Ann. § 49-4-147.1 (1994); Haw. 
Rev. stat. § 346-37 (Supp. 1996); Iowa Code Ann. § 249A.5 (West 
Respondent was unable to locate the Medicaid estate 
recovery provisions for the states of Alabama, Arizona, Kentucky, 
Michigan, and Vermont. Of the 44 state statutes reviewed, 33 
limit recovery to the estate of the recipient of Medicaid. 
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Supp. 1997); La. Rev. stat. Ann. S 46:153(G) (Supp. 1997); Me. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. Human services 22 S 14 (west Supp. 1996); Md. 
Code Ann., Health-General S 15-121 (1994); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 
lISE, S 31 (Supp. 1997); Miss. Code Ann. S 43-13-120 (1993); Mo. 
Ann. Stat. S 473.39S (Vernon Supp. 1997); Mont. Code Ann. S 53-6­
143 (1997); Neb. Rev. Stat. S 6S-1036.02 (1996); N.J. Stat. Ann. 
S 30:40-7.2 (West 1997); N. M. Stat. Ann. S 27-2A-4 (Michie 
1997); N.Y. Social Services Law S 369 (McKinney 1997); N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 10SA-70.5 (1994); N.D. Cent. Code S 50-24.1-07 (Supp. 
1995); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. S 5111.11 (Page 1996); Okla. Stat. 
Ann. Public Health and Safety 63 S 5051.3 (West 1997); Pa. Stat. 
Ann. Public Welfare Code, S 1412 (1996); R.I. Gen. Laws. § 40-S­
Iq-r	 15 (Supp. 1996); S.C. Code Ann. S 43-7-460 (Law Co-op Supp. 
1996); Tenn. Code Ann. S 71-5-116 (1995); Texas Probate Code Ann. 
§ 322 (west Supp. 1997); Utah Code Ann. S 26-19-13 (Supp. 1997); 
Va. Code Ann. S 32.1-327; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. S 43.20B.OSO (West 
Supp. 1997); W. Va. Code S 9-5-11c (Supp. 1996). 
Of the few states that make any reference to collection of 
Medicaid payments from the estate of the recipient's spouse, most 
limit recovery to the tracing of assets owned by the recipient at 
the time of her death. Cal. Welfare and Institutions Code § 
14009.5 (West Supp. 1997); Ind. Code Ann. S 12-15-9-5 (Burns 
Supp. 1997); Minn. Stat. Ann. S 256B.15 (west Supp. 1997); Nev. 
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Rev. stat. Ann. § 422.2935 (Michie 1996); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 
414.105 (Supp. 1996); Wyo. Stat. § 42-4-206 (1997). The 
remaining statutes are ambiguous, may not provide recovery in a 
case such as this, or exceed the authority granted to the states 
under federal law. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 35, para 3-9 (Smith-Hurd 
Supp. 1997); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 39-709(g) (Supp. 1995); N.H. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 167:16-a (Supp. 1996); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 28­
6-23 (Supp. 1997); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 49.496 (West 1997). 
Wisconsin's statute, one of the handful that clearly provided for 
spousal estate recovery, was invalidated by the Wisconsin Court 
of Appeals in Budney. (R. pp. 127-142). 
VI. JACKMAN IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS. 
As a personal representative defending the interests of 
Lionel's estate, Jackman is entitled to attorney's fees and cost:s 
from the estate whether she prevails or not. IC § 15-3-720. The 
Department, even if it prevails is not entitled to attorney's 
fees because Jackman's defense is not frivolous, unreasonable, or 
without foundation. IC § 12-121. Because the Department's 
position is contrary to the clear language of state and federal 
law and the Department's own regulations, Jackman should be 
awarded reasonable attorney's fees and expenses. IC § 12-117(1). 
A. Jackman is entitled to attorney's fees and costs from 
Lionel's estate. 
Idaho Code § 15-3-720 provides that a personal 
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representative who "defends or prosecutes any proceeding in good 
faith, whether successful or not, ... is entitled to receive 
from the estate [her] necessary expenses and disbursements 
including reasonable attorney's fees incurred." Jackman is the 
personal representative of Lionel's estate and any expenses and 
attorney's fees incurred in this action are incurred in good 
faith. The Department's insinuations of a lack of good faith are 
newly raised and have not been reviewed by a fact-finder. The 
record as it stands, however, contains copious, uncontested 
evidence of Jackman's good faith. 
Jackman has defended Lionel Knudson's estate against the 
Department's claim in fulfillment of her fiduciary duty to the 
estate. Jackman's opposition to the Department's claim is in the 
interests of the estate. Unlike instances where Idaho courts 
have denied reimbursement of expenses to a personal 
representative, Jackman is not litigating any issues to her 
personal benefit to the detriment of the estate or any other heir 
or devisee. The Department's suggestion that Jackman would best: 
fulfill her duties to the estate by forfeiting the entire value 
of the estate to the Department's claim is absurd. Regardless elf 
the ultimate outcome of this litigation, Jackman is entitled to 
her expenses and attorney's fees from the estate. 
B. The Department, even if it prevails, is not entitled t:o 
attorney's fees and costs from Jackman. 
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The Department may only recover attorney's fees if Jackman 
has opposed its claim unreasonably and without foundation. IC § 
12-121. As discussed earlier, Jackman's actions in this matter 
(and the actions of the Knudsons) were intended to comply with 
state law and the Department's regulations. The Department has 
not challenged the Magistrate's findings as to the propriety of 
the Marriage Settlement Agreement or Jackman's management of 
Hildor or Lionel's estates. The Department has only challenged 
the denial of its claim against Lionel's estate. Jackman's 
denial of the Department's claim is based on the clear language 
of Idaho statutes, the Department's regulations, and federal law 
and regulations. Jackman has prevailed on this issue before the 
Magistrate and the District court. Jackman's claim cannot be 
held to be frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation and the 
Department cannot recover its attorney's fees. 
c. Jackman is entitled to an award of attorney's fees 
aqainst the Department. 
Idaho Code § 12-117(1) provides that a citizen prevailing in 
a civil proceeding against a state agency is entitled to costs 
and attorney's fees if the state agency "acted without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law." The Department admits that 
there are no factual disputes in this appeal. Appellant's Brief', 
p. 7. The Department's pursuit of its claim against Lionel's 
estate is contrary to the clear language of state and federal law 
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and the Department's own regulations. The Department's position 
was completely rejected by the Magistrate and District Court. 
Because the Department has acted without a reasonable basis in 
law, Jackman is entitled to an award of her attorney's fees. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above, the decision of the Magistrate and 
District Court denying the Department's claim should be upheld. 
The language of IC § 56-218 is clear and unambiguous and allows 
the Department to recover Medicaid payments only from the estate 
of the recipient if the recipient dies possessed of an estate. 
Under federal law and regulations, the Department may only 
recover Medicaid payments from the estate of the recipient. The 
Department's Petition for Allowance should be denied. 
DATED this 4th day of October, 1997. 
Wil~.:Kir;:h
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the __ day of October, 1997 two 
true and correct copies of the foregoing document were mailed, 
Postage prepaid, to the following: 
w. Corey Cartwright 
Deputy Attorney General 
Division of Human Services 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036 
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IK VOl.UNTRICK AMitlJI.A.NC~ -- WUUiUlllW'. tiIllN~l"n 
11I1A.1 ""ITUCl!VI" dal.ll" for "anaclmlln~ dllllUl and InJuria. In the linD of duLy 
".u-" hI LWII 1"1,-",,", . llUllurrlnll on nr trJ\qr IIUC1h lIaUI, Ilu",Ul6nL 
IU'IIl:l!vlI Uaw .or Amllndmllnt by to I18CUon 601 L.lllll9, c. 81M, I68t OUL III II 
L.llllllt, Co 604; Appllcabllll.Y. Amend· note under aeetJon 7, 
ment by L.l989, c. 604. efT. July 21, 1989, 
Effective' Date: Section effective Jan.retroactive to Jan. I. 1989, and applicable
 
to certain pennanent partial disabilities;' 1, 1989;PW1iuant 'to· ,L.I988, Co 24, § 32.
 
-- Legislative Histories 
L.I989. Co 604': ,For memorand~of the Worker'll; Comperu;auOn Board, see McKinney's' 
1989 Session Laws of New York, p. 2223. 
L.1988, Co 24: For memorandum of the Department of State, ll8Il McKinney's 1988 
Sellllion LaWII of New York, p. 1934. ' 
CroIl8 Refe~nces . 
Liability of particular political subdivision for payment -of benefits, see'- Volunteer 
Ambulance Workel1l' Benefit Law § 30.' ­
§ 9. Temporary total disabil'itY benefits 
In the c~ 'of te~porary total disability the volUnteer arnbula'nce worker 
shall be paid three hundred dollara for each week during the continuanee 
thereof; providea, however, that when the volunteer ambulance worker is 
injured in the line of duty on or after t:he effective date of Uris chapter to June . 
thirtieth,iiiJiete~!n hUndred ninety; further provided,· that when the volunteer 
ambulanee worKer is injured in the line of duty on or after July fll'St, nineteen 
hundred iUrietY'w'June tJlirtieth, nineteen hundred ninety-one, said ambulance' 
worker stiillri"eceiVe three hundred forty dollars per week during the contin.u­
ance thereof, ·and·further provided, that when a volunteer ambulance worker is' 
injured in ·the line -of duty on or after July first,· nineteeli hundred ·ninety·~>ne 
to June .thirti~th, llineteen hundred ninety-two, said ambulance worker shall 
receive three"bundred fifty dollars per week during the-continuance thereof;' 
provided further.thatwhen a volunteer ambulance worker is injured in the line' 
of duty on or-after July first, nineteen hundredninety·two such amb~ce 
worker shall be paid four hundred 'dollars' for each week during the continu­
ance thereof: -'Temporary total disability, within the meaning of this section, 
shall exiSl liiilyifUie' earning capacity of the volunteer ambulance worker has 
been lost' temporarily and totally· as :the result of the injury. - -In caseo! 
temporarY-tOtAl'disability and permanent partial disability both resulting from . 
the same injury,.if the temporary total disability continues for a longer period 
than the number of weeks set forth in the following schedule, the' period, of 
temporaryoototal disability in excess of such number of weeks ahalI be added to 
the periOl! provided in section ten of this ehapter: arm, thirty-two weeks": -leg, 
Corty we~j[s; hand, thirty-two weeks; foot, tltirty-twoweeks; ear, twenty·five 
weeks; ~~, twenty weeks; thumb, twenty-four weeks; first finger, eighteen 
weeks; gJ,"eat toe, twelve weeks; second finger" twelve weeks; third .fmger, 
eight weeks; fourth finger, eight weeks; toe other than great toe, eight weeks. 
In any case resulting in loss or partiaJ loss of use of arm, leg, hand, fQot, ear, 
eye, thumb, ftnger or toe, where the temporary wtal disability does not' extend 
beyond the periods above mentioned for sueh injury, benefits shall be Jin:Uted 
to the schedule contained in section ten of this chapter. . . 
(L.I988, Co 24, § 31; amended L.I989, c. 604, § 3; L.l990, c. 924, § 31.) .., ,. 
Historical -and Statutory Notes 
1990 Amendmenl L.l990, c. 924, § 31, lion for injuries occurring on or after the 
err. July 31" \- retroactive to. July 1, effective date· 01 this'chapter to June 30. 
1flqfI mhstic. ~en!nce to comoensa· 
VUL.lJl'lllloi:ln ~IUI"""k''''oW ,,_ . 
1900. for reforence to' compensation for Effective Dale 01 Amendment by 
InlUt1~R Clccurl'lnll on or .R.tJr thn ol1'nclJve L.11t88, c. Applicability.604: Amend· 
mllnt by L.l~, c:. 604, Irr. July 21, Ulao.diLlA! uf thll chapter. Hnd added pl"llYilllonl 
reU'OBCtive to Jan. 1, 1989, and appllc:ablerelating to compensation for l!\Jurles oc­ to ceJ1.ain permanent partial disabilitil,!s,
curring between July I, 1990 and June 30, death and injuries in the line of duty
1991, July I, 19111 and.June 30, 1992, and occurring on or after such date, pursuant 
on or after July J, 1992. to section 6. of L.I989, Co 604, set out as a 
1989 Amendmenl LI989, c. 604, § 3, note under section 7. 
substituted "effective date" for ~enacir Effective Dale. Section elIective Jan. 
menL date", .1, 1989, PW1iuant to L.I988, c. 24, § 32, 
Leiislative Histories 
L.l11gll. c. 604: Fur mumol'1indum of Ulll WorkllJ'll' CumpulINtJun H'*l'd, _ Mc:Klnnu,y'~ 
19a9 Seaslon Laws or New York. p. 222:1. 
L.1988, Co 24: For memorandum of Ule Department of State, see McKinney's 19&1 
Session Laws or New York, p. 1934. 
Cross References 
LiabiliLy of particular political subdi~on ro~.payment of oonefi"tS;"see "Volunteer 
. Ambulance Workers' Benefi~ Law § 30. 
§ 10.' Pennanent'partiaJ djsahility benefits 
1. In the case of disability parti.a1 in charac;ter, but ~~~n~',~ quality, 
the volunteer ambulance worker. injured in the line of duty !l~_aJ'. ~ELpaid one 
hundred fifty dollars for each week for the period specifled in.~!l.':l.J.>division, 
provided, howeveJ:, that when the yolunteer ambulanee worker is injured in the 
line of duty on or after the effective date of this chapter to aiid iiicflimng June 
thirtieth, nineteen hundred ninety, and provided further that WIlen :the v()lun­
teer ambulance worker is ~ured in the line of duty on or itter'. Jtily firat, 
nineteen hundred ninety to and including June thirtieth,.ninoteeDhundred 
ninety-one such payments shall be two hundred eighty dollars.for each week, 
and provided .further that when the volunteer ambulance worker is injured in 
the line of duty On or after July first, nineteen hundred. !\intll.y:i)ne w and 
including June thirtieth, nineteen hundred ninety-two suc~ MymeQw.shall be 
three hundred fifty dollars for each week; and provided furth~ ,tha~ ~en the 
volunteer ambulance worker is injured in the line of duty on or after July first, 
nine~n hW).dred ninety-two such p;lyments shall be four~tD.idf.~(d.()llars for 
each week as follows; ­
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period shall be (lne-half the period for 1088 of the entire digit. The period for 
loss or loss"cif use of tWo or. more digits, or One or more phalanges of two or 
more digitii;'on: nand or foot; may be proportioned to the period for the loss 0'( 
use of thehiihd 'or foot occasioned thereby, but shall not exceed the period for 
the loss 'ora Haild'or foot. If an ann or leg shall be amputated at or above the 
wrist or ankle. the period rorsuch loss shall be in proportion to the period for 
the 10ss.oC,the,arro..or leg.; In the case of loss of binocular vision or of eighty 
per cenwm,or ,JJl9re, of the vision of an eye, the period shall be the same as fOJ: 
the IOssDHh~,eye, 
b. Loss of hearing. In the case of the complete loss of the hearing of one 
ear..sixty weeks; for the loss of hearing of both ears, one hundre~ flfty weeks. 
c. TC!tal loSS" of use. In the case of permanent total loss of use of ~ 
member';'the"compensation'shaU be the same as for the 'loss of the membet. 
d. ParUaI, loss Or partial, loss of use. Except as above provided in this 
subdiviSiori; 'in',the' case of permanent partial loss or loss of use of a member, 
the periOd shall be for the proportionate loss or loss of use of the membet. 
CompeiisaUon' COr pennanent parl:.;ialloss of use of an eye shall be awarded oh 
the basls'of ut\eorrected loss of vision or corrected loss:of vision resulting from 
an injurywhich ever is greater. ,,' :' , ' I, 
_ e. DiSfigurl!l11ent. ,In the caSe of' ;~~us 'caciai' o~ head disfilurement, 
including's ilisIigiirement continuous in length which is partly in the facial area 
and also extends into the neck region as deScribed in this 'paragraph; the 
volunteet'lUrtbulance worker: shlillbe 'paid' in, a lump 'sum' a proper and 
equitabllqmto\lh~ which shall be determined by the workers' compensation 
board. If the earning capacity of the volunteer ambulance worker shall have 
been inJ,ps,ired•. or. may in the fublre be impaired .. by' any serious disfigurement 
in the region'above the ilterno clavicular articulationS' anterior to and including 
the region of the~terno 'cleido' mastoid muscles on either side. the volunteer 
ambulance worker'"8hall be paid.in a,lump suill a proper and equitable amount 
,which shaU-·be·determined by such··board. 'Two or more serious disfigul"t!­
ments. not .e'9ntinuous in length, resulting mm the same injury. if partially in 
the facial area, aoopartiaUy in such neck region, ,shall be deemed to be a facial 
disfigmemant. .. ,An award, or the aggregate of the awards; to a volunteer 
ambulance worker under this paragraph shall not exceed twenty 'thousand 
dollars._ _.... . 
f. '):'otaJ. -or .partial loss or .loss of. use of more than one member.' In any 
case in which there shall be a'ioss or loss of use of more than one member or 
parts of more than one member set forth above in paragraphs a to e, both 
inclusive,"oT"Uiis'subdivision, but not amounting to permanent total disability, 
the periods for loss or loss of use of each such member'or part thereof shall 
run consecUtively., ,:. 
"g, ~~ses. In aU other cases of permanent ·partial disability the 
volunteer ambulance worker shall be paid for each week, during the continu­
ance thereof,. as follows: 
(1) Itthe percentage of loss of earning capacity is seventy-five per centum, 
or grea,tl!J:,J.l.e. Qr ~he shaU be paid one hundred flf'ty dollars for each week, 
provide4,.1I9.W~~r.....that the volunteer ambulance worker is injured inthe line 
of duty'..0!:1.. 9r:..~ the effective date of this chapter to and including JUru:i 
thirtie~l.!!¥te_~~_I!.~undred ninety, provided. however; 'that when the volunteer 
ambul~ncE!~<.>r~!!.!'.is injured in the line of duty on ,or: a.nerJulYfJrst,nineteen 
hundre_~~eo/.~and including June thirtieth, nineteen hundred ninety-one 
~uch p2~'!!!!!nt shall be two h!!!!d!'~d ~ighty Ijollar!! for ~,,~h w,?",k, 'Inti prnviclerl 
further Uiit 'when'the volunteer ambuIarlce worker is injured in the line of 
}'orioiart.erJ'U1y first, nineteen hundred ~ety~'ne to and including June " 
,~. 
... 
."" ""' __ - . 
i,hirtieth.· nineteen hUndred ninety-tWo such' payment shall be,~, .hund.red 
('illy dollars for each; week; and provided further that when the volunteer 
ambulance wo~er is injured in the line of duty on or after July tint, nineteen 
hundred' ninety-two such payments shall be four hundred dollars for each 
week. ,,:,,' ." ,,' "j 
.• (2) If the pereentage of los8 of earning capacity is fifty per,' centum, or 
greater, but lesS~an:seventy-five per centum, he or she slWl be Paid. one 
hundred dollars ,for, each week, provide<1; however,'thilt the voliiiiteer ambu­
klnce worker is ii\jui'ed in the line of duty on or after the effective date of this 
chapter to and, including June' thirtieth, nineteen hundred mnety, provided, 
however, that when:~ volUnteer ambu~ce worker is injured in the line of 
duty on or aft.er~uly first, 'nineteen hun~ ninety to;andinchiding June 
thirtieth. nineteen hundred ~ety.:one, sUCh' ,paYmj!nt shall be one hundred 
eighty-six dollars and Seventy-8ix cents Cor each week, provided. hOwever, that 
when the volun~r. arn.buIaii~e wbrker is. injured in the line of duty ori6r after 
July' first, nineteeii,hundred~ninety~ne to and including Jiine thirtieth, nine­
teen hundredniriety'-t?No. ,such payment ~ be two hWidred··thii'ty-four 
doUars .and fUlY cents Cor, each, weeki·.)roVided, however, thaLwhen the 
volunteer ambulance worker is injUred iiI'the line of duty on or after July first, 
nineteen hundred ninety-two, such payment 'Bhan be two hWidi-td sixty-eight 
dollars for,eaclt·week..: ,', .' ,', "., . . ;' .. 
. . ~. .'. "I... I,' • .' .: ,. . '.' 
(3) If the pen:entage of IOS8 of earning capacity is twenty.-~ve,wcentum, or 
greater, but less than fifty per C!!Dtum; he .or she BhalJ be paid. thirty' dollars 
for each week. n, ," .• ' '.' .' ;'.' ;,; .. ;'~. . ,'. 
(4) if the percen~ge O(lOS8 or eBining capacity is leu tlulri tWe'nty-five per, 
centum. he or she'sluiJ1 not pe. paid any ~eekl1 benefit. ,.,' , :.:. ,.' -', '.' 
. 'Permanent partial disability;, within the 'ine~g of this, paragraph, shall 
exist only if the earning eapacity oC the:volunteer ambulance.worker.has been 
permanently and partially lost as the result of the injury...The workers' 
compensation board shall detennine' the :degree oC BUch disability and such 
board may reconsider such, degree on its own motion or upon application of 
any party in interest. ' ' ':, . ,'. , . :.' , .... 
2. An aWard'made to a claimaht under this section shaU in case of death 
arising from c:ause8 other than the irijury 00 payable to and Cor the benefit of 
the personsfollowing:, .. .. 
a. If there be a 8urviving ~pOuse' and:~~' clwd of the deCeaSed' under the 
age'of eightren yearil;'to such spouse;' .'.' .. ".. ' " : ..... :. 
. l . . • .•..•.. 
b. If there be a surviving spouse and surviving child or: children of the 
deceased under the age (If: eighteen ,y~., ~ne:ha1f shaU, ,be.: payable to the 
surviving spo.use and the other.,,~alf.!lto. ~e s~ving.clilld.. or .children. 
c. , If there be a surviving child or children of the deceased under the age of 
eighteen, years, but no ,surviving spouse,' ,then to such child or' children. 
d. If th~ be n~ s~ving spouse and 'n~ surviving clwd '~r children of the 
deceased ilnder ·the age of eighteen ,yellrll,' then to such de~ndenf or depen­
dents as defmed, in section Seven:of ,this'article, as directed: hy' 'tlle workers' 
compensation'b6ard;:'and if there shall be no' Buch 'deperident8;"i1ieii to the 
estate of such deceased in an am.ount not exceeding'" reasonable funeral 
expenses sa'provided in subdivision one of sectioriseven otthls3iticle. or, if 
there be no e5i.aie.·"w t.hi: ~-DVii"'u~ pc..~on~ 'p~~"_~g thle;~infi."_J"~n~ or 
such dece~din an amoUnt',riot exc~g .reasonable ~~ra). ~nses as 
'orovided inSuchsubdiVisioll one." ' ) 000284
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••~ WORKERS' COMPENSATION lAW 
Art. :z 
cand~date for rehabilitation; such rehabilitation shall constitute 
~ treatment and care as provided in this chapter. 
w. Other cases. In all other cases in this class of disability, the 
compensation shall be sixty-six and two-thirds per centum of the 
difference between his average weekly wages and his wage-earning 
capacity thereafter in the same employment or otherwise, payable 
during the continuance of such partial disability, but subject to 
reconsideration of the degree of such impairment by the board on 
its own motion or upon application of any party in interest. 
4. Effect of award. An award made to a claimant under subdi­
vision three shall in case of death arising from causes other than 
the injury be payable to and for the benefit of the persons follow­
ing; 
a. If there be a surviving spouse and no child of the deceased 
under the age of eighteen years, to such spouse. 
b. If there be a surviving spouse and surviving child or children 
of the deceased under the age of eighteen years, one-half shall be 
payable to the surviving spouse and the other half to the surviving 
child or children. 
The board may in its discretion require the appointment of a 
guardian for the purpose of receiving the compensation of the 
minor child. In the absence of such a requirement by the board the 
appointment for such a purpose shall not be necessary. 
c. If there be a surviving child or children of the deceased under 
the age of eighteen years, but no surviving spouse then to such child 
or children. 
d. If there be no surviving spouse and no surviving child or 
children of the deceased under the age of eighteen years, then to 
such dependent or dependents as defined in section sixteen of this 
chapter, as directed by the board; and if there be no such depen­
dents, then to the estate of such deceased in an amount not 
exceeding reasonable funeral expenses as provided in subdivision 
one of section sixteen of this chapter, or, if there be no estate, to the 
person or persons paying the funeral expenses of such deceased in 
an amount not exceeding reasonable funeral expenses as provided 
in subdivision one of section sixteen of this chapter. 
An award for disability· may be made after the death of the 
injured employee. 
4-a. Protracted temporary total disability in connection with 
permanent partial disability. In case of !empcr~-y :otal uisabiiity 
and.,· )anent partial disability both resulting from the same 
T	 fl 
.
 
adjustment is tair and in the best interest of the claimant. The, r d may, in such case. order all future compensation tf) ¥ T" .... ) 
§ISCOMPENSATION 
Art. 2
 
injw-y, if the temporary total disability continues for a longer
 
period than the number of weeks set forth in the following sched­

ule, the period of temporary total disability in excess of such
 
number of weeks shall be added to the compensation period provid­

ed in subdivision three of this section: Arm, thirty-two weeks; leg,
 
forty weeks; hand, thirty-two weeks; foot, thirty-two weeks; ear,
 
twenty-five weeks; eye. twenty weeks; thumb. twenty.four weeks;
 
first finger, eighteen weeks; great toe, twelve weeks; second finger,
 
twelve weeks; third finger. eight weeks; fourth finger, eight weeks;
 
toe other than great toe, eight weeks.
 
In any case resulting in loss or partial loss of use of arm. leg, 
hand, foot. ear, eye. thumb. finger or toe, where the temporary total 
disability does not extend beyond the periods above mentioned for 
such injury, compensation shall be limited to the schedule con· 
tained in subdivision three. 
5. Temporary partial disability. In case of temporary partial 
disability resulting in decrease of earning capacity. the compensa­
tion shall be two-thirds of the difference between the injured 
,	 employee's average weekly wages before the accident and his wage 
earning capacity after the accident in the same or other employ­
ment. 
5-a. Determination of wage earning capacity. The wage earning 
capacity of an injured employee in cases of partial disability shall 
be determined by his actual earnings. provided, however, that if he 
has no such actual earnings the board may in the interest of justice 
fIX such wage earning capacity as shall be reasonable. but not in 
excess of seventy-five per centum of his fonner full time actual 
earnings, having due regard to the nature of his injury and his 
physical impairment. 
5-b. Non-schedule adjustments. Notwithstanding any other pro­
vision of this chapter, in any case coming within the provisions of 
subdivisions three or five of this section, in which the right to 
compensation has been established and compensation has been 
paid for not less than three months. in which the continuance of 
disability and of future earning capacity cannot be ascertained with 
reasonable certainty. the board may, in the interest of justice. 
approve a non-schedule adjustment agreed to between the claimant 
and the employer or his insurance carrier. The board shall require, 
before approving any such agreement. that there be an examination 
of the claimant in accordance with section nineteen of this chapter. 
and such approval shall only be given when it is found that ;he 
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§ 10 VOLUNTEER FIREFIGHTERS' BENEFIT	 lAW 
Art. 2 
loss of use of each such member or part thereof shall run consecu­
tively. 
(g) Other cases. In all other cases of permanent partial disability 
the volunteer fireman shall be paid for each week during the 
continuance thereof, as follows: 
1. If the percentage of loss of earning capacity is seventy-five 
per centum, Or greater, he shall be paid ninety-five dollars for 
each week, provided, however, that when the volunteer fireman is 
injured in the line of duty on or after January first, nineteen 
hundred seventy-eight to and including June thirlieth, nineteen 
hundred eighty-three, such payment shall be one hundred five 
dollars for each week provided, however, that when the volunteer 
fireman is injured in the line of duty on or after July first, 
nineteen hundred eighty-three to and including June thirtieth, 
nineteen hundred eighty-four, such payment shall be one hundred 
twenty-five dollan for each week provided, however, that when 
the volunteer fireman is injured in the line of duty on or after 
July first, nineteen hundred eighty-four to and including June 
thirtieth, nineteen hundred eighty-five such payment shall be one 
hundred thirty-five dollars for each week, provided, however, that 
when the volunteer fireman is injured in the line of duty on or 
after July first, nineteen hundred eighty-five such payment shall 
be one hundred fifty dollars for each week; 
2. If the percentage of loss of earning capacity is fifty per 
centum, or greater, but less than seventy·five per centum, he shall 
be paid sixty-three dollars and thirty-three cents for each week, 
provided, however, that when the volunteer fireman is injured in 
the line of duty on or after January first, nineteen hundred 
seventy-eight to and including June thirtieth, nineteen hundred 
eighty-three, such payment shall be seventy dollars for each week. 
provided, however, that when the volunteer fireman is injured in 
the line of duty on or after July first, nineteen hundred eighty­
three to and including June thirtieth, nineteen hundred eighty­
four such payment shall be eighty-three dollars and thirty-three 
cents for each week, provided, however, that when the volunteer 
fireman is injured in the line of duty on or after July first, 
nineteen hundred eighty-four, to and including June thirtieth, 
nineteen hundred eighty-five, such payment shall be ninety dol­
lars for each week, provided, however, that when the volunteer 
fireman is injured in ihc Hile: of duty on or :lfter July first, 
nine ) hundred eighty-five such payment shall be one hundred 
, '.. :- '........'........ or.'·.
 
COVERAGE AND BENEFITS	 § 10 
Art. 2 
3. If the percentage of loss of earning capacity is twenty-five 
per centum. or greater, but less than fifty per centum, he shall be 
paid thirty dollars for each week; 
4. If the percentage of loss of earning capacity is less than 
twenty-five per centum, he shall not be paid any weekly benefit. 
Permanent partial disability, within the meaning of this paragraph, 
shall exist only if the earning capacity of the volunteer fireman has 
been permanently and partially lost as the result of the injury. The 
workmen's compensation board shall determine the degree of such 
disability and such board may reconsider such degree on its own 
motion or upon application of any party in interest. 
2. An award made to a claimant under this section shall in case 
of death arising from causes other than the injury be payable to and 
for the benefit of the persons follOWing: 
(a) If there be a ~urviving spouse and no child of the deceased 
under the age of eighteen years. to such spouse. 
(b) If there be a surviving spouse and surviving child or children 
of the deceased under the age of eighteen years, one-half shall be 
payable to the surviving spouse and the other half to the surviving 
child or children. ~ 
(c) If there be a surviving child or children of the deceased under 
the age of eighteen years, but 110 surviving spouse, then to such 
child or children. 
, 
(d) If there be no surviving spouse and no surviving child or 
children of the'deceased under the age of eighteen years, then to ~ I::
such dependent or dependents as defined in section seven of this 
chapter, as directed by the workmen's compensation board; and if i; 
nrthere shall be no such dependents, then to the estate of such 
deceased in an amount not exceeding reasonable funeral expenses 
.:; 
:1'.
as provided in subdivision one of section seven of this chapter, or, if 
there be no estate, to the person or persons paying the funeral 
'r 
expenses of such deceased in an amount not exceeding reasonable 
,w 
funeral expenses as provided in such subdivision one. 
." 
3. An award for disability may be made after the death of the • 
vol unteer fireman. 
.'
,
(L.J956. c. 696; amended L.1956, c. 697, §§ 2,3; L.1958. c, 9, § 2; L.1959. 
c, 502, §§ 5,6; L.1960, c. 781, §§ 4. 5; L.1962. c. 175, § 4; L.196S. c. 311. 
~§ 4. S; L.1968, c. 833, § 4; L.!97Q, c. 2!!3, §§ 4: S; L_1Q74, c. ~~4, §§ 4, 5; 
~ L.1977, c. 675, §§ 84, 85; L.1978, c. 597, §§ 4, 5; L.1982, c. 34b \ 2; 
~ L.198l c. 654. ~~ 4. 5,) • 
6 
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514 Pa. 636 ATLANTIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
things, that damages for wrongful death 
are not recoverable against DOT as a mat· 
ter of law. The Court of Common Pleas 01 
Montgomery County BUStained DOT'B pre­
liminary objections, and, for the reasons 
below, we aeflml. 
AppellantB argue that the trial court 
el'ftd in ita anaIYBis of the sections of the 
Judicial Code pertaining to sovereign im· 
munity (Code), 42 PLC.S. Ii 8521-8528. 
Specifically, appellantB all8ert that future 
loss of earnings and earning capacity and 
lou of consortium are recoverable in a 
wrongful death aetion. 
Seetion 8628(c) of the Code provides: 
(c) 7Wu of damagu recowrab/e. 
DamageB shall be recoverable only for. 
(1) PlI8t and future 10IIII of earnings and 
earning capacity. 
(2) Pain and Buffering. 
(8) Medical and denial ellpellBes includ­
ing the reuonable value of reasonable 
and neceaaary medical and dental servic· 
es, prosthetic devices and necessary am· 
bulance, hospital, professional nursing, 
and phYBical therapy expenses accrued 
and anticipated in the diag1lOBis, care and 
recovery of the claimanL 
(4) LosB of COllBortium. 
(6) Property l0S8es, except that property 
loases ahalI not be recoverable in clailll3 
brought PIUIIU8llt to section 8522(b)(5) 
(relating to potholes and other dangerouB 
conditions). 
The Superior Court of Penllllylvania Btat· 
ed in McClinton II. White, 285 Pa.Superior 
Ct. 271, 277-78, 427 A.2d 218, 221 (1981): 
In a survival action, the cause ariBes out 
of the injury, not out of the death. The 
estate is substituted for the deeedent, 
and itB recovery is baaed upon the rights 
of sction which were posBessed by the 
deeedent at his death. The estate may 
rec:over for the Io8a of deeedent'B past 
and future earning power, lor the dece­
dent's pain and Buffering prior to death, 
and for the cost of medical serviceB, 
nlUlling and hOBpital care provided to 
decedenL The estate may not, however, 
recover iuui:i'Ql C.ii'C'~ :;:n:e, ~h1!~t!!.. 
ly, fecedent could not have brought 
an action for these expenses at the time
 
of his death. (Citations omitted.)
 
In footnote No.6, the McClillllm cowt 
atated, in comparison: 
IWcoverable damages under the Wrong· 
ful Death Act have been held to include 
'the present worth of the deceased'. 
probable earnings during the probable 
duration of the deceased'l life, which 
could have gone for the benefit of the 
children. parent, husband or wife 118 the 
case may be; the value of BUch services 
B8 the deceaaed would have rendered to 
the named beneficiaries, and 8uch gifta 
aa the deeeaaed would have been reason­
ably expeeted to have given the benef,. 
ciaries. The Wrongful Death Ad itself 
also apecifically provides for the recov­
ery of medical expenses and funeral ex­
penles. The cost of the tombstone and 
the cost of administration of the estate 
have also been held to be proper items of 
damage.' (citations omitted.) 
The damages which appellants seek in 
Count 1. paragraph 34, of their complaint, 
which would be included in a wrongful 
death action, are not enumerated in 42 Pa. 
C.s. § 8528(c) of the Code. 
Therefore, Judge Albert Subera in the 
instanl case correctly stated, "we conclude 
that Seetion 8528(c) clearly is limited in 
scope to the type of damages properly re­
coverable in a Survival Action, not s 
Wrongful Death Action." The types of 
damages which an: recoverable in Seetion 
8528(c) of the Code are recoverable by the 
decedent's estate beause they an: clearly 
expenses incurred by the decedent, for 
which the decedent could bring suit had the 
decedent Burvived. 
Finally, appellants incorrectly state that 
loss of consortium is "an item of damage 
recoverable under its Wrongful Death Stat· 
ute. . .... The Superior Court of Pennsyl· 
vania recently held in Liftebaugh v. uh,., 
351 Pa.superior CL 135, 139, 605 A.2d 303, 
305 (19813), "a surviving spouse cannot 
maintain a separate cause of action for loss 
of consortium resulting from the death of a 
amuse but must ill&tead recover damages 
for loss of the decealled spouse's lOCietym ~~­) , 
U.S. STEEL CORP. v. W.e.A.B. Pa. 615 
cu... SJ6 A.Zd SIS (Pa.CalwI....,.., 
an action for wrongful death." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Accordingly, we aftlrll1 the order of the 
trial court and remand the case to the 
Court of Common Plell8 of Montgomery 
County for further proeeedinp Oli the J'eo 
maining countB. 
ORDER 
AND NOW, this 28th day of January, 
1988, the order of the Court of Common 
Pleaa of Montgomery County in the above­
captioned matter is affirmed and the Ol.lIe 
is remanded to that court for proeeedings 
COllJliatent with thia opinion. 
Jllriadiction relinquished. 
UNITED STATES STEEL
 
CORPORATION.
 
PeUtloner,
 
v. 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AP.
 
PEAL BOARD (KAMINSKY),
 
Respondents.
 
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. 
Argued OcL 6, 1987. 
Decided Jan. 28, 1988. 
Elltate of workers' compensation claim· 
ant WII8 awarded benefits for facial disfig· 
urement sustained by claimant during 
course of employment. The Workmen's 
Compensation Appeal Board affinned the 
referee's order, and the employer appealed. 
The Commonwealth Court, No. 1671 C.D. 
1984, ColinB, J., held that: (1) estate of 
claimant, who was not survived by depend. 
ent spouse or child at time of death, WII8 
barred by BtatUte from receiving previously 
awarded compenlJltion benefits for disfig. 
urement in ellcess of rell80nable funeral 
expenaea. and 12) 8ubject matter, parties, 
and capacity of parties suing or being sued 
were not identical in initial action in which 
claimant waa detennined to be entitled to 
diBfigurement benefits on weekly basis and 
in sUbsequent proceeding in which claim­
ant'. estate aought unpaid disfigurement 
benefitll, 110 that doctrine of res judicata 
was inapplicable. 
Reveraed and remanded. 
1.	 Worbrs' CompenaaUon *"606 
Estate of workerll' compensation c1aim­
ant, who waa not survived by dependent 
8PO-U~ or child at time of death, was 
bal'ftd by Btatute from receiving previously 
awarded compensation benefits for disfig­
urement in exceas of reaaonable funeral 
expenses, which are limited by atatute to 
$1,600. 77 p.s. ft 618(22), 641, 641(7), 
661(7). 
z.	 Worken' Colllpenaation $:>1789 
Subject matter, parties, 8Ild capacity of 
parties BUing or being aued were DOt identi­
cal in initial action in which workera' corn­
pellBation claimant was determined to be 
entitled to diafiguremen t benefits on week· 
ly basis and in 8ubsequent proceeding in 
which claimant'B estate, after claimant'a 
death for nonwork·related reasons, sought 
award of unpaid disfiguremeDt beDefits, 80 
that doctrine of rea judicata was inapplica­
ble. 77 p.s. §f 513, 641. 
8. Worken' CompenaaUon $:>1791 
Any question regarding entitlement of 
workers' compensation claimant', e8tate to 
award of disfigurement benefits waa not 
ripe for consideration during time of initial 
proceeding in which claimant had 8Oughtto 
establish entitlement to disfigurement ben­
efits on weekly bll8is. 77 P.S. It 613, 641. 
Paul A. Robb, Robert C. Jonea, Pitta· 
burgh, for petitioner. 
William Lowman. Ronald Zera, Ada Guy· 
ton, Daniel D. Harshman, United Mine 
Workera of America, DiaL # 6, Belle Ver· 
non, for respondents. 
Before MacPHAIL snd COUNS, JJ., 
and KALiSH, Senior Judge. 
)
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Pa. 636 ATLANTIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES U.s. STEEL CORP. v. W.e.A.B. Pa. 517 
C1'...~ A.U '15 .....Cmwllh. 19M' 
llNS, Judge. 
ited Statel Steel Corporation (employ­
're appeala an order of the Workmen'! 
oelll8tion Appeal BoanI (Board) which 
oed the order of a Referee awarding 
IDl!n'l mmpe!ll!8tion benefita \.0 the ell­
of ita fonner employee, Jolm C. Ka­
(f (Kaminsky) for a facial dilfigure­
luatained by Kaminsky during the 
'.e of his employment. 
February 8, 1979, a Referee iasued an 
. awardiDg Kaminsky 200 weeki of 
I!DI&tion for a facial dilfigurement 
I reeuJted from a depreued fracture 
e Ikull which he sustained on JllJIe 7. 
while in the COUl'Be of his employment. 
iDSky was receiving workmen'l mm· 
IDon benefita for total disability for 
il!l he had lustained in the same acc" 
which reBulted in the dilfigurement. 
!fore, the Referee's order deferred the 
aDon of the employer to make pay-
of the disfigurement benefita to the 
,ant.I An appeal was taken by the 
oyer challenging only the amount of 
oeDBaDon awarded. [n that appeal, the 
oyer did not challenge the suspeDBion 
ltigurement benefita for BO long as the 
WIt was receiving workmen's compen­
Q benefits for total diaability, the fact 
the injury had in fact oeeurred or that 
tigurement had been lustained by the 
WIt. On July 26, 1979, the Board 
fJed the amount of compensation 
h WlL8 awarded for the disfigurement 
ZOO weeb to 180 weeki. The dec.. 
of the Referee W&ll .mnned in all 
r respecta. Neither party appealed the 
.ion of the BoanI. 
uninBky died on November 14. 1981 
to eauaea unrelated to his work-related 
'Y. He had received weekly benefita 
total disability from the date of his 
'Yon June 7, 1972 until the date of his 
h. Because he had mntinued to re­
oncurrenl pay"",nl of be""fil. for 101A1 di.. 
lily and dlofil\1remenl benen•• i. pn:>K1"ibed 
SeI:llon J06(d) of The Penn.ylvania Worll.· 
n't Compenullon Act (Act). Act or JullC 2. 
15. P.L 736. IU amouUJ. n p.s. I 513. 
«lion 306(c) of lhe ""I provideo: 
ceive workmen's compenaation benefits for 
total disability until his death, Kaminsky 
never received payment of disfigurement 
benefits purauant to the Referee'l awant. 
as modified by the Board. 
The instant matter was initiated by the 
filing of a claim petition on or about April 
28, 1982. by Kaminsky'a estate. The e.tate 
auerted that it was entitled to the payment 
of the 180 weeb of compeD&lltion awarded 
for Kaminsky's dilfigurement which he did 
not receive during his lifetime. The Ref· 
eree's decision on the matter WILB circulated 
on December 12, 1982. The Referee 
awarded the estate payment of 180 weeb 
of mmpeD&lltion and denied payment of 
statutory funeral expeDles. On appeal, the 
Board arfJnlled the decision of the Referee, 
dismissed the appeal and ordered payment 
to the estate. The Order of the Board is 
now before this Court for our review. 
Our scope of review is limited to a deter­
mination of whether constitutional rights 
were violated, an error of law was commit­
ted, or whether necesllary" fmdinga of fact 
are supported by lubstantial evidence. 
Section 704 of the Administrative Agency 
Law, 2 Pa.C.s. I 704. 
(I) The employer raiaea two issues on 
appeal. We shall addreSIi them aeriatim. 
First, the employer avera that the Boant 
erred as a matter of law in awanting pay­
ment of compensation benefita in excess of 
reasonable funeral upenaes to the estate 
of Kaminsky, where Kaminsky was not 
survived by a dependent llpouae Or child at 
the time of death. We agree. 
Before this Court is a queation of law, 
namely, whether Section 306(g) of the Act, 
77 p.s. I 541, precludell an award of bene­
fits to Kaminsky'a estate in exceu of rea­
sonable funeral eltpensea. During his life­
time. Kaminsky was awarded benefits pur­
IU8JIt to Section 806(c). 77 P.S. § 618(22).1 
For .11 di..bili.y rcoullilll from pennancnl 
injuries of Ihe followilll classes. the compen. 
"lion .hall be exchwvely u folloW1l: 
(22) For lICriOUl and permanenl diofigure­
menl of Ihe "e&<!. neck or f.ce. of such • 
chan,elcr U 10 produce an urWllhlly tppear· 
anee. and such u is nOl Ulually (neldenl 10 
Section 306(g) of the Act, 77 P.S. § 541(7), 
providea that payment of such benefits. 
after the death of the claimant shall be 
made as follows: 
Should the employe die from BOme other 
eauae than the injury, paym!!!lt of eom­
peDlation to which the deceased would 
have been entiUed to under aection 
306(c)(l) to (26) shall be paid to the fol­
lowing periODS who at the time of the 
death of the deceased were dependents 
within the definition of claWle (71 of see­
tion 307 and in the following order and 
amounta: (footnotel omitted) 
(7) If there be no dependenlB eligible 
to receive payments under this section 
then the payments shall be made to the 
estate of the deceased but'in amount not 
exceeding reasonable funeral elJleDBes 
as provided in this act or if there be no 
estate. to the perlon or perlons paying 
the funeral expenses of such dee:eaaed in 
8JI amount not uc:eeding reasonable fu­
neral expenses as provided in this act. 
At the time of his death, KamiDaky was a 
widower and had DO lurviving dependenta. 
Therefore, lIubsection (7) of Section 306(g) 
of the Act appliea in this caae. Thst sub­
aeetion limits any amount payable to an 
estate, of previously awarded disfigure­
ment benefits, to reasonable funel'1ll ell:­
penses. As indieated in Section 307(9) of 
the Act, 77 P.S. I 561(7). reasonable fu­
neral expenses are limited to One 'Thousand 
Five Hundred Dollan ($1,600.00). The 
clear language of the statute diClBtes that 
the estate of Kaminsky should receive an 
amount not in ell:Ct!ss of reasonable funeral 
eJtpenaes in an amount of One 'Thousand 
Five Hundred Dollars ($1,500.00). We are 
guided in our decision by our rules of statu­
tory mnatruction which dictate that when 
the language of a statute is clear and un­
ambiguous we may not disregard the letter 
of the law in pursuance of i18 spirit See 
Section 1921(b) of the Statutory Construc­
tion Act of 1972, I Pa.C.S. I 1921(b). The 
lhe employmc:nl. li.ly-oir. and lW<>lhirds per 
cenlum of waaes nol 10 cr.aed lwo "undred 
language of the Act is clear and we must 
follow its mandate. 
We further note that this Court in the 
ease of Bl4ck y. BiU, Penn Cot-poraticm, 
72 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 628, 467 A.2d 192 
(l983), discussed Section 806(g1 of the Act 
and the amendmenta thereto, with particu. 
larity. The Court noted: 
Prior to the 1972 Amendmenta to this 
ltatute, the death of the e1aimant from a 
eauae unrelated to the mmpenaable inju­
ry, terminated all responsibility for the 
mntinuation of payment. . • . 11M! 
amendments here eited gave eertain stat­
utorily-defmed dependents the right to 
receive the payments, and, if none of 
theae dependenta lurvive, then the estate 
may make a claim. The legislature, bow­
.ever, has dearly and unambiguously cht>­
sen to limit the amount of the estate's 
claim. 
Id. at 632, 467 A.2d at 198-94 (citations 
omitted). 
The Court in Blade, went on to cite the 
language of the Act whJch limited the es· 
tate's awant to reasonable funeral u­
penses. We adopt the reasoning set forth 
in Black and reverse and remand this mat-­
ter for the eomputation of reasonable fu· 
neral expenses. 
(2) The second iBBue addreaaed by the 
employer involves the applieability of the 
doctrine of rei judicata to the instant pI'()­
ceeding. The estate daima that the em­
ployer ill barred by res judicalA from wl­
!enging the nght of the estate to receive 
Kaminsky's dilfigurement benefits. The 
estate, in ita brief to this Court, asserts 
that the Decision and Order of the Referee 
cireulated on February 21, 1979, awarded 
compensation benefita to Kaminsky's rep­
resentatives in the event that he did not 
survive. Therefore, the estate mneludea 
that the employer, by its failure to appeal 
that Decision and Order, despite the fact 
that the award may have been contrary to 
the Act, resul18 in the employer being 
bound by that awant. We disagree. 
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I. 
IT IS NOT THE POLICY OF THE STATE TO GRANT 
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE IN ORDER TO GIVE A 
WINDFALL TO A RECIPIENT'S HEIRS. 
It is basic to the policies underlying Idaho's public assistance laws that each 
person is, to the extent possible, responsible for his or her own needs, including 
medical care: 
Declaration of policy. - It is the policy of this state that each 
person, to the maximum extent possible, is responsible for his or her own 
medical care .... 
Idaho Code § 31-3501. Therefore, il must be presumed that, absent a clear intent to 
the contrary, the legislature does not intend to provide taxpayer funded medical care to 
a person, while that person preserves his or her assets for the benefit of relatives or 
heirs. 
II. 
JACKMAN'S ERRONEOUS AND DISTORTED 
REFERENCES AND ARGUMENTS DO NOT 
SUPPORT HER STRAINED INTERPRETATION OF 
TIlE STATUTE. 
Jackman has raised many minor arguments without support, or with strained 
interpretations of statute and rule. Even if lhese arguments had merit, which they do 
not, they entirely miss the central issue which is whether the spousal recovery 
provisions of Idaho Code § 56-218 are to be given effect. Jackman's arguments are 
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briefly discussed in the order presented: 
A. No One "Required" Hjldor Knudson to Convey Her Properly to Ljonel. 
Jackman repeatedly states that the Department "required" Hildor Knudson to 
convey her assets to her Lionel. Respondent's Brief. pp. 7. 24, 25. 27 etc. Jackman 
then asserts that since the Department forced Hildor to convey her property to Lionel. 
it cannot now complain that she had no property at her death. This characterization. 
however. is a distortion. Idaho's Medicaid program is entirely voluntary. No one may 
force another to apply for or receive Medicaid. Indeed. some families choose to fund 
nursing care for their loved ones on their own rather than incur the estate 
reimbursement obligations that accompany Medicaid benefits. 
No one "required" the Knudson's to obtain Medicaid benefits. Rather, the law 
permits couples to obtain Medicaid benefits for the spouse needing nursing care while 
the at-home spouse keeps the couple's assets for his or her own support. 
Furthermore, real property is an excluded resource for a Medicaid applicant who 
states an intention to return home. 42 U.S.C. § 1382b(a)(1). Even for those choosing 
to make a spouse eligible for Medicaid benefits, there is no requirement that the 
applicant convey away the family home, which is normally the couple's primary asset. 
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B lackman's Partial Payment, Which Came after Lionel's Death. Was Not 
Accepted as Full Payment by the Department. 
Jackman contends the Department received and accepted the balance of Hildor's 
estate. Respondent's Brief, p. 7. This is incorrect: 
Hildor Knudson died October 27, 1994. R. p. 67. Lionel died just two weeks 
later on November 11, 1994. About June 30, 1995, nearly eight months after Li.onel's 
death, Jackman offered to disburse $1,861.30 upon affidavit from the Department. See 
Exhibit A to Affidavit of Willard Abbot. R. p. 146. This offer was rejected by the 
Department, although by return mail on July 7, 1995, the Department did say it would 
accept the sum as partial payment. R. pp. 143-147. About August 22, 1995, the 
Department issued a receipt to Jackman's attorney for receipt of the sum of $1 ,638.03. 
R. p. 70. At no time has the Department accepted payment from Jackman in 
satisfaction of its claim against Lionel's estate. 
C. The Department Airees That the Legislature Intended to Protect the Survhing 
Spouse, but this Doesn't Extend to Heirs. 
Jackman contends that the legislature intended to protect the estates of the 
spouses of Medicaid recipients and cites the following: 
It is further the intent of this legislation to protect the community and 
separate property rights of a married person whose spouse applies for 
medical assistance regardless of whether they are living together. 
Respondent's brief, p. 14 (quotillg S.L. 1988, ch. 50, § I, p. 74). The Department is 
in complete agreement that this statute was intended to protect the assets of the spouse 
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remaining at home. Nothing in this statutory language, however, manifests any intent 
to protect a deceased spouse's e.s.la1e, so that it can be gifted to relatives, after the 
taxpayers have shouldered the cost of the other's nursing care. The statute protects the 
healthy spouse - it doesn't grant a windfall to the heirs. 
D. The Assets from Which the Department Seeks to Recover Were Community 
Property. 
Jackman quotes the language of IDAPA 16.03.09.025.20 contending that ..he 
Department's rules prohibit recovery from the spouse's estate (Respondent's Brief, p. 
15): 
20. Limitations on Estate Claims. Limits on the Department's claim 
against the assets of a deceased recipient shall be subject to Sections 56-218 and 
56-2I8A, Idaho Code. A claim against the estate of a surviyjng spouse of a 
predeceased recipjent is limited to the yalue of the assets of the estate that were 
community property, or the deceased recipient's share of the separate property, 
and jointly owned property. Recovery shall not be made until the deceased 
recipient no longer is survived by a spouse .... 
IDAPA 16.03.09.025.20 (underline added). Jackman contends that since the marriage 
settlement agreement made all of the couple's property Lionel's separate property, the 
Department has no claim to his estate. Respondent's Brief, p. 15. This argument, 
however, is disingenuous and carefully ignores the context of this section and another 
section of the same rule that follows by only a few paragraphs. 
All of the assets in Lionel Knudson's estate ~ the community property of the 
couple - until they were transferred through the marriage settlement agreement to 
facilitate Medicaid eligibility. Section 24 of the same rule states: 
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24. Marriage Settlement Agreement or Other Such Agreement. A 
marriage settlement agreement or other such agreement which separates assets 
for a married cQuple does nQt eliminate the debt against the estate Qf the 
deceased recipient or the spouse. Transfers under a marriage settlement 
agreement or other such agreement may be voided if not for adequate 
consideration. 
IDAPA 16.03.09.025.24 (underline added); see also IDAPA 16.03.05.620.04 (Rules 
governing countable property for eligibility for aid to the aged, blind and disabled [which is 
the basis for Medicaid eligibility in cases such as this] pennit a marriage settlement agreement, 
but the Department's rights to the transferred property are retained). 
Subsection 20, quoted by Jackman, is merely intended to protect a spouse who marries 
later in life bringing substantial separate property into the marriage. The Department only 
pursues its spousal estate claim against property that had been the couple's community 
property or separate property in which the nursing home spouse had an interest. 
E. Jackman's Incorrectly Argues That Federal Law DQes Not Permit Spousal 
Recoyery When in Reality, the Law Merely Does Not Require SpQusal Recoyery. 
AJthQugh Jackman spends considerable effQrt claiming that IdahQ's spQusa.1 
reCQvery law is pre-empted by federal law, pre-emption shQuld not be an issue here. 
Respondent's Brief, sectiQn IV (beginning Qn page 16). Initially, this was Jackman's 
sQle claim. R. p. 49. This argument was rejected by the magistrate (R. pp. 150-151) 
and was nQt appealed tQ the District Court. Contrary tQ Jackman's arguments that pre·· 
emptiQn is merely an alternative basis for decision and they are nQt seeking affirmative 
relief, a decisiQn based Qn this claim changes the entire nature Qf this dispute. The 
magistrate held that IdahQ law is nQt pre-empted, but under these particular 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRlEF - 5 C:\WCC\TEMI'IJWPLVB. WJ'O 
000297
o o o
o
. o
1t o o o o
cov o
tio o
o
o o o
tio o
i io o o
ho o
I cc\T ' I  
.......	 circumstances, does not apply. Jackman is asking the court to nullify an act of the 
legislature on the basis of federal pre-emption. Such remedy is far greater in scope 
than that afforded by the lower courts. It should not be in issue here. 
To the extent that federal pre-emption is in issue in this matter, the Department 
incorporates by reference and adopts its briefing and argument on this issue presented 
to the magistrate division and found in the record at pages 72-89. To summarize that 
argument, while federal law does not clearly require spousal estate recovery, nothing in 
the law forbids it. 
F. lackman's Argument That Congress Rejected Language That Would Haye 
"Allowed" Spousal Recoyery Is a Clear Djstortion. 
As part of her pre-emption argument, Jackman contends that Congress 
specifically rejected language that would have "allowed" spousal estate recovery. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 19. This same argument was made to the magistrate and was 
shown to be a distortion of language taken out of context. R. pp. 85-86. Despite clear 
knowledge of her error, Jackman repeals the same argument here. again without 
including language plainly needed to give meaning to the quoted language. The full 
Congressional language rejected, is quoted below. Those few portions quoted by 
Jackman are in bold italics. The essential contextual language has been underlined for 
emphasis: 
(2) REQUIREMENTS FOR ESTATE RECOVERY 
PROGRAMS.-Section 1917(b) (42 U.S.C. 1396p(b) is amended­
(A) in paragraph (1). 
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(i) by striking "(b)(l)" and inserting "(2)", and 
(ii) by striking "(a)(I)(B)" and inserting "(a)(I)(B)(i)"; 
(B) in paragraph (2), by striking "(2) Any adjustment or recovery under" 
and inserting "(3) Any adjustment or recovery under an estate recovery program 
under"; and 
(C) by inserting before paragraph (2), as designated by subparagraph 
(A), the following: 
U(b)(I) For purposes of section 1902(a)(51)03l. the requirements for an 
estate recovery program of a State are as follows: 
"(A) The program provides for identifying and tracking (and, at the 
option of the State, preserving) resources (whether excluded or not) of 
individuals who are furnished any of the following long-tern) care services for 
which medical assistance is provided under tltis title: 
"(i) Nursing facility services. 
"(li) Home and community-based services (as defined in section 
1915(d)(5)(C)(i». 
"(iii) Services described in section I905(a)(I 4) (relating to services in an 
institution for mental diseases). 
"(iv) Home and community care provided under section 1929. 
"(v) Community supported living arrangements services provided under 
section 1930.
 
"(B) The program provides for promptly ascertaining­

"(i) when such an individual dies;
 
"(ii) ill tire case 0/ sIIch a" illdividllal wllo was married aJ tile time 0/ 
deaJl" wire" tire sllrvivi"g spollse dies; and 
"(iii) at the option of the State, cases in which adjustment or recovery 
may not be made at tlte time of death because of tlte application of paragraph 
(3)(A) or paragraph (3)(B). 
"(C)(i) n,e program provides/or tire collectio" cOluistellt witl, 
paragraplr (3) 0/all amoll"t ("ot to exceed the al1lolllll described ill clallse 
(ii» /rom­
"(1) the estaJe 0/ tl'e iI,dividllal,' 
"(II) in tl'e case 0/a" ;,'dividllal described ill sIIbparagraplr (B)(ii), 
from ll,e estate o/tl'e sllrvivi"g spollse; or 
"(Ill) at the option of the State, in a case described in subparagraph 
(B)(ili), from the appropriate person. 
"(ii) The amount described in this clause is the amount of medical 
assistance correctly paid under this title for long-tenn care services described in 
subparagraph (A) furnished on behalf of the individual. ". 
139 Congo Rec. H2997-01. 
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When read in the proper context, it is obvious that the rejected language would 
have required all states to perform spousal recovery. Nothing in the language suggests 
that states are not already permitted to engage in spousal estate recovery. 
G. Spousal Estate Recoyery Does Not Encourage Diyorces. 
Jackman contends that spousal estate recovery encourages divorces to protect 
separate estate assets. She, however, offers absolutely no support for her argument. 
Idaho has been doing spousal estate recovery since 1988 and there is no evidence to 
support a claim that it has encouraged divorces. 
As noted above, IDAPA 16.03.09.025.020 protects the separate property a 
spouse marrying late in life brings into the marriage. Therefore, no divorce is 
required. Only those assets which ~ the community property of the couple are 
subject to the spousal estate claim. Since the at-home spouse retains the couple's 
property for his own support, there is no motive to divorce to protect that property. 
Should a couple divorce and split their property unevenly, for the sole purpose of 
avoiding the Department's claim, the Department would view the transfer as voidable 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 56-218(1).1 
Just as in this case, it is after the death of both spouses that the dispute arises, 
JUndersigned counsel is aware of one case in which this did happen. In a First District case, the 
spouse in the nursing home, apparently upon advice ofcounsel, stipulated to a decree ofdivorce vesting all 
the couple's property in the at-home spouse, approximately six weeks before his demise. The Department 
contended the transfer was not for adequate consideration and imposed liens on the real property in question. 
Because a disabled (adult) child survives (delaying recovery under Idaho Code § 56-lIS( I), no recov<:ry has 
yet been made. 
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and the dispute is between the Department and the heirs, not between the Department 
and the benefitted couple. 
III. 
JACKMAN'S INTERPRETATION OF IDAHO CODE § 
56-218 IS ONLY POSSIBLE BECAUSE SHE 
IMPROPERLY MANIPULATED KNUDSON'S 
ESTATES. 
A. The Present Circumstance Could Not Haye Arisen Without Ignoring Established 
procedures and Priorities in the Idaho Code. 
In her brief, Jackman states that she collected Hildor's personal property by 
affidavit, paid expenses and forwarded the remainder to the Department. Respondent's 
Brief, p. 4. The facts in the record show that this is possible only if she acted outside 
the authority granted her, and in violation of her fiduciary duty to Lionel's estate. 
While often repeated, the sequence of events is important: Jackman signed a 
marriage seUlement agreement for both Hildor and Lionel Knudson on March 8, 1993. 
HHdor died October 27, 1994. R. p. 67. Lionel died two weeks later on November 
11, 1994. About two weeks after Lionel's death, on November 28, 1994, Jackman 
obtained appointment as personal representative of Lionel's estate. About June 30, 
1995, nearly eight months after Lionel's death, Jackman offered to disburse $1,861.30 
upon affidavit from the Department. See Exhibit A to Affidavit of Willard Abbot. R. 
p. 146. This offer was rejected by the Department. R. pp. 143-147. About August 
22, 1995, the Department issued a receipt to Jackman's attorney for receipt of the sum 
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of $1 ,638.03. R. p. 70. On August 29, 1995, Jackman filed an inventory with the 
court showing $1,861.30 in the conservator estate. R. p. 58. Jackman's signature on 
the document is dated two months prior to the date of filing. R. p. 58. 
The rights and powers of a conservator, after the death of the protected person, 
are very limited. Idaho Code § 15-5-425(e) provides as foHows: 
(e) If a protected person dies, the conservator shall deliver to the 
court for safekeeping any will of the deceased protected person which 
may have come into his possession, inform the executor or beneficiary 
named therein thai he has done so, and retain the estate for delivery to a 
duly appointed personal representatjve of the decedent or other persons 
entitled thereto. If after forly (40) days from the death of the protected 
person no other person has been appointed personal representative and no 
application or petition for appointment is before the court, the conservator 
may apply to e~ercise the powers and duties of a personal representalive 
so that he may proceed to administer and dislribute lhe decedent's estate 
withoul additional or further appoinlment. 
Idaho Code § 15-5-425(e) (underline added). Therefore, once Hildor had passed away, 
Jackman had no power to deal with her property, other than to retain it for delivery to a 
duly appointment personal representative. After forty days, she could petition to 
become the personal representative, which was never done. 
Jackman did, however, obtain appointment as· personal representative of Lionel's 
estate. Thereafter, she had a fiduciary obligation toward Lionel's estate. Idaho Code § 
15-3-703(a). When Jackman, in August, 1995, obtained Hildor's bank account by 
affidavit, she could do so only as a "successor" to the estate. Idaho Code § 15-3­
)20 I (a). A successor is a person, other than a creditor. entitled to possession of estate 
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property by will or pursuant to the probate code. Idaho Code § 15-1-201(46). 
Therefore, Jackman could obtain the money as heir under a will or through intestate 
succession, or she could obtain the money as the personal representative of Lionel's 
estate. As conservator for Hildor, she had no rights other than to retain the money for 
the personal representative. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 15-2-401 and 402, Lionel had the right to at least the 
first $7,500 from Hildor's estate. Since Jackman had a fiduciary obligation towa.rd 
Jackman's estate, she had a duty to apply any sums she obtained from Hildor's estate to 
Lionel's estate. Unless she violated this fiduciary duty, she had no right to deliver 
Hildor's money to the Department.2 In fact, by operation of Jaw, the money Jackman's 
attorney sent the Department in August, 1995, was Lionel's money, not Hildor's .. 3 
In order to put this malter in the present posture, then, Jackman had to ignore or 
violate Idaho Code §§ ]5-5-425(e) , 15-3-703(a), 15-2-40], 15-2-402, and 15-2-801. 
Had Jackman abided by t.hese laws, this case would never have come before the court. 
In point of fact, Hildor had no estate from which any recovery could have been made 
2As personal represenlalive of Lionel's eSlale, Jackman had the obligalion lo maximize the value of 
lhe eslale - whether lhe eslale would laler be paid lo credilors or heirs. Her personal slake as an heir could 
nol play inlo this obligalion. 
3While the probale code permits renuncialion and lhe homeslead and exempl property allowances 
may be subjecllo renuncialion, such renuncialion musl be in \\Tiling and musl be done wilhin nine months of 
lhe dealh of lhe decedent Idaho Code § 15-2-80 I. There was never any renuneialion here. Even had Lionel 
renounced. alleasllhe $3,500 exempl property allowance would have gone lo one of Lionel and Hildor's 
children before being subjecllo lhe Department's claim. 
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by the Department. 
B. It's Not Okay to Manipulate the System in an Attempt to Reap a Windfall at
 
Taxpayer Expense.
 
Jackman contends that the fact that she Ilmanipulated" the system is II irrelevant" 
because there is nothing wrong wilh shrewd estate planning. Respondent's brief, p. 26. 
This case, however, is not a case of shrewd estate planning. This is a case where the 
personal representative manipulated the estate to make it appear that money was being 
paid from Hildor's estate, when in fact, it was not. This was done for the soJe purpose 
of taking assets that had belonged to Hildor and Lionel Knudson and passing them to 
others, while leaving the public holding the bag for HiJdor's nursing care. Nothing in 
the law makes such an action morally or legally proper. 
IV.
 
CONCLUSION
 
Under Idaho's probate code and Idaho Code § 56-218(1), all estate and property 
of a deceased Medicaid recipient passes to the surviving spouse. Those funds are 
intended for that spouse's support and use. After both spouses have passed away, the 
law anticipates the public. will be repaid, to the extent possible, from the remaining 
estate. Jackman's manipulation should not be rewarded. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The issue presented by this case is whether there is any 
limit on the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare's recovery of 
Medicaid payments. Hildor Knudson was institutionalized on June 
28, 1992. She received $41,600.55 in Medicaid between January 1, 
1993 and her death on October 27, 1994. The value of Hildor's 
estate, minus funeral expenses and her legal fees (a net 
$1,683.03), was paid to the Department. Lionel Knudson, Hildor's 
spouse, died in November 1994 without having received any 
Medicaid. His estate was valued at $40,798.35. 
In January 1995, the Department filed a claim against 
Lionel's estate for the unrecovered balance of the Medicaid 
payments to Hilder. Barbara Jackman, the personal representative 
_lII' 
of Lionel's estate, objected that the Department's claim exceeded 
its authority under state and federal law. The Department's 
claim against Lionel's estate was denied by the magistrate· jUdge 
as contrary to state law. The Department appealed to the 
district judge, l~ho affirmed the magistrate judge's decision. 
The Department appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court vacated the 
order denying the Department's claim. 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I.	 The Court'!l holding is based upon a misunderstanding of the 
Medicaid system and will lead to unforseen, inequitable, and 
absurd results. 
II.	 The Court erred in ho1ding that federa1 1aw does not prohib­
it the Department from recovering Medicaid payments :Erom the 
estate of t~he recipient's surviving spouse. 
III.	 The Court erred in ho1ding that state 1aw authorizes the 
Department to recover Medicaid payments from the estate of 
the recipient's surviving spouse. 
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I.	 The Court's holding is based upon a misunderstanding of the 
Medicaid system and will lead to unforseen, inequitable, and 
absurd restLlts. 
The Court's; decision to allow the Department's claim is 
based on a misunderstanding of the Medicaid system, particularly 
as laid out by federal law. With all due respect, the Court 
misperceived how the system currently works and did not 
adequately consi.der how the Court's holding will disrupt the 
system in the future. 
It is easy to see how such confusion arose. The Medicaid 
system is extremely complex. The United states Supreme Court 
described the Medicaid statutes as "among the most intricate ever 
drafted by Congress" and stated that their "Byzantine 
construction . . . makes [them] almost unintelligible to the 
uninitiated." Schweiker v. Grey Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43 (1981) 
(citations omitted). Because the magistrate and district court 
decisions focused upon state law, both parties emphasized state 
law in the briefs submitted to the Court and neither part}' set 
out an overall picture of the Medicaid system at the federal or 
state level. Where the parties referred to the federal system, 
Jackman relied on specific technical arguments and the Department 
made several misrepresentations. Both parties also ignore:d the 
fact that both the federal and state law have independently 
changed in signi:ficant ways over time and that federal 
regulations, state laws, and state regulations have often not 
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...., kept up with changes in federal law. 
Before interpreting Medicaid statutes and regulations, one 
must understand the Medicaid system as it works for institution­
alized individuals in Idaho. Medicaid payments are not a loan 
and couples do not cheat the system simply because the State may 
not fully recover Medicaid payments made to one spouse. The 
federal law ensures that a married couple will spend most of 
their assets on the needy spouse's medical care before an insti­
tutionalized spouse receives any Medicaid. Further, states may 
later recover Medicaid payments from whatever assets are retained 
by the recipient. Thus, even without a provision for states to 
recover from the limited assets a community spouse is allowed to 
retain, Medicaid statutes already require a couple to expend a 
substantial portion of their assets on an institutionalized 
spouse's medical expenses: 
Middle-class individuals in need of long-term care must 
dispose of their assets exceeding poverty limits either to 
pay for their care or, in the alternative, to qualify for 
pUblic assistance. Thus, unlike the affluent (who can 
provide for their own health-care needs) and low-income 
individuals (who qualify for pUblic assistance), middle­
class individuals must forfeit any wealth accumulated. 
through a lifetime of hard work and savings to pay for long­
term care. This forfeiture is a harsh result for an indi­
vidual who has saved for a lifetime to provide for the 
future and ,~ho has paid taxes to support government programs 
like Medicaid. 
Amber R. Cook, Estate Planning with Medicaid: Qualification and 
Planning for the Elderly, 99 W. VA. L. REV. 155 (1996). 
A. How Medicaid eligibility currently works. 
Federal Medicaid eligibility laws are complex but generally 
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1~ work in a straight-forward way. In 1998, the institutionalized 
spouse must have a monthly income below $1,502 and non-exempt 
assets below $2,000 to receive Medicaid. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a{a) 
(10). In determining how much assets an applicant has for 
eligibility, the process ignores actual ownership (as bet~reen the 
spouses) of the .assets (though the institutionalized spouse will 
ultimate have to transfer actual ownership of all but $2,000 
worth of the non-exempt assets). 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5{c) (1) (A). 
Instead, a "snap-shot" is taken of all assets owned by either 
spouse, jointly or separately, on the date the spouse is a.dmitted 
to an institution (the "snap-shot" date). 42 U.S.C. § 139Sr­
S{c) (I) (B). The question is then how much of the "snap-shot" 
assets are "attributed" to each spouse. 42 U.S.C. § 139Sr­
S{c) (2). The community spouse is attributed a "community spouse 
'.." 
allowance" which is equal to one-half the total assets or $87,350 
(in 1998), whichE:!ver is lower {but not to be below $16,200 (in 
1998»). 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-S{f). "Snap-shot" assets beyond" the 
community spouse allowance are attributed to the institutional­
ized spouse. 42 U.S.C. § J.395r-5(C) (2). 
This complex system is easily illustrated. For example, 
assume one member of a married couple is institutionalized and 
applies for Medicaid. If the couple has non-exempt assets worth 
$20,000, $16,200 will be attributed to the community spouse 
(i.e., the Community Spouse Allowance (CSA» and the remaining 
$3,800 will be attributed to the institutionalized spouse. S. 
REP. No. 36{I), 10sth Cong., 1st Sess. 360-361 (1997). Thus, the 
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institutionalized spouse "has" assets exceeding the eligibility 
limit by $1,800. Id. If the couple has non-exempt assets worth 
$100,000, $50,000 will be attributed to each the community spouse 
and the institutionalized spouse (because the eSA will be one­
half of the total and the remainder be the other half). Id:. If 
the couple has non-exempt assets worth $200,000, $87,350 will be 
attributed to thl~ ·community spouse (as the maximum eSA) and the 
remaining $112,000 to the institutionalized spouse (as the 
remainder). Id. 
Again, the institutionalized spouse's non-exempt assets must 
be below $2,000 before he or she is eligible for Medicaid. 
Individuals who E:!xceed the resource limitations on the "snap­
shot" date typically "spend-down" their assets. Applicants 
generally spend-down assets by paying for their own medical care 
until they becomE~ eligible for Medicaid, meeting current ongoing 
expenses of the community spouse, investing in exempt assets 
(i.e., making improvements to the home t buying a cart or purchas­
ing funeral plans), paying of one's mortgage or other debts, and 
making gifts. 
Applicants can, and dOt dispose of assets by making gifts t 
but they do so at: a price. Disposal of assets (except for 
transfers between spouses) for less than fair market value during 
the look-back peJ:iod is penalized by a delay in Medicaid eligi­
bility. 42 u.s.e. § 1396p(c) (1) (B) (i). The look-back period is 
defined as the 36 months prior to the first day when an individ­
ual is both institutionalized and has applied for benefits. Id. 
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(For certain trusts, the look-back period is 60 months.) Id. 
The number of months of delay is determined by the value of the 
transferred ass€!ts divided by the average state nursing home rate 
determined by the Department, approximating the value of a. 
month's institut.ionalized care. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c) (1) (E). 
Thus, the penalt.y is a delay which is about equal to the amount 
of time the individual could have paid for his own care w:i th the 
transferred assets. There is no penalty, however, for transfers 
to the individual's spouse (or for the transfer of one's home to 
one's child who is under 21, blind or disabled). 42 U.S.C. § 
1396p(c) (2). 
B.	 How the current eligibility laws, estate recovery, and 
asset transfer penalties evolved. 
Before moving from the current eligibility system to the 
-w current estate recovery system, it is helpful to examine how the 
federal provisions as to eligibility, estate recovery, and asset 
transfer penalti,es were developed in reaction to these provi­
sion's interaction over time. 
From Medicaid's creation in 1965 until changes were made in 
1988, the attribution of income and resources for Medicaid 
eligibility purposes was simpler than the current system. When 
one spouse enterl:!d a nursing home, each spouse was treated (for 
eligibility purposes) as a separate household. H.R. REP. No. 
105 (II), lOath Cc:mg., 2nd Sess. I 66 (1988) reprinted in 1988 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 889. Income was considered to belong to the spouse 
whose name was 011 the instrument conveying the funds. Id. 
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'1_' Similarly, resources held solely by the institutionalized spouse 
were attributed to him/her. Id. Resources that were jointly 
held were also considered to belong entirely to the institution­
alized spouse, em the theory that he or she had an unrestricted 
right to use them. Id. If assets were held solely by th,e 
community SPOUSE~, however, they were considered to belong solely 
to him/her and there was no obligation on the part of the 
community SPOUSE! to contribute any amount toward the COsti3 of the 
care of institut.ionalized spouse. Id. at 889-890. 
When Congre,ss created the Medicaid program in 1965, it 
included a strict restriction on the ability of states to pursue 
recovery of Medicaid payments: 
A State plan for medical assistance must ­
(18) provide that . . . there shall be no adjustment or recov­
ery (except, in the case of an individual who was 65 years of 
age or older, from his estate, and then only after the death 
of the surviving spouse, if any, and only at a time when he 
has no surviving child who is under age 21 or is blind or 
permanently and totally disabled) of any medical assistance 
correctly paid on behalf of such individual under the plan. 
Title XIX of the Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 89-97, §: 1902, 
79 stat. 347 (1965). 
Originally, Congress allowed states to deny Medicaid eligi­
bility to applic,:mts who, within the previous 24 months, grive 
away non-exempt assets, but did not allow states to penalize the 
transfer of exempt assets.' S. REP. No. 494 (I), 97th Cong,., 2nd. 
Sess., 38 (1982) reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 781, 814. Thus, 
an elderly individual who needed nursing home care could give 
his/her home awa~{ (whether to a family member, friend, or 
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,,~....	 complete strangE!r) and "assure that the home will not be part of 
his/her estate and therefore will not be sUbject to any recoveryl 
action initiated by the state after the individual/s death." Id. 
at 815. Also 1 the penalty for transfer of non-exempt assE~ts was 
a 24 month delay in Medicaid payments 1 regardless of the value of 
the assets. Id. 
In 1982 1 Congress changed the law to penalize the transfers of 
any assets (whether exempt or not for eligibility purposeB) 
except where an individual transfers title to his/her home to a 
spouse or a minor or handicapped child. Tax Equity & Financial 
Responsibility Act, Pub. L. 97-248, § 132, 96 stat. 324 (1982). 
Congress also replaced the old estate recovery provision with the 
following language codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (1) (19~12): 
(b) ADJUSTMENT OR RECOVERY OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE CORRECTLY 
.., PAID UNDER A STATE PLAN . 
(1) No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance 
correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the state 
plan may be made, except ­
(A) in the case of an individual described in subsection 
(a) (1) (B), from his estate or upon sale of the property 
subj ect to a lien imposed on account of medical as::ds­
tance pai.d on behalf of the individual, and 
(B) In th.e case of an individual who was 6S years ()f age 
or older when the individual received such medical assis­
tance l from his estate. 
rd. The House Committee that wrote these provisions made it 
clear they were intended to ensure that all resources of "an 
individual will be used to defray the public costs of supporting 
that individual in a long-term medical institution" while 
protecting "the legitimate rights of the recipient the reci­1 
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pient's spouse cmd his/her dependent children." S. REP. No. 
494 (I) . 
The normal effect of these provisions was that an individual 
would have to spend-down all of his non-exempt assets and any 
gift of his assets would be penalized by a delay in Medica.id 
benefits (which would mean the individual would have to spend on 
nursing home ca:re during the delay an amount equal to the value 
of the gifts). H.R. REP. No. lOS (II) . The individual could retain 
exempt assets and the state could recover their value from the 
individual's estate - except for the family home which the 
individual was free to transfer to his/her spouse or minor or 
disabled child. Id. Because the home is the primary exen~t 
asset and married individuals could be expected to use the 
opportunity to preserve the home for their family, the Health 
~..., 
Care Financing Administration assumed its regulations implement­
ing the 1982 statutes would only result in estate recovery from 
unmarried recipients. See 47 Fed. Reg. 43644, 43646 (1982). 
In 1988, Congress recognized that "the leading cause of 
financial catastrophe among the elderly is the need for long-term 
care n because "the expense of nursing home care [$2,000 - $3,000 
per month in 1988] has the potential for rapidly depleting the 
lifetime savings of all but wealthiest." H.R. REP. No. lOS(II), 
loath Cong., 2nd Sess., 6S (1988) reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
888. Because Medicare does not cover the costs of long-term 
insti'tutionalization and "private insurance for nursing home 
costs is not genE~rally available," Congress concluded that the 
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Medicaid progranl is the only viable source of payment for nursing 
home care for most of the elderly. Id. 
Congress further recognized that the old resource and income 
attribution rule:s were leading to unintended and unwanted 
results. For example, it was quite common for the bulk o:E the 
couple's income and resources to be jointly-owned or owned by the 
institutionalized spouse so that they were attributed to t.he 
institutionalized spouse and had to be spent-down before he/she 
received any Medicaid. See H.R. REP. lOS (II) . Under such. circum­
stances, the community spouse (usually an elderly woman) could 
keep the couple's house but was otherwise "unjustly impovE~rished" 
(i.e., left with little or no income and resources). Id. at 899­
900. On the other hand, if the bulk of a couple's income and 
resources were solely owned by the community spouse, the insti.tu­
.., 
tionalized spouse would immediately qualify for Medicaid .. no
 
matter how wealthy the couple had been - and the community spouse
 
would retain all the couple's income and assets without contrib­

uting anything to the costs of his/her spouse's medical caLre.
 
Id.
 
Congress responded to these problems by passing the lVledicare 
Catastrophic Cov1erage Act (MCCA) which (among other things) 
amended the Medicaid statutes to essentially create the current 
eligibility and asset transfer regime described earlier hE~rein. 
The primary relevant changes were replacing the original method 
of resource attribution with the current model of piling together 
all the assets and then taking out the Community Spouse Resource 
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Allowance beforl~ requiring a spend-down. Medicare Catastrophic 
Coverage Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-360, § 303(a), 102 Stat. 
683, 756 (1988)" MCCA also replaced the 24-month look-back and 
penalty for assE~t transfers with a 30-month look-back and a 
penalty proportionate to the amount transferred with a 30-month 
cap on the penalty. Id. at § 303(b), 102 stat. at 761. Finally, 
MCCA expanded the ability of individuals to transfer their home 
to the community spouse without penalty to include the ability to 
transfer all assets without penalty (which made sense because who 
was the actual owner of the assets no longer mattered for 
eligibility attribution purposes). Id. at § 303(a), 102 stat. at 
759; H.R. REP. 105(11) at 896. MCCA did not, however, change the 
estate recovery provisions. 
Congress again dealt with these issues in August 1993. Based 
on concerns that individuals were hiding assets for eligibility 
purposes, Congress passed broader definitions of assets, E!xtended 
the look-back period to 36 months, and lifted the 30-month cap on 
transfer penalties. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, 
Pub. L. No. ~03-66, §§ ~366~-~36~2, ~07 Stat. 3~2, 622-6251 • To 
the estate recovery provisions, Congress added a mandatory' and an 
optional definition of "estate ll and changed the language to read: 
(b) ADJUSTMENT' OR RECOVERY OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE CORRECTLY 
PAID UNDER A STATE PLAN. 
(1) No adjul;Jbnent or recovery of any medical assistance 
correctly pilid on behalf of an individual under the State 
plan may be made, except that the State shall seek adjust­
ment or recc)very of any medical assistance correctly paid on 
behalf of an individual under the State plan in the case of 
the following individuals: 
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(A) In the case of an individual described in subsec­
tion (a) (1) (B), the state shall seek adjustment or recov­
ery from the individual's estate. 
10.. at §13612(a & c), 107 Stat. at 627-628 (1993) (emphasis 
added) . 
As Congressman Henry Waxman has noted, "once you wade 
through the maze of Medicaid eligibility rules and trust a.nd 
estate law, the issue goes to some very fundamental questions" 
about who should pay for the long-term health care costs of the 
elderly. Medicaid and Medicaid Budget Reconciliation: Hearings 
before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House 
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 334 (1993)­
[hereinafter Hearings]. The answers to these questions must come 
first from Congress and second from the legislature. 
The preceding history of the Medicaid statute reveals some! of 
•." these answers. 
First, Congress knows and accepts that Medicaid is the 
primary payer for the long-term care costs of the elderly. H. R. 
REP. 105 (II). The vast majority of the institutionalized ,elderly 
- no matter how publicly responsible - have no choice but to rely 
on Medicaid unle:3s they simply forgo medical care. Id. Congress 
has thus provided Medicaid for such individuals while consistent­
ly seeking to ensure "that individuals with substantial personal 
assets pay a fair share for nursing horne care and certain other 
medical services before they qualify for Medicaid." Hearings at 
19 (statement of William Toby, Jr., Acting Administrator, Health 
Care Financing Administration) (emphasis in original). This is 
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achieved through the asset attribution process, the spend-down'I'.~· 
provisions, and asset transfer restrictions. Id. 
On the othE~r hand, Congress has decided it is unfair to 
require a spouse to contribute all of his or her assets to pay 
for the medical care of an institutionalized individual. It is 
fair for them to contribute some assets (unless the couple is too 
poor to do so). Thus, Congress enacted the MCCA allowing un­
penalized spousal transfers, attributing assets without regard to 
ownership for eligibility purposes, and requiring a spend-down 
while protectinsr the community spouse resource allowance. 
Further, Congress has never passed any provision allowing states 
to recover payments from the estate of a recipient's spouse ("nor 
made any exception to the general prohibition against state 
Medicaid recovery except from recipient's estates). 
C.	 The un.forseen, inequitable and absurd results of the 
Court's holding. 
The above-mentioned goals of the federal Medicaid system are 
generally realized in the system's day-to-day application (though 
there are always anomalies). The system anticipates (even 
expects) that many elderly individuals will engage in estate 
planning to maximize the extent they benefit from the system 
while minimizing their costs. Further, the system pursues: 
fairness by maximizing the amount an individual must pay for 
his/her own care, but limiting the extent others (spouses and the 
public) must pay. The Court's decision upsets this balance and 
creates unfair, even absurd, results without adding to the 
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hypotheticals: 
Example 1: Spouse receives Medicaid. 
Kelvin farms :Eor a living. He inherited the family farm from 
his parents. The farm is valued at $300,000. He, wife, and 
daughter worke3d the farm until Kelvin retired. At that point 
he leased the land to his daughter to farm. Wife is diag­
nosed with Al:2:heimer's disease and is required to enter a care 
center. Kelv:ln and wife private pay for care at roughly 
$4,000 per month. A year later wife applies for Medicaid and 
is found eligible. Wife lives in the care center for an 
additional ten years at a Medicaid cost of $300,000 ($2,500 a 
month). At wife's death her estate is valued at less than 
$2,000 as required by Medicaid eligibility rules. Kelvin 
lives an additional ten years and at his death his estate 
consists of his farm. Kelvin's heir is his daughter who has 
continued to lease the farm. The Department seeks recovery 
of the $300/000 for wife's care from Kelvin's estate (the 
farm) . 
Result: Undel~ the Court's decision, the Department will be 
allowed to recover the $300,000 from Kelvin's estate under state 
Example 2: Gift of farm to daughter, spouse receives Medicaid. 
Kelvin farms for a living. He inherited the family farm 
from his parents. The farm is valued at $300,000. He, wife, 
and daughter \\rorked the farm until Kelvin retired. At that 
point he leased the land to his daughter to farm. Wife;: is 
diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease and is required to enter a 
care center. At that point Kelvin gifts the farm to h:ls 
daughter. This gift of Kelvin's separate property carries 
with it a period of Medicaid ineligibility from 36 months to 
88 months depending on when Kelvin and his wife apply for 
Medicaid. Kelvin and wife pay for 36 months of long term 
care (roughly $144/000) depleting their cash resources. 
Thirty-seven months post-gift Kelvin's wife applies for Medic­
aid and is found eligible. Wife lives in the care center for 
an additional eight years (at a Medicaid cost of $240,000 
($2,500 a month). At wife's death her estate is valued at 
less than $2,000 as required by Medicaid eligibility rules. 
Kelvin lives an additional ten years and at his death his 
estate consists of his personal effects. 
Result: The Department is unable to obtain recovery of the 
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$240,000 for wife's care from the farm but can recoup minimally 
from Kelvin's estate. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c). See also Peter 
J. Strauss, Medi,caid Revisions in 1993 Budget Act, N. Y. L. ~r., Sept. 
30, 1993, at 3, 7. The very wealthy can afford to get around the 
asset transfer and estate recovery provisions, but poor and 
middle-class individuals cannot. 
Example 4: Formal post-nuptial agreement. 
Kelvin farms for a living. He inherited the family farm from 
his parents. The farm is valued at $300,000. He, first 
wife, and dau9hter worked the farm until Kelvin retired. At 
that point he leased the land to his daughter to farm. First 
wife dies. A year later Kelvin remarries. He and second wife" 
enter into a j:ormal post nuptial agreement preserving the 
separate natul~e of each spouse's estate. within a few years 
of marriage se~cond wife is diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease 
and is require~d to enter a care center . Kelvin and second wife 
private pay for care at roughly $4,000 per month. A year 
later second wife applies for Medicaid for second wife ,and is 
found eligible~. Second wife lives in the care center for an 
additional ten years at a Medicaid cost of $300,000 ($2,500 a 
month) . At second wife's death her estate is valued at less 
than $2,000 aEI required by Medicaid eligibility rules. 
Kelvin lives em additional ten years and at his death his 
estate consists of his farm. Kelvin's heir is his daughter 
who has continued to lease the farm. The Department sl:eks 
recovery of the $300,000 for second wife's care from Kelvin's 
estate (the farm). 
Result: Under the Court's decision, the Department will be 
allowed to recover the $300,000 from Kelvin's estate. The 
Court's decision ignores treasured principles of community' 
property law by Inaking Kelvin's separate property liable for his 
second wife's Medicaid payments. 
Example 5: Kelvin divorces second wife. 
Kelvin farms for a living. He inherited the family farm 
from his parents. The farm is valued at $300,000. He, 
first wife, and daughter worked the farm until Kelvin retired. 
At that point he leased the land to his daughter to farm. 
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First wife dies. A year later Kelvin remarries. He and 
second wife enter into a formal post nuptial agreement pre­
serving the separate nature of each spouse's estate. within 
a few years of marriage second wife is diagnosed with lUz­
heimer's disease and is required to enter a care center. 
Kelvin and second wife private pay for care at roughly $4,000 
per month. A year later Kelvin divorces second wife and their 
property is divided according to the post nuptial agree:ment. 
second wife, now ex-wife, applies for Medicaid and is found 
eligible. Second wife lives in the care center for all addi­
tional ten years at a Medicaid cost of $300,000 ($2,500 a 
month) . At second wife's death her estate is valued a.t less 
than $2,000 as required by Medicaid eligibility rules. Kelvin 
lives an additional ten years and at his death his estate 
consists of h:is farm. Kelvin's heir is his daughter who has 
continued to lease the farm. Medicaid seeks recovery of the 
$300,000 for ex-second wife's care from Kelvin's estate (the 
farm) . 
Result: Under this Court's decision, state law would preclude 
recovery other than from second wife's estate for her Medicaid 
costs. Hasn't the Court created a powerful incentive for di­
vorce? 
Example 6: Kelvin predeceases second wife. 
Kelvin farms for a living. He inherited the family farm 
from his parents. The farm is valued at $300,000. He, 
first wife, and daughter worked the farm until Kelvin retired. 
At that point he leased the land to his daughter to farm. 
First wife die~s. A year later Kelvin remarries. He and 
second wife enter into a formal post nuptial agreement pre­
serving the SE!parate nature of each spouse's estate. Within 
a few years of: marriage second wife is diagnosed with Alz­
heimer's disecLse and is required to enter a care center. 
Kelvin and second wife private pay for care at roughly ;$4,000 
per month. A year later Kelvin dies. His estate is probated 
according to his Will (reflecting separate nature of each 
spouse's property) with the farm passing to Kelvin's daughter 
and second wife, now widow, receiving her statutory spousal 
share. Second wife applies for Medicaid and is found eligi­
ble. Second wife lives in the care center for an additional 
ten years at a Medicaid cost of $300,000 ($2,500 a month) . 
At second wife's death her estate is valued at less than 
$2,000 as requ.ired by Medicaid eligibility rules. 
Result: Under this Court's decision, state law would preclude 
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recovery other than from second wife's estate for her Medicaid 
costs. Why should whether Kelvin's daughter inherits the farm 
depend upon who - Kelvin or his wife - dies first? 
Example 9: The second wife's inheritance 
Kelvin farms for a living. He and his wife lease a farm 
from Kelvin's parents. Wife is diagnosed with early Alzheime­
r's disease and is required to enter a care center. Kelvin 
and wife private pay for care at roughly $4,000 per month. A 
year later wife applies for Medicaid for wife and is found 
eligible. Wife lives in the care center for an additional ten 
years at a Medicaid cost of $300,000 ($2,500 a month). At 
wife's death her estate is valued at less than $2,000 as 
required by Ml:!dicaid eligibility rules. Kelvin remarries and 
he and his second wife live together for twenty-five years. 
The second wi:Ee and Kelvin accumulate an estate valued at 
$500,000 due to second wife's inheritance of a family farm 
from her parents a year before she dies. Second wife has a 
son who leased the inherited farm from second wife and second 
wife's parentB. At Kelvin's death his estate consists of this 
farm. The Department seeks recovery of the $300,000 for first 
wife's care from Kelvin's estate (the farm). 
Result: Under the Court's decision, the family farm of the 
second wife is liable for Kelvin's first wife's care costs. 
Again, how can this be reconciled with Idaho's community property 
laws? 
In conclusion, the issues raised in these hypotheticals do 
not make the Court's decision erroneous by themselves. They do, 
however, counter any notion that spousal estate recovery i.s a 
moral imperative or follows logically from Idaho's probate: law or 
the Medicaid schl:!me. There are just as many, if not more, good 
policy reasons to prohibit spousal estate recovery as there are 
reasons to allow it. If Congress and the state legislature has 
made a clear policy choice in favor of spousal estate recovery it 
would not be for the Court to deny it. If, however, federal or 
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state law is contrary to, or ambiguous in regard to, spou,sal 
estate recovery, the Court should have no qualms about prohibit­
ing it. At the very least, it should be clear that Medicaid is 
not a loan and couples do not cheat the system simply because the 
state may not fully recover Medicaid payments made to one spouse. 
II.	 The Court Elrred in holding that federal law does not prohib­
it the Depa~rtment from recovering Medicaid payments from the 
estate of t:he recipient's surviving spouse. 
Federal la'YOr provides the parameters for state recovery of 
Medicaid payments. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (18) (state Medicaid 
programs must comply with the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p 
with respect to liens, adjustments, and recoveries of Medicaid 
correctly paid). This Court held in McCoy v. state of Idaho, 
Department of Health and Welfare, 907 P.2d 110, 112 (1995): 
Each state's participation in Medicaid is optional, but once 
a state voluntarily elects to participate in the pro9ram, it 
must comply with the requirements imposed by the Act and 
applicable regulations. 
Hildor Knudson received Medicaid payments from Janualy I, 
1993 until her d,eath on October 27, 1994. The payments for 
medical services Hildor received prior to October I, 1993 are 
covered by 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (1) (A) (1992) which prohibits 
states from reco'iTery Medicaid payments made to a recipient who is 
institutionalized except "from his estate." The payments for 
medical services Hildor received after October I, 1993 are 
covered by 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (1) (A) (Supp. 1998) which also 
prohibits states from recovery of payments made to an individual 
who is institutionalized except from "the individual's estate." 
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Thus, the Department is prohibited by federal law from recovering 
any of the paymEmts made to Hildor except from her estate. The 
Department cannot recover from Lionel's estate. 
The Court finds two reasons why 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (1) (A) 
does not limit a state's recovery of Medicaid payments to the 
estate of the recipient. First, the Court concludes that the 
statute is only a limitation on the types of medical assi:stance 
which can be recovered and does not limit from whom these pay­
ments may be recovered. Second, the Court concludes that the 
definition of an individual's estate includes the income a.nd 
resources of the individual's spouse - thus recovery from an 
individual's estate includes recovery from the spouse's estate. 
A. Federal law does limit from whom Medicaid payments may 
be recovered - a state may only recover from the reci­
pient's estate. 
1.	 The language and history of the federal statute 
demonstrate the illegality of spousal estat:e re­
covery. 
Since the Medicaid program was created in 1965, fedeI:al law 
has consistently prohibited recovery of properly paid Medi.caid 
payments except from the estate of the recipient individua.1. The 
original 1965 statute specified that "a State plan for medical 
assistance must . . . provide that . there shall be no 
adjustment or recovery (except, in the case of an individu.al who 
was 65 years of age or older, from his estate .. Pub. L. 89­II 
97 at § 1902, 79 Stat at 347 (1965). In 1982, Congress summa­
rized the state of the law as follows: 
Under current law, States are barred from imposing any lien 
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against any recipient's property prior to his death because 
of Medicaid claims paid or to be paid on his behalf unless 
placed as a result of a court judgment. In the case of 
individuals under age 65, no adjustments or recoveri,es can 
be made for Medicaid claims correctly paid. In the case of 
individuals over 65, adjustments and recoveries for correct­
ly paid claims can only be made from his/her estate after 
the individual's death and only (1) after the death of his 
surviving spouse; and (2) where there are no surviving 
children who are under 21, blind, or disabled. 
S. REP. No. 494 (I), 97th Cong., 2nd. Sess., 38 (1982) reprinted 
in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 781, 814. Remember that Congress also 
summarized the law as allowing an elderly individual to give 
his/her house to his/her spouse and "by doing so, the individual 
assures that the: home will not be part of his/her estate imd 
therefore will not be subject to any recovery action initiated by 
the state after the individual's death." Id. at 815. It could 
not be clearer, that at least as of 1982, states could not 
.. recover Medicaid payments from the estate of a recipient' f3 
spouse. 
When did CongJ:ess change this language to allow recovery from 
the estate of the recipient's spouse? Never. In 1982, Congress 
changed the relevant provision to read: 
No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance c:orrect­
ly paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan may be 
made, except .. 
(A) in tl:Le case of an individual [who is an inpati,ent in 
a nursing facility, intermediate care facility for the 
mentally retarded or other medical institution, if such 
individual is required, as a condition of receiving s:ervices 
in such institution under the state plan, to spend for costs 
of medical care all but a minimal amount· of his income 
required fo:r personal needs], from his estate or upon sale 
of the property SUbject to a lien imposed on account of 
medical assistance paid on behalf of the individual, and 
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(B) In the case of an individual who was 65 years of age 
or older when the individual received such medical assis­
tance, from his estate. 
Tax Equity & Financial Responsibility Act, Pub. L. 97-248, § 132, 
96 Stat. 324 (1982) (bracketed portion reflects incorporation of 
referenced language from § 132(a) (1)). Congress also reworded, 
but retained the limitations on when recovery could be made ­
only after the death of the recipient's surviving spouse and only 
when there was no surviving child under 21, blind, or disabled. 
As codified. in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (1) (1992), the above 
language was the law of the land until October 1st, 1993. Note 
that Hildor received Medicaid payments from January 1993 through 
October 1994, so about half of her payments are covered by this 
language. R. pp. 25-40. After October 1, 1993, the applicable 
language as codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1396(b) (1) (Supp. 1998) reads: 
No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correct­
ly paid on bellalf of an individual under the state plan may be 
made, except t;hat the state shall seek adjustment or re,covery 
of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an 
individual under the State plan in the case of the folll::>wing 
individuals: 
(A) In the case of an individual [who is an inpa.tient 
in a nursing facility, intermediate care facility :Eor the 
mentally retarded or other medical institution, if such 
. individuall is required, as a condition of receivin9 
services in such institution under the State plan, to 
spend for costs of medical care all but a minimal amount 
of his income required for personal needs], the state 
shall seek adjustment or recovery from the individual's 
estate or upon sale of the property subject to a lien 
imposed on account of medical assistance paid on behalf 
of the in.dividual. 
(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of 
age or older when the individual received such medical 
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assistance, the state shall seek adjustment or recovery 
from the individual's estate, but only for medical assis­
tance consisting of ­
(i) nursing facility services, home and community-based 
services, and related hospital and prescription drug 
services, or 
(ii) at the option of the state, any items or services 
under the state plan. 
(C) (i)In the case of an individual who has received (or 
is entitled to receive) benefits under a long-tertrl care 
insurancla policy in connection with which assets or 
resources are disregarded in the manner described in 
clause (:ii) , except as provided in such clause, the State 
shall selak adjustment or recovery from the individual's 
estate on account of medical assistance paid on behalf of 
the indi'ridual for nursing facility and other long-term 
care services. 
(ii) Clause (i) shall not apply in the case of an 
individual who received medical assistance under a State 
plan of a state which had a state plan amendment approved 
as of May 14, 1993, which provided for the disregard of 
any assets or resources ­
(I) to the extent that payments are made under a 
long-term care insurance policy; or 
(II) because an individual has received (or is enti­
tled to receive) benefits under a long term care! insur­
ance policy." 
Omnibus Budget R1econciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103 -66, 
§1361.2 (a) , 1.07 Stat. 627-628 (1.993). The 1.993 amendments did not 
change the limit on when recovery could be made (only where there 
is no surviving spouse or dependent) and added a requirement for 
states to waive recovery where it would "work an undue hardship." 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (1-3) (Supp. 1998). As will be discussed 
later, a definition of the term "estate" was also added. 42 
U.s.C. § 1396p(b} (4) (Supp. 1998). 
Again, as oj: September 30, 1982, federal law unequivocally 
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prohibited spouHal estate recovery. S. REP. No. 494(1) a.t 814. 
Where in the lesrislation since then is there any change allowing 
states to recover Medicaid payments from the recipient's :spouse? 
Nowhere. The change on October 1, 1982 did nothing more than 
amend the generall prohibition against any recovery of Medicaid 
payments to add an exception to allow recovery from the estate of 
individuals who receive benefits prior to age 65 if they received 
such benefits because they were institutionalized. 42 U.S.C. § 
1396p (b) (1) (A) (1992) . 
The effect of the 1993 amendments is bit more complex, but 
similar. The law still retains the general prohibition asrainst 
any recovery of properly-made Medicaid payments. 42 U.S.C. § 
1396p(b} (1) (Supp. 1998). As to individuals who received fl'ledicaid 
prior to age 5S because they were institutionalized, the permis­
sive exception is changed to a mandatory requirement (i.e., 
states are required to recover the payments from the individual's 
estate or through use of a lien). 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b} (1) (A) 
(Supp. 1998). As to individuals who received Medicaid after they 
were 55, states may recover all payments from the individual's 
estate and are n~quired to recover some types of payments (those 
for long-term care) from the individual's estate. 42 U.S.C. § 
1396p (b) (1) (B) (i··ii) (Supp. 1998). As to individuals who receive 
Medicaid under special state provisions that coordinate eligibil­
ity with long-te]~ care insurance policies, states must recover 
payments for long-term care services (except where the state plan 
was approved before May 14, 1993) from the estate of the individ-
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ual.	 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (1) (C) (i-ii) (Supp. 1998). 
Thus, states are prohibited - with no qualifiers - from 
recovery of Medicaid payments except from certain recipients' 
estates in ever)r version of the Medicaid statute that has ever 
existed. It is difficult to conceive how the statute's language 
could more expli.citly limit from whom (and by what means) a state 
may recover Medi.caid payments. 
2.	 'I'he federal statute's l.imitation upon from whom 
(and how) states may recover Medicaid payments is 
J:'eflected in the case l.aw. 
Case law from the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit and other courts is premised upon the conclusion 
that the federal statutory language limits from where a state may 
recover Medicaid payments. In Bucholtz v. Belshe, 114 F.3d 923 
(9th Cir. 1997), and Citizens Action League v. Kizer, 887 F.2d 
1003 (9th Cir. 1989), the Ninth Circuit held that, prior to being 
amended in 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (1) limited recovery to the 
recipient's estate. The issue in each case was what assets are 
included in the :recipient's estate. In Kizer, the court held 
that a recipient's estate did not include property the recipient 
owned in joint b:mancy and that a state could not seek to recover 
Medicaid benefits from any person who succeeded by survivorship 
to such property. 887 F.2d at 1006-1008. In Bucholtz, the court 
held that a recipient's estate did include an ownership interest 
at the time of dE~ath in community property or property held as a 
tenant in common,. but did not include property in an inter vivos 
trust. 114 F.3d at 925-927. To the extent a state statute 
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·....,.	 "seeks to reach further than § 1396p (b) (1), it cannot stand. II 
Id. at 925. 
One might, of course, distinguish these cases on the ground 
that the statute was amended in 1993, but such a distincti.on is 
without merit. First, a large portion of Hildor's Medicaid 
payments were made prior to the effective date of the 1993 
amendments. Second, the key language ("No recovery ... except 
. . . in the caSte of an individual . . . from his estate II ) relied 
upon by the Ninth Circuit in Bucholtz remained essentially 
unchanged ("No r1ecovery . . . except . . . in the case of an 
individual. . from the individual's estate) by the 1993 
amendments. Co~)are 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (1) (A) (1992) with 42 
U.S.C. §	 1396p(b) (1) (A) (Supp. 1998). 
Cases after the 1993 amendments also hold that the language 
of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (1) prohibits states from collecting 
Medicaid	 paymentf; except from the estate of the recipient. In 
Demille v. BelshE~, 1994 WL 519457 (N.D. Cal. Sept.16, 1994), the 
United States District Court for the North District of California 
noted that the general rule created by the statute was no recov­
ery except from individual's estates and held: 
The federal statute allows the state to recoup its e~penses 
only from those persons who are holding real or personal 
property in which the deceased recipient held a legal inter­
est at the time of death. See [42 U.S.C. §] 1396p(b) (1)­
(requiring Eltate to recover from decedent's "estate") and § 
1396p (b) (4) (defining "estate"). The amount of expens'es the 
state may re!cover from such persons is capped by the .amount 
of decedent's interest in the property. § 1396p(b) (4). In 
other words, the federal statute only contemplates th,:it the 
deceased recipient's assets will be traced, not that other 
persons can become liable to pay over their own asset:3. 
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1994 WL at *7. similarly, in Matter of Estate of Budney, 541 
N.W.2d 245 (Wis. App. 1995), the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held 
that a state stcltute authorizing recovery of medical assistance 
benefits from the surviving spouse's estate exceeded the authori­
ty provided by the federal Medicaid statutes. 541 N.W. at 246. 
There appea.rs to be only one case even vaguely supportive of 
the Court's conclusion that 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b} (1) does not 
limit a state's recovery of Medicaid payments to the estate of 
the recipient. Ironically, Matter of Estate of Imburgia, 130 
A.D.2d 658 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987), was decided prior to both the 
1988 and the 1993 amendments to the statute and considers mainly 
the deeming of assets between spouses. Further, the Imbul:gia 
analysis was explicitly rejected by a higher court, the NE!W York 
Court of Appeals, in Matter of Estate of Craig, 624 N.E.2d 1003 
(N.Y. 1993). In Craig, the court held that federal law generally 
prohibited recovery of Medicaid, made a narrow exception f'or the 
recovery from the estate of the recipient, but did not "provide 
for recovery of lYIedicaid payments on behalf of a predeceased 
spouse from the lsecondari1y dying spouse's estate." 624 N.E. at 
1006. The court also noted that the 1993 amendments to the 
statute "gives the states, at their option, the power to recover 
against a spouse"s estate, but only against the recipient's 
assets that were conveyed through joint tenancy and other speci­
fied forms of sUJ:,vivorship. n Id. 
B.	 The Court erred by combining 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e) (l)'s 
definition with 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (4)'s definition of 
estate" 
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The Court's second basis for holding that the Department's 
claim against Lionel's estate does not violate 42 U.S.C. § 
1396p(b) (1) is the Court's conclusion that an individual's estate 
(as defined by the statute) includes all income and resources 
owned by the individual and his/her spouse, including any income 
or resources that the individual and spouse were entitled to but 
did not receive because of action by them on their behalf. By 
plugging the 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e) (1) definition of assets into 
the 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (4) definition of estate, the Court 
reasons that recovery from Hildor's estate includes all of 
Lionel's estate, particularly resources he acquired from the 
marriage settlement agreement. This analysis is faulty in 
several respects. 
1.	 T:b.e Court's analysis of the definitions ignores 
the effective dates of the statute. 
The 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e) (1) definition of assets does not 
apply "with respect to assets disposed of on or before the~ date 
of the enactment of this Act" (August 10, 1993). P.L. 103-66, § 
13612(e) (2) (B). Hildor transferred all of her interest in the 
Knudson's assets to Lionel on March 8, 1993. R. pp. 63-66. 
Thus, the (e) (1) definition of assets explicitly does not include 
any of Lionel's estate. Additionally, both the 42 U.S.C. § 
1396p(e) (1) definition of assets and the 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (4) 
definition of estate only apply to Medicaid payments "for calen­
dar quarters beginning on or after October 1, 1993." P.L. 103­
66, § 13612(e) (2:~ (A). Thus, even if the Court's analysis of the 
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definitions of E!state and assets is correct, it cannot be applied 
to Lionel's estate and, even if it could, it would only apply to 
those payments made on Hildor's behalf after October 1, 1993. 
2 • 'l~he	 Court's analysis defies the structure (:>f 42 
u. s. C. §	 1396p. 
Subsection (b) (4) 's definition of "estate" is specific to 
"this sUbsection" (i.e. I subsection 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b» ,r 
whereas subsection (e) (l)'s definition applies generally to "this 
section" (i.e., all of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p). When interpreting 
statutory definitions, as with statutory provisions in general, 
general	 definitions are superseded by specific definitions. 
State v.	 Jones, 34 Idaho 83, 199 P. 645 (1921); Herrick v.~ 
Gallet,	 35 Idaho 13, 204 P. 477 (1922); In re Drainage Dist. No. 
1, 40 Idaho 549, 235 P. 895 (1925). Subsection (e) (4) 's defini­
'.1"","	 tion of "assets" applies to that word's use in section 1396p as a 
whole. This broad definition is displaced, for purposes of 
subsection (b) r by subsection (b) (4) 's very specific definition. 
3.	 The Court's analysis ignores the legislatiV'e his­
t10ry of the definitions. 
The structu:ral wall between the (b) (4) definition of "es­
tate" and the (e) (1) definition of assets is not a mere techni­
cality. The two provisions were distinguished throughout their 
legislative history. Subsection (b) (4) was enacted as part of 
section 13612 "Ml~dical Estate Recoveries" of the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation A<::t of 1993. P. L. No. 103-66; 107 Stat. at 627­
628. Subsection (e) (1) was enacted as section 13611 "Transfers 
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of Assets; Treatments of Certain Trusts" of the Act. Id. 
Congress intended subsection (b) (4) (B) to allow states the option 
of recovering assets in which the recipient had a legal title or 
interest at the time of death, including assets held through 
joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, 
living trust, 0:(' other arrangement. H. R. CON. REP. No. 213 1 103rd 
Cong., 1st Sess. 835 (1993) reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N .. 1524. 
This was an explicit response to Kizer and other cases denying 
state recovery of such assets. Patricia Nemore et aI, DBllA-93 
Provisions Concerning Medicaid Transfers of Assets, Treatment of 
Certain Trusts, and Estate Recoveries, CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1199, 1206 
(Feb. 1994). Congress had an altogether different intent in 
enacting subsection (e) (1). H.R. CON. REP. No. 213 at 1523. Subsec­
tion (e) (1) was intended to effect how assets of an individual 
and his/her spouse are treated for the purpose of Medicaid 
eligibility. rd. Nowhere in the legislative history of t.hese 
subsections is an expressed intent that the asset definition 
would expand the range of estate recovery. 
4.	 The Court's combination of the two definiti,ons 
~eads to absurd resu~ts. 
The cooperation, without the combination, of the two defini­
tions results in a logical scheme. As Congress intended, the 
broad definition of assets in (e) (1) works to prevent the hiding 
of income and re:~ources for the eligibility purposes - applicable 
at the time of the "snap-shot" - and ensures that individuals are 
penalized for the improper transfer of such assets. Patricia 
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Nemore et aI, OElRA-93 Provisions Concerning Medicaid Transfers of 
Assets, Treatme.l:lt of Certain Trusts, and Estate Recoveries, 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1199, 1200 (Feb. 1994) (the definition was also a 
direct response to recent caselaw).; H.R. REP. No. 111, 103rd 
Cong., 1st Sess., 206-208 (1993) reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
533-535. The expanded definition of·estate in (b) (4) was intend­
ed by Congress to prevent an individual from making an otherwise 
prohibited transfer of an exempt asset (upon death of the indi­
vidual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, 
life estate, or other arrangement) without the individual being 
penalized or the state being able to recover the value of the 
asset. Id. 
The Court's combination of the definitions adds little to 
the meaning of the statute and leads to absurd results. "Plug­
ging in" (e) (I) ';s definition of "assets" to (b) (4) 's definition 
of "estate" would make 42 U.S.C. § l396p{b) (4) (A) read as fol­
lows: 
. "estate," with respect to a deceased individual ­
(A) shall include all real and personal property and 
other [income and resources of the individual and of 
the individual's spouse] included within the indivi­
dual's estate as defined for purposes of state probate 
law. 
{Emphasis added.]! What income and resources of an individual's 
spouse are included in the individual's estate as defined for 
purposes of Idaho probate law? At most, the individual's one-
half interest ill any community property. Not the spouse's half 
of the community property, and certainly not the surviving 
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spouse's separate property. 
The (e) (1) definition of assets also includes "any income or 
resources which the individual or the individual's spouse is 
entitled to but does not receive because of action" by the 
individual, the individual's spouse, or anyone (including a court 
or administrative body) acting on behalf of, in place ofl the 
direction of, or upon the request of the individual or the 
spouse. 42 U.S.C. § 1936p(e) (1) (Supp. 1998). Under Idaho 
probate law l what I if any, "income or resources which the indi­
vidual or the individual/s spouse is entitled to but does not 
receive . " are included in the individual's estate? Hespon­
dent hesitates to suggest an answer because the question itself 
seems absurd; unfortunatelYI the question will have to be an­
swered in the i~plementation of the Court's decision. 
Idaho, of course, has adopted the option in 42 U.S.C. § 
1396p(b) (4) (B) which would, under the Court's analysis, define 
estate as: 
any other real and personal property and other [income and 
resources o:f the individual and the individual's spou.se} in 
which the individual had any legal title or interest at the 
time of dea't:.h (to the extent of such interest) 
(Emphasis added.) Again, what is the extent of the recipient's 
legal title or interest in the surviving spouse's half of their 
former community property or the spouse's separate property? 
There is no such interest. Again, it seems absurd but becomes 
necessary to ask: what is the extent of an individual's legal 
title or interest at the time of the individual's death in income 
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or resources thE! individual or the individual was entitled to but 
never received? 
The structure of the statute, the legislative history of the 
statute, and thE~ absurdities that result from combining the 
Ib) (4) definition of estate and the (e) (1) definition of assets 
demonstrate that the definitions were intended to be and must be 
kept distinct. Thus, an "individual's estate" cannot include the 
individual's sUI:viving spouse's estate - even in the confusing 
world of federal Medicaid law. Moreover, because of the date of 
the transfer of assets between Hildor and Lionel and the effec­
tive dates of the 1993 amendments, Hildor's estate cannot in-
elude, for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1396(b) (1) (A), Lionel's 
estate. 
In conclusion, the language of the federal law is clear. It 
has been clear for 33 years. states may only recover Medicaid 
payments from the estate of the recipient. States may not 
recover from the estate of the recipient's spouse. with elll due 
respect, the Court erred in holding otherwise. 
III.	 The Court e:rred in hoJ.ding that state J.aw authorizes the 
Department t.o recover Medicaid payments from the esta.te of 
the recipient's surviving spouse. 
A.	 The C01llrt erred in interpreting Idaho Code § 56-218. 
Under Idaho law, the Department must seek recovery of 
Medicaid payment:;; from the estate of the recipient "or if there 
be no estate the estate of the surviving spouse. IDAHO CODE § 218. 
Hildor had an estate (and the Department recovered part of the 
payments to Hildc)r from it). Thus, the Department cannot recover 
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Medicaid paid to Hildor from the estate of her surviving spouse, 
Lionel. The Court appears to concede that the plain meaning of 
I.C. § 56-218(1) would prohibit the Department from recovering 
Medicaid payments paid on behalf of Hildor from Lionel's E~state 
because Hildor had an estate. The Court concludes, howevE~r, that 
the plain meaning of the statute is not controlling because it 
would be contrary to clearly expressed legislative intent and 
would lead to absurd results. 
1. The plain meaning of I.C. § 56~218 is not absurd. 
The primary premise of these arguments is that, because 
Medicaid recipients will almost never have "no estate," the 
provision for recovery from the spouse's estate would be rendered 
meaningless by a literal reading of the statute. Although it 
would be highly unusual for an individual to die without an 
estate, it is not theoretically impossible - particularly if the 
individual has institutionalized for a very long time. Further, 
because, until the statute was amended in 1995, an individual's 
estate was not dlefined by the statute, property that transferred 
automatically to another's ownership upon an individual's death 
at least arguably would not be included in the individual's 
estate. It is at least rational, therefore, that the legislature 
could have enactl~d the II if there be no estate, the estate of the 
surviving spouse III language on the premise that such circumstances 
could, in fact, arise. It should be noted that the Department 
itself argued at various points in this litigation that, for the 
purposes of the statute, Hildor had no estate - so at least the 
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Department did not think such a concept was absurd. App. Br. 15i 
R. pp. 87 - 88, . 
Even if the legislature expected that it would be practical­
ly (if not theoretically) impossible for an individual to die 
without an estate, it does not automatically follow that provid­
ing for such circumstances in I.C. § 56-218(1) would be absurd. 
At a' time when the legislature was enacting other new provisions 
regarding the attribution of assets between spouses and rE~garding 
transfers between spouses (i.e., spousal impoverishment provi­
sions), the legislature could well have intended the "if there be 
no estate" catch-all to provide a deterrent from artificial 
creation of such circumstances (or even a deterrent from attempts 
to create such circumstances). This may not be the most I:eason­
able interpretation of the statute, but this does not make it an 
absurd interpretation. 
2.	 T:he legislative intent of § 56-218 was not to 
allow Medicaid recovery from the estate of the 
recipient's surviving spouse. 
The Court r·efers to the "legislative intent to recover from 
the estate of a surviving spouse" without clarifying where, such 
intent is clearly expressed. In fact, the only clearly expressed 
legislative intent was that stated in the companion bill to the 
bill	 that created I.C. § 56-218(1): 
It is the intent of the legislature in enacting this section 
to reduce the number of situations in which medicaid regula­
tions as thj=y apply to long term care costs, cause either 
the destitution of the entire family, or a dissolution of 
marriage carried out to prevent destitution. It is further 
the intent of this legislation to protect the community and 
separate property rights of a married person whose spouse 
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applies for medical assistance regardless of whether they 
are living together. 
1988 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. SO, § I, p.74 (creating I.C. § 56­
20ge)i 1988 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 49., p.73. Given this c:xplicit 
language of the legislature, it is at least as, if not more, 
reasonable to conclude that the legislature wished to narrowly 
restrict or prevent, rather than facilitate, recovery from the 
estate of a surviving spouse. The plain language of the statute 
and the expressed concerns of the legislature should not be 
overwhelmed by a merely implied legislative intent. 
If, when I.C. § 56-218 (1) was enacted, the legislature had 
intended that the Department freely recover Medicaid from the 
estate of the recipient and the estate of the surviving spouse, 
the legislature could have easily so stated. (As it did \orhen it 
'lIIIIjlll' amended I.C. § 56-218 (1) in 1998). During oral argument before 
the Court, the Department expressed a belief that the legislature 
borrowed the language it used from a similar statute in Oregon. 
This only reinforces the point that, if the legislature ha,d 
intended the statute to mean that the Department could first 
collect Medicaid payments from the estate of the recipient and 
then recover the balance from the estate of the surviving spouse, 
the legislature could have enacted language clearly expressing 
such an intent. At the time I.C. § 56-218(1) was enacted, 
Oregon's statutes provided for the recovery of general assistance 
from "the estate of the deceased recipient or if there be no 
estate or the estate does not have sufficient assets to satisfy 
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the claim, the e'state of the surviving spouse." OR. REV. STAT. § 
411.795 (1987)1 
It is the Court's construction of I.e. § 56-218(1), rather 
than the plain meaning of the statute, that is contrary to clear 
legislative intent. First, the Court effectively nullifies the 
"or if there be no estate" language. Under the Court's construc­
tion, the only time the Department will not seek recovery of 
Medicaid payments from the estate of the recipient's surviving 
spouse is when the Department's claim is fully satisfied f:rom the 
recipient's estate. When the Department can fully recover from 
the estate of the recipient, the Department would not make a 
claim against the surviving spouse's estate even without the "if 
there be no estate" language. 
Further, the spousal impoverishment law was intended to 
avoid the necessity for couples to divorce in order to protect 
the community and separate property rights of the community 
spouse. By exposing all of the assets of a surviving spou.se to 
potential recovery, the Court's interpretation once again encour­
ages divorce to protect such assets. 2 
Although at the time I. C. § 56-218(1} was enacted Oregon law 
provided for recovery of Medicaid payments using the same "from the estate, or 
if there be no estate the estate of the surviving spouse" language, Oregon law 
now allows for recoyery of Medicaid Itfrom the estate of the individual or from 
any recipient of property or other assets held by the individual at the time 
of death including t.he estate of the surviving spouse" and limits such 
recovery from persons other than the recipient to the extent and valuE: of the 
Medicaid recipient's: legal title or interest in the property or asset~l 
transferred. OR REv. STAT. § 414.105 (Supp. 1996}. 
<I Ironically, the Department has denied that there would be an 
incentive to divorce under the Court's interpretation of I.C. § 56-2HI (1) I but 
concedes that at lea,st one such divorce (although apparently executed clumsily 
and perhaps unsuccessfully) has already occurred. App. Reply Br., p. 8. 
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B.	 The Cc>urt erred in ignoring the Department' s re~g'ula tory 
limitcltions upon estate recovery. 
The Court' 1:1 holding does not address the effect of the 
Department's regulations upon its ability to recover Medicaid 
payments from the estate of the recipient's surviving spouse. 
These regulations are relevant both as aids to the interp:retation 
of I.C. § 56-218(1) and as independent barriers to the Depart­
ment's recovery. 
In the Idaho Administrative Code, the Department has adopted 
provisions for recovery of medical assistance "pursuant to 
sections 56-218 and 56-218A, Idaho Code" through "the filing of 
liens against property of deceased persons, and the filin9 of 
liens against the property of permanently institutionalizE~d 
recipients. II IDAPA 16.03.09.025. The regulations providE! for 
.•~ recovery of Medicaid payments from the recipient's estate, or 
upon the sale of property subject to a lien, but makes only a 
limited provision for recovery from the estate of a surviving 
spouse. IDAPA 16.03.09.025.09; IDAPA 16.03.09.025.15. Ir~PA 
'h.... 
16.03.09.025.15 states: "If the deceased recipient has no estate, 
recovery shall bl= made from the estate of his surviving spouse." 
Under this regulation, because Hildor had an estate from \\'hich 
the Department rt:~covered, it may not recover from Lionel's 
estate. 
The other r~=gulatory reference to recovery from the estate 
of a recipient's surviving spouse further limits, rather than 
expands, the Department's authority to recover from the estate of 
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.,"-' a surviving spouse. IDAPA 16.03.09.025.20 states: 
Limits on the Department's claim against the assets of a 
deceased rE!cipient shall be sUbject to sections 56-218 and 
56-218A, Idaho Code. A claim against the estate of ia. sur­
viving spouse of a predeceased recipient is limited t.o the 
value of the assets of the estate that were community prop­
erty, or the deceased recipient's share of the separ.a.te 
property, aLnd jointly owned property. Recovery shall not be 
made until the deceased recipient no longer is survived by a 
spouse . . . 
(Emphasis added). Even if one accepts the Department's argument 
that this regula.tion still allows recovery of assets in the 
estate of the su.rviving spouse in which the recipient ever had a 
community prope:rty interest, this does not expand the Depart­
ment's recovery from a surviving spouse's estate beyond c:lrcum­
stances where the recipient had no estate. 
The Department's regulations explicitly refute any attempt 
to use broad definitions of estate and assets to make resources 
of the surviving spouse part of the estate of the recipient. 
IDAPA 16.03.09.025.03(c) defines the recipient's estate to 
include only that property and assets "in which the recipient had 
any legal or beneficial title or interest at the time of death. II 
IDAPA 16.03.09.025.18 extensively defines "assets in estate 
sUbject to claims," but includes only those assets "the deceased 
recipient owned or in which he had an ownership interest. 1I 
Thus, although the Court does not address the issue, state 
regulations impose an independent barrier on spousal estat.e 
recovery in Idaho, even if it is otherwise allowed by fedE~ral and 
state law.· Also, it seems highly unusual, if as the Court held 
the state law only creates an order of priority between recipient 
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and spousal estate recovery that the Department's regulations do 
not reflect this meaning. Similarly, it also seems stran'g'e that 
the Department ~lould have adopted regulations that not only do 
not incorporate, but also directly contradict, federal la'''' as 
interpreted by the Court. Perhaps the Department's regul,ations 
demonstrate that the Court erred. 
C.	 The CClurt's holding will cause undesirable results. 
1.	 '1~he Court's interpretation of federal and state 
l.aw creates unnecessary conflicts between t:he two. 
Read together, as properly constructed, the federal and 
state statutes a.nd regulations would allow the Department to 
recover Medicaid payments from the estate of the recipient, which 
would include the tracing of assets in which the recipient had a 
legal title or interest at the time of her death. All thE~ 
.~ applicable law can be consistently and reasonably read to limit 
recovery from the estate of the recipient's surviving spouse to 
such tracing. The Medicaid system would continue to work undis­
turbed without spousal estate recovery, though the Departnlent 
would obviously be denied some revenue. 
On the other hand, to allow the Department's claim a9ainst 
Lionel's estate requires defiance of the plain meaning of federal 
and state statutes and regulations. The Court's holding uninten­
tionally disrupts community property and probate principIE~S. The 
Court's holding leads to absurd and unfair results. Finally, the 
Court's holding creates direct conflicts between state and 
federal law that could have been avoided. 
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For eXamplE!, 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (1) requires the Depart­
ment to recover Medicaid payments from the estate of the recipi­
ent. As the court interprets 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (4)'s defini­
tion of "estate" and 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e) (l)'s definition of 
"assets", the estate of a recipient includes "all income and 
resources of the individual and of the individual' s SPOUSE~" 
including income or resources which the individual or spouse is 
entitled to but does not receive because of actions by or for 
them. Although Idaho has adopted (as of 1995) the 42 U.S .. C. § 
1396p(b) (4)'s definition of "estate" for estate recovery purpos­
es, neither Idaho's statutes or regulations include within such 
estate the broad definition of assets from 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)­
(1). To the contrary, the Department's extensive and detailed 
definition of "assets in estate sUbject to claims" in IDJ~PA 
16.03.09.025.18 does not include all income and resources of a 
recipient's spouse or all income and resources to which the 
individual or spouse is entitled to but does not receive because 
of actions by or for them; rather the regulatory definition 
includes only th.:;>se assets "the deceased recipient owned or in 
which he had an ownership interest." Thus, if the Court's 
interpretation o:E the relevant federal law is correct, the 
Department is in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (18) and 42 
U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (1) by under-seeking estate recovery. 
similarly, the IDAPA 16.03.09.025.20's limitation of claims 
against the estate of a surviving spouse to "the value of the 
assets of the estate that were community property, or the de-
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~~	 ceased recipient's share of the separate property, and jointly 
owned property" would also conflict with the Court's interpreta­
tion of federal law. As the Court construes 42 U.S.C. § 1396p­
(b) (1), the Department is required by federal law to seek recov­
ery of Medicaid payments from all income and resources of the 
individual and the individual's spouse. 
Of course, Respondent's point is not that the Department 
should be more a.ggressive in pursuing estate recovery. To the 
extent, however, that the Court's interpretation of federal and 
state statutes allowing recovery from surviving spouse' s ~~states 
bring the Department into violation of those statutes, those 
interpretations should at least be reconsidered. 
2.	 The Court's holding upsets traditional precepts of 
community property and probate law. 
It has already been explained how the Court's holdin9 
disregards distinctions between community and separate property 
and creates an incentive for married couples to divorce. It is 
not uncommon for elderly couples to get married late in li.fe and 
it is particularly unfair in those circumstances that the commu­
nity spouse, married only for a short time to the institutional­
ized spouse, should be expected not only to contribute assets for 
the support of the spouse in the nursing home, but also deprive 
the heirs of any expectation of receiving property from his or 
her will. After all, there is no taxation upon estates un.less 
the estate is worth more than $625,000 and other types of public 
assistance an individual may receive, even if recoverable from 
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the recipients Elstate, are not recoverable from the estatl9 of the 
surviving SpOUSE!. Ken Coughlin & Harry S. Margolis, Congress 
Gags Attorneys, Provides Capital Gains and Estate Tax Rel.ief, and 
Tweaks Medicare, ELDER LAW REP. 3 (Sept. 1997); I.C. § 56-224. To 
require that ther community spouse's estate be sUbjected to in 
essence 100 percent taxation from the state for the illnel:;s of 
the spouse is cClntrary to the cherished role of inheritance 
elsewhere in Idaho's law: 
Older people expect that the money they have saved all their 
lives will have value in funding their retirement and in 
securing	 the lives of their children and grandchildren. 
People will not save for a lifetime in order to see those 
savings	 go down the drain in a matter of a few months or a 
few years, just to save the government some Medicaid dol­
lars. It denies the essence of the middle class view of 
American	 life and the American dream. 
Joel	 C. Dobris, ,Medicaid Estate Planning by the Elderly: Jl Policy 
'• .,	 View of Expectations, Entitlement and Inheritance, 24 REAL PROP., 
PROB. & TR. J. 19-20 (1989). 
3.	 Implementation of the Court's holding wil.l. be di.fficul.t 
at best. 
Enforcement of the Court's decision will cause chaos. The 
tracking of asset:s over decades of time will easily consume the 
Department and create it's own inequities with some surviving 
spouse estates el3caping estate recovery with others not. Track­
ing of surviving spouse situations would be a nightmare. As an 
example assume that the surviving spouse remarries and takes her 
husbands name. Or the surviving spouse moves out of state and 
takes these resources with her. What resources will be used and 
how will the State of Idaho track this individual's life and 
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death? Then there is the problem of enforcing Idaho's surviving 
spouse estate rE!COvery rules that most certainly clash with the 
estate recovery and probate rules of every other state in the 
nation. Of cou:rse, the Department could simply not follm.,-up on 
the full range of spousal estate recovery authorized by the 
Court, but that would be contrary to the policies that purport to 
justify any spousal estate recovery. 
Conspicuous consumption and an unforeseen increase ill 
Medicaid costs could result from the Court's holding. It is not 
too far fetched for the surviving spouse, once realizing that the 
assets of the recipient as well as his separate property assets 
in existence at his death will pass to the state for repa)rment of 
the recipient's Medicaid costs, to intentionally leave little for 
recovery. There would be little incentive to save or spend these 
... funds in a reasonable manner. Realizing that you can spend your 
estate but not pass it to your heirs will result in the dE!pletion 
of savings and in many instances result in earlier eligibi.lity to 
Medicaid. Just how will the Department determine, track, and 
recoup the numer,ous gifts and transfers for less than fair market 
value remains to be seen. 
In estates '''''here a recipient's Medicaid debt exists i.n 
conjunction with the surviving spouse's estate and closely 
consumes the suriTiving spouse's estate the Department will 
increasingly be :required to determine whether or not a Will 
exists, file the probate, assume the duties and responsibilities 
of personal representative, collect, manage, and close the estate 
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of the survivin9 spouse. There would be few reasons for a 
relative to assume the responsibilities of a personal representa­
tive and endure the hassles of probating the surviving spouse's 
will solely for the state's benefit. 
In conclusion, the Court erred in holding that under state 
law the Department may recover Medicaid payments from the estate 
of the recipient's surviving spouse. The" Court's holding con­
flicts with the plain meaning of the statute, is contrary to 
legislative intemt, conflicts with the Department's own n~gula-
tions, and will lead to undesirable results. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully requests that the majority opinion 
be withdrawn and a sUbstitute opinion issued that affirms the 
Magistrate's order denying the Department's claim or that a 
rehearing be granted upon the relevant questions. 
DATED this 20th day of July, 1998. Wil~r~ 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIF~OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on th~' ~ay of July, 1998 two trUE! and 
correct copies of the forego1ng document were mailed, Postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
w. Corey Cartwright 
Deputy Attorney General 
Division of Human Services 
P.o. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 8372 -00 
WI 
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12 f PUBLIC ASSISTANCE LAW13 56-218 
Itl­ section are severable. [1941, ch. 181, § 14, p. 379; am. 1943, ch. 119, § 1, p. 
ill-
is 
~r 
l
., 
228; am. 1951, ch. 246, § 4, p. 520; am. 1974, ch. 233, § 8, p. 1590; am. 1978, 
ch. 74, § 1, p. 148; am. 1981,ch. 121, § 1,p. 207; am. 1989,ch. 67, § 2,p. 
107; am. 1995, ch. 214, § 4, p. 742; am. 1996, ch. 50, § 8, p. 147.J 
be Compiler's notes. Sections 1613(c) and 
1917(c) and (d) of the Social Security Act, 
Section 3 of S.L. 1995, ch. 214 is compiled 
as § 15-5-409a. 
iii 
referred to in this section, are compiled as 42 
U.S.C., § 1382b and 1396p, respectively. 
. Section 7 of S.L. 1996, ch. 50 is compiled as 
§ 56-210. 
et 
1, 56·218. Recovery of certain medical assistance. [Effe<:tive until 
o· July 1, 1998.1 ­ (1) Except where exempted or waived in accordance with 
!Ii federal law medical assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on hehalf of an 
n 
:0 
I 
I individual :Nho was fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the individual rec.eived such assistance may be recovered from the estate, or if there be no estate the estate of the surviving spouse, if any, shall be charged for such aid 
ie I I paid to either or both; provided, however, that claim for su,:h medical 
! assistance correctly paid to the indiv:idual may be established against the 
r estate, but there shall be no adjustment or recovery thereof until after the 
d death of the surviving spouse, if any, and only at a time when the individual 
D has no surviving child who is under twenty-one (21) years of ag€~ or is blind 
~ or permanently and totally disabled as defined in 42 U.S.C. 1382c. Transfers 
( of real or personal property by recipients of such aid without adequate 
\ consideration are voidable and may be set aside by an action in the district 
court. 
'81111' (2) Except where there is a surviving spouse, or a surviving child who is 
under twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind or permanently and totally 
• of,.. 
. r disabled as defined in 42 U,S.C. 1382c, the amount ofany medical assistance 
i 
I 
paid under this chapter on behalf of an individual who was fifty-five (55) 
years of age or older when the individual received such assistance is a claim 
against the estate in any guardianship or conservatorship proceedings and 
may be paid from the estate. . 
(3) Nothing in this section authorizes the recovery of the amount of any 
aid from the estate or surviving spouse of a recipient to the extent that the 
need for aid resulted from a crime committed against the recipient. . 
(4) For purposes of this section, the term "estate" shall include: 
(a) All real and personal property and other assets included within the 
individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probate law; and 
(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in which the 
individual had any legal title or interest at the time ofdeath (to the extent' 
of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or 
assign. of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in 
common, survivorship, life estate, living trust or other arrangement. 
(5) Claims made pursuant to this section shall be classified and paid as a 
debt with preference as defined in section 15-3-805(5), Idaho Code. 
(6) The department may file a lien against the property of any estate 
subject to a claim under this section. In order to perfect a lien against real 
property, the department shall, within ninety (90) days after the depart. 
ment is notified in writing of the death of the individual for whom medical 
.'.. 
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56-218 PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND WELFARE 
assistance was paid under this chapter, file the lien in the same general form 
and manneras provided in section 56-2l8A(3Xa), Idaho Code, in the office of 
the recorder of the county in which the property of the estate is located. The 
lien shall be recorded, indexed, and extended in the manner provided in 
sections 56-218A(3)(a) and 56·2l8A(5), Idaho Code. In order to perfect a 
security interest in personal property, the department shall, within ninety 
(90) days after the department is notified in writing of the death of the 
individual for whom medical assistance was paid under this chapter, file the' 
security interest in accordance with chapter 9, title 28, Idaho Code. Failure 
to file a lien or a security interest does not affect the validity ofclaims made 
pursuant to this section. 
(7) The director shall promulgate rules reasonably necessary to imple­
ment this section including, but not limited to, rules establishing undue 
hardship waivers for the following circumstances: 
(a) The' oniy asset of the estate provides the primary source ofsupport for 
other family members; or ' 
(b) The estate has a value below an amount specified in the rules; or 
(c) Recovery under the lien by the department will entitle the heirs of the 
deceased individual to public assistance. [I.C., § 56~218, as added by 
1988,ch.49,§ l,p. 73; am. 1994,ch.329,§ l,p. 1059; am. 1995,ch. 105, 
§ 1, p. 336.] 
Compiler's Dotes. For this section as ef­

fective July 1, 1998, see the following section
 
also numbered § 56-218.
 
56-218. Recovery of certain medical assistance. [Effective July 1, 
1998.] - (1) Except where exempted or waived in accordance withfed~ral 
law medical assistance pursuant to, this chapter paid on behalf of an 
individual who was fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the individual 
received such assistance may be recovered from the estate; or jf there' he no 
estate the estate ofthe surviving spouse, if any, shall be charged for such aid 
paid. to either or both; provided, however, that claim for such medical 
assistance correctly paid to the individual may be established against the . 
estate, but there shall be no adjustment or recovery thereof until after the 
death of the surviving spouse, if any, and only at a time when the in(j.ividual 
has no surviving child who is under twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind 
or permanently and totally disabled as defined in 42 U.S.C.1382c. TranSfers 
of real or personal property by recipients of such aid without adequate 
consideration are voidable and may be set aside by an action in the district 
court. ' 
(2) Except where there is a surviving spouse, or a surViving child who is 
under twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind or permanently and totally 
disabled as defined in 42 U.S.c-. l382c, the amount ofany medical ,assistance 
paid under this chapter on behalf of an individual who was fifty-five (55)' 
years ofage or older when the individual received such assistance is a claim 
against the estate in any guardianship or conservatorship proceedings and 
may be paid from the estate. 
:. '. . '.. ... .. . ·~i·:.·" r· ~ : ' ., . 
"'" ':'?'!:j:';:: ',', ,r;;:,;:S, -~r:F.J!:~~~~~~~rJ!!!!!! 
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15 PUBLIC ASSISTANCE LAW 56-218A 
(3) Nothing in this section authorizes the recovery of the amount of any 
aid from the estate or surviving spouse of a recipient to the extent that the 
need for aid resulted from a crime committed against the recipient. 
(4) For purposes of this section, the term "estate" shall include: 
(a) All real and personal property and other assets included within the 
-. individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probate law; and 
(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in which the 
individual had any legal title or interest at the time ofdeath (to the extent 
of such interest), including sueh assets conveyed to asurvivor, heir, or 
assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in 
common, survivorship, life estate, living trust or other arrangement. 
(5) Claims made pursuant to this section shall be classified and paid as a 
debt with preference as defined in section 15-3-805(5), Idaho Code.. 
(6) The department may file a notice of lien against the property of any 
estate subject to a claim under this section. In order to perfect a lien against 
real or personal property, the department shall, within ninety (90) days 
after the department is notified in writing of the death of the individual for 
whom medical assistance was paid under this chapter, file a notice of lien in 
the same general form and manner as provided in section 56-218A(3) (a), 
Idaho Code, in the office of the secretary of state, pursuant to section 
45-1904, Idaho Code. Failure to file a notice of lien does not affect the
'II validity of claims made pursuant to this section. 
(7) The director shall promulgate rules reasonably necessary to imple­
ment this section including, but not limited to, rules establishing undue 
hardship waivers for the following circumstances: 
(a) The only asset of the estate provides the primary source of support for 
other family members; or 
(b) The estate has a value below an amount specified in the rules; or 
(c) Recovery under the lien by the department will entitle the heirs of the 
deceased individual to public assistance. [I.e., § 56-218, as added by. 
198B,ch.49,§ 1,p. 73; am. 1994,ch.329,§ l,p. 1059; am. 1995,ch. 105: 
§ 1, p. 336; am. 1997, ch. 205, § 2, p. 607.] 
Compiler's notes. For this section as ef­ sions of this act. If the certification is not 
fective until July 1, 1998, see the preceding made by the twenty-first day after the ad­
section also numbered § 56-218. journment sine die of the First Regular Ses­
Section 10 of S.L. 1997, ch. 205 read: "Not­ sion of the Fifty-fourth Idaho Legislature, this 
withstanding the effective dates specified in act shall be null and void," 
section 1 through 9 ofthis act, nothing in this The Secretary of State has so certified to 
act shall take effect unless the secretary of the Idaho Code Commission and thus the 
state shall certify to the Idaho Code Comm.is­ Chapter 205 became effective as prescribed 
sion that he has received a sufficient appro­ herein.· .. 
priation to provide for the development of the Section 1 of S.L. 1997, ch. 205 is compiled 
technology required to implement the prlJvi· as §§ 45-1901 through 45-1910. 
56-218A. Medical assistancle liens during life of recipient. [Effec­
tive until July ·1, 1998.] - (1) The department may recover and may 
impose a lien aga,inst the real property of any individual prior to his death 
for medical assistance' paid or about to be paid under this chapter on behalf 
of an individual: 
',:' . ',­
'-. 
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MEDICAL ASSISTANCE	 ··IDAPA 16, 03¢ 09022 
03.09022 -- 03.09024 (RESERVED) , 
03.09025.	 LIE~S AND ESTATE RECOVERY. Pursuant to sections 56-218 
and 56-218A , Idaho Code; this SUbsection sets forth the 
provisions for recovery of MA. the filing oj: liens 
against the property of dece(j.sed persons; and the! filing 
of ~iEms against the property of permanently 
institutionalized recipients. (7-1-95)T 
01.	 MAIncorrectly Paid. The Department may, pursuant 
to a judgment of a court/ file a lien against the 
property of a living or deceased person of any age 
to recover the costs of MA incorrectly paid. 
(7-1-95)T 
02.	 Administrative Appeals~ Permanent 
institutionalization determination and undue 
hardship waiver hearings shall be ~overned by the 
fair hearing provisions of IDAPA 16; Title 05 I 
Chapter 03, IIRules Governing Contested Case 
Proceedings and Declaratory RUlings", (7-1-95)T 
.03.	 Definitions. The following. termeare.applicable to 
Subsection 025 of these rules: .. (7-1-95)T 
a.	 Authorized representative. The person 
appointed by· the court as the personal 
representative in a probate proceeding or, if 
none; the person identified by the recipient 
to receive notice and make decisions on estate 
matters. (7-1-95)T 
b.	 Equity interest in a home. Any equity 
interest in real property recognized under 
Idaho law. 
(7-~-95)T 
c.	 Estate. All real and personal property and 
other assets indluding those in which the 
recipient had any legal or beneficial title or 
ihterest at the time of death t to the extent 
of such ihterest, including stich Aissets 
conveyed to.a survivor; heir; or assi90ee of 
the deceased recipient throUgh joint bmancy, 
tenancy in common; survivorship; iife estate, ­
living trust; or other arrangement. 
(7··1-95) T 
d.	 Home. The dwelling in which the recipil~nt has 
an ownership interest; and which the recipient 
occupied as his primary dwelling prior to, or 
subsequent to. his admission to a medical 
institution. (7··1-95)T 
e.	 Institutionalized recipient. An inpatient in a 
nursing facility (NF). intermediate care 
facility for the mentally retarded (ICF/MR), 
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MEDICAL ASS!STANCE	 IDA.! 16 •03 . 09025 ; 03 . e . 
or other thedical institution, who is a 
~ Medicaid redipisht sUbject to post-eligibility
.1· treatment of income in IDAPA16. 03. OS; RUles 
Governing Eligibility for Aid to the Aged; 
Blind ahd Disabled (AABD). (~7-i- 95) T 
Lawfully residing; . Residing in a manr&r not 
contrary to or forbidden by law t and \ld th the 
recipient's knowledge and consent. (7-1-9S)T 
g.	 Permanehtiy institutionalized. An 
institutionalized recipient of any age who the 
Department has determined cannot reasollably be 
expected to be discharged from the inst:itution 
and return home. (7-1-95)T 
h.	 Personal property; Any property not real 
property, including cash, jewelry, household 
goods, tools; life insurance policies; boats 
and wheeled vehicles. (7-l-95)T 
Real property. Any land, including buildings 
or immovable objects attached permanently to 
the land. (7-l-95)T 
j	 . Residing in the home on a continuous basis. 
Occupying the home as the primary dwelling and 
continuing to occupy stich dwelling as the 
primary residence. (7-l-9S)T 
k.	 Termination of a lien. The rele,ase or 
dissolution	 of a lien from property. 
(7-1-95)T 
1.	 Undue hardship. Conditions that :justify 
waiver of all or a part of the Department's 
claim against art estate, described in 
-(Jsubsections 025.25 throtigh 025.29 of these UJ
rules. (7··l-9S)T Q 
m.	 Undue hardship waiver. A decision made by the 
Department to relinqUish or limit its claim to 
any or all estate aSsets of a deceased 
recipient based on good caUse. (7-l-95)T 
04.	 Notification to Department. All notifi.cation 
regarding liens and estate claims shall be directed 
to the Department of Health artd Welfare; Estate 
Recovery unit, TowerS Building t Sixth Floor; P.O. 
Box 83720~ 450 W. State St. Boise; Idaho, 
83720-0036. (7-t-95)T 
05.	 Lien Imposed During Lifetime of Recipient. During 
the lifetime of the permanently institutionalized 
recipient, and subj ect to the restric'tions set 
forth in Subsection 025. OB of. these rUles, the 
Department may impose a lien against the real 
r 000362
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MEDICAL ASSISTANCE 1 .~PA 16 l 03 i 09025.05 
property of the recfp!eht ,for·MA cbrtect1y paid on 
hi~ behalf: The lien ~h.l1 be filed Within ninety 
(90) days of the Departinent# S fincH determi.nation, 
~ft~t notice and bppbrttihity' fot· i hearing, that 
the recipient is permanehtly Ihstittitiona1i~:ed. The 
lien shall be effective ftoftt .the .·b~~ii1ning of the 
most recent continuoUs period, of the reclpient 's 
institutiona1izationj bUt hoI:· before July 1. j 1995. 
Any lien imposed ~ha1l tHssoive 
recipientis discharge from the medical 
and return home~ 
Upot! the 
institution 
(7-1-95)T 
06. Determination of Permanent Institutionalization. 
The Department must determine that the recipient is 
permanently institutionalized. prior to the lien 
being imposed. An expectation or plan that the 
reclpient will return home with the support of Home 
and Community Based Services .shal~ ~ot; in and of 
itself; justify a decision that he is reasonably 
expected to be discharged to retUrh hoine. The 
following factors shall be cortsidered when making 
the determination 
ization~ 
of permanent institutiona1­
(7-1-95)T 
The recipient must meet the criteria for NF or 
ICF/MR level of care and services as set forth 
in Subsections 180,03 and 190~08of: these 
rUles; and (7-1-95)T 
b. The medical records, including information set 
forth in Subsections 180:02 and 180.01 of 
these rules; shall be reviewed to determine if 
the recipient's condition is e~pected to 
improve to the extent that he will not :require 
NF or ICF/MR level of care: and (7-1-95)T 
c. Where the prognosis indicated in the medical 
records is uncertain or inconclusive, the 
Department may request additional medical 
lnformatiottl or may delay the determ:ination 
until the next utilization control review or 
-u 
LU 
Q 
annual Inspection 
appropriate. 
of Care review, as 
(7,-1-95) T 
01. HQJ:ice of Determination of Pet'manent 
Im~tituti.ona1ization and Hearing Rights. 
Department must notify the recipient ()r 
authorized representativ~j in writing; of 
intention to make a determination that 
The 
his 
its 
the 
recipient.:i.s permanently institutionalized; and 
that he has the right to· a fair hear:lng in 
accordance with SUbsection 025:02 of these rules. 
This notice 
informationt 
shall inclUde the foJ!&owing 
(7··1-95)T 
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MEDiCAL ASSISTANCE 
The notice shall ihfo:bn th~ re!c!pient t:hat the 
De~.tt~eht's deci~ibhc. that he cannot 
reasonably be.expected to be discharged from 
the tnecHcal inst1tutibrt to return home is 
based upon a review of the medical records.artd 
plan of care; but that this does not preclude 
him from returning home with Elervices 
necessary to support Nt:'. or reF IMR l'E!vel of 
care; and (7-1-95)T 
b.	 The notice shall inform the recipient that he 
or his authorized representative may request a 
fair hearing prior to the D~partmentis final 
determination that he·· is . permanently
institutionalized. The notice shall include' 
information that a pre-heari~g conference may 
be scheduled prior to a fair hearing~, The 
notice shall inciude the ti~e limi~s and 
instructions for requesting a· fair hearing; 
and (7-1-95)T 
c.	 The notice shall inform the recipient that if 
he or his authorized tepresentative does not 
request a fair hearing withih the time limits 
specified. hie! real property! ihcluding his 
home; may be subject to a lien, cont:ingent 
upon the restrictions in subsection 02!5.0a of 
these rUles. (7 '-1- 9S) T 
08.	 Restrictions on Imposing Lien During Lifetime of 
Recipient. A lien may be imposed on the 
recipientis real property; however, no lien may be 
imposed on the recipient I s home if any of the 
following is lawfUlly residing in such home! 
(7-'1-95)T 
a;	 The spouse of the recipient; (7-1-95)T 
b.	 The recipient's child who is under age 
twenty-one (2i), or who is blind or disabled 
as defined in 42 U.S.C. 13B2c as amended; or 
(7-1-9S)T 
L&J 
c.	 A sibling of the recipient who has an equity Q 
interest in the recipient's home and who was 
residing in such home for a period of at least 
one (1) year immediately before the date of 
the recipient; s admission to the m,edical 
instittition, and who has been residing .in the 
home on a continUous basis; (7-1-95)T 
-U 
09.	 Rest:r1ctions on Recovery on Lien tmposed During 
LifE~time of Recipient. Recovery shall be made on 
the lien from the recipient's estate, or at any
timE! upon the sale of the property subj ect t:o the 
lieni but only after th~ death of the recipient's 
000364
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MEDIcAL ASSISTANCE	 L.:i?A 16 l 0:30 09025.09 
surviving spouse, :l.f any; and only at. a time 
whent	 (1-1-95)T 
a ~	 The recipient has ho' sur"iving dhild who is 
tinder age twet1ty~one (21); (1-1-95) T 
b.	 The reciplertt has no slirviving child of any 
age who is blind or disabled as defined in 42 
U.S.C. 1382c as amended: and (1-1-95)T 
c.	 In the baSe ot i lien on a re~ipientls home, 
when none of the fol1owing is lawfully
residing in ~Uch home who has lawfully :resided 
in the home btl a continuous basis sihce the 
date of the recipient's admission to the 
medical institution! . (7-1-95)T 
i.	 A sibH.ng of the recipient; who waS 
residing in the recipient's home for a 
period of at least one (1) year
immediately before the date of the 
recipient's admission to the medical 
institutionj or (7-t-95)T 
ii.	 A son or daughter of the recipient; \tiho 
was residing. irtthe rebiplent;s home for 
a period of at least two (2) years
immediately before the date of. the 
recipientis admission to the medical 
institution; and who establishes: by a 
preponderance of the e'V"idence that he 
provided necessary care" to the reci.pient,
and the care he provided allow~:!d the 
recipient to remain at home rather than 
in a medical institution. 
(7-1-95}T 
10.	 Recovery upon Sale of Property Subject to Lien 
Imposed During Lifetime of Recipient. ShoUld the 
property upon which a lien is imposed be sold prior 
to "l:he "recipient.' S deathj the Department shall seek 
recovery of all MA paid on behalf of the recipient,
subject to the restrictions in SUbsection 025.09 of 
these rUles. Recovery of the MA paid bn behalf of 
the recipient from tne proceeds from the scale of 
the property does not preclude the Department from 
recovering additiortai MA paid from the recipient's 
est~te as described in Subsedtion 025.14 of these 
rult::!s. 
(7-1-95)T 
11.	 Filing of Lien During Lifetime of Recipient. When 
appropriate; the Department shall file, in the 
off:lce of the Recorder of the county in which the 
real property of the recipient is locat,ed, a 
verified statement, irt ~riting, setting forth the 
following~ (7-1-95)T 
U 
L&J 
C 
000365
 .0:3
 
Ur  
l ~one 
  
h
,
 
0  
su U
h
  i 
 
i t ~  ntiss.! .di
 
h '
 
" "i
. l i  
!d 
 s
-I ·r i l be rt
 
u s
ul
h
 
'
low n ! 
N 
MEDIcAL ASSISTANCE .........	 IDAPA i6; 03 •09025.11. a.
 
,~. . 
:-. ~ .. 
, ..... a.	 The·· ham~. and last . known address of the 
recipientJ ~i1d ('7-1-95)T
.J \ 
::011 
The tia~e and address of the	 official or agent 
of the bepartment fiiirtg the lien1 and 
... , . . ('7-1-95)T 
c.	 A brief description of the MA received by the 
recipierltland . (7-1-95)T 
d.	 The amount paid by the Department; as of a. 
given .date} ahdi if. applicable, a st:atement 
that the amo~nt bf the lien ~ill inc~eaBe as 
long as MA benefits are paid ort behalf of the 
recipi~ntl (7-i-9S)T 
12~	 Renewal of Lien !mposed DurlnQ Lifetime of 
Recipient ~ The. lien, or any ext¥nsion thereof I 
shall be reill:!wed every five (5), years by filing a 
neW verified statemetlt as required in sUbs.ection 
025.11 of these rUles,' or as required byvIdaho 
law. (7-1·95)T 
13,	 Termination of Lien Imposed buring Lifetime of 
Recipient. The lien shall be released as provided 
by Idaho Code~ upon e~t!sfadtioh of the 
Department;s dlai~; The lien shall dissolve in the
.,.'.	 event of the recipient's discharge from the medical~~.:. institution and returri' home; such dissolution of 
the lien does not discharge the Uhderlying debt and 
the estate remains subject to recovery under estate 
recovery provisions in subsections 025.14 I:hrough 
025.30 of these rulesi A request for release of the 
lien shall be directed to the Department of Health 
and Welfare; gstate Reco",ery unit, tr'owers gu:Llding, 
sixth Floor, P.O. BoJt 83720, 450 W~ state st., 
Boise; Idaho, 83720-0036. (7-1-9S)T 
14.	 Estate Recovery. Pursuant to Sect!orts 56-218 and 
56-218A; Idaho code I the Department is requi.red to 
recover the following: (7-1-95)T 
a.	 The costs of all MA correctly paid on or after 
July 1, 1995; on behalf of a recipient who was 
permanently institutionalized: and (7-1-95)T 
­
b.	 The costs 6£ MA correctiy paid on behalf of a U LlJ 
recipient who received MA at age fifty-five Q 
(55)	 or older on or after JUly 1, 1994t and 
(7-1-95)T 
c.	 The costs of MA correctly paid on behalf of a 
recipient Who received MA at age. sixtY'-five 
(65)	 or older on or after July 1, 1988. 
(7-:L-95)T 
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..." 15,	 RE!COvery from tsstate of Spouse. If'the"deceased
'/:.: ,I,i	 t'E!cipient, 'ha~ 'tid, efitate, recoverY· shall be made 
froM the ~~tatibf hi~stirVlving spoUsel '(7-1-95)T 
,',; .'	 \.-", 
16; ,	 Li.et1 Imposed AqcHhst Estate of beceased Recd.pient. 
The Department inay impose a lien .~gaiilst all 
p:roperty of the estate of an applicable re~cipient 
to ,secUre it~ c1~i~ ~gain~t the estate; To perfect 
a lien the Department shallj within ninety (90) 
days, after the Department isnotified l in writingj 
of the death of the MA recipient~ file a lien in 
the same gettera1 forril and inai'ttier as provided in 
Subsection 025~11 of these rules. FailUre to file a 
lien does not affect the va1idity of claims made 
against the estatei A request forre1ease of the 
lien shall be directed to the Department of Health 
and Weifare, Esteite! Recovery Unit; Towers Building, 
sbd:.h FloorJ P.o. Box 83720, 450 W. state SL, 
Boisel Idaho~ S3720-0036. (7-1-95)T 
1'7.;	 Nol:ice of Estate, c1afirL , The bepartment c, shall 
notify the author~zed representative of the amount 
of the estate elaim after the death of the 
recipient, or after the death of the surviving 
spoUsel ,The notice shall irtclude instructions for 
applying for an undue hardship wed.vet" ~ 
(7-1-9S)T 
18.	 ASElets in Estate Subject to Cla.lms. The authorized 
representative shall be notified of the 
Department;s claim against the assets of a.deceased 
recipient. ASsets in the estate from which the 
claim can be satisfied ~ha1l inclUde all real or 
personal property that the deceased recipient:' owned 
or in which he had an ~wnership intereBt~ including 
the following: (7-1-95)T 
a.	 Payments to the recipient under an installment 
conttact shall be included among the ass:ets of 
the deceased recipient. This includes, an 
installmeht contract on any real or personal 
property to which the deceased recipient had a 
property right. The value of a promissory 
note; loan or propetty agreement is its 
outstanding principal balance at the date of 
death of the recipient I ~heh a promissory ­unote, loanl or property agreement is secured UJ 
by a Deed of TrUst i the Department may ri:!quest Q 
evidence of a reaeonabie and just Underlying 
debti	 (7-1-95)T 
b.	 The deceased recipient· s ownership interf:!st in 
an estate;. probated or not probated, is an 
aSset of his estate wheti! (7-i-95)T 
,-
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.... 
",.: 
,'.:.: 
'1--­ i 1, . bdcumerttf3' show the deceased recipient is ~rt~1i~lbie de~ise~ br doriei'd~'ptbperty 
,I­ .. ) of another deceased persoI1jbr,' t1-1~9S) T
.' ... " . 
ii ~ The' decet:ised recipient redel'Jed income 
from property of another person; ,or(7,;,1-95)T 
iii. State intestacy laws award the deceased 
recipient a share irl the di~ttibution of 
the property of another estate. , (7-1-"9S)T 
c. My trust 1ns,trume11-t which is designed to hold 
or td distribute funds or property, real or 
personalj ih which the deceased recipient has 
a beneficial interest is art asset of the 
estate. ~ (7-1-95)T 
d. Life insurance is considered art asset when it 
has reverted to the estate. {7-1-95)T 
e. Buriai insurance is considered an asset when a 
furteral home i~ the primary benefic.tary or 
when there are tinspent. fUnds in the burial 
contract. The ftirtds remaining after payment to 
the fUneral home shall be considered assets of 
the estate; provided no contingent bene:Eiciary
is designated. . (7·4-95)T 
f. Checking and sa~ings aCdounts which hold and 
accumulate funds designated for the deceased 
recipient; are assets of the estate, includingjoint accounts whieih accUmulate funds for the 
benefit of the recipient I (7-1-95)T 
g. In . a 
order 
funds 
conservatorship s:U:uation, if a court 
under state laW specifically re!quires
be made clvai1ab1e for the care and 
maintenance of a recipient prior to his death; 
absent evidence to the contrary, Stich funds 
are an asset of the deceased recipient's
estatei even if ct court has to approve release 
of the funds. (7-1-95)T 
h. ShareS of stocks. bonds and mutual funds to 
the benefit of the deceased recipient are 
assets of the estate. The current market. value -
of all stocks; betids and mutUal furtds Must be 
proved as of .the month preceding settlement of 
the estate claim~ (7-1-9S)T 
u 
W 
Q 
19. value of Estate Assets~ 
fair market value as 
The Department shall use 
the value of the estate 
assets. {7-1-95)T 
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MEDICAL ASSISTANC~ 
...., 20 . L.im!t::at.!oris ·on •Estate claitns i "Ll~~ts on the 
Department's claiM against the ass~tsbf a deceased/~ ! 
rI:!c!pient shall be subje,ct to SectibriS56-218 and('.:';,,1' ~6-21aA, Idahd Cdd~~ A dlaim l~airi~t ~hE! ~state of 
a surviving SpoUse of a predeceasedtec!pient is 
limited to ~he ~alue of th~ ~sSE!t§,bf the estate 
that were community property.' or the deceased 
:tE!cipient's share of the. separate property j and jointly. owned property. Recd~ery shall not be made 
until the deceased :t:ecipien~ hd longer is survived 
bi a spouse, a child who is tinder age twenty-one 
(21), or a blind or disabled child, as defined in 
42 U.B.C. 13B2c as amertded ahcl. when appiicable, as 
provided in SUbsection 025 ~ 09 of' these :rules. No 
recovery shall be made if therecipi~ht received MA 
aSI the result of a crime committed against the 
re~c.ipient. ..' (7-1 .. 95) T 
Expenses Deducted from Estate. The following
expenses shall be deducted from the available 
assets to determine the amount available to satisfy 
the Department's claim: (7.:.1-95)T 
a.	 Surial expenses; which shall i.nclt.tde only
those reasonably necessary for embalming,
transportation of the ,body, cremation, 
flowerS, c1othing; and services of the funeral 
director and staff shall be deducted. 
(7-1-95)T 
b.	 Other legally enforceable arid necessary debts 
with priority shall be '. deducted. The 
Departmentis claim is classified and paid as a 
debt with preference as defined in Section 
15-03-e05~ Id~ho Cod~i Debts of the deceased 
recipient Which may be deducted from the 
estate prior to satisfaction of the 
Depart:mentis claim must be legally enforceable 
debts given preference over the bepar~ent;s 
claim tmde:t Section 15-03.:..8051 Idaho Code. 
(7-1-95)T 
22.	 Interest on Claim. Ths Departmentts claim does not 
bear interest except as otherwise provided by 
statute or agreement. (7-1-95}T 
-23.	 Excluded Land. Restricted allotted land i owned by U L1Ja deceased recipient who was an enrolled member of Q 
a !'edera,lly recognized American Indian tribe i or 
eligible for tribal membership, which cannot be 
soid	 or transferred without permission from the 
Indian tribe or an agency of the Federal 
Gov·ernmenti will riot be SUbject to estate 
recovery.	 (7-1-95)T 
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24;	 Marriage·.S~tt:.1emsnt,. .Agreement, 'or other Such 
~...., Agreement I;"',' A ,trtarriage sett,lement· 'agreement or/. J 
i' :.'	 other suchag:teement which eeparat(:!SI aSSets for a Inclrried cotitslE! does not elitrlirtatethedebt against 
the estat~ bf the deceased recip.i~t1t:·or the spouse. 
Trahsferi9 UhdM: a tttarria~e s~t:tH!trleht. agreerp:ent or 
ot~her sudh t:igr~emEH1t' may be' voided if nlSt for 
adequate cotisideratiorL ' (7-1-95)T 
25.	 Re!lease of Estate Claims. The OE!partment Shall 
re!lease a dlcHm when the Departmertt; s claim has 
been fully scitisfil!!d and, melY release its claim, 
under the following conditions:' (7-1-95)T 
a;	 When an undue hardship waiver as defined in 
Subsection 025.26 of these rUles has been 
granted; or (7-1-95)T 
b.	 When a written agreement with the authorized 
representative to pay the Department t;8 claim 
in thirty-six (36)' monthlY pctyntents or less 
has been achieved I ' (1-1-95)T 
26.	 Pu*pose of the Undue Hardship Exception. The undue 
ha:rdship ,exception is intended to avo:i.d the 
impoverishment of the deceased recipientts family 
due to the Department exercising its estate 
recovery right. The faet that family Inembers 
anticipate or expect art inheritance, or will be 
in(:!onveniencecl economically by the' lack of an 
inheritance. is hot caUse for the Department to 
dec:,lare an Undue hardship. (7··1-95)T 
27,	 AQplication for Undue Hardship Waiver. An 
applicartt for an undue hardship waiver must have a 
beneficial. interest in the estate and must apply 
fo:t the waiver withih hlhety (90) days bf thE! death 
of the recipient or Within thirty (30) days of 
receivihg hotic~ of th~ Dep4rt~~rt~fs claim, 
whicheve~ is later. The filirtg of a elaim by the 
Dep~rtment itt a probate proceeding shall constitute 
notice to all heir~. (7-1-95)T 
2iL	 Basis for Undue Hardship waiver. . Undue ha.rdship 
waivers shall be cOhsidered in ~he following
-circumstances! (7-1-95)T U 
l.LJ 
o 
a.	 The estate subject to recovery is thl~ sole 
income-producihg asset of the survivors where 
such income is limited; or (7-i~95)T 
b.	 Payment of the Depa:t~mertt·s clai~ would· calise 
heirs of the deceased recipient to be eligible 
for pUblic assistartcel or (7~1-95)T 
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MEDICAL AssisTANcE	 .IDAl?J-. 16.03.09. 025 ~ 2a J c. 
cL	 The. Department's, d1~~m:;':U.s' ie~s ,than five 
"WI' hundred do1lars ($500) or' the total assets oft.. i 
.. ",1 the entire estate are les~ thah five hundred 
dollar~ {$~OO)J ~xdltidirt~'~ttist account~ or 
'other bahk acdotihbh ,',,', '.'.,", (7-1-9S)T
:. :~ 
, ..... ·,,1 
d; The recipient received MA. as the resUlt of a 
c:d.tne committed against ,'the i:'ecipient. 
:,,' ( 7 ~'>1- 95 ) T 
29.	 Limitations oli Undue Hardship ,waiver. Any 
beheficiaty of the esta.t.e of a' deceased r,ecipierit 
inay appiy for waivet' of the estat~'reco1ti:.ty claim 
based on Undue hardship., Arty claiin t11ay be wed"ed by 
the Department i partially or. fUlly j because of 
undue hardship. An undue hardshi~ does hot exist if 
actiorl taken by the t~cipiertt prior to his adeath, 
or by his legal representativer, divested or 
diverted assets from the esb:l.tE! j The Department 
shall graht undue hardship waivers on a case by 
case basis upon review of ali facts and 
circumstances; includihg any action taken to 
diminish assets available for estate recovery or to 
d.rctlmvent estate recovery. (7-1-- 95) T 
30.	 Set Aside of Transfers. Transfers of real or 
personal property of the recipient without adequate
,-.., consideration are voidable and may be set a,side by 
the district court. (7-1-9S)T 
-­u 
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LtC' HEALTH: AND 'WELFARE
fgroup&--pregnant woma, residents in.,~ '2,', Copay amollDt" ",;:, :,':-
......1IWlJ.itY residences of Office of Mental Retar-,·, '." Medic:aId regulation establisbiDg maximum co­
t~Il' ~.,OI'Iice ,of Mental Health, and thOBe" paymeDt for iD-patieat hospital senices.at 50%
%' Unable to pay; note from pregnant WOIll8l1'S of payment state 
":'''~~ WlI8 suflicient for pharmacist and oth· patient. h06pital care, did not violate Medieaidf '.. _ providers, residents were Identified by' statute requirlIIg c:opaymentB to be ."nomL...J 1II 
:/ ", ·of community residenl!eli, and statement of ' ' lIIIIOlIDt";'CoI!gress adopted by legislative reen­
r'~ty to pay WlI8 sufficient. Sweeney v.' , aetmeDt and raWieation,. regulatory definiuon
.,. ,. , C.A.2 (N.YJ 1998, 996 F.2d 1384. .. promulgated by Secretary of Health and HlUI\lllI
, , " ..,. , . " ',,'" ", . Services. 'Kansai Hosp.' Ass'n
ebraaka's caleulatlon of flat-rate copayment· D.Kan.I9lH, 861 F.supp. 401. 
".",far" Medicaid recipienti prescription, " Hosplta1B established that they would be fr. ':l~, 1II which aversg!nll meth~ ~ excluded,' reparably hanned ifproposed Increase 1II Medic­
J,~~~' calculation. Medicaid J'IICIplentB not I'&- 'aid copay i1Dount of lIIpatient hospital services
lIIlIkes for 1IrBt claY of 1II­
v. WhIteman, 
" 
.•:•.~cjali'ed to make Cll~yment,COIlIItituted violation' . were allowed to take effeet, aa required for 
:·:~4f.,resuJation requiring state to determine aver~ tanpol'V'1 restralnlng order: hosplts1s C!OUId not C~,or typical payment fora ~ce; .~uaIon deny serrices to e1lgIble beneficiaries eluelo 
~:llli!tuIl~ of persons receiving Medicaid pre- their inabU1ty to pay requlred copayamoWlt, but 
,:~iCrlptjon asalstance was required 1II determlninr, would, be ban'ed from SlIing state from damages 
Nebraska PhannacistB Ass'n, Inc. v. ' If ittllrDed 'out that proposed l:O]llly requlrement 
libraska :Dept. of Soda! Servicea, D.Neb.l994,' WlI8 excessive. Xansas H06P. ,Ass'n v. WhIte­
F;Supp, 1087. -., ..:' .. _ man, D.Kan.199l1.8S6 F.Supp. 1548.. ," ,; -~: .- . '" "',' ,.'/;. ( :' v' ~I~ .' ••:~~i...'_:· :.~ .,' .\ ';:';~ ~< :.. . ....: .:, ". 
~', , '1396p. Liens, ~u8tment8 and recoveries, 
":', 
and transfen of 888m
 
:i~~r;ti::":'" .'":':-.:'-.."'): ": :~.::.~' '.:'. :." '", ~' .;.:. ", ::: ....~:.~~.:-.. ,..,;~
 
:i~}~~~ Jmpo~ltion of lien iIgainst property of an individual on a~unt ,of medical
 
:':'ii':"':,." 88118tance rendered to him under a State pl&.': _, _. ,.: '
 .~.. , .• ~ '" .• ". . .-.,'., .' ,!,.",j; (I", ~r.,t!".J&.\ ~( 
):~~: (l) No lien may be imposed against the property'of·any Individual prior to his death 
~pn"account of medical assistance paid.Dr to be paid ~n,.¥.!'. behalf JUlderthe State plan, 
"i.excellt- '~~':',:-" " ,. ,.' .'.~ :':':;:'{':; <.:,"~::,: " .,; '., . 
.'tJ:!'~'''('' (A) pursuant ~ the judgm~~ ~ a court .o~ ,~UJ.1~ ¥..!?e~eJits incorrectly paid 
.~j:~;~(~ ~es::;:::~ ~~~,~;"~:~~~~~~~D)~::~",' ,.' ",'~;~.':.' . 
~,iP.l;t;·s '(1) who is an inpatient In a nursing facility(lntermediate care facility for the 
::;~\~!);, mentally retarded, or other medical instituaoll, ihucll individual is required, as 
'~\'to,,;, a condition of receiving services in such institu1io~, under the State plan, to 
;.,;, . . spend for costs of medical cmre all but Ii Ji:linim81'am<iuDt.¢his income ,required 
',;" ~or~onalne,eds,and, " ..... ', ',".," . ",.~.",.:." " 
, ,(ii~ with resPect. to whom the Stated~termines, after notice and opportunity 
for a hearing (In accordance With procedures estaPlished by the State), that he 
'~"'" cannot reasonably be ~~~. to. be discharged from. the, me¥ institution 
~•. ~~e;r~1:=(t;~~~i2j:"";~,,<":~, ·::'::;~;!~l~~~~;::'~~;;i ..;L:: 
2) No lien maybe imposed under paragraph (l)(B),on 8UCh individual's home If-, 
r:<, (A) the'spouse of such individualt;,' '. .. Ii,:'" '.IL,~j .. i'._"" ,',", ~,.,:,,~ 
;;" (B) such'lndividual's child who is under age 21,·or (with'respellt UiStates eligible 
'; to participate In the State' program established under subchapter XVI of this 
chapter) is blind or permanently and totally disabled, or (with respect to States 
which are not eligible to participate In such program) is blind, or disabled ~ defined 
.. In section 1382c oftIUS title, or ,'.~.:,,: .:, ,. ,',' " :,,".~,: 'j':::':":~" ... " '. ': . 
.I' ,',' (C) a sibling of such individuld (:;Vh~ h'iIs Meq~tY:~terestlnsu~cldi~~e 8nd~ho 
, • was residing In such Individual's,home for a period of at least one year .edia~y 
, '. before the date of the individual's admission to the medical institution), , " 
,~.~7: :~~:~~:~::~ect ~.~ ~di;~:'~::t~ ::;~~~)~:"~han
 
Udlssolve upon that individual's discharge from the medical institu~n and return home. 
lfB','1..."o,: ; .:." ~"'"'' :,.. . "'~"'.~' :.'." .1.''J	 " 
'v",,~":~'" ., ' ..". '." .~ - :',' .. )-..1: ',:\.•• ::,;..::1.,:,' ; ,\,1",' ',." ~.!"i (l) No adjU8tment or,recovery of any medical assista.rice correct1ypaid on behalf of
:Wan· Individual'under the State plan may be made,' except·tbat. the State shall seek 
~adjustment· or recovery of any medical, assistance correctly. paid on behalf of an 
~ individual under·the State plan In the case of the following individuals: " . 
..	 ' iE·' . 
rn..(b) Adjustment or reCovery of medical 88sistancircioiTectl,y paid under a State pJan 
~ .......
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:",PUBLICHEALTH AND:WELFAR 
',' . 
~:42~,.§ 1396p 
(A) In the ease of an individual -described in aublle\,'tion (a)(1)(B) of this; section,,,, 
,; .'I·the State shaD seek adjustment or rerovery from the individual's estate or upon sale}: 
'., :. ::: ()f the prop¢y subject to alien imposed on account l)f medical assistance paid.'on'i; 
. ';';"':':;";;~~'I~'~~ ~~~~.: ,:,~":."",:,,,: ';'6'" ~;~~~,,~ .. ~.:;. ';~;':~;(:~:::~~'i ·~~;·;r~ ..:~:~:~;1: ..:, ';:~':~,~.'~/;:'; ..'~.~~:~~. 
'. :.;.~::·",(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years oc.·.aP 9rplder ,When "~e\ 
,:.;;.: .'individual reffivedsuchinedieal assistance, the State'shall seek adjustmentiJ:.orZ~ 
'::;''''~:recoViel'yfrom the individual's estate, but only f'or medical'88Bistance consisting',qf"';':'X 
. ".: ',:;' '(1)" n~g facility ~,'home and co~unity.baSed 8ervi~;and rel8¥ed\';­
.,....:'.. .':.. h~~~~~:;:~;e~:te~;;;or,~~:~:~~;~~~~~;;;~~~~ 
.. ' (C)(i) In the case of' an Individual who has received (or. Is. entitlecLto"reeeive)' 
. benefits under a long-tenn care insurance policy in connection with which assets or : 
. I'eSOUl'eeS are disregarded in the manner described in c1ause (il);except as provided" 
in such clause, the State shall seek adjustment Or recovery from the mdivi~s:! . 
I. estate on account of mediCal assistance paid on behalf of' the individual for nursing ..•.
 
.: facility and other JODg-term care services..; .. ,' :..,.: ....~ ..'! .. :,C:,!~ ;~.. ':::;::.~.~"'{)~
 
.. .' (ij) Clause (i) shaJl not apply in the case of an individual who received medicil :,'
 
assistance WIder a State plan of' a State which had a State plan amendment \. 
approved as of May 14, 1993, which provided for the disregard of any assets or, 
resources--:. ,~ . ,... ~. "":~ ";:r,;. ", ~ ": :'.:'~#: ~ ~ ... ~ ".:;•.':fr::;·'i;:i"t ~.l.'.~ .. " .;;--'~:~~ *}:~}t 
(1) to the extent that payments are made under a long·tenn care insuranCe 
. policy; or " .·;"t :~"', .. '" :';" :.>'. <: ''''.:' ;::.!~,.:::::.\·,(,:·,..;;J,~<i 
(D) because an indiVidual has received' (or is 'I!JItitled to· receive) benefits : 
under along-term care insurance policy.. .i,' ..;.,.' . ",~, ,:-:. ~. .: ii'$ 
'(2)-Any'3djW;t:riieJt'~ ~()\i~rrimdei- 'paragraph (l)rnay be':IDade ontY'8fter:'fb~"'1 
death of'the individual's surviving spouse, if any, and only at a time- .. •. ,"'~'G.'i~Y 
.. ,.	 :····fA>"when he ~. ll~i:~viiig chiii Who:is \inder.:~ 2i;:.~r}Nitli ''respeCt ~;L 
States eligible to participate in the. State program'establiilhed under subchapter,:: 
XVI of'this chapter) is blind or permanently arid totally disabled, or (withrespedto} 
. States which are Dot'eligible'to participate in such program).is blind or disableda(': 
,~. ·definedin.secti~nl382cofthistitle; and.·.~!:..! ~:'~<:.~'-';:; >-.. ':.r,:~.~y~ .~·!~.~·I:.~jr~'~ 'l;·;;~t{ 
.,-~ ~.::,;.; (B) in the case of' alien on an iildividliaI's bome under subsection (a)(I)(B) of this": 
.' ...I~-·Section, when- ,.-.l.'·H:':'- .t··r:~u!H;~ ~ .N·.j .. ...l::..'r:z'~ .•' :'~:'.~:~'"l. ....,.. :.:.;..<:...~~~r:-!:.~'~.~. ':~j!'ct~i~ 
',.' "._ .. ,. (i) no sibling of the ~dividual (who was residing in the indMdual's home ~;: 
· , .'" ",,' .a period of at least one year iinmediately bef'ore the date or .the individual:~ .. 
· - . admisSion to the medical institution), and . "'. - , " ,.;. ~".'", ". ~Ji .-: ..~~; 
. '". :!l" ,., ':. _~ .. , ', ... ' ....;, .~•. \1·····' ..•. : '.' "".": , .... I._ •• _~'l"" ~!i:~ 
. (0) no son or daughter of'the individual (who \Wll residing in th~ individuar!Li' 
~o~~ f'or a peri~.of at least ~ rea:rs.~e<Ji.!'.tely befo~'~fda~, oCth!,;: 
.' individual's admissIon to the medical institutiOD,' and who establishes to the.:. 
-.;. ,.. ·.·satisfaction or the State that he. or she providl!d. care to such individual ,yhich.> 
pennitted such individual to reside at home rather than. in an institutioir),~ 
.	 . - ~ , ", ...' . .•. ."'. "l" ..~.... .;... " "';'J>!":'. 
. ·,·,;·is lawfully residing in such ,home .w:ho haslawfu1ly lI!siQed in ,such:~ome OD,,!>} 
.,;:. continuous·.basis since the . date ;;of the individual's admission to. the medi~l 
.: ",: . ins.tiwtion. '.,:'''., ':.: .;.J•.: :. ~:L ,,[:~'~;j.~~ ~;·~~ii".~I~!..~~':" ;H;~ w'" ." .: ".••~~ :~H~ ~;! ~>.::~ ,:,:~:'i;.'~~'~~~ .';', .:~~';:,f 
""(3) The State ag~Cysh~ establish}iioceduriS '(in accordance with standards s~;
 
lied by the Secretary) under. which the agency shaD· waive the application,ot.,~,
 
· subsection (other than paragraph (1)(0»· if suchappHcation would work .BJi.un~~,
 
~, hardship as determined on the basis of' criteria established by the Secretary. '"" :~ '''1':~H
 
(4) For p~es';;f'this;~~bs~on',,·th~·~"~te",'With~ n;specttci"i:dec~: 
.. individual-- . " . ".'~:O.' '.:.:~!'; L'! :·}:.i:;:b,"; ,:lbrH~1 ~~~:i. 
.' 'c' >·.(A) shilllinclude all realBndpeisonal property and other·assetsincluded.wit1:liJ1 
..:~'.'r: the Individual's estate, as defined for-purposes of State probate laW; and· ~":~!ci~:tl1: 
.' . (B) may include, at the t?P1;ion. of'the State (ands~aJ]I!nclude, in ~e ca.se ~~l&:n.
 
( individual to whomparagraph"(l)(C)(iYapplies), iuiy'otherreal'lind 'persollBl ,
 
; property and other assets in whiehthe individual had-any legal .titJe or interest.~t.·,:
 
. .'the time of death (to .the extent or such..interest), including'such .assets,conveyecMe.,. 
Ii. survivor, heir, or assign of' the deceased individual through joint tenaDc;y, . 
in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other: arrangemeJ1t.::!..!;:;J): ..·' 
;::-258 
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. ! PUBLIC· HEALTH AND WELFARE .42 § 1396p 
i "(e) Taldnginto account cenain transtemof asseta,·~:-~,:?.::j 'tV'i:, :~,j!,;.~!. i ;', .. 
. , ''(Ix,A)" 'In"orderto' m'~tthereqUlrements of thiJ"'~n;to,tptu:po8es' or sectfon 
, 139&(a)(18) of this tltJe, the State plan must provide thilt l1' an inatitutionalized 
'/,individual'or the spouse of such an,individual(or"at,~e:option of a State, a nonillBtftu­
tlonalizedindividual or the spouse of such an Individual) disposes ofll88eta for less than 
fair market value on or after the look-back date specified in aubparagraph (lJ)(i), the 
indlvidual is ineligible for medical assistance for services dell4l':ibed in subparagraph 
(O)(i) (or, in the case of a noninstltutionalized individual, for the services desaibed in 
subparagraph (C)(ii» during the period beginning OD the date specl2ied in subparagraph 
CD) and equal to the number of months specified in subparagraph (E)., . ' '. , 
(B){!lThe look-backdate SpecuIt!d ii{thii1sUbp~ph Ii a ~ that'18'36 months 
\,(or, In the case of.payments from a trustor porttoDS of a trust t1Iat are treated as assets 
1disposed of by the individual purSuant to paragraph (3)(A)(!ii)'or (S)(B){fi) of subsection 
(d) of this section, 60 months) before the date speclfted in 'claUSe {iI).""""": ';;, 
\" (it>'ihedatl!speclfied ~thiailiUt;;. with;~8peCtto+:',:J;~:";~;;:~~":;.'~:;,~,,, 
\ ,,' (1) an institutionalized indMdu8I is',the fu.St dataaa of WhieU~eh1dividual both 
is an inetiwtlonallzed Individual and has appUed tor medical assistance under the 
,Stateplan,~ .... ,,, ,·.. ·','(7... '·":·-: ;;;::;" ""'C"';; "':'.'.",,,,, " ,,:'.'" , 
" (0) a nonillstitutionalized individual !sthe date bn.which theindivldual applles 
for medlcal assistance .under the State. plan' or, ·It later, the date on which the 
indMduai dlspol!l!S of assets for leas thali~.market !al.ue"~:;. 1:1 ;,,:.;, 
(C)(1) The servteea described In thfs subparagraph with respect; to an InstltutionaJized 
'p llI1 are the following: > .... ~;..; :: •· ..;;:.;:~;,'.I:..: <r ,,,i.' 
i 'I..-tn Nursing fac:i1lty services. '----:.; !~.;, . 
.' ,.';, (~) A IeveJ ot care: lIT any'inatltutibn eqlliva!ent<tothat of· mlng facllity 
servIceS. .,.:..!,,~): "~" ~·.1: i.H ~;,) ,'~:;<:;"::I" 
. !i.;: (ID) Home or community·baiedsenices furuished under-a waiver granted under 
\ subsection (c) or (d) ofseetion 1396n of this title. ,.;;.,l,;;iv;i '?'~;;'j .•;,,., 
(B)'The services described in this subparagraph· with respect to'. DOninstitutionallzed 
individual are services (not including any services; desCribed inclil.use (i» that are 
'eseribed in paragraph (7), (22), or (24) of section 1396d(a) of this title, and, at the option 
~ a State, other long-term care .senices for whiehmediC!l1·.asslstance ia otherwise 
..~ailable under the State plan to individuals requiring long~tern:1,eat'Iil. :,,; ...f:: f . 
.(D) The'date8pecltled In tbfs ilubparagrapl1ls the'nfst day·of.thefh'st month during 
; after which assets have bee~ for less,than;fairmarket'l81ue and which 
lea no~ oceur,in ~other,pl!1'1Dds ofmellgibl!ity ~der tbia~On.li:;:J..\;:·::'( 
(E)m Wlth'respect to an institUtionaHzed indMdti81/the(')'lumber':of months of 
neligibillty under this subparagn,phfor an indivldualshall be',equal ~, ::. .', " 
.' . en the tat8I,"eumulatiVe 'uncompenSated vai.k ot allassetS,tranatmTed by the 
.' individual (or individual's spouse) on tYr after' the' look-back' date speclfied in 
"'subparagrap1i(BrID;dividedby';, '.' ,.:1,',;' <':"':":"":~;.",""::;' ;""',', . 
,."(DFthe iverage montbly'coatto a private patient of numngfadlityservlces in 
',' .the State (or, at the option of the Stete, in the community in which the indivijiualls 
• Institutionalized) at the time ofapplication. .. ''''',- ,',
I., . .., ,.. , . '".', ... ' 
(11) With .~spect·to a i1oninstltutlonalfzedihdfridUaJ" the number ,of months of 
leliilbility under' this 8ubparagrapb .for an individual shall, not be greater than': a 
e~I~~ ~:~~tJveuDJ;;m~;ici~";~~~:.·~~··~ "~~~~:~':~e 
J individual (or individual's 'spouse) on or aller the .lOOk-back date)pedfied in 
. lNbparagraph (BX1), dMded by . ., " .... -', ..'''; . 
.<;~: CD) the'average monthly;caRt to a private patient of limirin'g facility' Services in 
;the Stete (or, at the option of the State,ln the community In'which the. indlvldualls 
iinstltutionaHzed)atthetimeofapplieatlon; .. ",'".,. ,','i.::,':':,. :'.,':. ,,' 
": , I.~ , ,'; .' ',;" ,,;..:., .' ,~": ", ',1 .,·.: .. ··r~-·: 'J i'l ;-'~ ., 
Ull) "'\e Dumber of months of ineligibility otherwise deteimiiied under clause,(i) or 
r~e::O:::~=o~a:r~:t=; =t{~ij'::~~:i:b~;'~e 
. lnumber' of months of ineligibility applicable to the individual under elauseJIi} as a 
result of such cBsp08al, and " .' ." '.;'., ' ' 
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;42;\tf1396p	 :PUBLIC· HEALTH AND: WELF 
. (ll) in the e&Ile of periods..of ineligibility detennined under .c1ause,(ii),: by . 
.,;:I~~JlUJDber of !l10n~:of.~~ IlJlplicable JO .~iJllfu.'j.~!1al.~~~ ,~:(i) 
·.·..!:\;·;~sult9~!JUch. disposaL J~:':[~\j :tiil~~ .. ';:f~: ;,:!, ~ <J .';<.:1 :,1: .~:- (~,l;(.c;:;::;; 
: (Z)An individua1shaU Dot be ineligible for medical assistlinee by reaBOn of Par8gra . 
. (l)totheextenttbat-=- ·',·'"i) ':.;i;;J'':'HlI':I;:;: ~H;~ "., • c,,···. ',;i::·... tl;!;,:·;.:.,y~;.':s:ti~~.(lff' 
~ .. : '::~(A) tiie'a8set.S traimfehed 'weref'a:ii~e"and iitIii·'t,O·thll home' was ~ ...., 
:;j.::~l~~;:;ii::~~~~~;~}i~~~;~~;~~~.:~~;.~~;~·!':;~~.::'~,.:~·,:~:;~:·';;~~'f;;;:1i~a~~~: .. ,-­
(ii) a ehildOfsncllindividualwlio(l) is'under age 21, Or (lI) (with respeet::to.:.H;~ I 
." ." . States e1igibI~ to participate In.tb~. State program estab~ed Ullder subchapter':Y 
..·;·.;·:,::~.ot.this ~ter~ ill b~~~or)enoanently :md~)~y disabled, or.<W}th'.~) 
.. "'. " .,i'espeet to States,which are.not eligible to par,tjdpate In IIllCh program) is bliJid;":"i' 
.. .. or disabled as defined iii section 1382c of thiS title· :'.... ........ ·-:..·',··· ..:'·!,'lY';
 
, .!~, .... ;,•• .J. "."•.• ~ .. ",-'", .,~~ ~~,._._. t :'" :.,-:'::, ,.:·~'~·r.:·, ~,~':,' ~v~ ..,':,!'-,' 
•	 . (ill) a sibling ot such lndivi~ual who has an equity interest in sucli home and. '> 
:. who Wll8 residing in ilUch fndfridua!'s home' for a' period of at least one'year ~~f/, 
.• .. '.;, . Immediately before the date the l'ndividual beeomes an instltutionalized iDdivid· ;~i 
'_a..... ::~~&- ... ·:aal;~or;.·:..: ·.~·~;L~.:n ~u..~ ....~·~~.1~ ..~!;. ·.~~:s ,.l.• ,... :":.. ;.' ~·,::-::""~t.';. ..,~",~,,,,;"~·.~.:..::.:~~~ -:' .•,.~~:~;~: 
. . (iv) a son or daughter of such individual (other tban a child de~!n '':;: 
". ::eJause·(h·)).who"Wa8-resi~g·in~Ch indivi~U!'8 home'rora'perio;d of at,least::0 
., . two years munedlate1y before the· date the lIldividual becOInes an inat!tutio~·l..'· 
ized individual, and wh~ (lis:'deteririined by the: State) provided care to lIllChe 
... iudivi~~~~ BUChindividual to reside athomeratlter. than in)\ 
i such an ll1!Ititution or facility; .,~ .::.: ,:,.; .' .;i:;' :;[,,1(';.:.)[,:' )'" (B) the ll8llets- ' ""; '-~;:-,>:.,"",.. " "J 
: ::::. (I) were transferred to theindividuai'aapouse or' to ~other fo~, the sole,): 
benefit of the Individual's spouse. . ... :.)'" ~ _) ',," 
.: -'7·(0) Were·.transferred:.ftom the individual's. apouscdo another for the 60I~J 
benefit ortJ1e individual'a.spouse,. :,.. :'.;:l -: ~'.;': .•<, ':;':;; ,!_;'"i.:.,_·(~:':·,(li 
''''';5 ..:: :.. ;; (ill) were. transferred, to.·:or.;to,a ,trust (including' aJ:rust dese:ribed in,::' 
".: ";;;:.:' ·llUbaection .(dX4)-.of"thiasection)established:'sole!J' .t'or·thebenefit;~'Jt!le:€ 
.: ,'... individual's ~ described in subparagraph· W<ii)(l1), or .:. ; ••". ~ :, .':(,,·C&·.,o ;:~; 
'. c (iv) were transferred' to a tru.et (including a trnEIt described in subseetion~. 
(d)(4) of tbissectlon)"eetablished' solely for the beDefi'~ of an individual WIder 65 .,; 
:":" :.!~yearufage.wg,l1,) ia:.·~!ed (8;'l.. ~.in ~oD.~c(a)(~>.;p~ ..:..~JitIe}tf. 
."'.' (C), a satistaetory.tmowing·ia;made to the State (m aecordance with.regulationid
promulgated· by the' Seaetary) thl¢..(i) the individual tatended. to· dillpoae or the: 
,~_ •;,888ets either ali'air market value, or .fllr other valuable etlllSideI:at;ion.. (ii) the u.se~ ~ 
• WlU'e tran8femi~ ~cl~~y'!~r ..a... pUrpose~ ·o~er~::tban ..to.' quillPY. 'for. . medic&,~ 
.' .. assistaIlee, or (in) an assets ~erreq for less tb8ri fair "lIIIIrket value have been., 
~~. ~;:~~edJ0the:~~~aa1,~~or~~,~. ':~":':;:;:':' ":~\)" ~,~,~::; ..:;~:,.:::,l::~~.' :'.",~~ ~:~.;,';1i 
(D) the'State determiries. Wider proCedures ~tab1lsJled by the. State (iIi:aceor,); 
! . ,•. dan~ with etan~·specified by th'il Secretary), ~at the denial of eligibility would 
...:.,' work ali'1iiIdlie'bardship'8& deterinined on the basis of crItemEistabUshed by tne:: 
~. :I~··Secretary~· ~. I~~ .~, .., ,.-,-- .., ::;~, :,':,,~:'.4.~;~_~:~~: ; ,.,'". :,.::..~~", ':~~:~~~;':,::-~~~·,~;_~\:rl~.:· .7~ 
(3) For purposes of this 6ubsection, ~. the we ~ ~ 'ass~theii:l by"an 'iiidiVidual'~ 
. "common with another perSon' oi~ons in: a 'jolnt"terlancy•.'tenii'iiey in common,oi 
.similar arrangement, the 'asset (or theaffecte<tportion Of stic:!i asset) sb~ be considere.d· 
to be ~erred by such individual when any action Is taken. either- by such' individUal 
'::or bY: anY,,'lJiher person, that reduces' or-elIminates saeh individual's iJwnershipor control 
,t'ots\icli .3sA(~~~~" '.J .. :., •.•. ' l·~ •••.:: '.~ '~,;~~ '; ~\...:~~~ ; -;.~~': :'r~~·\!,~~.:~'.:.~·~::;":~':~:~\ ~r:~·;~~;:~~:~!:.~:.~ ,::,:~{~ 
,; ,(4) A State (including a State which has elected treBbnellt Ullder section 1396a(!) of 
;thlatitle)plllY n~t,provide' for i.riyj!eriod.of Ineligibility fora-ll iq~vidual d~ to'ttansCel 
of resources for less than ·fair inarket value'eiteept. in aCeordailce. With· thiS Subsection. 
In the case of a transfer by the spouSe' of an individual which re8U1b .ina-period of 
"meligibility for niedie3J'iiSSiStanee Under a State pIan for Sulch individual, a State shall, 
using a reasonable methodology (as specified by the Secretm:y), apportion such period of 
. ineligibility (or any. portionot such period). among .the .individual and the individual's 
:·spouse if the spouse otberwise'-beoomes ~llle for medicaJlassiatance under.the State 
plan.' ...... :. ... ." , ... '_ .. ,~. t:.it~ ·;.S;iW.:.:r.~7""t..!-ri·::'·; .. ~,:,',;;i';'."!. • 
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PUBLIC 'HEALTH "ANDLWELFARE	 .42;§ 1396p 
fq5);· In this imbEleliiion.:tIie:term.: "resources". has the meaning ,given such ,term in 
~=L 1382b ,0~~~.tJe,.~WitJJoat ~:w,the excl~~;d~~in sub~on (a)(!) 
! iiD.:rieabneii:~;~~::~:~;'~~;;:!\:~:~:,;~C':,;;~'~:,~ J":~~"";:'~~{:'(;:~;;'~'.::';:' J:,: ,"~, . 
j(1!For purpo8ei~fd~:Siiii6gjiU{iD.~~uiiI'seug:iliilitY'rcir\':>r~iimoWit of, ill!nefita 
under, Ii State plaiiundei' this'~pteiriiubjeet to'paragraph (4), the rules specified in 
i par3graph'(S} sh81l app!y"w'a,b1J8t established by such individual. ' >"." ..•. .... 
1 ;·,·ti't..'!·.\.JC.~-·J{I'·':' '''-l'AP.A7'f''I-:r'·4 ':.:: , - ...• ~ •. , :.•••• ; ! ", , .. :. 
I (~}(A) Fo.I' PIJl'i:>oseil"of 'thiS' SiIlisectiori; .an individual ShaIJ be' eorisiden!d to have 
,stabIisheda trUSt· if' ii.iSetB 'OftJieindividUal were used to: form'all or part of the corpu8 
. of the trust lind ifaiiy 'Of the (ollowing-individuals estabJisljed such trust.other than by
willi .<: ...: "'J '-'!.::'~'(":~~;','.-~::'::':' ::":'i'~~" ''''; '.~.:(:;·ri,::: .. : ..',: .... '.
 
. (i): The']jl(Hvfdu:.L·; , . . <.;:j':·.·.~.,;.f! \',' ,.·~?;·:r ..:··,..·.: , ..:<0..
 
:.'::(ii) Th~"fii'dMihW'sspo'"Wiii>;'~Jl" ;;,; .' :'~':,.':: '.: .. :.:: ;,' ..... .'" . . 
. , (iii)'A peri6~;·%~diDg'a;~iUt:or~e~y.diePIauthority to 
1 ' act in place of or on·behaJfof the' lndividualor the individual's spouse. ' !.. ;.:(iv)···A person; bicluding any court or administrative body.·8cting at the direetlon 
i ,. ','01' upon the request. of. the individual or the individual·s,Bpouseo' .•,.: ,; :'. 
(B) In the' .case cif'.al:rciBt the· cOrpus of which includeil asseta of mindividual (as 
-lletermiried	 under sUb)ia'nlgriph CA»)'iuid asseta of any other pe1'lKIJ1 or persons. the 
~On8 of,this·.liubseetion ~ 'apply-:to the portion of the trust attributable to the 
1IlM!ti1 of the mdividuaL '/'.' .:':11,;".".'::,:::[ ::'.::", ' ... ;. , .. ; :.:;r :.-.: ::,'" C', '" ;:; .. ~ .. 
(C) Subject to paragraph (4), this subsection shall apply without regard ~ 
.	 }D~~:~·r~r~~a)~:~~:.~e.sta!?~ed;;.:'~~::::,,:;~:~·:' ':" ... 
•_'-'. Jii) w~ether..t:b~ ~ve o~ ~~ ~ ~ti.~n~der the trust, 
'.	 ;··(ili}- any ~ctions on .:when. or whether. distribJ?,t;ions may!>e,.~e from the 
, trust, or ,.:.....~ _ ", . . ;~;,.~ .·.'~i:;';'·.•~~·,,~ ... ":~'i~' '~jbrYU l~;;:.it;. 
l;(~;(~~~~~~~~~~~:;~;~:~::~~~;~~;~':;:·,:r;·;··. :'''' '::.
 
", ~t (I); the 'oorpUsOf ih"li tniat'8halJ'be corisidared resources available to the individu­
<"'!~"il;.. ;~;.,: ~.;.l..;~).:';{~' ;~c;·.·~)o£.;:)Lr::~"!~·.\~:~tt .j:.!" :.o.:i.;),"'/7~:.~.i ':: ':1 :1:.,; ·~i·~.~;~~i\rl .~(. ;f'I,.:': ~. :":., ~ ',~ 
I . (ii) paymimts from the trust to, or for the benefit" of'the individual shall be 
l;·:COosid~lncome.~the~dual,.~~: :;:;W:): '~ ..; ,.,i;;;;~::.' 'i"..;-~',-:: ,. ',:.~ :~ 
""~": (W"'ahy'otherpliymenis frlnn-thetrust shallbe considered'888eta disposed of by 
; . tb~ illdividualfor pUrpOseii.of silbaection (c) oithia section. '" .,..j::,:', " 
I(B) In'the aise of an irrevOCable t:niSt-
I, • •. . ,;, • ",,' • • • _. : ••.. • '.' • • • : i" '.~' " '.; .•~~' • 
':' (I) if there are any cin:mnstances under which payment from the trust could be 
. made to or fOJ: the benefit of' the fndivi~ the portiQllof the cOrpus from which, or 
" the irlco.m,e.p'~ ~~~~.fromwhicll' pa~-;n~ to ~eindiy.!dual co,uld. be made s~all 
I .,be COn81d~~urce8available to the mdiVldiJal. and paymenta from .that portion 
1 ::.ofthe,~ _qrJ~c9rn~1~ /: ;,/:hi:rU";; ,:,;!;.~, ,~i;~!'.::.~·;;;:~J:·l:;i~; ;::::;:~,;;::~:<;:.',:, 
.	 (~). to or for the benefit of the individual, shall be .consi~ income. of the 
1 mdividual, and.. .:~~:t,:,:"o:.!f. t!:~LF~;··!-t \.:.:' . ~:.£.: ~ ..' ~.:'"~·if)./jj(rt ';.<-:: ·.'1 ... · ( '.
 
~. ,~;'::' (u)foraDyother,puiopose. shall be considered a tranSfer: of asseta by the
 
l ..'; ; -.: individual siibjeet:tOStlbseetion (c) of this section;' arid \ . ~ 'J:' .....
 
,..... ~, .. ~.', .••:~·~I.~ .. ·..~.·,.:. •.:-',.J\ .• (.;l;. "'~A;:' .:';;";" ,: •. ,.... . !'J~iJ.·~,.i .•,'o1"1 ·\~";o7"'~\\"!"'~ , 
.. (n) lilly portion of the trust from which, or any lricome on tIie ~orpU8 from which, 
,ntl. payment ,could Ulidei3:by circumstances be made to themdiVidual shall bei . considered,;'ils:of thedai20f est8blislm1entof the trUSt (or, if later, the date on 
~'wbicllpayri1ent'tO~ the indiViduillw1is forecloSed) to be··asseta.disposed by the 
I. ':individual,for purposes of~on.(c) of this section.,andthe ~ue.of.the trust 
shaD be determiiled for purposes of such subsection by including the amount ~f any 
I" paymentamade.from such portiollof the trust ~ such date. . ." " 
I.... . - v". ,.--r' .... ,'~~ .. ~ ... _......_' .... ~. ·.. >: ..... ··J·;d.••.• , ',~· ••".J..Lu;""......',':~ ... ,n.-,r.:..! I.:;' .:.a; 
!(4); ,This 8U~OiJ! sh8D. not apply f;o;any otthe foUowilig trusts:"-;i.~;: ~l '!j;; : .. ' . 
I. ;;.-.; (A); AtfUst'COD~ the assets'Of ail iii.diVidual·under· age 65 who. is disabled 
''1& defimidiJi 'section' 1382c(a)(3); of this title} and 'which- is E!i!tablished .for the 
Jiefit of such, individual bY8'parent;:grandparent, legalguardian,of the individual, 
,.. 8 court if the State will receive an amounts remaining ~ #letrust. upon the.,death 
, ~261 
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42"'§ 1396p	 PUBLIC.'HEALTH:ANDtWELF.ARE:'iYt 
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., .:of such individual up to an' amounteqaal to the total medical assisbmce paid on' :;: 
,,"; behalf of the:individualunder a State plan under this sl1bchapter.~~.)·.·;,,': '. ,;.:, ".'JJ!{,'i\:", 
(B) A t.1'UBt established in a State for the benefit of an Individual if- " ,.,' "ld!:! 
(1) the trust is composed onlY otpenilion. Social ~ty, "and. othermco~F 
"',., to the individual (and aceumulated ,income inJhe trust), " . '. " ';:,':; 
" ,"" •• ,' •. ~,., ' •. '.'-:'; ,',.;. ":;" :~;.,,'~.. : .:~~\.' ;:~~ ";)'-:.::,.: ',',I" ',""", < ~, ';'J~" 
.. ~~o::.o·~ (ii) the State will receive ,all amounts l'!!mainlng iii the trust upon the death: 
. of such individ~ up to an amount ~. too the .total zriedf~ ~tan~_~~ .on 
, behalf of the indiYidaal under a State plan under this subchapter, and' :.. ::,\ 
'. - .': ': ,,-", . '.' ~',-'~; .,:~ " "",",,~,~.:;: "',. I~ .,:". ":", " : .(~ ..... , '.' 
• 0'0 ,(iii) the State makes medical asBistance 0available to individuals described in'
 
section .1396a(a)(lO)(A)(ll)(V) of this .title;' but OOes'not'uiake such assistance'
 
available to individuals for .nursing' facility' &erVices under sectlOli·
 
. 1396a{a)(10)(C) of this title. . '0...·0:~~;
 
: - ,	 \.,~- '. ;, '~I '''(\ ' ~, ,. 
(C) A trust containing the assets of an individual who is disabled (as defined in 
section 1382c(a)(3) of this title) that meets the following ~onS: .' 0 0 '. 
0" (i) 'Theb-ust is established and manage.:t by a no~Fo'fit'~~o;;::'.' ,,' ".>, 
," (ll) A separate account Is maintained tor esch beneficla1jr of the trust, but, 
for purposes ot investment and management ol~ funds, the trust pools these 
accounts. . ... ' ... '" ,..; .t ... ; ,". , ,. . ".,', ;".,\'.':"': 
(III) Aeeountain the trust are established solely tor the benefit of individuals 
who are disabled (as detined in section 13B2c(a)(3) of this title) by the pareDt, 
grandparent, or legal guardiBn of such lndlvidualB, by such individuals, orby.ii 
'·court..:". ',' .. ", : ,_ '. .... " '" c,;'·., 
(tv) To the extent that amounts remaining in the beneficiary's account upon 
the death. of the beneficiary are not retained by the trust, the trust paY! to the 
State from such rernalning amounts in the account an amount equal to the total 
'~ amount of medical assistance paid on behalf of the beneficiary undertbe State 
plan under this Bubchapter., ' . - .,' 
'(5) The State ~;;j ~ ~b&h p~tidures (ht 'lICC<irdan~e 'With staDdJU.da sPecl~
 
fled by the Secretary) under which the agency waNes the application ot thfssubsectlon
 
with respect to' an .Individual if the indiYidaal establishes.· that such, application would
 
_work an undue hardship on the individual as determined on the basis of eriterJa 
estabUshed, by theSec:retary. ,.",;.: " :;';tl>' "\ ',,·."f; ',';' ,.;,;, c, ''''l';:,', i;; I" .,:' 
(6) The tenD. "trust" includes any legal ilistruJnent cir' deviCe that is ~'to a trust 
but lIIcludeslul'BDnuity onlY' to such extentom· in such manner 118 the Secretar,y

specifies. ;: .):';::::;;;. : (, '" , ~ ':~"~C~(~ ie_ ,)~ ": ,'." , ',n ..,;.~~ .
 
:(e) ~IU~':"Wt'" ":"/~:..:.~ ':":"\;L,,;~;~;~:;~~:~;~~:~::"-:·:.~.l,"~:.,v". ~'~: I " 
:In this section,.thetoDowIngdeflnitiODB·shall app!y:,,: ',.,;".,., .. ": "..,.,: ';:~';
 
. '; .1:(1) The·ter~l'''a88etli .., with respect to 'an iril&7idual. includea'iill income and
 
.'~., i'esoUreeB of the individUal and:cit·t:!1e Individual's spouse; including-'any income 'or
 
re80urces whic:h the individual or such individual's spouse is entitled to but'doeB no;
 
.... receive'becausebfaction-', ;:;/;';:or~~ ~d;.·:~ :;{:." -:: .::~~ '~'. ':·I,_I,."I}
 
.'	 . (A) by the individual or 8uch individual's spouse. ,':c;. i.c':;':';':'H: , 
'I "',' ;.;:"~~~ , ....,"\:.::.'"'". ~, .. ','"'' '.,'" ".q~?' ,'.' <~. '. ' •. _ : ",i--' ~", 
" '. . '(B) bya peraon, . inchidlng.' a court or administrative body, .with lega
 
... ; ;' ~"authorjty ~,aetilip1ace of or O,D, ~ehalfof th~, individ~ or B~ individual';
 
;;::~po~ ..~r:~':"",":;::;,' :;, ~~;~;'~:" .... ,' ... :':; ';'" ..:<,', .',.
 
. , .;;,', :.,~.;(C) by'any person, including any court or administrative body, acting at th 
".;.: ,;~direction.or,-,-upon the .request.,of the individual or such, indiYidual'sspouat 
, "(Z)'The terDi'"income" has the meaning given 8!l1ch term.in 8eeti~~'I88ia of tIi 
::"( ~ ~ title:'" '.T~ (' "'"j" '>~J.~'i:i":~F: "'.: ~i}r,~,:,' .. ~·, -:' :. '.. :.:~.,,: ..•1' .(:',~; :-:": ;i~T. ~',~" ;;. ~; ,rr::,:":];:.:;, ,~,\J ;::~~.: i;~ , 
. (3) The term "iriiItitUtioil8ilieCi'indivfdLlaJ" mew an individual 'Who is 'tan inp 
tientin a nursing facility; who is an inpatient ·iIl a medical institution and wi' 
'. respect- to whoDl payment is .made pased. on a level of care provided in a nursll 
.". facility, or who is described in,section 1396a{a)(lO)(A)(ii)(VI) of this title. ,: '.' . 
'''~;;:(4)The'temt·~oiliniltitutio~alized individual":~~eaitsan individual ~~ 3l 
L.	 "'ofthEi sei'vfces'speCified in subsection (c)(l)(C)(ii) of'this section.;.l.. '!i ~Ie.;,,,,, .l'''' 
, 2~ 
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,PUBLIC';HEALTH~'AND.WELFARE 42·i;§ l~96P. 
i . . .. 
! ,;,~': ~"{5) 'The tenn "resources" has the meaning given such term in section 1382b of
 
. '.. l.r. this title;' without· regard (in the case of an institutionalized individual) to the'
 
i ':~"exclusioii desCribed in subsection (a)(l) of such section.' "', ""~'( .', :.':
 
I (Allg. 14, 1~'~. 58tTW; ~;.§ 1917,'~'~ded sePL 3,'i982;Pu'b;i.:·;r;~, ~e ~:. § 1~(b), 96
 
I Stat. 370, and amended'JlIIL 12, 1983, Pub.L. &7~ Title nIt §'309(b)(2l), (22), 96 Stat. 2410; Dee.
 
I 22, 1987, Pnb.L.· 1~203. Title IV, § 42ll(h)(12)(A), 101 Stat. 1330-20'1; Dee. 22;'1981, Pub.L.
 
, 100--203, Title IV;·§ 421l(h)(12)(B), as amended July 1, 19B8, Pub.L. lr0.300, TitlaIV, § 411(0(3)(1),
 
i "1 102 Stat. 803; July I, 1988. Pub.L. 100-&10, Title III, § 303(1), 102.Stat. 7.60•.Oct.13. 1988, Pub.L.
 
10Q-l86,Title:,Vk § 6Oll(d)(I6)(B), 102 Stat. 2417; Dec. :19. 1989, Pnb.L.IOI-239. Title VI,
 
I§ 64ll(e)(I), 103 Stat. 2271; .A1lg. 10, 1998, Pub.L. 103--66, Title XIII, §§136ll(a)to (c). 13612(a) tA)

"(C~,,!:~::~;:!~·;;~~;:'~~~I(:AL'~ STA~:r'~~~~:::,,:;···::~:;~:~~;~;:~{:::Y·:~;~:.~ 
IReVision Notes and LegfaliltiveReport8 . - .. ';·"(B) the'resources were'\I'anlifen'ed (I) to or
 
I 1993 Acta; Ho;;se' 'Report No. 103-111 and from (or to another for the sole benefit of) the
 
House Conference Report No. 103-213, see 1998 indlvldilal's spouse, or (II). to the lDdividual's
 
! ... U.s. Code Congo and Adm. News; p. m ehild deeen1led in subparagraph (AXii)(Il);". 
. ,~ .AmendmentB ;:' .,'.::~:::.\'.' , . '!·SubseC. •. " (e)(2)(C).· Pub.L.. '103-36,
 
] . . . ", § 13611(a)(2)(C), substituted .~assets" 'for "re­
1993 Amendme.nts.· Sub8ee."(b)(l).. Pub.L.· sou~" andadded'cl. (iii)." """": ' ..
 
103--66, § 13612(a), lowered tJlreshold age to'66 .. . _., , ;1·,','~!~ ,.:" '"
 
from 66 for indlvidualstl'Om whom the State wiD . Subsee.·, (c)(2)(D)•.. '. ·.Pnb-L. ·103--66,
 
!seek. medicaidesta~ ~~, and expanded § 1:S61I(a)(2)(D), generally ameDded ,.subpar.
 
I::~ ~:cai~~~~~whl~r:;~~ ~~?,:,,~,~e~~~~;~~:,-~~,~ r 
beneficiaries of long·term care Insurance. . . "(D): the State determines that denial of eligi-
Subsee. (1)(3)",. Pnb.L. 103--66, § 136l2(b), bilit;y would work an undUe hardship." .'
 
ladded~•.(S).:.:; .,.,:,." '.' :: Subsec. (I:)(S). Pub.L. 103-36,
 
" Subsee. (b)(4). Pub.L. 103-66, § 13612(c), § V1611(a)(2)(E), generally amended par.(3).
 
'added par. (4)•.. ". , ,', .. ". . Prior to amendment par. (3) read 88'- follows: 
Subsec:.. (e)(1).· Pub.i: 103-66, '§ 13611(a)(I), "(3) ID this. subsection, the term 'iDstitution. 
'"letely revised par. (1). Prior to the amend· alizI!d individual' means llJI lDdividual wbo is an 
par. (1) read as foUOWII: . inpatient iII a nursing facility, who is an lDpa­
. ',...rI) In order to meet the requirements of tlent in a medical institution and with respect to 
this subsection. (for purposes of section '. whom payment is made based on· a level ofcare 
1396s(a)(5IXB) otthis title), the State plsn must provided iII .a.nurslllg.facility, or who is de-
provide for a period of Ineligibility for nllJ'Sing scribed iII section 1396a(a)(lO)(A)(ii)(VI) of this 
:CaciIlty services li!Id for a level of care in a ~~e'"''-I;'''':' :.: :,.;;; i ...:' . i I ~ ..;:1: ':>. 
;medIcal institution equivalent to that of llUJ'5ing . SlibBeco;:. ,o'(e)(4). " Pub.L.·.·· 103-66,fscility serviCes and for services under section 
1396n(e) of this title iII the'case of an institution. § -I1l611(a)(2XF),: added provisions. relating to .
 
~ .iIldividual (as defined iII 'paragraph (3» apportionment of period of Ineligibility amongst
 
rho, or whose !'JlOUll8, st any time during' or spouses..:,· .. !n~ .. '.. . ',:, .... ":; ' ..,:-.,",", , ..•if.
 
lifter the 3O-month period immediately before , .SUb~ (d);',~~L. 1~, §: 1361I(b}; added 
~~~~:~~~=:uanis~~~ subsee,.(d):, ;~".: """~ ,: ..; •...::.:'
 
;nedica1 asillst.anee under the Stateplsn on such S~ (e). ;_~.L. 10lHi6,§' 13611(41), added
 
,late) or, if the individual is not. 80 entitled,. the BUbaee. (e)_ .~ ...:::~. , "T, .•. :~;! i ;
 
i:e~ ~~:=~~~~~: Effective~' .~1"·'; ,,:'~,;:;; ,;. ';:;'~i~:c"'
 
:;:a~=;~~~:ua: ~~: 1~
~~~v:s.mo~~~=J:i:~~l361I(e)O
.,.: 
fI whlch such' resources were transferred and ~ .. "(:I) The. amendments made' by this Section
 
,he'number of'months in such period shall be [amending aubsec.(c)and eMcting eubsecs..(d)
 
t!qual to the leaserof-:" .cO and (e) of this Bectlon and amendiDg Bect:ions
 
'''(AfSOmonths,'ilr ".' . '. ,," l396a and·,l396r-6 of this titJe)..shall apply,
 
"(B): til the total uncompensated value' of excellt ,88 provided iII· this .subseetion, to pay-

i the resources· so transferred, divided by (ii) ments under title XIX of the Social Security Act
 
l! the average cost, to a private patient :at the', Jthla., subchapter] foj- caJendar quarters begin-

time of the application, of nllJ'Sing facility ser- niDg on' Or after October 1, 1993, without regard
 
vices.in the S~. or, at.Stateoption, iII the to whether or not final regulations to canyOut

i community in :Rhlch ~e lDdividuai i8 institu- . such amendments have been 'promUlgated by
 
i tionalized.'~ :·',':'i....'".:~ ,:."".:... .. ,,':, __.;; ,.. such date. .. , .
 
,Subsee. ",: (c)(2)(A). " ..Pnb.L. . I~, •"(2) The amendments lIIIIde by this section
 
§ 1361l(a)~)(A),. substituted "a.ssets". for "re- [amending subsec. (e) and enacting subsecs. (d)
 
sources"., ;", .. :.' ...,... ~, ...:; '.... ' .... ,'.... and· (e) of this section and amending sections
 
ISubsec.. ",: (c)(2)(13).,: .. · PnbL. . 103-$. . 189&, and 1395r-5 of tIP title] shall nat apply­

. 1361l(a)(2)(B); generally amended par. (2)(13). . .i·,':'(Ai to{i;eweaJ a8sistan~ Provtdecffor aer­
.. _Mor to amendment par. (2)(13) read as foUows: .. vW!S·.furnished.before October 1, 1993,.,",263'" ,...... . .. '..". 
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ib~~:'.~ HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
 
{\~0? .~-::;.:.. . 
~,~~. Revi8lon Notell and Legislative Reports community spouse, as defined in section 
'~~': ~: 1'182 Act. Senate Report No. 97-494 1396r-5(h)(2) of this title,,". 
~;;g:(;f 'and House Conference Report No. Subsec. (c)(2)(B)(iii). Pub.L. 101-239, 
~)~,97-760, see 1982 U.S.Cooe CoI1!:. and § 6411(e)(1)(B)(ii). struck out d. (iii) 
i:r;WAdm.News, p. 781. which contained materia! relating to ·:~r$.~;'··1'183 Act. Senate Report No. !>7-592 transfer of resources to person other 
t~lL and House Conference Report No. than a spouse for less than fair market 
.~~'1\97-986, see 1982 U.S.Code Congo and value. 
ittt?;'Adm.News. p. 4149. 1988 Amelldments. Subsec. (c)(I).1f;j.:~:1987 Act. House Report No. 100-391 Pub.L. 100-485, § 608(d)(l6)(B)(i),sub.
"lw.t/(Parls I and II) and House Conference stituted "period of ineligibility for nurs­
~~K:Report No. 100-495, see 1987 U.S.Code ing facility services and for a level of 
~~,:.r .Cong. and Adm.News, p. 2313-1. care in a medical institution equivalent 
:~~~!i'188 Acts. House Report No. to that of nursing facility services and 
,)1*0;, 100-105(1). (II) and House Conference for services under section 1396n(c) of 
_. . 988 USC d ~ this title in the case of an institutional­;1:';:., Report 1(){Hi61, see 1 . . 0 e !.,;ong.\"')'" d 8' ized individual (as defined in paragraph::t~,·i..,.an Adm.News, p. 03. () hi!I~"X' 3 ) w o. at any time during or after the 
1iJ'&(,i':. Senate Report No. 100-377, House 30-month period immediately before the :f;\~iConference Report No. 100-998, see date the individual becomes an institu. ~~~.j1988 U.S.Code Congo and Adm.News, p. tionalized individual (if the individual is ;;~Jij!. ~776. entitled to medical assistance under the 
. "':7:;1'189 Act. House Report No, 101-247, State plan on such date) or. if the indio 
House Conference Repon ,No. 101-·386, vidual is not so entitled, the date the 
and Statement by President, see 1989 individual applies for such assistance 
U.S.Code Cong. and Adm.News, p. 1906. while an institutionalized individual" for 
iL "period of ineligibility in the case of an 
CodlficaU01l1l . institutionalized individual (as defined ~~ Pub.I.. 100-203. Title IV. in paragraph (3» who, at any time dur­
§ 421l(h)(12)(A), Dec. 22, 1987. 101 Stat. ing the 3~month period immediately 
.:133~207, provided that subsec. before the individual's application for 
'{c)(2)(B)(i) is amended by striking out medical assistance under the State plan". 
"skilled nursing facility, intermediate 
.care facility" and inserting "nursing fa. Pub.I.. 100-360. § 303(b). substituted 
cility, intermediate care facility for the provisions establishing a period of ineli· 
""entally retarded" in lieu thereof, and gibility for institutionalized individuals 
Pub.L. 100-203, Title IV,' who, at any time during the 3D-month 
§ 4211(h)(12)(B), Dec. 22,1987, 101 Stat. period immediately before the individu­
13:ID-207. as amended Pub.L. 100-360, ai's application for medical assistance 
·tl IV § 411(1)(3)(1) J I 1 1988 102 under the State plan, disposed of re-
Ie, • U y. • sources for less than fair market value stat. 803. provided that subsec. (c)(2)(B)(ii), is amended by striking out for provisions for denial of medical as· 
killed" each place it appears, which sistance for any individual who would 
. ndments could not be executed in not be eligible for such assistance except 
. of complete amendment of sub~ec. for such disposition. 
by Pub.L. 100-360, § 303(b). Subsec. (c)(2). Pub.L. . 100-360, 
",.' § 303(b). substituted provisions that an 
endments individual shall not be ineligible for 
198'1 Amendment. Subsec. (c)(l). medical assistance by reason of par. (1) 
Pub,L. 101-239, § 6411(e)(I)(A), inserted to the extent that the resources transfer­~or'whose spouse," following "an institu· red were a home and title to the home 
,'onallzed Individual (as defined in para· was transferred to certain individuals. 
. ph (3)). who,". the resources were transferred to (or to 
··;bsec. (c)(2)(B)(i). Pub.L. 101-239, another for the sole benefit of) the com­
411(e)(1)(B)(i). substituted "(i) to or munity spouse. or the individual's child 
in (or to another for the sole benefit who is blind or permanently and totally 
the individual's spouse, or" for "(i) 'to disabled, a satisfactory showing was 
. to another for the sole benefit of) the made to the State that the individual 
763 
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, Pub.I.. 100-203, Title IV, 
4211 ec. 22, 1987, 101 Stat. 
, provided that subsec. 
. {c)(2)( )(i) is a ended by striking out 
facility" a  inserting "nursing fa-
inter ediate care facility for the 
;:~:::::~:!.lj' retarded" in lieu thereof, and 
100-203, itle I , 
(h)(12)( ), ec. 22, 1987. 101 tat. 
l""'~.L'oJl, as a ended Pub. . 100-360, 
I . § 411(1)(3)(1). July 1, 1988, 102 
r.li'·",' .. ",,,,,   o   
place it appears, hich 
~,enclmEmts could not be executed in 
l t  t f sub~ec. 
s . ( )( )( )(iii). . . - , 
 ( )(l)( )(ii), str  t . (iii) 
i  t i  t ri l r l ti  t  
 ll ts. s . ( )(1). 
-
-
t  that of nursing facility services and 
for services under section 1396n(c) of 
-
 
( » h ,
- t  ri  i i t l  f r  t  
date the individual beco es an institu-
tionalized individual (if the individual is 
, i-
    
i  r r  ( » , t  ti  r-
ing the 30- onth period i ediately 
before the individual's application for 
edical assistance under the State plan". 
ub.I.. 100-360. § 303(b). substituted 
rO isi s st lis i   ri  f i li-
i ilit  f r i stit ti li  i i i ls 
, t  ti  ri  t  - t  
ri  i i t l  f r  t  i i i · 
I's li ti  f r i l ssist  
under the tate plan. disposed of reo 
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f r r isi s f r i l f i l s-
sistance for any individual ho ould 
t  li i l  f r s  ssist  t 
for such disposition. 
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intended to dispose of the resources ei· 
ther at fair market value or for other 
valuable consideration, or the resources 
were transferred exclusively for a pur, 
pose other than to qualify for medical 
assistance. or the State determines that 
denial of eligibility would work an un­
due hardship for provisions which em­
powered States to establish periods of 
, I' 'b'l'ty . f 24 ths ' 
me 19I 1 1 In excess 0 mon In 
any case in which the uncompensated 
value of disposed of resources exceeded 
$12.000 or the property was disposed of 
for less than fair market value, 
Subsec. (c)(2)(A)(ii). Pub,L. 100-485, 
§ 608(d)(16)(B)(ii). designated existing 
provisions in part as subcls. (l) and (II), 
respectively. 
Subsec. (c)(2)(A)(iii). Pub.L 100-485, 
§ 608(d)(I6)(B)(iii), substituted "the in­
dividual becomes an institutionalized in­
dividual" for "of the individual's admis­
sion to the medical institution or nurs­
ing facility", 
Subsec. (c)(2)(A)(iv). Pub.L 100-485, 
§ 608(d)(16)(B)(iv), substituted "the in­
dividual becomes an institutionalize<l in­
dividual" for "of such individual's admis­
sion to the medical institution or nurs­
ing facility". 
Subsec. (c)(2)(B). Pub.L. 100-485, 
§ 608(d)(l6)(B)(v). designated existing 
provisions in part as d. (0. adde<l cl. (ii), 
and struck out "or the individual's child 
who is blind or permanently and totally 
disable<l" following Nsection 
IJ96r-5(h)(2) of Ihis title,". 
Subsec. (c)(J). Pub.I.. 100-485, 
§ 608(d)(l6)(B)(vi), qualifie<l definition 
of "institutionalized indIvidual" to pro­
vide that inpatients in medical institu­
tions must be those with respect to 
whom payment is made based on a level 
of care provided in a nursing facility, 
and included within the definition per­
sons described in section 
1396a(a)(lO)(A)(ii)(VI) of this title. 
Pub.I.. 100-360. § 303(b), substituted 
definition of the term "institutionalized 
individual" for provision that in any case 
where an individual was ineligible for 
medical assistance under the State pian 
solely because of the applicability to 
such individual of the provisions of sec­
tion 1382b(c) of this title. the State plan 
could provide for the eligibility of such 
individual for medical assistance under 
the plan if such individual would have 
SOCIAL SECURITY 
been so eligible if the State plan require­
ments with respect to disposal of re," 
sources applicable under paragraphs '(1) 
and (2) of this subse<:tion had been ap­
plied in lieu of the provisions of section: 
1382b(c) of this title. 
Subsec. (c)(4). l'ub.L. 100-360, ' 
§ 303(b). added par, (4). 
. ~ i • 
Subsec. (c)(5). J'ub.L. 100-485,·.·§ 608(d)(16)(B)(vii), added par. (5). "::"""~l 
1987 Amendment. Subsec:
 
(a)(l)(B)(i). Pub.L. 100-203, .
 
§ 4211(h)(I2)(A), suhstituted "nursing
 
facility, intermediate cure facility for the 
mentally retarded" for "skilled nursing" 
facility, intermediate care facility" .. : .. ,:) 
1983 Amendment. Subsec. (b)(2)(B). 
Pub,L. 97-448, § 309(b)(21), substituted 
"who" for "and" preceding "has lawfullY­
resided...·:',,, 't 
Subsec. (c)(2)(B)(iii). Pub.L. 97-448; ,':­
§ 309(b)(22). substituted in subcl. (1)"­
"can" for "cannot" and deleted from' 
subd. (IV) the introdu,c;tory word "if~: 
EffecUve Dates ,~.~ 
1989 Act. Amendment by Pub.I..' 
101-239 amending subsec. (c)(1) and' 
(2)(B)(i), (ii) and striking subsed 
(c)(2)(B)(iii), applicable to transfers oc-, 
curring after Dec. 19, 1989, see section 
6411(e)(4) of Pub.L. 101-239, set out asa . 
note under section 139tia of this title; 
1988 Ae:ts. Amendment by Pub.L: 
100-485 effective as if included in the' 
enactment of Pub.I.. 100-360, see section .; 
608(g)(I) of Pub.I.. 100-485. set out as'a 
note under section 704 of this title... : ~ 
Amendment by' secti"n 30J(b) ','of' 
Pub.L. 100-360 applicable to resourceS: . 
disposed of on or after July I. 1988",., 
except tbat such subsection, as' so 
amended, shall not apply with respect to 
inter·spousal transfers occurring befor~ 
October 1. 1989, and to payments under: 
this subchapter for calendlU' quarters be- . 
ginning on or after July I, 1988 (except 
in certain situations requiring State leg­
islative action), without re!lard to wheth­
er or not final regulations to carry out' 
such amendment have heen promul. 
gated by such date (with an exception 
for resources disposed of before July I, 
1988), see section 303(g)(2), (5) of Pub.L. 
100-360, set out as a note under section 
1396r-5 of this title.--: 
1987 Act. Amendment: by Pub.t.· 
100-203 applicable to nw'sing facility 
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encompass a range of issues with respect to access, quality, financ­
ing, and other aspects of long-term care. 
Protection of income and resources of couple for maintenance of 
community spouse (section 214) 
The leading cause of financial catastrophe aniong the elderly is 
the need for long-term care, especially the need for nursing home 
placement. The expense of nursing home care-which can range­
from $2,000 to $3,000 per month or more-has the potential for 
rapidly depleting the lifetime savings of all but the wealthiest. 
Even under the Committee's bill, Medicare's expanded skilled nurs­
ing facility benefits will not protect the elderly against the costs of 
long-term institutionalization. Private insurance coverage for nurs· 
ing home costs is not ~enerally available. For most of the elderly, 
the Medicaid program 18 the only third party source of payment for 
nursing home care. 
Medicaid, a means-tested entitlement program, requires that the 
elderly or disabled nursl~ngoine resident be poor in order to qual­
ify for coverage. It also li its the income that an institutionalized 
spouse may make avail Ie for the spouse remaining in the com­
munity. If the instituti nalized spouse receives the pension and 
other income in his name, this limit may have the effect of impov­
erishing the spouse in the community. The purposeof the Commit· 
tee bill is to end this pauperization by assuring that the communi­
ty spouse has a sufficient-but not excessive-amount of income 
and resources available to her while her spouse is in a nursing 
home at Medicaid expense. This will be of particular benefit to 
older women, who, in the current generation at risk of nursing 
home care, have often worked at home all their lives raising fami­
lies and have limited income other than their husbands' pension 
checks. 
Current law.-To determine how much is available for the com~ 
munity spouse to live on when her elderly spouse in the nursing
home applies for Medicaid, it is necessary first to determine wheth­
er the institutionalized spouse is eligible for Medicaid based on 
income and resources. If eligibility is established, it is then neces­
sary to determine how much of the institutionalized spouse's 
monthly income is to be applied to the cost of nursing home care, 
and how much is to be available to the community spouse. 
Eligibility standards.-ln general, in order to qualify for Medic­
aid, an individual must be categorically related-that is, be aged, 
blind, disabled, or a member of a family with dependent children­
and must meet certain income and resources standards. 
In most States, elderly or disabled people receiving cash assist­
ance under the Supplemental Security Income (SS!) program are 
automatically eligible for Medicaid. Aged or disabled individuals 
may receive SSI benefits if their countable income and countable 
resources do not exceed specified standards. The basic SSl income 
standard for an individual in 1987 is $340 per month, but many 
States have elected to supplement this benefit with their own 
funds. ThE~ basic SSI resource standard for an individual in 1987 is 
$1,800. In determining countable resources, a number of items are 
excluded, including the individual's home (of any value), household 
goods and personal effects worth less than $2,000, an automobile 
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with a market value of $4,500 or less, and up to $1,500 in life insur­
ance or burial funds. 
Not all States automatically extend Medicaid coverage to SSI 
beneficiaries. In about 14 States, known as "209(b)" States, eligibil· 
ity standards, 'jarticularlY resource rules, more restrictive than 
those under S8 are applied to the elderly or disabled. In about 35 
States, elderly individuals who are not poor enough to qualify for 
881, but who have large, recurring medical expenses, such as nurs­
ing home bills, qualify for Medicaid as "medically needy." Finally, 
abo!1t 30 States offer coverage, on· an "optional categorically 
needy" basis, to nursing home residents whose incomes faIl below a 
State-establi:shed special income level no higher than 300 percent
of the basic 881 benefit level ($1,020 per month in 1987). 
There are roughly 1.5 million Medicaid beneficiaries in nursing 
homes, whether skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) or intermediate 
care facilities aCFs). Less than one-fourth of those are poor enough 
to qualify for 581 cash assistance. The remaining three-fourths are 
eligible either as "medically needy" or "optional categorically 
needy." Individuals who qualify for Medicaid in nursing homes on 
either of thl~se bases must apply a certain portion of their income 
toward the cost of their nursing home care. It is these post-eligibil­
ity rules, in combination with the rules for attributing income and 
resources, that give rise to the problem of "spousal impoverish­
ment." . 
Attribution of incom.e.-When one spouse enters a nursing home 
(or other institution) and applies for Medicaid, the following rule 
determines the amount of that spouse's income for eligibility pur­
poses. Shortly after institutionalization,each spouse is treated as a 
separate household. Income-generally Social Security checks, pen­
sions, and interest or dividends from investments-is considered to 
belong to the spouse whose name is on the instrument conveying 
the funds (in the case of Social Security checks, the amount attrib­
uted to each spouse is the individual's share of the couple's bene­
fit). Thus, in a case where a couple's pension check is made out to 
the husband, if the husband enters a nursing home, all of the 
income is considered his for purposes of determining eligibility. If 
the wife in this case enters the nursing home, however, none of the 
income is considered hers, and the husband is under no obligation 
under Federal law to contribute any of his income toward the cost· 
of her care. (However, some States do impose spousal contribution 
requirements in these circumstances). 
Attribution of resources......:The rule for attributing resources is 
basically the same as that for attributing income. Of course, the 
only resources that are~ttributed are countable resources, com­
monly liquid assets like savings accounts, mutual fund invest­
ments, certificates of depo ~t, ete. Generally, in the month follow­
ing institutionalization, resources to which a spouse has unrestrict· 
ed access, including joint savings accounts, are considered available 
to that spouse for eligibility purposes. Thus, if resources are held 
solely by the institu.tionalized spouse, they are attributed to him 
for eligibility purposes. If the resources are jointly held, they are 
also consid,ered to belong entirely to the institutionalized spouse, on 
the theory that he or she has an unrestricted right to use them. If 
the assets :are held solely by the community spouse, however, they 
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are considf1red, after the first month, to belong to her. There is no 
, 
obligati"', under Federal law on the part of the community spouse 
to cont·.ibute any amounts of resources toward the costs of care of 
thtl !l1stitutionalized spouse. In the view of the Department, these 
attribution rules apply in all States, including those with communi­
ty property laws: this Departmental interpretation 'is currently the 
subject of liti~ation. 
Transfer or resources. -States have the option of denying Medic­
aid eli!pbility to individuals who have transferred countable ra-­
sources for less than fair market value within two years of apply­
ing for Medicaid. In the 881 program, the uncompensated value of 
the resource is counted for 24 months from the month the resource 
was disposed of, regardless of the amount at issue. States can be 
less restrictive than 881, but they can also be more restrictive as 
well. Where the value of the resOl"Ces for which no compensation 
was received exceeds $12,000, the State may deny eligibility for 
more than 24 months, beginning with the date of the transfer. 
States may waive this penalty in cases where undue hardship 
would result. In the case of transfers of an individual's home to 
someone other than a spouse or minor or disabled child, the period 
for which eligibility is denied, if any, must be based on the rela­
tionship between the value of the home for which no compensation 
was received and the average Medicaid expenditure for' nursing 
home care. States cannot deny eligibility if the individual intended 
to dispose of the home at fair market value or if denial would 
cause undue hardship.
Post-eligibility application of income.-Once an institutionalized 
spouse has established eligibility for Medicaid by meeting the appli·
cable income and resource standards, some of his monthly income 
is reserved for his use and that of his spouse, and the rest is ap­
plied to the cost of nursing home care. These post-eligibility income 
rules apply whether the spouse qualifies for Medicaid as a "medi· 
cally needy" or "optional categorically needy" individual. From the 
gross monthly income of the institutionalized spouse are deducted 
the following amounts, in the following order. First, there is ra-­
served fc:rr the institutionalized spouse a persona! needs allowance 
for clothing and other expenses of at least $25. Second, there is set 
aside an allowance for the maintenance needs of the communit,Y 
spouse. This amount, combined with the community spouse s 
income, if any, allows the community spouse a certain amount of 
income, or maintenance needs level. Third, if the institutionalized 
spouse has a family' at home, an amount is set aside for the mainte-­
nance of the family. Finally, an amount is allowed for expenses in­
curred for medical care that is not covered by the State's Medicaid 
plan or by Medicare or other third party. Any income remaining 
after these deductions is used to reduce the~mount that the Medic­
aid program pays to the nursing home for the care of the institu­
tionalized spouse. 
Under current regulations, the mainten ce needs level for the 
community spouse, may not exceed the hig est of the SSI, State 
supplemEmtation, or "medically needy" income standard in the 
State. As the follQwing table, based on a March 1987, survey con­
ducted by the American Association of Retired Persons, indicates, 
these' community spouse maintenance needs levels vary greatly 
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0	 from S te to State. The maintenance needs level is the total of the
 
amount of the community spouse's income and the amount set
 
aside from the income of the institutionalized spouse. Thus, in a
 
.... State with a maintenance needs level of $340, if the community
 
.i- spouse receives a monthly Social Security check of $150, the contri­

bution from the institutionalized spouse is $190, not $340.
 
Community spowse maintena1lCe needs lerJe18 
... 
JlaintenaACl!e- State: 
-U.kveJ 
Alabama . $340 
Alaska . 682 
• ..J Arirona . (1)
 
be
 Arkansas . 188
 
~1 Cali~ornia . 534
 Colorado .. 229
1 Connecticut - 375-450
_.1 Dela·wllre .. 164 
er. District of Columbia . 362 
'J ~.. ~~ Florida . 340 'j: 
\)	 Georgia. . 340
 
Hawaii . 300
(i Idaho ,	 . Up to 393!la- Dlinois	 . 267 
;n~ Indilma , . 340
 
; !g Iowa .. 340
 
\ . ld Kansas .. 341
 
,uld	 192 , ...",,"~~::~::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 187
 
Maine .. 350
 j ld ·Maryland . 325
 
. 
li· Massachusetts .. 354
 
orne Michigan .. 358-370
 Minnesota . 397
~1)- 340
~:a~~~~:=:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 340
 ~.~ Montana . 340
 
I the Nebraska .. 375
 
Neyada . 173
 
New Hampshire .. 354
 
= 
re- New Jersey .. 372
 
~d.ed 
~ce New Mexico .. 340

.8set New York .. 417
 
mitl
 North Carolina . 233
 
I North Dakota .. 345
!e s 
I Ohi.o	 . 258 
< 
of OkJahoma	 . oJliZed 342
 
unte- ~:~;i'.;~i;·=::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::=:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 373
 
( Iin- Rh,:>de Island . 475
 
j :aid South Carolina .. 340
 South Dakota .. 257
liriing Tennessee	 .. 1504edic­ Texas . 340
 
1 :itu- Utah ~ . 289
 
217-325or the ~~i~~;:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::=:::::::::::::::=:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 398 368State 200l: the	 ;=o~rt~~~::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 442 
,; pon- W:roming :........................................................................ 195 
llcates, I Amona operaleol. under demonstration authority. 8 Medicaid program that does not cover 
nursing home or other long.term care benefit8. ~eat1y 
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Court-ordered support. -In some cases, courts have issued orders 
against institutionalized spouses requiring them to make monthly 
support payments in certain amounts to their spouses in the com­
munity. The policy of the Health Care Financing Administration 
(HCFA) is that, notwithstanding such an order, the income of the 
institutionalized spouse is to be considered available to him for pur­
poses of determining the amount of his contribution toward the 
cost of nursing home care. The only part of his income which 
HCFA policy acknowledges as available to the community spouse is 
the specified maintenance needs allowance. This interpretation is 
the subject of litigation. 
Committee bill. -The improvement of individuals whose spouses 
reside in nursing homes and receive Medicaid benefits is not justifi· 
able. The current maintenance needs levels for community spouses, 
which are limited by current Federal regulation, are inadequate. In 
some cases, they have forced community spouses, in desperation, to 
sue their husbands for support. The financial duress that these low 
maintenancE~ needs levels impose on the community spouse may, in 
certain cases, even force the premature institutionalization of that 
spouse. 
The Committee bill would end spousal impoverishment. It revises 
the current Federal requirements relating to attribution of income, 
attribution of resources, transfer of resources, and post-eligibility 
.,
I 
application of income. These revisions are limited to the context of 
.. 
a couple with one spouse in an institution who applies for or re­
ceives Medicaid. The purpose of these revisions is to assure that 
the community spouse in these circumstances has income and re­
sources sufficient .to live with independence and dignity. 
This bill establishes a uniform national spousal protection f-0licy 
that applies in all States, whether they are "SSI," "209(b)," medi­I 
cally needy," or "special income level" States, and whether or not 
they are community property jurisdictions. Should Arizona at some 
point offer nursing home coverage through its Medicaid demonstra­
tion, these rules would ~pply to it as well. 
The bill allows an institutionalized spouse to elect to be governed 
by the rules that were in effect in his State as of March 1, 1987, 
regarding the treatment of income, the protection of income for the 
community spouse, the transfer of resources to the community 
spouse. The purpose of this election is to assure that the bill does 
not inadvertently make a community spouse worse off than under 
current law with respect to protected income of with respect to the 
minimum protected resource level of $12,000. This election could be 
used by the institutionalized spouse either to increase the amount 
of income or resources available to the community spouse or to 
reduce it, thereby allowing the community spouse· to qualify for 
Medicaid or other public assistance benefits herself. However, the 
bill does not permit either the institutionalized spouse or the com­
munity spouse to opt out of the rules regarding the treatment of 
countable resources at the time of initial eligibility determination, 
which impose, in effect, a maximum protected countable resource 
limit of $48,000 on the 'community spouse. 
Eligibility standards.-The bill does not alter income or resource 
standards for MedicaId eligibility of the institutionalized spouse. 
Thus, if the current resource standard is $1,800, it would remain 
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$1,800 under this bill. Similarly, the bill generally does not alter 
current law as to what income or resources are countable, and 
which are not, or how income or resources are valued. The princi­
pal exception to this relates to the exemption for household goods
and personal effects for the limited purpose of attributing resources 
at the time of institutionalization. The spousal protection rules in 
this bill apply regardless of whether the institutionalized spouse 
has qualified for Medicaid by meeting the eligibility standards as a
categorically needy, optional categorically needy, or medically
needy individual.
Attribution of income.-During any month that a spouse enters a 
nursing home, hospital, or other institution, the following attribu­
tion rules apply for purposes of determining eligibility. Income paid
solely in the name of one spouse or the other is considered to 
belong to that respective spouse. Thus, no income paid solely to the 
community spouse is considered available to the institutionalized 
spouse for eligibility purposes, If the income is paid in the names of
both spouses, half is considered available to the community spouse, 
and half to the institutionalized spouse. If income is paid in the 
name of either spouse and another person or persons, the income is 
considered available to each individual names in equal proportion­
al shares, unless the instrument controlling the income specifically 
otherwise provides. The same principles apply in the case of 
income from trust property. In the case of income from a trust 
where there is no instrument establishing ownership, half of the 
income is attributed to the institutionalized spouse and half to the 
community spouse. These attribution rules are subject to rebuttal 
by the institutionalized spouse upon a showing, by preponderance 
of the evidence, that ownership interests are otherwise. 
Attribution of resources.-The following rules would apply in de­
termining the amount of countable resources at the time of appli­
cation for Medicaid benefits by the institutionalized spouse. First, a 
determination would be made of the total value of all the countable 
resources held by either the institutionalized spouse, the communi­
ty spouse, or both, on the day the institutionalized spouse began
the continuous period of institutionalization during which he ap­
plies for Medicaid benefits. Any countable resources belonging to
either or both spouses would be included in this detennination, in­
cluding resources from inheritance or previous marriages. For this 
purpose only, the current limit of $2,000 on the equity value of the 
exemption for household goods and personal effects would be inap­
plicable. Thus, all household goods and personal effects, regardless
of value, would not be counted among the resources attributed to 
the couple or either spouse at the time of institutionalization for 
purposes of determining eligibility.
One half of the value of all these resources, known as the spousal
SharE!, would be attributed to each spouse. If the spousal share of 
the community spouse were less than $12,000, the institutionalized 
spouse would be allowed to transfer a sufficient amount to the com­
munity spouse to enable her to hold countable resources in her 
own name of a' total of $12,000. The institutionalized spouse would 
not be required to make this transfer; however, any resources not 
solely in the ownership of the community spouse would be attrib­
uted to the institutionalized spouse and, to the extent they exceed­
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ed the applicable resource standard (generally $1,800), would 
render the institutionalized spouse ineligible for Medicaid. 
If the spousal share of the community spouse were greater than 
$48,000, the institutionalized spouse would have attributed to him, 
for purposes of determining eligibility, both his own spousal share 
and the resources attributed to the community spouse in excess of 
$48,000. 1'his $48,000 limit represents four times the $12.000 pro­
tected resource level. In 1989 and each year thereafter, these dollar 
amounts would be increased by the percentage increase in the con­
sumer price index for all urban consumers for each year since Sep­
tember 1987. 
The attribution of resources into spousal shares, and the subse­
quent imposition of limits on the community spouse's shares, would
occur only once, at the time of initiaJ application. After the month 
in which an institutionalized spouse has met the resource eligibil­
ity standard and is determined to be eligible for benefits, no re­
sources of the community spouse. regardless of value, would be con­
sidered available to the institutionalized spouse. Thus. if while the 
care of the institutionalized spouse is being paid for by Medicaid, 
the community spouse's countable resources grow to exceed the 
$48,000 initial limit, the State would not be authorized to require 
the community spouse to apply any excess toward the cost of care 
of the institutionalized spouse. 
The Committee observes that, in many cases, the institutional­
ized spouse m.a...y.. not a.pply .. for Medicaid benefits until months after 
. ..hisadmission to a nursing home. Often these individuals and their 
spouses have "spent down" a significant amount of their life sav­
ings to pay the nursing home charges. Repeated division of the cou­
ple's total resources into equal spousal shares at each application 
or reapplication for benefits would result in the pauperization of 
the community spouse. as the couple's total resources would effec­
tively be reduced to twice the resource eligibility standard. general­
ly $3600, before the institutionalized spouse qualified for Medicaid. 
Precisely the opposite result is intended b,;r the Committee. For this 
reason, the bill requires, .,n effect, that a 'snapshot" of the couple's 
total resources be taken at the time of initial institutionalization, 
and that attribution of resources into spousal shares proceed on the 
basis of that "snapshot;' regardless of the point at which the insti­
tutionalized spouse actually files application for benefits. The Com­
mittee expects that the States, in reconstructing the couple's re­
sources at the time of institutionalization, will not apply unreason­
able documentation requirements. 
Post-eligibility application of ineome.-After an institutionalized 
spouse has met the resOUrce and income criteria for eligibility, the 
income attributed to that spouse would be applied as follows each 
month. (The rules relating to attribution of income for purposes of 
determination of eligibility, described above, would also apply for 
purposes of post-eligibility treatment of income). From the institu­
tionalized spouse's income, the following amounts would be deduct­
ed, in the following order. First, at least $25 would be reserved for 
that spouse's personal needs. Second, a community spouse monthly 
income allowance 'would be set aside. Third, a family allowance 
would be deducted for each minor or dependent child. dependent 
parent, or dependent sibling of either spouse living with the com­
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munity spouse. Finally, there would be deducted amounts for in­
curred expenses for medical care for the institutionalized spouse 
not paid for by Medicaid, Medicare, or another liable third party.
The community spouse monthly income allowance is the amount 
needed to bring the community spouse's monthly income, including 
any income otherwise available to her, up to a minimum level. 
This minimum level is defined as the sum of (1) an amount equal 
to 150 percent of the Federal poverty guidelines for a family of two, 
or $925 per month in 1987; (2) an excess shelter allowance (the
amount by which mortgage expenses or rent, plus utility costs, 
exceed 30 percent of the amount in (1); and (3) one-half of the 
amount by which the income of the institutionalized spouse ex­
ceeds the sum of amounts (1) and (2). The community spouse's min­
imum monthly maintenance needs allowance may not exceed $1500 
per month. In 1989 and each year thereafter, this amount would be 
increased by the percentage increase in the consumer price index 
for all urban consumers for each year since September 1987. This 
$1500 limit applies only to the amount that may be deducted from 
the institutionalized spouse's income for the maintenance of the 
community spouse; it does not in any way constrain the amount of 
income that the community spouse may receive in her own name 
from sources other than the institutionalized spouse. 
The $1500 limit on the minimum monthly maintenance needs al­
lowance is not absolute. Under the bill, the institutionalized spouse 
is entitled to an opportunity to demonstrate, at' a fair hearing, that 
the minimum monthly maintenance needs allowance is inadequate 
to support the community spouse without fmancial duress. If the 
spouse makes this showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
the State would be required to establish an adequate monthly 
maintenance needs allowance in that case. 
Under the bill, States would be required, upon request by either 
spouse or upon a determination of eligibility, to notify the institu­
tionalized spouse of the amount of the community spouse monthly 
income allowance, the family allowance, the way in which the com­
munity spouse resource allowance was computed, and the spouse's
right to a fair hearing. The bill makes clear that an institutional­
ized spouse who believes that the minimum monthly maintenance 
needs allowance for the community spouse is inadequate, or who 
believes that the State has not accurately determined the amount 
of monthly income actually available to the community spouse 
from other sources, is entitled to a fair hearing on either of these 
issues, as well as any other State determinations that adversely
affect the incelme or resources available to the community spouse. 
Court ordered support.-The Committee recognizes that there 
will be some instances in which the rules set forth in the bill do
 
not take adequate account of the special circumstances affecting a

particular community spouse. The bill therefore provides that; if a
 
. court has entered an order against an institutionalized spouse for
 
monthly income for the support of the community spouse, the com­

munity spouse monthly income allowance must be at least as great
 
as the amount of the {ncome ordered to be paid. Similarly, if a
 
court has entered a !?UPport order against an institutionalized
 
spouse requiring that spouse to transfer countable resources to the
 
community spouse, the spouse ntay comply with the court's order
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without running afoul of the transfer of assets prohibitions, even 
where the effect is to leave the community spouse with countable 
resources in excess of $48,000. 
Tran.~fer of resources.-The Committee is informed that a 
number of States have not made effective use of the authorities 
under current law to prevent affluent individuals from disposing of 
resources in order to qualify for Medicaid nursing home coverage. 
In the view of the Committee, Medicaid-an entitlement program 
for the poor-should not facilitate the transfer of accumulated 
; wealth from nursing home patients to their non-dependent chil­
dren. The Committee is also concerned by the arbitrary nature of 
current SSI policy relating to disposal of assets, under which the 2­
year penalty for transfers is unrelated to the amount of the assets 
disposed of. Accordingly, the Committee bill replaces the current 
law option with a uniform national policy, mandatory on all the 
States, that is specific to Medicaid eligibility and that reasonably 
relates the value of the resources improperly transferred to the 
period of denial of eligibility. 
Under the bill, States must determine whether each nursing 
home or hospital patient who applies for Medicaid has, within 2 
years of application, disposed of any countable resources for less 
than fair market value. If such a transfer has occurred, the State 
must determine the value (as of the time of transfer) of the count­
able resources transferred for which the applicant received less 
than fair market value. The total uncompensated value of these 
countable resources must then be divided by the average cost, to a 
private patient at the time of application, of nursing home care in 
the State. This yields the number of months for which the individ­
ual is ineligible for Medicaid, beginning with the month in which 
the transfer took place. The Committee expects that, where practi­
cable, the State should use the cost of nursing home care to private 
patients in the community in which the applicant is institutional­
ized. 
To avoid inequitable results, the bill provides for a number of ex­
ceptions from the denial of eligibility for transfers of countable re­
sources for less than fair market value. 
First, the prohibition on transfer does not apply at all in the case 
of the transfer of an applicant's home to his or her spouse, child 
under 21, or blind or disabled adult child. The Committee recog­
nizes that, so long as an individual lives in a home or intends to 
return to it, the home is not a countable resource. The purpose of 
this exception is to underscore that the transfer of an applicant's 
or benE~ficiary's home to the community spouse or to any minor or 
disabled children would be protected.
Second, the prohibition on transfers does not apply at all in the 
case of a transfer of countable resources to the community spouse 
of an institutionalized individual, or to another for the sole benefit 
of the community spouse. Since the Committee bill establishes 
rules fi>r the attribution of resources of married couples at the time 
of institutionalization which reach both spouses, no purpose would 
be served by prghibiting transfers of countable resources from the 
institutionalized sJX?use to the community spouse. 
Third, if an indIvidual can demonstrate, to the satisfaction of the 
State, that he or she intended to dispose of the resources at fair 
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market value, or for other valuable consideration, denial of eligibil­
ity for Medicaid should not occur. The purpose of the Committee 
bill is to deter those who, through Ilgifting" or other disposal, 
knowingly seek to shelter assets from dissipation due to nursing 
home costs. The bill is not intended to penalize those who inadven. 
entIy, or through lack of sophistication. did not receive adequate 
compensation. Nor is the bill intended to deny eligibility to those 
who transfer resources to relatives or others by way of compensa­
tion for the informal care which these individuals have given to 
the applicant or beneficiary; the imposition of a penalty in such 
circumstances would have the unfortunate effect of discouraging
family members and friends from caring for the frail elderly or dis­
abled and helping them remain independent for as long as possible. 
Finally, the Committee recognizes that there will be circum­
stances where, although an individual may have transferred assets 
in order to qualify for Medicaid benefits, the effect of denying Med­
icaid coverage for the specified period of time would be to seriously 
threaten the continuing care or well·being of the applicant or oth­
erwise work an undue hardship. The Committee also recognizes 
that there will be circumstances where, with no expectation of 
needing nursing home care and no intent of qualifying for Medic­
aid, an individual may give away money or property, perhaps for a 
grandchild's education, and then later learn that, as a result of a 
rapid change in medical condition, such as a stroke, nursing home 
placement is suddenly required. The bill provides that where the 
State determines such circumstances exist, eligibility for Medicaid 
benefits must not be denied. 
These prohibitions on transferring countable resources, and the 
exceptions to them, are mandatory on all the States. The Commit­
tee bill expressly provides that States are not authorized to impose 
more-or less-restrictive eligibility delays than those specified in 
the Committee bill. Thus, the States could not impose any penalties 
for transfers of resources on applicants or beneficiaries other than 
those in nursing homes or hospitals. Similarly, the current SSI 
policies relating to transfer of assets would no longer apply for pur­
poses of determining Medicaid eligibility of applicants or benefici­
aries in institutions or those outside. 
Conforming changes.-Currently, a number of States that offer 
Medicaid coverage to the aged and disabled under the "medically
needy" option use less restrictive income or resource methodologies 
in determining eligibility than apply to the aged and disabled 
under the SSI program. HCFA interprets current law to require
that States use S8I income and re50urce methodologies under their 
medically needy programs for the elderly and disabled. 
The current treatment of income and resources of institutional­
ized spouses-substantially revised by the Committee bill-is essen­
tially the result elf applying 5SI principles in a Medicaid context. 
This is only one of many examples where principles that may be 
valid in the context of a cash assistance program are not appropri­
ate in the context of a medical assistance program. The State Med­
icaid Directors A..<ISOCiation has submitted a report to the Congress 
concluding that directly linking Medicaid and 55I income and re­
source methodololPes results in impoverishment of the elderly and 
disabled, increased State and Federal costs, and burdensome ad­
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ministrative practices. The Medicaid Directo1'3 offer a number of 
examples of SSI policies which are inappropriate when applied to 
Medicaid, such as the rule that resource eligibility is determined 
on the first day of the month. Following this 881 rule, if a nU1'3ing 
home patient has resources in excess of the allowable. threshold 
($1,800) on that day, he or she is ineligible for Medicaid throughout 
the rest of the month, even if the amount of excess resources is too 
small to enable the individual to pay for the entire month's nurs­
ing home costs.
In the View of the Committee, there is no justification for the 
rigid application of 881 eligibility rules to Medicaid medically 
needy programs. Prior to this HCFA interpretation, States had 
flexibility to establish income or resource methodologies less r~ 
strictive-i.e., more generous from the applicant's standpoint­
than those under 88I. States should continue to have this flexibil­
ity. On the other hand, the Committee does not believe that the 
States should have· the discretion to apply methodologies under 
their medically needy programs that are more restrictive-i.e., less 
generous from the applicant's standpoint-than those under S8I. 
The bill therefore provides that the State's methodology for deter­
minirlg eligibility for the medically needy aged and disabled shall 
be no more restrictive than that under the S81 program (or, in the 
case of families with children, under the corresponding Aid to Fam­
ilies with Dependent Children cash a!lsistance program). To avoid 
any possible ambiguity, the bill provides that a methodology is con­
siderl~ to be "no more restrictive" if, using the methodology, indio 
viduals qualify for Medicaid even though they would not be eligible 
were the SSI methodology used, and individuals who would be eligi­
ble for Medicaid under the SSI methodology would not be ineligible 
under the State's medically needy methodology. 
Effective dates.-Tbe provisions relating to the treatment of 
income and resources for institutionalized spouses are effective for 
individuals residing in institutions on or after January I, 1988. 
This includes spouses who were residing in nursing homes before 
that date, as well as spouses who are admitted on or after that 
date. The provisions relating to transfers of resources apply to all
institutionalized individuals first applying for Medicaid on or after 
January I, 1988, with respect to any transfers for less than fair 
market value occurring up to two years prior to the date of applica­
tion. Both provisions are effective whether or not the Secretary of 
HHS has promulgated final implementing regulations. If the Secre­
tary determines that a State requires State legislation. other than 
an appropriations bill, to implement these requirements, the provi­
sions do not take effect until the first day of' the first calendar 
quarter beginning after the close of the first regular State legisla­
tive session beginning after enactment. Finally, the provision al
lowing States to use less restrictive income and resource method­
ologies in their medically needy programs is October I, 1982, the 
effective date of the current statutory language on which HCFA er­
roneously bases its current interpretation. No disallowances or 
other adverse.. actions may be taken against States based on the 
CUITlmt statutory language relating to "same" methodologies.
Examples.-The following examples illustrate the operation of 
the Committee bill. Assume an elderly couple who together own a 
898 
000393
 
 
 
 
 
 
~, 
. 
'I·' 
"" 
 
100-105(11  
r.
I
-
 
!
-
! -
!
-
!
-
ru;
-
i-
-
l h
1
 
1
-
 -
-
-
-
-
1 .
 -
  
currt  
MEDICARE CAT. COVERAGE ACT 
P.L. to0-36O 
[page 76) 
home assessed at $110,000 and have a joint savings account, to 
which either spouse has unrestricted access, with a balance of 
$20,000. The husband's monthly income, from his Social Security 
benefit and his private pension, is $750. The wife, who worked at 
home all her life raising a family, has income of $150 from Social 
Security. The husband develops Alzheimer's disease and his wife, 
no longer able to care for him at home, must place him in a nurs­
ing home. The husband a~plies for Medicaid. The State covers "op­
tional categorically needy' nursing home residents under a special 
income standard of $875 per month and a resource standard of 
$1,800. The State's maintenance needs allowance for community 
spouses is $340 per month. 
Under current law, the husband is categorically related due to 
his age, and, as of the beginning of the first full calendar month
after institutionalization, is eligible under the special income stand­
ard of $875. (Until the beginning of the first full calendar month, 
the wife's income is attributed to him, and he does not meet the 
special income standard). However, he must still meet the $1,800 
resource standard. The entire amount in the couple's joint savings 
account is attributed to the husband, since he has unrestricted 
access to it, giving him excess resources of $18,200. Until he spends 
these excess resources, he will remain ineligible for Medicaid. If he 
gives the $18,200 to his wife, the State has the option of denying
him Medicaid eligibility for more than 2 yea,rs from the date of 
transfer. 
Assuming all the excess resources in the couple's joint account
are applied to the cost of nursing home care, and assuming a pri­
vate patient rate of $2,000 per month, it will take about 9 months 
for the husband to become resource-eligible for Medicaid. After eli­
gibility has been established, the husband's income is applied as 
f:)Hows. First, an allowance of $25 is reserved for his personal 
needs. Then an allowance of $190 for the maintenance needs of his 
wife (the State standard of $340 minus the wife's own income of 
$150) is set aside. If the husband had no uncovered medical costs in 
the previous month, the remaining $535 of his income is applied to 
the cost of nursing home care. The remainder is paid by the State 
and Federal governments through Medicaid.
The wife in the community is left with the house, a monthly 
income of $340, and access to the $1,800 remaining in the couple's joint savings account. Before her husband entered the nursing 
home, the couple's total income ($900 per month) was about 146 
percent of the Federal poverty level for a couple; after her hus­
band's institutionalization, she has only $1,800 in liquid assets and 
her income places her at 75 percent of the Federal poverty level for 
a single individual. 
In sharp contrast to current law, the Committee bill would not 
impoverish the wife in this case. At the time the husband enters 
the nursing home, only $750 in income would be attributed to him, 
and he would immediately be eligible under the State's special 
income standard. With respect ,to resources, half of the couple's 
total assets would be attributed to the wife and half to the hus­
band. However, the bill allowS''' the husband to transfer without 
penl;\lty $12,000-the minimum community spouse resource allow­
ance-to an account in his wife's name at any time. When the hus­
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band has spent all but $1,800 of the remaining $8,000, he becomes 
resourcEH:!ligible for Medicaid. Assuming he applies all of these 
excess resources to the cost of his nursing home care at $2,000 per 
month, this will take about 4 months. 
Once eligibility for Medicaid has been established, the husband's 
monthly income is applied as follows. First, $25 is set aside each 
month for a personal needs allowance. Second, $725 is reserved for 
the maintenance needs of the community spouse. The community 
spouse is allowed a minimum of $925, including her income; since 
the wife's income is only $150, she can receive at least $775 from 
the husband. However, since the husband's total income is less 
than $775, she receives only the total income less the $25 personal 
needs allowance, or $725. Nothing remains to reduce the cost of the 
husband's nursing home care to the Medicaid program. 
Under the Committee bill, the wife is left with a monthly income 
of $875 (her Social Security check of $150 plus the maintenance 
needs allowance of $725), or about 190 percent of the Federal pover­
ty level for a single individUal. She also has $12,000 in savings in 
her name. The husband would qualify for Medicaid about 5 months 
earlier than under current law. The total Federal and State Medic­
aid payment to the nursing home would go up by $535 per month 
(the difference between the husband's $190 community spouse 
.
,( monthly income allowance under current law and the $725 allow­
,~
.. ance under the bill). 
Another example will illustrate the effect of the bill's provision 
for an equal division of the couple's resources. Assume that the 
couple's joint savings account at the time of institutionalization 
contains not $20.000. but $50,000. Under the bill, the husband 
would be. allowed, without penalty, to transfer $25,000 of this 
amount to an account in the wife's name. Of the remaining half, 
$23,000 would have to be spent before the husband would become· 
resource-eligible for Medicaid. Under current law, all but $48,200 
in the joint account has to be spent before the husband becomes 
eligible for Medicaid. (Although a couple with $50,000 in savings is 
likely to have household goods and personal effects valued at more 
than $2,000, the bill provides that all these items are not to be con­
sidered resources for purposes of de~rmining the community 
spouse resource allowance). 
The effect of the bill's ceiling of $48,000 on the community 
spouse resource allowance may be demonstrated by assuming that 
the couple has not $20,000, but $100,000 in joint savings accounts 
and jointly held stocks and mutual funds at the time of the hus­
band's institutionalization. The bill allows the husband to transfer 
half of the jointly held resources, or $50,000, to the wife in her own 
name, subject to the limit of $48,000. Thus, the couple would have 
to spend $50,200 (the husband's $50,000 share, plus $2,000 excess 
resources from the wife's share, less the resource eligibility stand­
ard of $1,800) before the husband could qualify for Medicaid. Again, 
any household goods or personal effects would not be taken into ac­
count in determining 'the amount of the community spouse's re­
source allowance. 
The effect of the bill on financial planning (or the lack thereof) 
can be illustrated with the following example. Assume that this 
couple has a total of $50,000 in savings, and because it has done no 
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financial planning, all of these resources are held by the husband 
in his own name when he is admitted to the nursing home. Under 
current law, the husband cannot qualify for Medicaid until all but 
$1,800 of this amount is spent. Under the bill, however, the hus­
band may transfer $25,000 to the wife in her own name without 
penalty.
If one assumes that this couple, learning of the husband's dis­
ease, anticipated the need for institutionalization and transferred 
all of the $50,000 joint savings to the wife more than two years 
prior to application for Medicaid, the result under the bill is the 
same as in the previous example. Regardless of ownership, the re­
sources are attributed in equal shares to each spouse. Until the 
wife's resources are reduced to $25,000, the husband is not re­
source-eligible for Medicaid. Under current law, the husband, with 
no resources attributable to him, would immediately qualify for 
Medicaid, and the wife would be under no Federal law obligation to 
contribute toward the cost of his care. 
Finally, the concept of the resource "snapshot" at institutional­
ization is illustrated by the following example. Assume, as above, 
that couple has countable resources of $50,000, jointly held, at the 
time of the husband's admission to the nursing home. The husband I.: does not apply for Medicaid upon admission; instead, the couple 
begins to spend it resources to pay for the cost of his care. After a 
year, the couple has spent $24,000 from its joint resources, and the 
husband applies for Medicaid. The State would then look back to 
the date of the husband's institutionalization for purposes of attrib­
uting resources. Since the wife's spousal share was $25,000 then, if 
the husband transfers his interet in $25,000 of the remaining re­
sources to his wife, he will immediately be resource-eligible for 
Medicaid, since the remaining $1,000 would meet the $1,800 re­
source standard. 
Study ofadult day care services (section 215) 
The Committee bill would require the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services to conduct a survey and report to the Congress on 
adult day care services that are currently being provided through­
out the United States. Such a report is to include information on 
(1) the scope of adult day care services and the extent of their 
availability around the country; (2) the characteristics of the vari­
ous entities (such as community-based programs, hospitals, and 
nursing facilities) that provide these services; (3) licensure, certifi. 
cation, and other quality standards that are applicable to those en­
tities providing such services; (4) the cost and fInancing of adult 
day care services; and (5) the characteristics of individuals who use 
the services (including on the individuals' level of disability and on 
the availability of similar in-home care services). 
The purpose of this review is to evaluate programs and projects 
that have already been established, so that Congress can properly
consider the advisability of Medicare coverage for adult day care 
services. Thus, it is not the intention of the Committee that the 
Secretary undertake a demonstration project or in any other 
matter initiate or fund new adult day care programs. The Secre­
tary is to report only on the current availability of services and on 
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[page 37] 
Further, the committee expects that the Secretary, in reviewing a 
State's p'roposed cost-sharin/!: charges to detennine if they are nom­
inal, WIll consider the monthly amounts paid by the State as cash 
assistanr,e under the State's AFDC program. and the income stand­
ards used to determine eligibility for the medically needy, as well as 
the costs of the specific medical services. Finally the amendment as­
sures thllt recipients are not denied emergency care or other needed 
services because they are not able to pay required copayment amounts 
as a precondition to securing such services. 
Effec#ve date.-Enactment. 
E8ti1TlA7.te<1 8aving8.­
Fiscal years: MlltIons 
1983 _ _ _......................... $42 
1984 _.............................................. 47 
1985 _ _..................................................................................... 53 
ELIlIIINATE MATCHING RATE FOR MEDICINE PART B "BUY-IN" 
(Section 132 of the Bill) 
Present law.-Most State Medicaid plans pay the monthly Medi­
care Part B premium payment for their dual eligible beneficiaries 
under a "buy-m" agreement. While States may buy-in to Medicare for 
both their cash assistance and medically needy populations who are 
eligible for Medicare foderal matching for premium payments is 
r. '-Dilable only for the cash assistance group. If a State does not buy 
in for' Purt B coverage, it cannot receive Federal matching payments 
for services that would have been covered under Medicare if there had 
been a buy-in arrangement. Four States and two jurisdiction~ do not 
currently have a bU~'-in arrangement. These are: Alaska, Louisiana, 
Oregon, 'W"yoming, tl,e Northern Mariana Islands, and Puerto Rico. 
AIl>,"lkll.'s buy-in agreement becomes efl'ecti,'e flctoher 1. 1982. 
Oommittee amendment.-The amendment eliminates Federal 
matching for all Medicare Part B premium payments, effective with 
respect to premiums due for months after September 1982. The com­
mittee notes that the current comhination of the 75 per~nt Ft'deral 
general revenue subsidy for part B (for all Medicare part B eligi­
bles) coupled with the Federal match for Medicaid eligibles results 
in a Federal subsidy of close to 90 percent for part B services for this 
popnlation group. 
EfFccti1Je date.-Premiums due for months after September 1982. 
Estimated 8avinga.­ ' 
FIScal years: 
1983 _ _ _ 
Mitllons 
~.................. $203 
1934 _ _ _........................................................... 216 
1985 _ _ _ _ _...................... 230 
MODIFY LIEN l'ROVISIONB 
(Section 133 of the Bill) 
Present law.-Under current law l States ore barred from 'imposing I
 
any lien .against a~y recipient's property prior to his death because of >
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Medicaid claims paid or to be paid on his behalf unless placed as a 
result of a court judgment. In the case of individuals under age 65, no 
ll.djustments or recoveries can be made for Medicaid claims correctly 
paId. In the case of individuals over 65, adjustments and recoveries for') 
correctly paid claims can only be made from his/her estate after the 
indivi(htal's death and only (1) after th~ death of his surviving'; 
spouse; and (2) where there are no surviving children who are under) 
21, blind, or disabled. '­
Further, under current law, States may deny medicaid eligibility to 
applicants who, within the previous 24 months, transferred for less 
than fair market value resources which, if retained, would have made 
them ineligible for the program. However, in most instances the 
applicant's ownership of a home would not make him or her ineligible 
for medicaid. 
It is therefore possible, under current law, for an elderly individual 
who anticipates needing nursing home care to give his/her home to a 
famil;y member or friend without fear of losing or being denied medic­
aid elIgibility. By so doing, the individual assures that the home will 
not be part of his/her estate and therefore will not be subject to an)' 
reco,'ery action initiated by the State after the individual's death. 
007Tltmittee amendment.-The amendment intends to assure that all
 
of the resources available to an institutionalized individual, including
 
equity in a home, which are not needed for the support of a spouse or
 
dependent children will be used to defray the costs of supporting the
 
mdividual in the i.nstitution. In doing so, it seeks to balance govern­

ment's legitimate desire to recover its medicaid costs against the indi­

vidual's need to have the home available in the event rliscll1l-rge from
 
the institution becomes feasible.
 
The amendment has two parts. First, it allows States to deny :Medic­
aid eligibility temporarily to patients in medical institution'> who 
dispose of a home for less than fair market value, even though such 
disposa.l would not make them ineligible for supplemental security 
income (SSI). States could either deny eligibility to all such in<hyid­
uals for periods reasonably related to the uncompensated value, or 
they could deny eligibility in all cases for a minimum of 24 months, 
with the option to provide for longer periods of ineligibility in the 
case of individuals who disposed of homes worth substantial amonnts. 
The provision would not apply in the case of individuals who reason­
ably expected to be discharged from the medical institution and re­
turn home; individuals who demonstrated that they had intended to 
obtain fair market value or other valuable consideration in exchange 
for their homes; or individuals who transferred title to their homes 
to a spouse or a minor or handicapped child. The State coulrl also 
make an exception in other cases where undue hardship would other­
wise result. ' 
Second, the amendment would allow States to attach the real prop­
erty, including the home, of medicaid recipients who are permanently 
institutionalized, in nursing homes or other long term care medical 
institutions. The lien could not be foreclosed upon, and States could 
recover the cost· of medical assistance providt>d to the recipient only 
when the recipient voluntarily chose to sell the property or, after the 
recipilmt's death, from his estate. As under current law, no recovery 
would be permitted while the recipient's spouse was still living or 
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(page 39J 
while his/her children were still dependent (under 21, or blind, or 
disabled). Further, if the recipient is discharged from the institution 
and returns home, the lien would dissolve, and the property would be 
uvailable for the recipient's use until his/her death. 
The commjttee notes that, under current law, States are often. un­
able to recover resources which recipients hold as homes or as income­
producin~ real property. The amendment would facilitate States' 
efforts to recover medical assistance costs from these types of resources 
and to assure that all resources available to an individual 'will be used 
to defray the public costs of supporting that individual in a long-term. 
medical institution. 
At the same time, the committee notes that the legitimate rights of 
the recipient, the recipient's spouse and his/her dependent children are 
protected under the amendment. 
Effective aate.-Enactment. 
E8timated savings.­
Fiscal years: Millions 
1983.......................................................................................................................... 
1984.......................................................................................................................... 
1985.......................................................................................................................... 
$183 
200 
221 
REDUCTION IN ERROR RATE TOLERANCE 
(Section 134 of the Bill) 
Present law.-Under an amendment to the 1980 Appropriations Act, 
States were l'eguil'ed to reduce their payment error r~tes for elil~bil­
ity determinatlons to 4 percent by September 3D, 1982. States whose 
error rates exC'eed the target figure are subject to a penalty reduetion. 
The nationwide Medicaid payment error rate for the October 1980­
.March 1981 period was estimated at 4.1 percent. 
Oommittee amendment.-The amendment deletes the error rate pro­
visions and penalties incorporated in the 1980 Appropriations A<~t. It 
substitutes language establishing a 3 percent target error rat;~ fqr 
quarters beginning after March 30, 1982. Prospective fiscal sanction!? 
are to be a.pplied beginning in the second half of fiscal year 1983 fo'r 
States which have error rates exceeding the 3-percent figure. The an­
nual penalty, applied on a prospective basis, will be equal to th¢ 
product of (a) the portion of the projected error rate WhICh ex,cee~!! 
3 percent for the year in question and (b) the total amount of Federa:J 
financial participation expected to be claimed lor the yea.r for ser'vices 
provided to recipients for whom the State determined eligibility. If th~ 
estimated prospective penalty proves to be inaccurate when actual data 
from the period become available, appropriate adjustments wm be 
made in subsequent grants. The Secretary is provlded discretion in 
applying the fiscal penalties, in whole or part, for a State which has 
made a good faith effort to meet the 3-percent target. 
The committee is aware that many questions remain to be re8o:llved 
relative to the matter of sanctions for excessive rates of error. For 
example•.,under the existing provision no sanctions have in fact been 
imposed. However, the Administration's projections of program costf$ 
uncleI' present law appear to he based on an assumption that no 'lVaiv-, 
ers would be granted. The committee believes that the question can­
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107 STAT. 622 PUBLIC LAW 103-66-AUG. 10, 1993 
PART ll.....ELIGmlLITY 
sEc. 13611. TRANSFERS OF ASSETS; TREATMENT OF CERTAIN TRUSTS. 
(a) PERIODS OF INELIGIBILITY FOR TRANSFERS OF AssETS.­
. (1) IN GENERAL.-Section 1917(c)(l) (42 U.S.C. 1396p(c)(I» 
is amended to read as follows: 
"(l)(A) In order to meet the requirements of this subsection 
for purposes of section 1902(a)(18), the State plan must provide 
that if an institutionalized individual or the spouse of such an 
individual (or, at the option of a State, a nomnstitutionalized 
individual or the spouse of such an individqal) disposes of assets 
for less than fair market value on or after the look-back date 
specified in subparagraph (BXi), the individual is ineligible for 
medical assistan~ for services described in subparagraph (C)(i) 
(or, in the case of a noninstitutionalized individual, for the servi~s 
described in subparagraph (C)(ii)) during the period beginning on 
the date specified in subparagraph (D) and equal to the number 
ofmonths specified in subparagraph (E). 
"(B)(i) The look-back date specified in this subparagraph is 
a date that is 36 months (or, in the case of payments from a 
trust or portions of a trust that are treated as assets dis~sed 
of by the individual pursuant to paragraph (3)(A)(iii) or (3XB)(ii) 
of subsection (d), 60 months) before the date specified in clause 
(li). . 
"(ii) The date specified in this clause, with respect to- . 
"(I) an institutionalized individual is the first date as of 
which the individual both is an institutionalized individual 
and has applied for medical assistan~ under the State plan. 
or 
"(II) a noninstitutionalized individual is the date on which 
the individual applies for medical assistan~ under the State 
plan or, if later, the date on which the individual disposes 
of assets for less than fair market value. 
"(C)(i) The servi~s described in this subparagraph with respect 
to an institutionalized individual are the following: 
"(1) Nursing facility servi~s. . 
"(II) A level of care in any institution equivalent to that 
ofnursing facility services. 
"(Ill) Home or community-based services furnished under 
a waiver granted under subsection (c) or (d) of section 1915. 
"(ii)The servi~s described in this subparagraph with respect 
to a noninstitutionalized individual are services (not including any 
servi~s described in clause (i» that are described in paragraph
(7), (22), or (24) of section 1905(a), and, at the option of a State, 
other long-term care services for which medical assistance is other­
wise available under the State plan to individuals requiring long· 
term. care. . 
"(D) The date specified in this subparagraph is the first day 
of the first month during or after which assets have been transferred 
for less than fair market value and which does not occur in any 
other periods of ineligibility under this subsection. 
"(E)(i) With respect to an institutionalized individual, the num­
ber of months of ineligibility under this subparagraph for an individ­
ual shall be equal to­
"(I) the total, cumulative uncompensated value of all assets 
transferred by the individual (or mdividual'S spouse) on or 
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after the look-back date specified in subparagraph (BXi), divided 
by 
"en) the average monthly cost to a private patient of nurs­
ing facility services in the State (or, at the option of the State, 
.- in the community in which the individual is institutionalized)
 
at the time ofapplication.
 
"(ll) With respect to a noninstitutionalized individual, the num­

ion ber ofmonths of ineligibility under this subparagraph for an individ­

ide ual shall not be greater than a number equal to­
1 "(I) the total, cumulative uncompensated value of all assets 
: I transferred by the individual (or individual's spouse) on or 
b...J after the look-back date specified in subparagraph (BXi>, divided 
ite by 
f--r "(II) the average monthly cost to a private patient of nurs­
~ ) ing facility services in the State (or, at the option of the State, 
:1 in the community in which the individual is institutionalized) 
on at the time ofapplication. 
Jef
1 "(iii) The number of months of ineligibility otherwise deter­
mined under clause (i) or (ii) with respect to the disposal of an, asset shall be reduced­
,a "(1) in the case of periods of ineligibility determined under 
led clause (i), bl the number of months of ineligibility applicable 
I ) to the indiVIdual under clause (ii) as a result of such disposal, 
1 I and 
"(II) in the case of periods of ineligibility determined under 
clause (ii), by the number of months of ineligibility applicable 
to the in.dividual under clause (i) as a result of such disposal. 
(2) EXCEFTIONs.-Section 1917(c) is amended- 42 USC 1396p. 
(A) in parar-aph (2XA), by striking "resources" and 
inserting "assets ; 
(B) by amending paragraph (2XB) to read as follows: 
"(B) the assets­
"(i) were transferred to the individual's spouse or to 
another for the sole benefit of the individual's spouse, 
"(ll) were transferred from the individual's spouse to 
another for the sole benefit of the individual's spouse, 
"(iii) were transferred to, or to a trust (including a 
trust described in subsection (dX4» established solely for 
the benefit of, the individual's child described in subpara­c ~ graph (AXiiXm, or1., "(iv) were transferred to a trust (including a trust 
~, described in subsection (dX4» established solely for the 
benefit of an individual under 65 years of age who is~~ disabled (as defined in section 1614(aX3»;"; 
r " (C) in paragraph (2XC)­
IL_:' (i) by striking "resources" each place it appears
ng­ and inserting "assets" 
(ii) by stiiking "anY',d T (iii) by striking "or (ii)" and inserting "(ii)", andl' :l (iv) by striking "; or!' and inserting ", or (iii) all any 
assets transferred for less than fair market value have 
.I been returned to the individual; or"; ;. (D) by amending paragraph (2XD) to read as follows:
". l 
"(D) the State determines, under procedures established 
by the State (in accordance with standards specified by theJets Secretary), that the denial of eligibility would work an unduer 
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Inter­
governmental
relations. 
hardsh!p as determined on the basis of criteria established
 
by the Secretary;";
 
(E) by striking paragraph (8) and inserting the 
following: 
"(3) For p~es of this subsection, in the case of an asset 
held by an indiVIdual in common with another P,erson or persons 
in a joint tenancy.l.. tenancy in common, or similar arrangement~ 
the asset (or the anected portion of such asset) shall be considereo 
to be transferred by sooh individual when any action .is taken, 
either by such individual or by any other person, that reduces 
or eliminates such individual's ownership or control of such asset."j 
and 
(F) by adding at the end of paragraph (4) the following: ·1 
"In the case of a transfer br the sp'?use of an individwil 
which results in a period of meligibllity for medical assist·· 
anoo under a State plan for such individual, a State shall" 
using a reasonable methodology (as specified by the Sec·· 
retary), apportion such period of ineligibility (or any )l(!rtioll: 
of such. period) among the individual and the individual's 
spouse if the spouse otherwise becomes eligible for medical 
assistance under the State plan.... 
(b) TREATMENT OF TRUST AMOUNTS.-Section 1917 (42 U.S.C,. 
1396.11) is amended by adding at the end the following:
(dXl) For purposes of determining an individual's eligibilit:r 
for, or amount of, benefits under a State plan under this title" 
Bubject to paragraph (4), the rules specified m paragraph (3) shalll 
appll. to a trust established by such individual 
(2XA) For purposes of this subsection, an individual shall 
be considered to have established a trust if assets of the individua:l 
were used to fonn all or part of the corpus of the trust and 
if any of the following individuals establisned such trust other 
than by Will: 
"(i) The individual. 
"(ti) The individual's spouse. . 
"(iii) A person, including a court or administrative body, 
with legal authority to act in place of or on behalf of thE~ 
individual or the individual's spouse.
"(iv) A person, including any court or administrative body, 
acting at toe' direction or upon the request of the individual 
or the individual's spouse. 
"(B) In the case of a trust the corpus of which includes assets 
of an individual (as determined under subparagraph (A» and assets ; ,
of any other person or persons, the provisions of this subsection 
",
shall apply to the portion of the trust attributable to the assets 
of the individual. 
"(C) Subject to paragraph (4), this subsection shall apply with· 
out regard to-­
"(i) the purposes for which a trust is established. 
"(ii) whether the trustees have or exercise any discretion 
under the trust, 
"(iii) any restrictions on when or whether distributions 
may be made from the trust, or 
"(iv) any restrictions on the use of distributions from the 
trust. 
"(3)(A) In the case ofa revocable trust­
"(i) the corvus of the trust shall be considered resoureel~ 
available to the mdividual, 
.' 
.1
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"(ii) payments from the .trust to or for the benefit of the 
individual shall be considered income of the individual, and 
"(iii) any other payments from the trust shall be considered 
assets disposed of by the individual for purposes of sub­
set section (c). 
1. , "(B) In the case ofan irrevocable trust­
·1 ~ "(i) if there are any circumstances under which payment 
W from the trust could be made to or for the benefit of the 
en, individual, the portion of the corpus from which, or the income 
Cl on the corpus from which, payment to the individual could 
be made sliall be considered resources available to the individ­I i 
ual, andgayments from that portion of the corpus or income­
ng: (I) to or for the benefit of the individual, shall be 
usal considered income of the individual, and 
~ , "(In for any other purpose, shall be considered a trans­
8 l ferof assets by the individual subject to subsection (c); 
lee­ and 
ion "(ii) any portion of the trust from which, or any income 
8 , on the corpus from which, no payment could under any cir­
tC I cumstances be made to the individual shall be considered, 
I as of the date of establishment of the trust (or, if later, the 
;.c. date on which pa~ent to the individual was foreclosed) to 
be assets disposed by the individual for purposes of subsection ~ ~ (c), and the value of the trust shall be determined for purposes t __i, of such subsection by including the amount of any payments 
tall made from such portion of the trust after such date. 
"(4) This subsection shall not apply to any of the following 
1 1 trusts: 
.I :t "(A) A trust containing the assets of an individual under 
md age 65 who is disabled (as defined in section 1614(a)(3» and 
her 
\ 
which is established for the benefit of such individual by a 
!	 parent, grandparent, legal· guardian of the individual, or a 
court if the State will receive all amounts remaining in the 
trust upon the death of such individual up to an amount equal 
)(J.y. to the total medical assistance paid on behalf of the individual 
r under a State plan under this title. . 
....., "(B) A trust established in a State for the benefit of an 
individual if­~ "(i) the trust is composed onlf of pension, Social Secu­
rity, and other income to the individual (and accumulated 
It \~ income in the trust), 
S 's "(ii) the State will receive all amounts remaining in 
tion the trust upon the death of such individual up to an amount 
seta 
I 
equal to the total medical assistance paid on behalf of 
i the individual under a State plan under this title, and 
i \- "(iii) the State makes medical assistance available to 
individuals described in section 1902(a)(10)(AXii)(V), but 
does Dot :make such assistance available to individuals 
:t h for nursing facility services under section 1902(a)(10)(C). 
"(C) A trust containing the assets of an individual who 
is disabled (as defined in section 1614(a)(3» that meets the 
following conditions: . 
,. ~e 
"(i) The trust is established and managed by a non· 
profit association. 
"(li) A separate account is maintained for each bene­
trees ficiary of the trust, but, for p~es of investment and 
management of funds, the trust pools these accounts. 
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"(iii) Accounts in the trust are established solely for 
the benefit of individuals who are disabled (as defined 
in section 1614(aX3» by the parent, grandparent, or legal 
Inter­
govemmental
relations. 
guardian of such individuals, by such individuals, or by 
a ('.ourt.
"(iv) To the extent that amounts remaining in the 
beneficiary's account upon the death of the beneficiary 
are not retained by the trust, the t1'U8t pays to the State 
from such remaining amounts in the account an amount 
equal to the total amount of medical assistance paid on 
behalf of the beneficiary under the State plan under this 
title. ' 
"(5) The State a~ncy shall establish procedures (in accordance 
with standards specified by the- Secretary) under which the agency 
waives the application of this subsection with respect to an individ­
ual if the individual establishes that such appliCation would work 
an undue hardship on the individual as determined on the basis 
of criteria established by the Secretary.".
"(6) The term 'trust' includes any legal instrument or device 
that is similar to a trust but includes an annui~ only to such 
extent and in such manner as the Secretary specifies.. 
(c) DEFINITIONS.--Section 1917 (42 U.S.C. 1396p), as amended 
by subsection (b), is further amended by adding at the end the 
following new subsection:
"(e) In this section, the following definitions shall apply: 
"(1) The term 'assets', with respect to an individual, 
includes all income and resources of the individual and of 
the individual's spouse, including any income or resources 
which the individual or such individual's spouse is entitled 
to but does not receive because of action- . 
"(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse, 
"(B) by a person, including a court or adininistrative 
body, with leg81 authority to act in place of or on behalf 
oBhe individual or such individual's spouse, or 
"(C) by any person, including any court or administra­
tivebody, acting at the direction or upon the request of 
the individual or such individual's spouse. 
"(2) The term 'income' has the meaning given such term 
in section 1612. 
"(3) The term 'institutionalized individual' means an 
individual who is an inpatient in a nursing facility, who is 
an inpatient in a medical institution and with respect to whom 
payment is made based on a level of care provided in a nursing 
facility, or who is described in section 1902(aXI0XAXii)(VI). 
"(4) The term 'noninstitutionalized individual' means an 
individual receiving any of the services specified in subsection 
(cX1XCXii). . 
"(5) The term 'resources' has the meaning given such term 
in ~tion 1613, without regard (in the case of an institutional­
ized individual) to the exclusion described in subsection (aXl) 
of such section.". 
(d) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.­
(1) Section 1902 (42 U.S.C. 1396a) is amended­
(A) in subsection (aXI8), by striking "and transfers 
of assets" and inserting", transfers of assets, and treatment 
ofcertain trusts"; 
(B) in subsection (a)(51)­
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~, •• for (i) by st~ "(A)"; and 
.	 lei (li) by striking ", and (B)" and all that follows 
and inserting a semicolon; andr:~ (0) by striking subsection (k), 
(2) Section 1924(bX2)(B)(i) (42 U.S.C. 1896r-5(b)(2)(B)(i» 
i : the is amended by striking "1902(k)" and inserting "1917(d)", 
,j iary (e) EFFECTIVE DATES.-{l) The amendments made b;yJhilUlec. 42 USC 1396p
··:State	 note.t!~n shap apply, exceJ>.~a&J)~~.d:~!~L~bi.~]ijih_ttQn;]:i)_.PI!Y-Plents 
mount qridel"·tltJe··-xrx-oftlie 13OCiil ..8eCiUity.AcLfor...calendal'·-quar,ters(Ion 
~this ;::-~;S!l~~~~~~-lNf!~cl:~~~:ts~a~:e~ 
promulgated by such date. 
rdance (2) The amendments made by	 this section shaJ.LAQt-..Jlpp1.Y­(N to medical assistance provided for servi~~!-fUID1sJ1ed~1~~	 before 0Ct01ler-r,Tg93;.- ..-----.--.·..- -----..-.. ­
1 .~ork 
l basis	 ~~····{:l~~~~a=ot;_~~·~~·l?:?~·~·~~-~--o.r.··~f.o~~~Jhe ~...._.._.._.._._.._- ,,-.,....-. ---"',	 ,(C)	 with respect to irustB established on or before the 
, \vice date of the enactment ofthis Act. ~ ~ch (3) In the case of a State plan for medical assistance under 
title XIX of the Social Security Act which the Secretary of Healthlended 
r.	 -! the and Human Services determines requires State legislation (other 
than legislation appropriating funds) in order for the plan to meet 
i	 the additional re<Iuirements imposed by the amendment made by
 
subsection (b), the State plan shall not be regarded as failing
vidual, to comply with the requirements imposed by such amendment solelyEd of 
on the basis of its failure to	 meet these additional requirements lrcesj(	 before the first day of the first calendar quarter beginning after)l••itled 
the close of the first regular session of the State legislature that 
begins after the date of the enactment of this Act. For purposes 
" i • of the preceding sentence, in the case of a State that has a 2­;f ,ltive 
,half year legislative se8Sion, each year of such session shall be deemed 
to be a separate regular session of the State legislature. 
mjatra­ SEC. 13612. MEDICAID ESTATE RECOVERIES. 
(a)	 MANDATE To SEEK REcOVERY.-Section 1917(b)(l) (42 I
'''I''of hierro	 U.S.C. 1396p(bXl» is amended by striking "except-" and all that 
follows and inserting the following: "except that the State shall 
U I an seek atljustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly 
, lo is paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the case 
)·.)hom of the following individuals: 
lursing "(A) In the case of an individual described in subsection 
C::'{VI). (a)(l)(B), the State shall seek adjustment or recovery from 
8 S an the individual's estate or upon sale of the property subject 
I( !:tion to a lien imposed on account of medical assistance paid on 
behalfof the mdividual. . 
:It term "(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of 
.J. ~nal­ age or older when the individual received such medicBl assist­
Q !a)(l) ance, the State shall seek adjustment or recovery from the 
indiviclual's estate, but only for medical assistance consisting 
of­
"(i) nursing facility services, home and community­
'I ~fers based services, and related hospital and prescription drug
lI1~IDent services, or 
"(il) at the option of the State, any items or services 
under the S~te plan. 
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107 STAT. 628 .rUBLIC LAW 103-66-AUG. 10, 1993 
42 USC 1396p 
note. 
"(CXi) In the case of an individual who has received (or
is entitled to receive) benefits under a long-term care insurance
policy in connection. with which assets or resources are dis­
regarded in the manner described in clause (ii), except as 
provided in such clause, the State shall seek acljustment or 
recovery from the individual's estate on account of medical 
assistance paid on behalf of the individual for nursing facility 
and other long-term care services. 
"(ii) Clause (i) shall not apply in the case of an individual 
who received medical assistance under a State plan of a State 
which had a State plan amendment approved as of May 14, 
1993, which provided for the disregard of any assets or 
resources­
"<D to the extent that payments are made under a 
long-term care insurance policY; or 
"(II) because an individual has received (or is entitled 
to receive) benefits under a long-term care insurance 
~licy.". (b) HARDSHIP WAIVER.-Section 1917(b) (42 U.S.C. 1396p(b» 
is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
"(3) The State agency shall establish procedures (in accordance 
with standards s~ed by the Secretary) under which the agency 
shall waive the application of this subsection (other than paragraph . 
(lXC» if such application would work an undue hardship as deter­
mined on the bains ofcriteria established by the Secretary.... (c) DEFINITION OF ESTATE.-Section 1917(1)) (42 U.S.C. 
1396p(b»l as amended by subsection (b), is amended by adding 
.. at the ena the following new paragraph: 
"(4) For purposes of this subsection. the term 'estate" with 
respect to a deceaSed individual­
"(A) shall include all real and personal property and other 
assets included within the individual's estate, as defined for 
purposes ofState probate law; and 
"(B) may include, at the option of the State (and shall 
incl~de, in the case of an individUal to whom paragraph (lXCXi) 
applies). any other real and personal pro~rty and other assets 
in which the individual had any legal tItle or interest at the 
time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such 
assets conveyed to a $urvivor. heir. or assign of the deceased 
individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivor­
ship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement..., 
(d) EFFECTIVE DATES,-(IXA) Except as provided in subpara­
graph (B). the ~endments m.ade by'... this se~tion. s_ha!!-apJlJy..to 
~~_~ ~~er title_X!K-of..t.he..SoCII~L~J,U'1tY-_.Aet._fu.LCiilenaar 
C@.~.r.s:_oo~n or after October I, 1993. WIthout regard 
t(f whether or not 1iDiJ~gu1affonrti>C8.lTy-outsuch amendments 
have been promulgated by such date.
(B) In the case of a State plan for medical assistance under 
title XIX of the Social Security Act which the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services determines requires State legislation (other 
than legislation appropriating funds) in order for the plan to meet 
the additional requirements imposed by the amendments made 
by this section, the State plan shall not be regarded as failing
to comply with the requirements imposed by such amendments 
solely on the basis of its failure to meet these additional require­
ments before the first day of the first calendar quarter be~ng 
after the close of ,the first regular session of the State legIslature 
that beg 
of the I 
year leg
tobeaE (2)
to indivi 
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PUB~ ..C LAW 103-66-AUG. 10, 1993 107 STAT. 62!l 
that begins after the date of the enactment of this Act. For purposes 
of the preceding sentence, in the case of a State that has a 2­
year legislative session, each year of such session shall be deemed 
to be a separate regular session of the State legislature. 
(2) The amendments made by this section shall not apply 
to individuals who died before October 1, 1993. 
PART m-PAYMENTS 
SEC. 13821. ASSURING PROPER PAYMENTS TO DISPROPORTIONATE 
SHARE HosprrALS. 
(a) DISPROPORTIONATE SHARE HOSPITALS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE 
MINIMUM LEvEL OF SERVICES TO MEDICAID PATIENTS.­
(1) IN GENERAL.-8ection 1923 (42 U.S.C. 1396r-4) is 
amended­
(A) in subsection (a)(I)(A),. by striking "requirement" 
and inserting "requirements"; 
(B) in subsection (b)(l), by striking "requirement" and 
inserting "requirements"; 
(0) in the heading to subsection (d), by striking 
"REQUIREMENT" and inserting "REQUIREMENTS"; 
(D) by adding at the end of subsection (d) the following
new paragraph: 
"(3) No hospital may be defined or deemed as a dispropor­
tionate share hospital under a State plan under this title or 
under subsection (b) or (e) of this section unless the hospital 
has a medicaid inpatient utilization rate (as defined in sub­
section (b)(2» ofnot less than 1 percent."; 
(E) in subsection (e)(l)­
(i) by striking "and" before "(B)", and 
(li) by inserting before the period at the end the 
following: ", aJ;ld"{C) the plan meets the requirement 
of subsectiol)-{d)(3) and such payment adjustments are 
made consIstent with the last sentence of subsection (c)"; and/ 
(F) in s~bsection(e)(2)­
(i) :'in subparagraph (A), by inserting "(other than 
the last sentence ofsubsection (c»" after "(c)", 
(li) by striking "and" at·. the end of subparagraph 
(A), 
, (iii) by striking the period at the end of subpara­
r graph (B) and inserting", and", and 
~ (iv) by adding at the end the following new 
f subparagraph: 
"(0) subsection (d)(3) shall apply.". 
r.	 (2) EFFECTIVE DATE.-The amendments made by thi8 8Ub­ 42 USC 1396r-4 
note.b section shall apply to payments to States under section 1903(a) 
J1 of the Social Security Act for payments to hospitals made 
It under State plans after­
.e (A) the end of the State fiscal year that ends dwing 
t 1994, or 
~ (B) in the case of a State with a State legislature 
l" which is not scheduled to have a regular legislative session 
.g in 1994, the end of the State fiscal year that ends during 
,. 1995; 
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I. 
INTRODUCTION 
By Order dated August 26, 1998, the Court has requested that the Appellant, the 
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter "Department") file a limited 
responsive brief addressing only the issue of "whether the definition of 'assets' contained 
in 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(e)(I)(B) as enacted in 1993 is applicable to the Marriage Settlement 
Agreement between Lionel and Hildor dated March 8, 1993." 
This brief concludes that: 
(1) Whether the definition is "applicable" depends on whether the issue 
examined is Medicaid eligibility or estate recovery; 
(2) The definition of "assets" is not applicable for the purpose of determining 
Hildor Knudson's Medicaid eligibility; 
(3) The definition of "assets" is applicable and significant in understanding 
Congressional intent for estate recovery purposes; but 
(4) The definition of assets is only persuasive authority and does not control the 
outcome of this case. 
While the Department profoundly disagrees with many other aspects of Jackman's 
Rehearing Brief, in accordance with the Court's order, only the issue presented by the 
Court has been briefed herein. 
LINIITED RESPONSE TO 
PETITION FOR REHEARING - 1 
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THE DEFINITION OF "ASSETS" lVIAY BE 
APPLICABLE FOR ESTATE RECOVERY PlJRPOSES 
EVEN THOUGH IT IS INAPPLICABLE IN 
DETERlVIINING MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY. 
A. The Distinction Between Eligibility and Estate Recoverv. 
When scrutinizing asset transfers, including transfers between spouses through a 
marriage settlement agreement, there is a significant distinction between questions of 
eligibility and questions of estate recovery. Transfers which may be appropriate for 
eligibility purposes, may be voidable in other contexts. See IDAPA citations, {nlra. This 
unusual circumstance arises because, at least in part, federal Medicaid law ignores state 
marital property laws. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p deals with both eligibility and estate recovery in different 
sections. For example, subsection (c) imposes a period of ineligibility for prohibited 
transfers, while specifically pennitting transfers between spouses. Seemingly in conflict 
with state community property principles, transfers to third parties by either spouse are 
punished, without regard to which spouse is the legal owner of the property. At the same 
time, what property is available for estate recovery is enlarged in subsection (b) by an 
expansive definition of "estate." 
The eligibility provision, punishing transfers to third parties, ignores the effect of 
state community property laws. When estate recovery law is applied to the same 
circumstance to recover property which has been transferred between the spouses, it 
LIMITED RESPONSE TO
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appears that the laws conflict. This perceived conflict arises, however, only because of 
the interplay between state community property laws and federal Medicaid law. There is 
actually no conflict, and in Idaho, community property principles are preserved and are 
modified only to the extent necessary to effectuate the federal scheme. 
As an example, IDAPA 16.03.09.025.20 permits recovery only of estate property 
which had previously been the couple's community property: 
20. Limitations on Estate Claims. Limits on the Department's 
claim against the assets of a deceased recipient shall be subject to Sections 
56-218 and 56-218A, Idaho Code. A claim against the estate of a survivil}g 
spouse ofa predeceased recipient is limited to the value of the assets of the 
estate that were community property, or the deceased recipient's share of 
the separate property, and jointly owned property. 
IDAPA 16.03.09.025.20 (underline added).l Similarly, transfers between spouses 
Iii,.... through a marriage settlement agreement, valid under state law, which have no effect on 
eligibility, are, because of community property law, restricted for purposes of estate 
recovery: 
24. Marriage Settlement Agreement or Other Such Agreement. A 
marriage settlement agreement or other such agreement which separates 
assets for a married couple does not eliminate the debt against the estate of 
the deceased recipient or the spouse. Transfers under a marriage settlement 
agreement or other such agreement may be voided ifnot for adequate 
consideration. 
lIt is because of this section that most of the "examples" posed by Jackman at pages 15 through 18 of 
the Rehearing Brief are wrong. The Department does not seek recovery of property that has been received and 
maintained as separate property.. Only property that was, prior to establishing Medicaid eligibility, community 
property, is subject to the Department's reimbursement claim. The Court's decision, contrary to Jackman's 
claim at page 16 of her Rehearing Brief, does not ignore "treasured principles of community property law", it 
protects them. 
LIMITED RESPONSE TO
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IDAPA 16.03.09.025.24. This provision is found within the Medicaid estate recoverY 
provisions, but a similar provision is found within the eligibility rules: 
A marriage settlement agreement may be valid for Medicaid eligibility and 
still be voidable for estate recovery purposes if value is transferred between 
spouses without adequate consideration. 
IDAPA 16.03.05.620.04. 
These provisions of State and federal law merely show that a different ar;,alysis is 
required when considering questions of eligibility and questions of estate recovery. The 
reason this dichotomy arises is, at least in part, because federal law ignores community 
property principles and State law preserves them. 
B. Hildor Knudson's Medicaid Eligibility Is Not in Issue and the Eligibilitv 
Provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p Are Not in Issue. 
Had the marriage settlement agreement improperly conveyed assets between 
Hildor and Lionel Knudson, Hildor's Medicaid eligibility could have been affected. No 
one, however, has contended that Hildor was not eligible for Medicaid. No one has 
claimed the marriage settlement agreement improperly transferred assets from one spouse 
to the other. Therefore, whether the definition of "assets" in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p applies to 
the marriage settlement agreement, for eligibility purposes, is completely irrelevant to the 
outcome of this case. 
At page 28 (under subheading 1) of her brief, Jackman argues that the definition in 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p does not apply because the marriage settlement agreement was entered 
into before the effective date of the act. In support of this argument, Jackman cites P.L. 
,...,	 LIMITED RESPONSE TO 
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103-66, § 13612(e)(2)(B). Section 13612 contains the effective dates for those provisions 
dealing with estate recovery. However, the cited provision does not exist in section 
13612. Instead, the correct citation is § 13611(e)(2)(B). Section 13611 is the section 
dealing with eligibility not estate recovery. Therefore, it is true that Hildor Knudson's 
eligibility was unaffected by transfers made prior to the effective date of the act. But 
that was never the issue. 
The effective date for the estate recovery changes is found in § 13612(d) (1 )(A) 
which states: 
Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the amendments made by this 
section shall apply to payments under title XIX of the Social Security Act 
for calendar quarters beginning on or after October 1, 1993, without regard 
to whether or not final regulations to carry out such amendments have been 
promulgated by such date. 
P.L. 103-66, § 13612(d)(l)(A). In other words, the estate recovery amendments are 
effective based on payments made, not on the date of a transfer which could have affected 
eligibility. There is no question that the definition of "assets" is applicable to estate 
recovery issues in this case. 
<...,. LIMITED RESPONSE TO 
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III. 
THE DEFINITION OF "ASSETS" IS IMPORTANT 
AND APPLICABLE IN DEMONSTRATING 
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT TO RECOVER ASSETS 
TR<\NSF'ERRED BETWEEN SPOUSES. 
A. The Definition of "Assets" Is Significant and Important to Proving Jackman's 
Preemption Claim Is Incorrect. 
The fact that Hildor Knudson's eligibility is not in issue does not mean the 
definition of "assets" in 42 U.S.c. § 1396p is unimportant. It is important, but mostly to 
show congressional intent. Jackman's argument has been that federal law somehow 
preempts Idaho's estate recovery law and prohibits recovery from the estate of a 
surviving spouse. Since there is no specific federal prohibition to spousal estate recovery, 
Jackman has been forced to argue that the structure and purpose of the federalla.w 
somehow implies preemption. However, this is simply not so. The definition of "assets" 
in 42 U.S.c. § 1396p, by including a broad range of property of both spouses merely 
shows that Congress did not view State marital property laws as having an effect on the 
overall scheme to permit one spouse to become eligible without impoverishing the other, 
while at the same time preserving the State's ability to recover the couple's property after 
both of them are deceased. 
LIMITED RESPONSE TO 
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B. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p Supports Idaho Code § 56-218 Spousal Estate Recov~. 
The Court correctly held that Idaho Code § 56-218 pennits estate recovery from 
the estate of Hildor Knudson's spouse in this case. This section, alone, is sufficient to 
reach all of the property in this case. The court also correctly perceived the federal 
support for spousal estate recovery found in the definition of "estate" in 42 U.S.C. § 
1396p(b)(4): 
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate", with 
respect to a deceased individual ­
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other 
assets included within the individual's estate, as defined for 
purposes of State probate law; and 
(B) may include, at the option of the State (and shall 
include, in the case of an individual to whom paragraph (l)(C)(i) 
applies), any other real and personal property and other assets in 
which the individual ha~ any legal title or interest at the time of 
death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets 
conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual 
through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life 
estate, living trust, or other arrangement. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (underline added). This section refers to "assets" and 
therefore incorporates the defInition of "assets" found in subsection (e).2 Unlike the 
eligibility amendments made in § 13611 of P.L. 103-66, this provision was adde:d by § 
13612. As stated above, this section became effective based on payments made and is 
clearly applicable in this case. There is no question but that the definition of "estate," as 
2Jackman argues that the definition of "assets" in subsection (e) cannot be applied to the word "assets" 
found in subsection (b). Rehearing Brief, p. 27. There is no support for this contention, however, which 
contradicts the plain language of the definition which begins "(e) Definitions - In this section, the following 
definitions shall apply:". 
'\I ••• I~	 LIMITED RESPONSE TO 
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broadened by reference to the definition for "assets" includes property transfen'ed by 
Hildor in the marriage settlement agreement. While these provisions of federal law are, 
by no means, essential to the court's holding in this case, they clearly defeat Jackman's 
argument that federal law somehow prohibits spousal estate recovery. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
The Order requesting this brief asked whether the definition of "assets" £:mnd in 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e) is "applicable" to the marriage settlement agreement. lfthe 
question were whether the definition was applicable with regard to Hildor's eligibility, 
the answer would have to be "no." However, the definition is clearly applicable to show 
that Congress intended estate recovery to reach assets conveyed between spouses, 
including assets conveyed through a marriage settlement agreement. While not essential 
for the court's decision in this case, the property Hildor conveyed to Lionel through the 
marriage settlement agreement is certainly part of the definition of "estate" and is subject 
to recovery in this case. 
DATED this 9 day of September, 1998, 
lilt'" LIMITED RESPONSE TO 
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I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing document were 
mailed, postage pre-paid, to the following: 
William C. Kirsch 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9384
 
Moscow,ID 83843-9384
 
DATED this CJfh day of September, 1998. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Docket No. 23928 
"" .... ';,' ..• :.... : ".",::'i., ..t , •• ' " .:', •• 
.. , .)
'" ,.,\. ':
.. IN THE MATTER OF THE 'ESTATKOF .:' ') 
.'.,LIONEL:MALCOLM, KNUDSON". ..... ,~. ,"}" ,.' i' : ~ : : 
J
 
Deceased. )
 
) 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND ) 
WELFARE, ) 
) Lewiston, Aprll 1998 Term 
Petitioner-Appellant, ) 
} 1998 Opinion No. 60. 
v.	 ) 
) Filed: June 16, 1998 
BARBARA JACKMAN, Personal ) 
Representative for the &tate of LIONEL ) Frederick C. Lyon, Clerk 
. MALCOLM KNUDSON,	 )
 
)
 
Respondent• )'

.... 
------------------'} 
Appeal from the District Court of the Second judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, Latah County. Hon. John R. Stegner, District 
JUdge; Hon. W.C. Hamlett, Magistrate Judge. 
Appeal from order denying claim against estate. Vacated and 
remanded. 
Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General, Boise, for appellant W. 
Corey Cartwright, Deputy Attorney General, argued. 
William C. Kirsch, Moscow, for respondtmt. 
JOHNSON, Justice 
This is a Medi~lid recovery case. We conclude that p!Jrsuant to section 56.·218(1) of the 
Idaho Code (I.e.). the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (the Department) may recover 
from the available estate of a surviving spouse the balance 'of Medicaid payments rl::ceived by an 
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individual who was fifty-five years old or older when receiving the paymentS' if the individual's 
estate is inadequate to repay the entire amount. 
I. 
THE BACKG:Q.OUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS ,."
• • '. ~. I • , 
Barbara Jack.man (Jackrnan) '.Vas the niece of jUl elderly coup~e, Hildor_~~ Lionel Knudson 
(the Knudsons).. Jackman was also Hildor's guardian and held a durable power of attorney for 
Lionel. On behalf of the Knudsons, Jackman signed a "Marriage Settlement Agreement" (the 
. agreement) on March 8, 1993. The agreement transmuted most of the Knudsons' community 
.property into Lionel's separate property. By the agreement, Hildor received as her separ~te property 
. her personal property and household effects in her possession, her irrevocable burial trust, arid 
$1,900 in cash. The purpose of the agreement was to make Hildor eligible for Medicaid assistance. 
Hildor received $41,600.55 in Medicaid payments (the Medicaid'payments) prior to her death on 
October 27, 1994. 
After Hildor's death, Jackman collected Hildor's estate'pursuant to the procedures for small 
estates contained in I.e. § 15-3-1201. After paying Hildor's funeral expenses .fUld legal fees, 
JaclQn~ delivered the balance ofHildor's ,estate, $1,638.03, to the l)epartment ~n August 10, 1995. 
.. "...
,The Department .accepted this as a partial settlement ofits claim fo,r,recovety ofthe. 'Medicaid 
. . . , 
payments. 
Lionel died two weeks after Hildor on November 11, 1994. After Lionel's death, Jackman 
initiated probate proceedings ~or his estate and became Lionel's personal representative. Lionel's 
estate was vatu"ed at $40.1798.35. 'The Department sought allowance ofa claim against Lionel's 
estate to recover the remaining balance of !ho Medicaid payments (the balance of the Medicaid 
,payments). Jackman objected to the Departmenfs claim. 
The magistrate judge denied the Department's claim against Lionel'~ estate because Hildor 
had an estate, and the Department received the remainder of the estate after expenses. The 
Department appealed to the district judge. ·who affirmed the magistrate judge's decision. The 
Department appealed. 
II.
 
. I.C. § 56-218 PERMITS RECOVERY OF THE BALANCE
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OF THE MEDICAID PAYMENTS FROM LIONEL'S ESTATE• 
...... 
The Department asserts that I.e, § 56-218 pennits recovery of the balance Cof the Medicaid 
payments from Lionel's estate. We agree. 
Ie. § 56-218prbvides that niedic~f assist3n~e "plrid on behalfofan ~dividual who was fifty­
l "fiV'e"(55}'yeats 'of age otoldhrwheri th~:iridi~idualreteived such~~istancemay be l'eco~ered from 
the estate, or ifthere be rio estate the estate of the surViving sp~use> ifany, shall be charged for'such 
aid paid to either or both ....n I.e. § 56-218(1). 
,In George w: Watkins FamilYv. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 797 P.2d 1385 (1990), the Court 
- pointed out: 'The plain meaning of a statute will prevail unless clearly expressed legislative intent 
is contrary or unless plain meaning leads to absurd results." [d. at 540, 797 P.2d at 1388. 
Ifwe were to read I.e. § 56-218(1) not to allow recovery from Lionel's estate ofthe balance 
of the M~dic'aid payments because there was $1,638.03 in Hildor's estatel our reading would be 
contrary to expressed legislative intent and would lead to absurd results. This reading would mean 
that if the estate ofa spouse who received Medicaid assistance had even one cent, or a toothbrush, 
the Department could collect nothing from the estate ofthesurviving spouse. As acknowledged by 
,'JaCIanan'sattorney ~t the oral ~~erit ofthis c~e,this readirig ~f the stafut~'would ~ean that there 
'.' i~' h6; ;circum'stante' iIi which 'th~ iegislative"iritent 't~ rebo~er' fro~:t&e: 6state ~f iS~I~ivi~g spo~se 
would be fulfilled. TIlls result flies in the face ofthe expressed legislative intent that the Department 
recover from the estate of the surviving spouse under some circumstances. It is absurd to read the 
statute as preventing recovery from the surviving,spo\lse's estate even if the recipient's estate is 
inadequate for the full recovery ofMedicaid payments. 
From this analysis we conclude that the correct reading ofI.C. § 56-218(1) is that if the 
estate of the individual who receivedMedicaid assistance is inadequate to repay the full amount of 
the assistance received, the Department can recover the balance from tho estate of the surviving 
spouse. Stated in tenns of the circwnstances ofthis case, when the Department receivl:d the balance 
of Hildor's estate, there was cCno estateU of Hildor remaining from which tho Department could 
recover the balance ofthe medicaid payments. Therefore, the Department is entitled to recover the 
balance from Lionel's estate. 
. . ~ ~ ... 
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Jaclonan contends that the Idaho statutes allowing for estate recovery exceed the authority 
granted by federal law. We disagree. 
Jaclanan relies on a portion of42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(I)(B) for the proposition that re~overy 
may only be had from the recipient's estate. Reading the entir~ .section, however, it :is clear that the 
statute is only a limitation on the types ofJ1.1edical assistance which can bo recovered. lbis includes 
payments for nursing facility services, home and community-based services, and related ?-ospital and 
prescription drug services, or, at the State's option, any items or services under the State plan. The 
statute defines the types ofpayments· tp.at are recoverable and does not purpprt to defllle from whom 
. " ,. 
these payments may be recoyered. 
Federal law encompasses recovery both from the estate of the recipient as well as from the 
estate of the surviving spouse. The federal defmition of asset is significant. Federal law includes 
within the recipient's estate "all real and personal property and <?ther assets included within the 
.individual's estate ... " and "any other real and personal property and other assets in which the 
individual had any legal title orinterest at the time ofdeath . .- .. '~ 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4); I.C. § 
, 
56-2~8(4). Under federal law, Hildor's assets would include her income and resources as well as 
Lionel's income and resources. The agreement does not affect the status of the assets that federal 
law considers to be part of the recipient's estate because the definition of assets includes "income 
or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse is entitled to but does not receive 
because ofaction by a person. .. with legal authority to act in place ofor on behalfofthe individual 
or such individual's spouse." 42 u.S.C. § 1396p(e)(1)(B). Jacbnan's signing ofthe agreement 
constituted action by a person on behalf ofHildor and Lionel. Federal law does not prohibit the 
Department from recovering the balance of the Medicaid payments from Lionel's estate. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
We vacate the magistrate judge's denial of the Department's claim against Lionel's estate 
and remand the c~e to the ~agistrate judge for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
We do not address Jackman's contention that pursuant to I.C. § 15-3-720 she is entitled to 
receive from Lionel's estate her necessary expenses and disbursements including reasonable attorney 
fees. lhis is a question the m~~gistr~te judge· must consider on remand. 
, 4 
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/ 
We award the Department costs, but not attorney fees, on appeal. 
ChiefJustice TROUT, Justices SItAK, SCHROEDER, and WALTERS, CONCUR. 
L Fr(l<!81'lck C. Lyon, Clerk of the Suprnms COllrt
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221.7 Sec. 26. Minnesota Statutes 2008, section 256B.15, subdivision Ia, is amended to read: 
221.8 Subd. Ia. Estates subject to claims. (~Jf a person receives any medical assistance 
221.9hereunder, on the person's death, if single, or on the death of the survivor of a married 
221.10couple, either or both of whom received medical assistance, or as otherwise provided 
221. 11for in this section, the total amount paid for medical assistance rendered for the person 
221. 12and spouse shall be filed as a claim against the estate of the person or the estate of th{: 
221. 13surviving spouse in the court having jurisdiction to probate the estate or to issue a de(:ree 
221.140f descent according to sections 525.31 to 525.313. 
221.1S(b) For the purposes of this section, the person's estate must consist of: 
221.16(1) the person's probate estate; 
221.17(2) all of the person's interests or proceeds of those interests in real property the 
221. 18person owned as a life tenant or as a joint tenant with a right of survivorship at the time of 
221.19the person's death; 
221. 20(3) all of the person's interests or proceeds of those interests in securities the person 
221. 210wned in beneficiary form as provided under sections 524.6-301 to 524.6-311 at the time 
221. 220f the person's death, to the extent the interests or proceeds of those interests become part 
221. 230f the probate estate under section 524.6-307; 
221.24(4) all of the person's interests in joint accounts, multiple-party accounts, and 
221. 25Qay-on-death accounts, brokerage accounts, investment accounts, or the proceeds of 
221. 26those accounts, as provided under sections 524.6-201 to 524.6-214 at the time of the 
221. 27QerSOn's death to the extent the interests become part of the probate estate under section 
221.28524.6-207; and 
221.29(5) assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the person through survivorship, 
221. 30living trust or other arrangements. 
221.31(C) For the purpose of this section and recovery in a surviving spouse's estate for 
221. 32medical assistance paid for a predeceased spouse, the estate must consist of all of the legal 
221. 33title and interests the deceased individual's predeceased spouse had in jointly owned or 
221. 34marital property at the time of the spouse's death, as defined in subdivision 2b, and the 
221. 35Qroceeds of those interests, that passed to the deceased individual or another individual, a 
222.1survivor, an heir, or an assign of the predeceased spouse through a joint tenancy, tenan£Y.. 
222.2in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement. A deceased 
222.3recipient who, at death, owned the property jointly with the surviving spouse shall hav,~ 
222.4an interest in the entire property. 
222. sed) For the purpose of recovery in a single person's estate or the estate of a survivor 
222. 60f a married couple, "other arrangement" includes any other means by which title to all or 
222.7any part of the jointly owned or marital property or interest passed from the predeceas{:d 
222. sspouse to another including, but not limited to, transfers between spouses which are 
222.9permitted, prohibited, or penalized for purposes of medical assistance. 
222 .10(&A claim shall be filed ifmedical assistance was rendered for either or both 
222.11persons under one of the following circumstances: 
222 .1$jiU the person was over 55 years of age, and received services under this chapter; 
222. 13(bta.l the person resided in a medical institution for six months or longer, received 
222 .14services under this chapter, and, at the time of institutionalization or application for 
222. 15medical assistance, whichever is later, the person could not have reasonably been expected 
222 .16tO be discharged and returned home, as certified in writing by the person's treating 
222 .17physician. For purposes of this section only, a "medical institution" means a skilled 
222 .18Uursing facility, intermediate care facility, intermediate care facility for persons with 
222.19developmental disabilities, nursing facility, or inpatient hospital; or 
222.2ofejill the person received general assistance medical care services under chapter 
222. 21256D. 
222.22(QThe claim shall be considered an expense of the last illness of the decedent for the 
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222. 23purpose of section 524.3-805. Notwithstanding any law or rule to the contrary, a state or 
222. 24county agency with a claim under this section must be a creditor under section 524.6·-307. 
222. 25Any statute of limitations that purports to limit any county agency or the state agency, 
222.260r both, to recover for medical assistance granted hereunder shall not apply to any claim 
222. 27ffiade hereunder for reimbursement for any medical assistance granted hereunder. Notice 
222. 280fthe claim shall be given to all heirs and devisees of the decedent whose identity call be 
222. 29ascertained with reasonable diligence. The notice must include procedures and instrw;tions 
222.30for making an application for a hardship waiver under subdivision 5; time frames for 
222. Jlsubmitting an application and determination; and information regarding appeal rights and 
222. J2procedures. Counties are entitled to one-half of the nonfederal share ofmedical assistance 
222. 33collections from estates that are directly attributable to county effort. Counties are entitled 
222. 34to ten percent of the collections for alternative care directly attributable to county effort. 
222.35 Sec. 27. Minnesota Statutes 2008, section 256B.l5, subdivision 1h, is amended to read: 
223.1 Subd. 1h. Estates ofspecific persons receiving medical assistance. (a) For 
223.2purposes of this section, paragraphs (b) to Wiil apply if a person received medical 
223.3assistance for which a claim may be filed under this section and died single, or the 
223.4surviving spouse of the couple and was not survived by any of the persons described 
223.5in subdivisions 3 and 4. 
223.6 (\:I) fer ~\:tFfleses ef this seetietl, the ~ersetl's estate eetlsists ef: (1) the ~ersee's 
223. 7preeate estate; (2) all efthe ~ersee's ieterests er ~reeeeds efthese ieterests ie real ~reflerty 
223. sthe ~ersee e'lfeed as a life teeaet er as a jeiet teeaet with a right ef sl:!F'li'lershi~ at the 
223. 9time ef the ~ersee's death; (3) all ef the ~erseR's iRterests er ~reeeeas ef these iRterests-ffi 
223. 1osee\:trities tile ~ersoR O'llRea ie eeeefieiary farm as ~ro"iaea l:tFIaer seetiees 524.6 30 l-te 
223.11524.6 311 at the time efthe ~erseR's death, te the exteRt they eeeeme flart efthe ~reeil-te 
223 .12estate \:tRder seetieR 524.6 307; (4) all ef the ~ersoR's iRterests iR jOiRt aeeol:l:Rts, m\:tltiple 
223.IJ~arty aeeo\:tRts, afla ~ay eR aeath aeeel:l:Rts, er the flroeeeas of those aeeol:l:Rts, as ~royided 
223 .14\:tRaer seetioes 524.6 201 te 524.6 214 at the time of the ~erseR's death to the exteRt 
223. 15they eeeome ~iH1 of the ~roeate estate \:tRder seetioR 524.6207; aed (5) the flersoR's 
223 .ulegal title or iRterest at the time ef the ~ersoR's death iR real flre~erty traesferrea \:tRder 
223 .17a traRsfer eR death deed \:teder seetioR 507.071, or iR the ~reeeeds [rem the sooseq\:teet 
223 .18sale of the ~eFSeR's iRterest iR the real flre~erty. Neh'lithstaedieg aey law or rule to tfttl 
223. 1geoetraf)', a state or eo\:tRf)' &geee)' with a elaim \:tRder this seetiofl shall se a eFeditoF 1:Hl4er 
223.2oseetioR524.6 307. 
223.21 WJQl Notwithstanding any law or rule to the contrary, the person's life estate or joint 
223. 22tenancy interest in real property not subject to a medical assistance lien under sections 
223.23514.980 to 514.985 on the date of the person's death shall not end upon the person's d{:ath 
223. 24and shall continue as provided in this subdivision. The life estate in the person's estate 
223.25shall be that portion of the interest in the real property subject to the life estate that is {:qual 
223.2610 the life estate percentage factor for the life estate as listed in the Life Estate Mortality 
223. 27Table of the health care program's manual for a person who was the age of the medical 
223.28assistance recipient on the date of the person's death. The joint tenancy interest in real 
223.29property in the estate shall be equal to the fractional interest the person would have owned 
223. 30in the jointly held interest in the property had they and the other owners held title to the 
223. Jlproperty as tenants in common on the date the person died. 
223.32 Will The court upon its own motion, or upon motion by the personal representative 
223. 330r any interested party, may enter an order directing the remaindermen or surviving joint 
223. 34tenants and their spouses, if any, to sign all documents, take all actions, and otherwise 
223. 35fully cooperate with the personal representative and the court to liquidate the decedent's 
223. 361ife estate or joint tenancy interests in the estate and deliver the cash or the proceeds of 
224.1those interests to the personal representative and provide for any legal and equitable 
000429
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224.2sanctions as the court deems appropriate to enforce and carry out the order, including ,ill
 
224.3award of reasonable attorney fees.
 
224.4 WJill. The personal representative may make, execute, and deliver any conveyances
 
224.50r other documents necessary to convey the decedent's life estate or joint tenancy interest
 
224. 6in the estate that are necessary to liquidate and reduce to cash the decedent's interest or
 
224.7for any other purposes.
 
224.8 fttm Subject to administration, all costs, including reasonable attorney fees,
 
224.9directlyand immediately related to liquidating the decedent's life estate or joint tenancy
 
224 .1ointerest in the decedent's estate, shall be paid from the gross proceeds of the liquidation
 
224.11allocable to the decedent's interest and the net proceeds shall be turned over to the personal
 
224 . 12representative and applied to payment of the claim presented under this section. 
224.13 WiD The personal representative shall bring a motion in the district court in which
 
224. 14the estate is being probated to compel the remaindermen or surviving joint tenants to
 
224 .15account for and deliver to the personal representative all or any part of the proceeds of any
 
224 .16sale, mortgage, transfer, conveyance, or any disposition of real property allocable to the
 
224 . 17decedent's life estate or joint tenancy interest in the decedent's estate, and do everything
 
224.1soecessary to liquidate and reduce to cash the decedent's interest and turn the proceeds of
 
224. 19the sale or other disposition over to the personal representative. The court may grant any
 
224.2olegal or equitable relief including, but not limited to, ordering a partition of real estate:
 
224. 21under chapter 558 necessary to make the value of the decedent's life estate or joint tenancy 
224. 22interest available to the estate for payment of a claim under this section. 
224.23 Wig} Subject to administration, the personal representative shall use all of the cash
 
224.240r proceeds of interests to pay an allowable claim under this section. The remaindermen
 
224. 250r surviving joint tenants and their spouses, if any, may enter into a written agreement 
224. 26With the personal representative or the claimant to settle and satisfy obligations imposed at 
224. 27any time before or after a claim is filed. 
''-' 224.28 fi:)JJll The personal representative may, at their discretion, provide any or all of the
 
224. 290ther owners, remaindermen, or surviving joint tenants with an affidavit terminating the
 
224.30decedent's estate's interest in real property the decedent owned as a life tenant or as a joint
 
224. 31tenant with others, if the personal representative determines in good faith that neither the
 
224.J2decedent nor any of the decedent's predeceased spouses received any medical assistance
 
224. 33for which a claim could be filed under this section, or if the personal representative has
 
224. 34filed an affidavit with the court that the estate has other assets sufficient to pay a claim, as
 
224.3spresented, or if there is a written agreement under paragraph Wig), or if the claim, as
 
224.36allowed, has been paid in full or to the full extent of the assets the estate has available
 
225.1to pay it. The affidavit may be recorded in the office of the county recorder or filed in
 
225.2the Office of the Registrar of Titles for the county in which the real property is located.
 
225.3Except as provided in section 514.981, subdivision 6, when recorded or filed, the affidavit
 
225.4shall terminate the decedent's interest in real estate the decedent owned as a life tenant or a
 
225.~oint tenant with others. The affidavit shall:
 
225.6(1) be signed by the personal representative;
 
225.7(2) identify the decedent and the interest being terminated;
 
225. s(3) give recording information sufficient to identify the instrument that created the
 
225.9interest in real property being terminated;
 
225.10(4) legally describe the affected real property;
 
225.11(5) state that the personal representative has determined that neither the decedent
 
225. 12nor any of the decedent's predeceased spouses received any medical assistance for which
 
225.13a claim could be filed under this section;
 
225 .14(6) state that the decedent's estate has other assets sufficient to pay the claim, as
 
225. 1spresented, or that there is a written agreement between the personal representative and
 
225.16the claimant and the other owners or remaindermen or other joint tenants to satisfy the
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225. 170bligations imposed under this subdivision; and
 
225.18(7) state that the affidavit is being given to terminate the estate's interest under this
 
225. 19subdivision, and any other contents as may be appropriate.
 
225.2oThe recorder or registrar of titles shall accept the affidavit for recording or filing. The
 
225. 21affidavit shall be effective as provided in this section and shall constitute notice even if it
 
225. 22does not include recording information sufficient to identify the instrument creating the
 
225. 23interest it terminates. The affidavit shall be conclusive evidence of the stated facts.
 
225.24 ffiJU The holder of a lien arising under subdivision lc shall release the lien at 
225. 25the holder's expense against an interest terminated under paragraph Wig} to the extent 
225. 260f the termination. 
225.27 Wiil If a lien arising under subdivision 1c is not released under paragraph ffiJU, 
225.2sprior to closing the estate, the personal representative shall deed the interest subject to the 
225. 291ien to the remaindermen or surviving joint tenants as their interests may appear. Upon 
225.30recording or filing, the deed shall work a merger of the recipient's life estate or joint 
225. 31tenancy interest, subject to the lien, into the remainder interest or interest the decedent and 
225. 320thers owned jointly. The lien shall attach to and run with the property to the extent of 
225. 33the decedent's interest at the time of the decedent's death. 
225.34 Sec. 28. Minnesota Statutes 2008, section 256B.15, subdivision 2, is amended to read: 
226.1 Subd. 2. Limitations on claims. The claim shall include only the total amount 
226. 20f medical assistance rendered after age 55 or during a period of institutionalization 
226.3described in subdivision la, elatlse (6) paragraph (el, and the total amount of general 
226.4assistance medical care rendered, and shall not include interest. Claims that have been 
226. 5allowed but not paid shall bear interest according to section 524.3-806, paragraph (d). A 
226. 6claim against the estate of a surviving spouse who did not receive medical assistance, for 
226. 7ffiedical assistance rendered for the predeceased spouse, shall be payable from the full 
226.8value ofall of the predeceased spouse's assets and interests which are part of the survivi.!:!&.. 
226.9spouse's estate under subdivisions Ia and 2b. Recovery of medical assistance expenses in 
226.1othe nonrecipient surviving spouse's estate is limited to the value of the assets of the estate 
226. llthat were marital property or jointly owned property at any time during the marriage.-.:rhe 
226. 12claim is not payable from the value ofassets or proceeds of assets in the estate attributable 
226.13to a predeceased spouse whom the individual married after the death of the predeceas(:d 
226. 14recipient spouse for whom the claim is filed or from assets and the proceeds ofassets Jin the 
226. 15estate which the nonrecipient decedent spouse acquired with assets which were not marital 
226. 16property or jointly owned property after the death of the predeceased recipient spouse. 
226. 17Claims for alternative care shall be net of all premiums paid under section 256B.0913, 
226. 18subdivision 12 , on or after July 1, 2003, and shall be limited to services provided on or 
226. 19after July 1, 2003. Claims against marital property shall be limited to claims against 
226.2orecipients who died on or after July 1, 2009. 
226.21 Sec. 29. Minnesota Statutes 2008, section 256B.15, is amended by adding a 
226. 22subdivision to read: 
226.23 Subd. 2b. Controlling provisions. (a) ForpuIJloses of this subdivision and 
226.24subdivisions la and 2, paragraphs (b) to (d) apply. 
226.25(b) At the time of death of a recipient spouse and solely for pUIJlose of recovery of 
226. 26medical assistance benefits received, a predeceased recipient spouse shall have a legal. 
226. 27title or interest in the undivided whole of all of the property which the recipient and the 
226.2srecipient's surviving spouse owned jointly or which was marital property at any time 
226. 29during their marriage regardless of the form of ownership and regardless of whether 
226. 30it was owned or titled in the names of one or both the recipient and the recipient's 
226. 31spouse. Title and interest in the property of a predeceased recipient spouse shall not end 
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226. 320r extinguish upon the person's death and shall continue for the purpose of allowing 
226. 33recovery of medical assistance in the estate of the surviving spouse. Upon the death of 
226. 34the predeceased recipient spouse, title and interest in the predeceased spouse's proper!y­
226. 35shall vest in the surviving spouse by operation oflaw and without the necessity for aI!V.. 
227.lprobate or decree of descent proceedings and shall continue to exist after the death of the 
227.2predeceased spouse and the surviving spouse to permit recovery of medical assistance,,­
227.3The recipient spouse and the surviving spouse of a deceased recipient spouse shall not. 
227.4encumber, disclaim, transfer, alienate, hypothecate, or otherwise divest themselves of 
227. sthese interests before or upon death. 
227. dc) For pU1poses of this section, "marital property" includes any and all real or 
227. 7personal property of any kind or interests in such property the predeceased recipient 
227. sspouse and their spouse, or either of them, owned at the time of their marriage to each 
227. 90ther or acquired during their marriage regardless of whether it was owned or titled in 
227. lathe names of one or both of them. If either or both spouses of a married couple received 
227.11medical assistance, all property owned during the marriage or which either or both spouses 
227.12acquired during their marriage shall be presumed to be marital property for purposes of 
227.13recovering medical assistance unless there is clear and convincing evidence to the COI~ 
227.l4(d) The agency responsible for the claim for medical assistance for a recipient spouse. 
227.lsrnay, at its discretion, release specific real and personal property from the provisions of 
227.16this section. The release shall extinguish the interest created under paragraph (b) in the 
227. 1 71and it describes upon filing or recording. The release need not be attested, certified, or 
227.18acknowledged as a condition of filing or recording and shall be filed or recorded in the 
227.19office of the county recorder or registrar of titles, as appropriate, in the county where the 
227.2areal property is located. The party to whom the release is given shall be responsible for 
227.2lpaying all fees and costs necessary to record and file the release. If the property described 
227.22in the release is registered property, the registrar of titles shall accept it for recording and 
227. 23shall record it on the certificate of title for each parcel of property described in the release. 
227. 2df the property described in the release is abstract property, the recorder shall accept it. 
227.2sfor filing and file it in the county's grantor-grantee indexes and any tract index the cou!!!y­
227. 26ffiaintains for each parcel of property described in the release. 
227.27 Sec. 30. Minnesota Statutes 2008, section 256B.15, is amended by adding a 
227. 28subdivision to read: 
227.29 Subd. 9. Commissioner's intervention. The commissioner shall be permitted to 
227.3aintervene as a party in any proceeding involving recovery of medical assistance upon 
227.31filing a notice of intervention and serving such notice on the other parties. 
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IDAHO GENERAL DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY	 
',' 
THE POWERS YOU GRANT BELOW ARE EFFECTIVE 
EVEN IF YOU BECOME DISABLED OR INCOMPETENT 
NOTICE: THE POWERS GRANTED BY THIS DOCUMENT ARE BROAD AND 
SWEEPING. THEY ARE EXPLAINED IN THE UNIFORM STATUTORY FORM POWER 
OF ATTORNEY ACT. IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT rHESE POWERS, 
OBTAIN COMPETENT LEGAL ADVICE. THIS DOCUMENT DOES NOT AUTHORIZE 
ANYONE TO MAKE MEDICAl. AND OTHER HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS FOR YOU. 
YOU MAY REVOKE THIS POWER OF ATIORNEY IF YOU LATER WISH TO DO SO. 
THIS POWER OF ATIORNEY IS EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY AND'WILL CONTINUE 
TO BE EFFECTIVE EVEN IF YOU BECOME OISABLED,INCAPACITATED, OR 
INCOMPETENT. . 
I, Martha Jean Perry 2401 Tendoy Boise, Idaho 83705 Lrcu	 
.~ 
Appoint	 NDV 2 8 2007 
:., 
.~ 
George D. Perry 2.401 Tendoy, Boise, Idaho 83705 or	 AECE'I'VED . ;,;;' 
as my Agent (attorney-in-fact) to act for me in any lawful way with respect to the 
following initialed subjects: 
TO GRANT ALL OF THE FOLLOWING POWERS. INITIAL THE LINE IN FRONT OF 
(N) AND IGNORE THE LINES IN FRONT OF THE OTHER POWERS. 
TO GRANT ONE OR MORE, BUT FEWER THAN ALL, OF THE FOLLOWING 
POWERS, INITIAL THE LINE IN FRONT OF EACH POWER YOU ARE GRANTING. 
.	 . . 
TO WITHHOLD A POWER, DO NOT INITIAL THEUNE IN FRONT OF IT. YOU MAY, 
BUT NEED NOT. CROSS OUT EACH POWER WITHHELD.	 . 
.:. 
:\" Note: If you initialltarn A or Item 9, which follow, a notarized signature will be/~
,"
", required on bet'lalf of the Principal. . 
, ~" INITIAL 
)1'/ d I (A) Real property transactions. To lease, sell, mortgage, purchase, '~e. and acquire, and to agree, bargain, and contract for the lease, sale, . 
purchase, exchange. and acqUisition of, and to accept, take. receive, and possess any 
interest in real property whatsoever,on such terms and conditions, and under suoh 
covenants, as my Agent shall deem proper; and to maintain, repair, tear down, ialter,. 
'.	 rebuild, improve manage, insure, move, rent, lease, sell, convey, SUbject to liens, 
mortgages, and security deeds, and In any way or manner deal with all or any part of 
any Interest in real property whatsoever, Including specifically, but without limItation, real 
., 
,.,
"	 
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" 
property lying and being sjtuated in the State of 1daho, under such tenns and conditions,
'r: 
. , and under such covenants, as my Agent shall deem proper ancl may for all deferred 
payments accept purchase money notes payable to me and secured by mortgages or 
deeds to secure debt, and may from time to time collect and cancel any of said notes, 
mortgages, security Interests, or deeds to secure debt. ." l.'rClJ 
;f1,~ its) Tangible p81'Sonal property trana.etlone. To ~se, .e~f,lI(Oll9tllle, 
purc ase, eXchange, and acquire, and to agree, bargain, and contr~~J.J~e )ei'BSl 
sale, purchase, exchange. and acqulsltl?n 0'\ and to ~ccept,.ta~e, re~~~ssess 
any personal property whatsoever, tangible or intangible, or ,"terest thereto, o~h 
..	 terms and conditions, and under such covenants, as my Agentshall deem proper; and .
 
to maintaIn, repair, improve, manage, insure, rent, lease, sell, convey, subject to liens or
 'r'
,
,<, mortgages, or to take any other security interests in said property which are recognized 
under the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted at that time under the laws of the State 
of Idaho or any applicable state, or otherwise hypothecate (pledge), and in any way or 
manner deal with all or any part of any rear or personal propertY whatsoever, tangible or 
intangible, or any interest therein, that I own a1 the time of exec~tjon or may thereafter 
acqUire, under such terms and conditions. and under such covElnants, as my Agent 
shall deem proper. 
!lJ..../..t.(C) Stock and bond transectlons. ,To purchase, sell, exchange, surrender, 
assign, redeem, vote at any meeting, or otherwise transfer any and arl shares ,of stock, 
bonds, or other securities In any business, association, corporation, partnership, or 
other legal entity, whether private or public, now or hereafter belonging to me. 
·111 /7)(0) Commodity and option transaction•• To organl~ or continue and· ~~ny business which term includes. without limitation, any farming, 
manufacturing, service, mIning, retailing or other type of business operation In any fonn, . 
whether as a proprietorship, joint venture, partnership, corporation, trust'or other legal 
entity; operate, buy, sell, expand, contract, terminate or liquidate any busIness: direct, 
oorltrol. supervise, manage or participate In the operation of any' business and engage, 
compensate and discharge business managers,employeee, agents, attorneys, . 
" accountants and consultants; and, In general, exercise all powers with respect to
 
',' business interests and operations which 'the principal could If pf'$sent and under no
:. 
.:~. disability. 
. . 
(E) Banking and other flnanoia' instltutlon tran$actlbna. To make, recatva,
 
., s' h, endorse,execute, acknowledge, deriver and possess checks, drafts. bills of
 ~ 
.' 
.\	 
exchange. letters of credit, notes, stock certificates, withdrawal r'$celpts and deposit
 
instruments. relating to accounts or deposits in, or certificates of deposit of banks,
 
savlnge; and'ioans, credit unions, or other Institutions or associattons. To pay all sums of
 
money, at any time or times, that may hereafter be owing by me Upon any account, bill
0' exchange, check, draft, purchase, contract, note. or trade acceptance made, '
 
executed, endorsed, accepted, and delivered by me or for me In my name, by m,Y
 :~'
....Agent. To borrow from time to tfme such sums of money as my Agent may deem proper 
and execute promissory notes, security deeds or agreements, financing statements, or 
...• 
~	 ,~. 
':;	 Page 2 of 7;~ 
•~ ': ,,'.. ~: •. :~'.: , .~ ~:""'''..'.-:-: ,~'~'. ~ ~..,.:"..,:~~ ..~.....:.~,: :o-::t.'..':"::O~.: ::,:,. ~:-:S4:;,.~::""~"~~?r....".:~~",~*;":'~;:'~~:~;'~;'~~:-.~'I~~~~~~~~=":',.~ ~~"1':r'.'''~;V-~;'~:R'.:'~~:~~.~;'tPt.~~..,'1*':~.':~.:",;,:~~· 000434
 
 €:I  €l  
": ,< ' ,:~:~:;<';(,,~; :   lI ::¥~~. :.e!";<I:r.,:"';' '~ ~'I''''':; \~{- <'~'':':::;i"w '; ~1;:':~':f"~%,,?;'~;'~~1-.~ ';;' -"1 'A'!M' >-;'~>/'''~~1 , ;,Jo(.'1,-;"~':;1,~'; " .. 
" 
'  
 
" 
.:; 
,:',\ 
" 
 
 
 
, 
 
Id  
"I U
11, ~ c .,....on c  •• "'asa, se~o~ e
x J~e 
of
I '
 
.  
appJ .
. i  
u . ,
1 ../..t. a i  
SSOCiatio
17)( a l   ,
. . '
-
; q
,
.  
 
. 
' , 
l 8 e e  
· . ,  
, . .  
 
i /; .  
. O i  
of O tr  
.   
 
.'
"
 ,'     t!' ,., :"     "::O~.: ! . ;   ,;,,!,~;:'~ :~;'~;'~~:-.~'I~~~~'~~~="="'~ '''~;V-~;'~:R: pt.~~..,'1*''!~.':~.:" ;,:~~· 
other security instruments in such fonn as the lender may request and renew said notes 
,"
• 
and security Instruments from time to time In whole or in part. To have free access at
 
,< 
'/ any time or times to any safe deposit box or vault to which I might have access.
 
hI d MF) Business operating tra".aetlons. To conduct, engage in, and£.~se ~the affairs of any and all lawful business ventures of whatever nature"or'J(~ 
." 
'..:	 that I may now or hereafter be Involved In. NlJ1/ ') 8 , .. 
,	 . ~ 200? 
"	 7tJ?!e I (G) Insurance and annuity transactions. To exercise or pe~~
 
po r, duty, right. or obligation, in regard to any contract of life, accid~~t:h~,vt:D
 
disability, liability, or other type of Insurance or any combination of insurance; and to
 
, 
,.~., 
,'(	 procure new or 'additional contracts of insurance for me snd to 'designate the beneficla'lV 
• .0' 
.',,-'	 of same;. provided, however, that my Agent cannot designate himself or herself as 
"
.~'	 beneficiary of any such Insurance contracts. ',j 
" (	 
)fJ ~ I (H) Estate, trust, and other beneficiary transacti~n•• To accept, receipt for,
 .~ release, reject, renounce, assign. disclaim, demand. sue for, claim and
 
.recover any legacy, bequest, devise, gIft or other property interest or payment due or
 
payable to or for the principal; assert any Interest in and exercfse any power over any
 
trust, estate or properly subject to fiduciary control; establish a revocable trust solely for
 
the benefit of the principal that terminatesst the death of the principal and is then
 
distributable to the legal representative of the estate of the principal; and, in general,
 
exercise all powers with respect to estates and trusts which the principal could exercise
 
if present and under no disability; provided, however, that the Agent may not make or
 
change a wi" and may not revoke or amend a trust revocable or amendable by the
 
principal or require the trustee of any trust for the benefit of the principal to pay income
 
or principal to the Agent unless specific authority to that end is given.
 
.~. 
hi l! ;J (1) Claims and litigation. To commence, prosecute, discontinue. or defend all 
~'.	 '~r other legal proceedings touchIng my property, real or personal, or any part 
thereof, or touching any matter in which I or my property, real or personal, may be in 
any way concerned. To defend, settle, adjust, make allowances, compound, submit to 
,.~	 arbHration. and compromise all accounts, reckonings,claims, and demandswhatsoever
 
that now are, or hereafter shall be, pending between me and any person, finn,
 
corporation, or other legal entity, in such manner and in all respects as my Agent shall
 
deem proper. . . . .
f~ 
,. 
',' 
.. ~ m<J) Personal and family maintenance. To hire accountants, attorneys at law, 
conSUltants, clerks, physicians, nurses, agents, servants, workmen, and others and to 
remove them, and to appoint others In their place, and to pay and arlow the persons so 
'''',	 employed such salaries. wages, or other remunerations, as my Agent shall deem 
:~': proper.:~ 
.. . . 
?J1 f1 I' 
~ 
(K) Benefits from Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid. or other 
". 
'~ental programs, or military service. To prepare, sign and file any claim or· 
'application for Social Security, unemployment or military servfcebenefrts; sue for, settle . 
~:~ 
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,or abandon any claims to any benefit or assistance under any federal, state, local or 
foreign statute or regulation; control, deposit to any account, collect, receiptfor, and 
" 
take title to and hold all benefits under any Social Security, unemployment, military IF 
.,;. 
/"service or other state, federal, local or foreign statute or regUlation; and, in general, ,:> 
exercise al/ powers with respect to Social Security, unemployment, military service, and 
,.)"
governmental benefits. Including but not limited to Medioare and Medicai'd, which the l:' 
principal could exercise if present and under no disability. 
Jt (/; I'(L)Retirement plan transaGtfons. to contribute to, withdraw from and 
detosit funds in any type of retirement plan (which term includes, without limitation, any 
tax qualified or nonquallfled pension, profit sharing, stock bonus, employee savings and 
other retirement plan, individual retirement account, deferred compensation plan and 
any other type of employee benefit plan); select and change payment options for the 
principal under any retirement plan; make rollover contributions from any retirement 
plan to othenetirement plans or Individual retirement accounts; exercise all investment 
powers available under any type of self-direeted retIrement plan; and, in general, 
exercise all powers with respect to retirement plans andretjrement plan account 
balances which the principal could If present and under no disability. 
'JfJ,d, / (M) Tax matters. To prepare. to make elections, to execute and to file all tax, 
~urity, unemployment insurance, and informational returns required by the laws 
of the United States, or of any state or subdivisIon thereof, or of any foreign 
govemment; to prepare, to execute, and to file all other papers and instruments wtllch 
the Agent shall think to be desirable or necessary for safeguarding of me against 
excess or illegal taxation or against penalties imposed for claimed violation of any law or 
other governmental regulation; and to pay, to compromise. or to contest or to apply for 
refunds in connection with any taxes or assessments for which I am or may be liable. 
InIJ ;1 (N) ALL OF THE POWERS LISTED ABOVE. YOU NEED NOTLtt~(jL ANY 
Oi1iERUNES IF YOU rNITIAL LINE (N). '. ,L',f, 
, NOV 
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: , , ' " , J:i." :2 8 2007 
,,'"
ON THE FOLLOWING LINES YOU MAY GIVE SPECIAL INSTRUCT~g~l_G ~~ OR EXTENDING THE POWERS GRANTED TO YOUR AGENT. ' , 
'-: 
.: 
.. ' 
,,'i'
.:: 
:~ 
.~. ~ .
",:~ . 
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.
.... 
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.:~ 
,': 
.- 'ud? 
.~". THIS POWER OF ATTORNEY IS EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY AN ~AtDNIINUE 
UNTIL IT IS REVOKED. . . • vr::O 
THIS POWER OF ATTORNEY SHALL BE CONSTRUED AS A GENERAL DURABLE 
POWER OF ATTORNEY AND SHALL CONTINUE TO BE EFFECTIVE EVEN IF I 
BECOME DISABLED, INCAPACITATED, OR INCOMPETENT. 
(yOUR AGENT WILL HAVE AUTHORITY TO EMPLOY OTHER PERSONS AS 
NECESSARY TO ENABLE 'THE AGENT TO PROPERLY EXERCISE THE POWERS 
GRANTED IN THIS FORM, BUT YOUR AGENT WILL HAVE TO MAKE ALL 
DISCRETIONARY DECISIONS. IF YOu. WANT TO GIVE YOUR AGENT THE RIGHT 
TO DELEGATE DISCRETIONARY DECISION-MAKING POWERS TO OTHERS, YOU 
SHOULD KEEP THE NEXT SENTENCE, OTHERWISE IT SHOULD BE STRICKEN.) 
Authority to Delegate. My Agent shall have the right by written Instrument to delegate 
any or all of the foregoing pOwers involving discretionary decision-making to any person 
.or persons whom my Ag~nt may select, but suoh delegation may be amended or 
revoked by any agent Oncludlng any successor) named byrne who is acting under this 
power of attomey at the time of reference. . 
(yOUR AGENT WILL BE ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT FOR ALL REASONABLE 
EXPENSES INCURRED IN ACTING UNDER THIS POWER OF ATTORNEY. STRIKE 
OUT THE NEXT SENTENCE IF YOU DO NOT WANT YOUR AGENT TO ALSO BE 
ENTITLED TO REASONABLE COMPENSATION FOR SERVICES AS AGENT;) 
Right to CompensatIon. My Agent shall be entitled to rea$onable compensation for 
services renderecl as agent under this power of attorney. . . 
(IF YOU WISH TO NAME SUGCESSOR AGENTS, INSERT THE NAME(S) AND 
ADDRESS(ES) OF SUCH SUCCESSOR(S) IN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH.)
 
"
 Successor Agent. If any Agent named by me shall die, become Incompetent, resign or 
refuse to accept the office of Agent, I name the following (each toac! alone and 
successively, In the order named) as successor(s) to such Agent: 
.. 
Steven A. Perry 3215 Targee, Boise, Idaho 83705 
,
, BarbarEil MoCormlck 2525 Joretta Drive, Boise, Idaho 83704 
Choice of Law. THIS POWER OF ATTORNEY WILL BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS. 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO WITHOUT REGARD FOR CONFLICTS OF LAWS 
PRINCIPLES. IT WAS EXECUTED IN THE STATE OF IDAHO AND IS INTENDED TO 
" 
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BE VALID IN ALL JURISDICTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND ALL
 
FOREIGN NATIONS.
 
I am fully informed as to an the contents of this form and understand the x: 
full import of thIs grant of powers to my Agent. .:.' 
I agree that any third party who receives a copy of this document may act 
under it. Revocation of the power of attorney Is not effective as to a third 
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EXHIBIT "An 
The East 70 feet of Lot 111n WINeS SUBDIVISION, according to the offlctal plat thereof, filed in Book 10 of 
Plats at Page(s) 489. official records of Ada County, Idaho. 
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Supreme Court of Idaho,
 
Lewiston, April 1998 Term.
 
In the Matter of the Estate of Lionel Malcolm
 
Knudson, Deceased.
 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
 
WELFARE, Petitioner-Appellant,
 
v.
 
Barbara JACKMAN, Personal Representative for
 
the Estate of Lionel Malcolm Knudson, Respond­

ent.
 
No. 23928.
 
Nov. 2,1998.
 
Following death of Medicaid recipient and sub­
sequent death of her husband, Department of Health 
and Welfare sought allowance of a claim against 
husband's estate to recover the remaining balance 
of the Medicaid payments. W.C. Hamlett, Magis­
trate Judge, denied claim, and the District Court, 
Latah County, John R. Stegner, J., affirmed. De­
partment appealed. The Supreme Court, Johnson, 
J., held that: (I) if the estate of the individual who 
received Medicaid assistance is inadequate to repay 
the full amount of the assistance received, the De­
partment can recover the balance from the estate of 
the surviving spouse, but (2) federal law, as in ef­
fect when recipient and her husband entered into 
marital settlement agreement transmuting most of 
recipient's and husband's community property into 
separate property of husband, limited the Depart­
ment to recovering any community property recipi­
ent and husband may have accumulated after the 
agreement. 
Vacated and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
III Health 198H €=>494 
198H Health 
I98HIII Government Assistance 
I 98HIII(B) Medical Assistance in General; 
Medicaid 
198Hk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment 
of Payments 
I 98Hk494 k. Estate of Aid Recipient, 
Recovery From. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 356Ak24 1.70) 
Health 198H ~495 
198B Health 
198HIII Government Assistance 
198HIII(B) Medical Assistance in General; 
Medicaid 
198Hk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment 
of Payments 
198Hk495 k. Spouse of Aid Recipient, 
Recovery From. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 356Ak24 1.70) 
If the estate of the individual who received Medi­
caid assistance is inadequate to repay the full 
amount of the assistance received, the Department 
of Health and Welfare can recover the balance from 
the estate of the surviving spouse. I.C. § :56-218. 
12) Statutes 361 €=>188 
361 Statutes 
361 VI Construction and Operation 
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
361 k 187 Meaning of Language 
361 k188 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Plain meaning of a statute will prevail unless 
clearly expressed legislative intent is contrary or 
unless plain meaning leads to absurd results. 
13) Health 198H ~494 
198H Health 
I98HIII Government Assistance 
I98HIII(B) Medical Assistance in General; 
Medicaid 
198Hk490 Recovery Back or Rt:coupment 
of Payments 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. CASES 
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198Hk494 k. Estate of Aid Recipient, 
Recovery From. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 356Ak24 1.70) 
Health 198H €=495 
198H Health 
I98HIII Government Assistance 
198HIlI(B) Medical Assistance in General; 
Medicaid 
I98Hk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment 
of Payments 
]98Hk495 k. Spouse of Aid Recipient, 
Recovery From. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 356Ak24 1.70) 
Federal statute regarding recovery of Medicaid as­
sistance, as in effect when husband's guardian 
signed marriage settlement agreement on March 8, 
1993, transmuting most of husband's and wife's 
community property and the income from that 
property into separate property of husband, pre­
cluded Department of Health and Welfare from re­
covering from husband's estate the Medicaid assist­
ance that wife had received and that Department 
had not recovered from wife's estate, except De­
partment could recover any community property 
husband and wife may have accumulated after the 
agreement. Social Security Act, § 1917(b)(I )(B), 
(b)(4), (e)(I)(B), as amended, 42 U.S.C.(l994 Ed.) 
§ 1396p(b)(I)(B), (b)(4), (e)(l)(B); I.C'. §§ 
15-1-201(15),32-906(1),56-218(4). 
**7 *214 Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; 
W. Corey Cartwright, Deputy Attorney General, 
Boise, for Appellant. W. Corey Cartwright argued. 
WiIliam C. Kirsch, Moscow, for Respondent. 
SUBSTITUTE OPINION THE COURT'S PRI­

OR OPINION DATED JUNE, 16, 1998, IS
 
HEREBY WITHDRAWN.
 
JOHNSON, Justice. 
This is a Medicaid recovery case. We conclude that 
section 56-218(1) of the Idaho Code (I.C.), as it ex-
Page 2 
isted at times applicable to this case, authorized the 
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (the De­
partment) to recover from the available estate of a 
surviving spouse the balance of Medicaid payments 
received by an individual who was fifty-five years 
old or older when receiving the payments if the in­
dividual's estate is inadequate to repay the entire 
amount. We conclude, however, that federal law 
applicable to this case prohibited this recovery, ex­
cept from any community property the spouses may 
have accumulated after a marriage settlement 
agreement transmuting their community property 
into separate property of each. We remand for fur­
ther proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
I. 
THE BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEED­
INGS 
Barbara Jackman ( Jackman) was the niece of an 
elderly couple, Hildor and Lionel Knudson (the 
Knudsons). Jackman was also Hildor's guardian and 
held a durable power of attorney for Lionel. On be­
half of the Knudsons, Jackman signed a "Marriage 
Settlement Agreement" (the agreement) on March 
8, 1993. The agreement transmuted most of the 
Knudsons' community property into Lionel's separ­
ate property. By the agreement, Hildor received as 
her separate property her personal property and 
household effects in her possession, her irrevocable 
burial trust, and $1,900 in cash. The purpose of the 
agreement was to make Hildor eligible for Medi­
caid assistance. Hildor received $41,600.55 in 
Medicaid payments (the Medicaid payments) prior 
to her death on October 27, 1994. 
After Hildor's death, Jackman collected Hildor's es­
tate pursuant to the procedures for small estates 
contained in I.C. § 15-3-120 I. After paying Hildor's 
funeral expenses and legal fees, Jackman delivered 
the balance of Hildor's estate, $1,638.03, to the De­
partment on August 10, 1995. The Department ac­
cepted this as a partial settlement of its claim for re­
© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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covery of the Medicaid payments. 
Lionel died two weeks after Hildor on November 
II, 1994. After Lionel's death, Jackman initiated 
probate proceedings for his estate and became Li­
onel's personal representative. Lionel's estate was 
valued at $40,798.35. The Department sought al­
lowance of a claim against Lionel's estate to recov­
er the remaining balance of the Medicaid payments 
(the balance of the Medicaid **8 *215 payments). 
Jackman objected to the Department's claim. 
The magistrate judge denied the Department's claim 
against Lionel's estate because Hildor had an estate, 
and the Department received the remainder of the 
estate after expenses. The Department appealed to 
the district judge, who affirmed the magistrate 
judge's decision. The Department appealed. 
II. 
I.C. § 56-218 AUTHORIZED RECOVERY OF
 
THE BALANCE OF THE MEDICAID PAY­

MENTS FROM LIONEL'S ESTATE.
 
[1] The Department asserts that I.C. § 56-218, as it 
existed at times applicable to this case, authorized 
recovery of the balance of the Medicaid payments 
from Lionel's estate. We agree. 
I.e. § 56-218 provides that medical assistance "paid 
on behalf of an individual who was fiftyfive (55) 
years of age or older when the individual received 
such assistance may be recovered from the estate, 
or if there be no estate the estate of the surviving 
spouse, if any, shall be charged for such aid paid to 
eitherorboth...."I.C. § 56-218(\). 
[2] In George W Watkins Family v. Messenger, 
118 Idaho 537. 797 P.2d 1385 (\990), the Court 
pointed out: "The plain meaning of a statute will 
prevail unless clearly expressed legislative intent is 
contrary or unless plain meaning leads to absurd 
results." ld. at 540, 797 P.2d at 1388. 
If we were to read I.C. § 56-218(\) not to allow re­
covery from Lionel's estate of the balance of the 
Medicaid payments because there was $1,638.03 in 
Hildor's estate, our reading would be contrary to 
expressed legislative intent and would lead to 
"absurd results." ld. This reading would mean that 
if the estate of a spouse who received Medicaid as­
sistance had even one cent, or a toothbrush, the De­
partment could collect nothing from the estate of 
the surviving spouse. As acknowledged by Jack­
man's attorney at the oral argument of this case, this 
reading of the statute would mean that there is no 
circumstance in which the legislative intent to re­
cover from the estate of a surviving spouse would 
be fulfilled. This result is contrary to the expressed 
legislative intent that the Department recover from 
the estate of the surviving spouse under some cir­
cumstances. The statute should not be read as pre­
venting recovery from the surviving spouse's estate 
even if the recipient's estate is inadequate for the 
full recovery of Medicaid payments. 
From this analysis we conclude that the correct 
reading of I.C. § 56-218( I) is that if the estate of 
the individual who received Medicaid assistance is 
inadequate to repay the full amount of the assist­
ance received, the Department can recover the bal­
ance from the estate of the surviving spouse. Stated 
in terms of the circumstances of this cas~:, when the 
Department received the balance of Hildor's estate, 
there was "no estate" of Hildor remaining from 
which the Department could recover the balance of 
the Medicaid payments. 
III. 
FEDERAL LAW PREEMPTS THE AUTHOR­
ITY GRANTED TO THE DEPARTMENT BY 
I.C. § 56-218 TO RECOVER FROM LIONEL'S 
ESTATE, EXCEPT FROM ANY COMMUNITY 
PROPERTY OF LIONEL AND HILDOR. 
[3J Jackman asserts that federal law applicable to 
this case does not permit recovery from Lionel's es­
© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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tate. We agree, except to the extent of any com­
munity property Lionel and Hildor accumulated 
after the agreement. 
The pertinent portions of 42 U.S.C. § 
I396p(b)(l)(B) and (4), as enacted in 1993, 
provide, as follows: 
(b) Adjustment or recovery of medical assistance 
correctly paid under a State plan 
(I) No adjustment or recovery of any medical as­
sistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual 
under the State plan may be made, except that the 
State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any med­
ical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an indi­
vidual**9 *216 under the State plan in the case of 
the following individuals: 
(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years 
of age or older when the individual received such 
medical assistance, the State shall seek adjustment 
or recovery from the individual's estate, but only 
for medical assistance consisting of­
(I) nursing facility services, .... 
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term 
"estate", with respect to a deceased individual­
(A) shall include all real and personal property and 
other assets included within the individual's estate, 
as defined for purposes of State probate law; .... 
This amended statute applied to Medicaid payments 
for calendar quarters beginning on or after October 
1,1993. Pub.L. 103-66, § 13612(d). 
I.e. § 15-1-20 I (15) defines "estate," as follows: " 
'Estate' means all property of the decedent, includ­
ing community property of the surviving spouse 
subject to administration, property of trusts, and 
property of any other person whose affairs are sub­
ject to this code as it exists from time to time dur­
ing administration." The agreement, in addition to 
transmuting the community property Lionel re­
ceived into his separate property, contained the fol­
lowing provision: 
3. We further specifically agree that the income, 
rents, issues, profits, capital gains, and other earn­
ings or increases on our separate property as de­
scribed above and the proceeds from any disposi­
tion thereof constitute the separate property of the 
person owning such property and are: not com­
munity property. The forgoing [sic] also shall apply 
to all property that may be separately acquired 
hereafter by either of us in any manner whatsoever. 
As authorized by I.C. § 32-906(1), this provision 
maintained the separate character of the assets 
transmuted into Lionel's separate property by the 
agreement, as well as "the income, rents, issues, 
profits, capital gains, and other earnings or in­
crease" on this separate property. The agreement 
did not prevent the accumulation of other com­
munity property by Lionel and Hildor after the date 
of the agreement and before Hildor's death. The re­
cord before us does not disclose whether Lionel and 
Hildor had any community property at Ithe time of 
Hildor's death. If they did, Lionel's interest in that 
community property may be part of Lionel's estate, 
and may therefore be part of Hildor's "estate" that 
42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(I)(B) and (4) authorizes the 
Department to recover and apply against the bal­
ance of the Medicaid payments. 
The Department contends that 42 V.S.c. § 
I396p(e)(1 )(B), enacted in 1993, broadens the 
"assets" from which it may recover the balance of 
the Medicaid payments. This portion of the federal 
law provides, as follows: 
(e) Definitions 
In this section, the following definitions shall ap­
ply: 
(I) The term "assets", with respect to an individual 
includes all income and resources of the individual 
and of the individual's spouse, including any in­
© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
000443
-
\ 
-
-
-
-
-
C J  
-
-
-
-
-
. -
-
-
-
(\
.
-
-
-
I 
-
U ~
1  I 
-
-
970 P.2d 6 
132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6 
(Cite as: 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6) 
come or resources which the individual or such in­
dividual's spouse is entitled to but does not receive 
because of action­
(B) by a person, including a court or administrative 
body, with legal authority to act in place of or on 
behalf of the individual or such individual's spouse, 
We conclude that this definition of "assets" is not 
applicable to the agreement, which Jackman signed 
on behalf of Lionel and Hildor on March 8, 1993. 
The definition of "assets" contained in the 1993 
amendments to the federal statute does not apply 
"with respect to assets disposed of on or before the 
date of the enactment of this Act [Aug. 10, 1993]." 
Pub.L. 103-66, § 13611(e). Therefore, it does not 
apply to the agreement and does not allow the De­
partment to recover the balance of the Medicaid 
payments from Lionel's separate property. This is 
true even though 42 U.S.c. § I396p(b)(4), which 
applies to Medicaid payments for calendar quarters 
beginning on or after October I, 1993, authorizes 
the Department to recover the Medicaid payments 
from "other assets." Without the definition of 
"assets" contained **10 *217 in 42 lJ.S.e. § 
1396p(e)(I), "other assets" are only those included 
within Hildor's estate, as defined by I.C. § 
15-1-20 I(15). Lionel's separate property, including 
the community property transmuted by the agree­
ment, is not part of Hildor's estate. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
We vacate the magistrate judge's denial of the De­
partment's claim against Lionel's estate and remand 
the case to the magistrate judge for further proceed­
ings consistent with this opinion. 
We do not address Jackman's contention that pursu-
Page 5 
ant to I.e. § 15-3-720 she is entitled to receive from
 
Lionel's estate her necessary expenses and disburse­

ments including reasonable attorney fee:s. This is a
 
question the magistrate judge must consider on re­

mand.
 
We award no costs or attorney fees on appeal.
 
TROUT, C.J., and SILAK, SCHROEDER and
 
WALTERS, JI., concur.
 
Idaho, 1998.
 
Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Jackman
 
132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6
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Page 1 
Supreme Court of North Dakota.
 
In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Verna M.
 
WIRTZ, Deceased.
 
North Dakota Department of Human Services,
 
Claimant and Appellant,
 
v.
 
Vernon Caroline, as Personal Representative of the
 
Estate of Verna Wirtz, deceased, Respondent and
 
Appellee.
 
No. 990275.
 
March 21, 2000.
 
Department of Human Services petitioned for al­
lowance of claim against widow's estate for Medi­
caid benefits paid for benefit of husband prior to his 
death. The District Court, Mountrail County, North­
west Judicial District, Robert W. Holte, J., denied 
department's claim, and department appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Neumann, J., held that any assets 
conveyed by husband to his widow before his death 
and traceable to widow's estate were subject to de­
partment's recovery claim. 
Reversed and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
[11 Appeal and Error 30 €='842(1) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k838 Questions Considered 
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether 
Questions Are of Law or of Fact 
30k842(1) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Interpretation of a statute is a question of law, 
which is fully reviewable by the Supreme Court. 
121 Statutes 361 C=181(1) 
361 Statutes 
361 VI Construction and Operation 
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
361 k180 Intention of Legislature 
36lk 181 In General 
36IkI81(1) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
The primary objective of statutory construction is 
to ascertain the legislature's intent. 
131 Statutes 361 C=188 
361 Statutes 
361 VI Construction and Operation 
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
361 k187 Meaning of Language 
361kl88 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
In ascertaining legislative intent, thf: Supreme 
Court looks first at the words used in Ithe statute, 
giving them their ordinary, plain-language mean­
ing. 
141 Statutes 361 €;=205 
361 Statutes 
361 VI Construction and Operation 
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
361 k204 Statute as a Whole, and Intrinsic 
Aids to Construction 
361k205 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Statutes 361 C=206 
361 Statutes 
361 VI Construction and Operation 
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
361 k204 Statute as a Whole, and Intrinsic 
Aids to Construction 
361 k206 k. Giving Effect to Entire 
Statute. Most Cited Cases 
The Supreme Court construes statutes as a whole to 
give effect to each of their provisions, whenever 
fairly possible. 
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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.,,..;' 
151 Statutes 361 €==212.7 
361 Statutes 
361 VI Construction and Operation 
361 VT(A) General Rules of Construction 
361 k212 Presumptions to Aid Construc­
tion 
361k212.7 k. Other Matters. Most 
Cited Cases 
If the language of a statute is clear and unambigu­
ous, the legislative intent is presumed clear from 
the face of the statute. 
16) Statutes 361 €=>214 
361 Statutes 
361 VI Construction and Operation 
361 VT(A) General Rules of Construction 
36 tk213 Extrinsic Aids to Construction 
361k214 k. Tn General. Most Cited 
Cases 
If statutory language is ambiguous, the Supreme 
Court may resort to extrinsic aids to construe the 
statute. 
(7) Health 198H €=>495 
198H Health 
198HI1I Government Assistance 
I98HITI(B) Medical Assistance in General; 
Medicaid 
198Hk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment 
of Payments 
198Hk495 k. Spouse of Aid Recipient, 
Recovery From. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 356Ak241.70) 
Any assets conveyed by husband to his widow be­
fore his death and traceable to widow's estate were 
subject to recovery claim by state Department of 
Human Services for Medicaid benefits paid for be­
nefit of husband prior to his death; however, separ­
ately-owned assets in widow's estate, or assets in 
which husband never held interest, were not subject 
to department's claim for recovery. Social Security 
Act, §1917(b), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396p(b) 
; NDCC 50-24.1-07. 
18) Health 198H €==495 
198H Health 
I98HIII Government Assistance 
198HIII(B) Medical Assistance in General; 
Medicaid 
198Hk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment 
of Payments 
198Hk495 k. Spouse of Aid Recipient, 
Recovery From. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 356Ak241.70) 
Recovery from a surviving spouse's separately­
owned assets because of a past obligation to pay a 
now-deceased Medicaid recipient's medical ex­
penses as necessaries, or recovery from the surviv­
ing spouse's entire estate, including assets not trace­
able from the recipient, is not allowed. Social Se­
curity Act, §1917(b), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 
1396p(b); NDCC 50-24.1-07. 
191 Health 198H €==503(2) 
198H Health 
198HlII Government Assistance 
198HllI(B) Medical Assistance in General; 
Medicaid 
198Hk499 Administrative Procl~edings 
198Hk503 Evidence 
198Hk503(2) k. Presumptions and 
Burden of Proof. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 356Ak241.115) 
As the claimant seeking recovery from widow's es­
tate for Medicaid benefits paid for bene:fit of hus­
band prior to his death, the Department of Human 
Services bore the initial burden of showing traceab­
ility of those assets it sought recovery against. So­
cial Security Act, §19I7(b), as amended, 42 
U.S.C.A. § I396p(b); NDCC 50-24.1-07. 
*883 Blaine L. Nordwall, Special Assistant Attor­
ney General, Bismarck, for claimant and appellant. 
Shane C. Goettle of McGee, Hankla, Backes & 
Dobrovolny, Minot, for respondent and appelIee. 
NEUMANN, Justice. 
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(Cite as: 607 N.W.2d 882) 
['\I 1] The North Dakota Department of Human Ser­
vices appeals from the trial court's order denying 
the department's claim against Verna M. Wirtz's es­
tate for Medicaid benefits paid by the department 
for the benefit of Clarence Wirtz. We reverse and 
remand. 
['\I 2] Clarence Wirtz and Verna Wirtz married in 
1943. In July 1996, Clarence Wirtz began receiving 
Medicaid benefits to pay for nursing home care. 
Clarence Wirtz continued to receive benefits until 
his death on August 24, 1997. Clarence Wirtz was 
over age fifty-five and married to Verna Wirtz at all 
times he received benefits. The parties stipulated 
Clarence Wirtz received $53,635.83 in benefits. 
Clarence Wirtz's estate was not probated at his 
death. 
['\I 3] Verna Wirtz died on September 21, 1998. 
Vernon Caroline was appointed Personal Repres­
entative of the estate. On November 18, 1998, the 
department filed a claim against Verna Wirtz's es­
tate for $55,977.93, seeking reimbursement for be­
nefits paid to Clarence Wirtz, plus interest. On 
January 11, 1999, Caroline denied the claim. On 
January 22, 1999, the department petitioned the tri­
al court for allowance of the claim. A hearing was 
held on April 12, 1999. The department argued 
Verna Wirtz's entire estate was subject to recovery 
because Clarence Wirtz had a marital or equitable 
interest in all of her property at his time of death. 
Caroline moved to dismiss. The trial court denied 
the department's claim, rendering the motion for 
dismissal moot. The trial court determined "[n]one 
of the property in the Verna Wirtz Estate is prop­
erty Clarence had any legal title or interest in at the 
time of his death." The department appeals. 
['\I 4] The department argues the trial court erred, as 
a matter of law, by interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 
1396p(b) and N.D.C.C. § 50-24.1-07 as not allow­
ing recovery for past Medicaid benefits paid to 
Clarence Wirtz from Verna Wirtz's entire estate. 
The department contends 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) al­
lows recovery of equitable interests, a marital estate 
interest in the surviving spouse's entire estate, a 
homestead interest, and a legal interest in the sur­
viving spouse's obligation to pay for the Medicaid 
recipient's medical care as a necessary. Caroline ar­
gues the trial court did not err because any asset not 
transferred by the Medicaid recipient at death to the 
surviving spouse through joint tenancy, tenancy­
in-common, survivorship, life estate, or living trust 
is not subject to recovery, even if the asset was 
transferred only hours before the recipient's death. 
We disagree with both parties' arguments. 
['\I 5] 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b) limits a stat~:'s power to 
recover Medicaid benefits, providing: 
*884 (b) Adjustment or recovery of medical assist­
ance correctly paid under a State plan 
(I) No adjustment or recovery of any medical as­
sistance correctly paid on behalf of an indi­
vidual under the State plan may be made, ex­
cept that the State shall seek adjustment or re­
covery of any medical assistance correctly paid 
on behalf of an individual under the State plan 
in the case of the following individuals: 
(B) In the case	 of an individual who was 55 years 
of age or older when the individual received 
such medical assistance, the State shall seek 
adjustment or recovery from the individual's 
estate, ... 
(2) Any adjustment or recovery under pamgraph (1) 
may be made only after the death of the indi­
vidual's surviving spouse, if any, ... 
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the tt:rm 'estate 
" with respect to a deceased individual ­
(A) shall include all real and personal property and 
other assets included within the individual's 
estate, as defined for purposes of State pro­
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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bate law; and 
(B)	 may include, at the option of the State ... any 
other real and personal property and other as­
sets in which the individual had any legal 
title or interest at the time of death (to the 
extent of such interest), including such assets 
conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the 
deceased individual through joint tenancy, 
tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, 
living trust, or other arrangement. 
Id. (emphasis added); see Estate o/Thompson, 1998 
ND 226, 586 N.W.2d 847. 
[~ 6] Section 50-24.1-07, N.D.C.C., using broader 
language, fully implements 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) 
and provides: 
I.	 On the death of any recipient of medical assist­
ance who was fifty-five years of age or older 
when the recipient received the assistance, and on 
the death of the spouse of the deceased recipient, 
the total amount of medical assistance paid on 
behalf of the recipient following the recipient's 
fifty-fifth birthday must be allowed as a preferred 
claim against the decedent's estate.... 
2.	 No claim must be paid during the lifetime of the 
decedent's surviving spouse, if any, nor while 
there is a surviving child who is under the age of 
twenty-one years or is blind or permanently and 
totally disabled, but no timely filed claim may be 
disallowed because of the provisions of this sec­
tion. 
[~ 7] We rely on 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) to provide 
the meaning of N.D.C.C. § 50-24.1-07 because the 
federal statute limits the situations in which the 
states can recover Medicaid benefits from the sur­
viving spouse's estate. Estate of Thompson, at ~~ 
8-11; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396p(b)(I) and I396a(a)(I 8). 
We must, therefore, interpret 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) 
to determine which assets in Vema Wirtz's estate 
are subject to recovery. 
[1](2][3][4][5][6] [~8] In Estate of Thompson, we 
explained our statutory analysis process. 
Interpretation of a statute is a question of law, 
which is fully reviewable by the Court. Jensen v. 
North Dakota Workers Compo Bureau. 1997 ND 
107, ~ 9,563 N.W.2d 112. 
The primary objective of statutory construction is 
to ascertain the Legislature's intent. Effertz v. 
North Dakota Workers' Camp. BlII"eau, 481 
N.W.2d 218, 220 (N.D.1992). In ascertaining le­
gislative intent, we look first at the words used in 
the statute, giving them their ordinary, plain­
language meaning. Shiek V. North Dakota Work­
ers Compo Bureau, 1998 ND 139, ~ 16, 582 
N.W.2d 639. We construe statutes as a whole to 
give effect to each of its provisions, whenever 
fairly possible. *885County of Stutsman V. State 
Historical Society, 371 N.W.2d 321, 325 
(N.D.1985). "If the language of a statute is clear 
and unambiguous, the legislative int,~nt is pre­
sumed clear from the face of the statute." A.fed­
center One, Inc. V. North Dakota Slate Bd. of 
Pharmac.v, 1997 ND 54,'1 13,561 N.W.2d 634. 
If statutory language is ambiguous, we may resort 
to extrinsic aids to construe the statute Hassan v. 
Brooks. 1997 ND 150, ~ 5,566 N.W.2e1 822. 
Estate of Thompson, at ~~ 6-7. 
[~9] Under 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(4)(B), the operat­
ive language provides Medicaid benefits can be re­
covered from: 
[R]eal and personal property and other assets in 
which the individual had any legal title or interest 
at the time of death (to the extent of such in­
terest), including such assets conveyed to a sur­
vivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual 
through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, sur­
vivorship, life estate, living trust, or other ar­
rangement. 
[~ 10] The parties stipulated Verna Wirtz is a sur­
vivor, heir, or assign of Clarence Wirtz, and Clar­
ence	 Wirtz had not transferred or conveyed any 
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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property or other assets he had any legal title or in­
terest in at the time of his death to Verna Wirtz 
through joint tenancy, tenancy-in-common, surviv­
orship, life estate, or living trust. Our inquiry, 
therefore, is narrowed to whether Clarence Wirtz 
had "real and personal property and other assets in 
which [he] had any legal title or interest at the time 
of death, including such assets conveyed" to Verna 
Wirtz through "other arrangement." 
[~ II] Under 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(e)(l), asset IS 
defined as: 
(l) The term "assets", with respect to an individual, 
includes all income and resources of the individu­
al and of the individual's spouse, including any 
income or resources which the individual or such 
individual's spouse is entitled to but does not re­
ceive because of action­
(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse, 
(B) by a person, including a court or administrative 
body, with legal authority to act in place of or on 
behalf of the individual or such individual's 
spouse, or 
(C)	 by any person, including any court or adminis­
trative body, acting at the direction or upon the 
request of the individual or such individual's 
spouse. 
See Idaho Department of Health and WelJare v. 
Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6, 9 (Jd.1998) 
(concluding the definition does not apply to assets 
disposed of on or before August 10, 1993). 
[~ 12] Thus, the department can assert a claim 
against real or personal property, and other assets in 
which Clarence Wirtz had any legal title or other 
interest at his death, including income and assets 
conveyed through "other arrangement." This has 
been interpreted to include community property 
FN I and homestead interests. Bucholt: v. Belshe, 
114 F.3d 923, 927-28 (9th Cir.1997) (including 
community property interests because they are in­
cluded in the state's definition of "estate" and re­
mained liable for the decedent's debts); EstaTe of 
Rhodes, 148 Misc.2d 744, 561 N.Y.S.2d 344, 346 
(N.Y.1990) (including homestead interests). Recov­
ery under 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) is not limited to as­
sets in the surviving spouse's estate that the Medi­
caid recipient had legal title to and conveyed 
through joint tenancy, tenancy-in-comrnon, surviv­
orship, life estate, or living trust. Such an interpret­
ation would ignore the words "interest" and "other 
arrangement." However, on this point, the statute's 
language and meaning are not clear. See Estate of 
Thompson, at ~~ 11-14. The words "interest" and 
"other arrangement" are ambiguous. We, therefore, 
resort to extrinsic aids to ascertain the legislative 
intent. Id. at ~ 7. 
FNI. North Dakota is not a community 
property state. American Standard Life and 
Ace. Ins. Co. v. Speros, 494 N.W.2d 599, 
606 (N.D. 1993). 
[~ 13] In Estate of Thompson, we determined the 
Congressional committee reports*886 on 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396p(b) revealed an intent to allow states a wide 
latitude in seeking Medicaid benefit recoveries. Id. 
at ~ 14. 
"Allowing states to recover from the estates of per­
sons who previously received assistance furthers 
the broad purpose of providing for the medical 
care of the needy; the greater amount recovered 
by the state allows the state to have more funds to 
provide future services." Belshe v. Hope, 33 
Cal.AppAth 161, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 917, 925 
(CaI.Ct.App.1995). That broad purpose is 
furthered more fully by allowing states to trace a 
recipient's assets and recover them from the es­
tate ofa recipient's surviving spouse. ... 
We conclude consideration of all the relevant 
statutory provisions, in light of the Congressional 
purpose to provide medical care for the needy, re­
veals a legislative intention to allow states to 
trace the assets of recipients of medical assist­
ance and recover the benefits paid when the re­
cipient's surviving spouse dies. 
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Id. at ~~ 14-15 (emphasis added). 
[7][8] [~ 14] We hold any assets conveyed by Clar­
ence Wirtz to Verna Wirtz before Clarence Wirtz's 
death and traceable to her estate are subject to the 
department's recovery claim. However, the recover­
able assets do not include all property ever held by 
either party during the marriage. Cf Estate I~f Johe, 
590 N.W.2d 162, 166 (Minn.Ct.App.1999). 42 
U.S.c. § 1396p(b) contemplates only that assets in 
which the deceased recipient once held an interest 
will be traced. It does not provide that separately­
owned assets in the survivor's estate, or assets in 
which the deceased recipient never held an interest, 
are subject to the department's claim for recovery. 
Thus, recovery from a surviving spouse's separ­
ately-owned assets because of a past obligation to 
pay a now deceased Medicaid recipient's medical 
expenses as necessaries, or recovery from the sur­
viving spouse's entire estate, including assets not 
traceable from the recipient, is not allowed. 
[9] [~ 15] On the limited record before us, traceable 
assets could minimally include Clarence Wirtz's 
transferred interest in the Granada House and his 
interest in a land contract for deed dated March 22, 
1977. However, unless the department can show 
traceability, assets subject to recovery would not in­
clude Verna Wirtz's solely-owned home interior 
business, automobile, bank account, and miscel­
laneous personal property. As the claimant, the de­
partment bears the initial burden of showing trace­
ability. See Sorum v. Schwartz. 411 N.W.2d 652, 
654 (N.D.1987) (providing "one who asserts the ex­
istence of a fact material to an issue in a case as­
sumes the burden of proof'). We remand to allow 
the department the opportunity to present evidence 
concerning asset traceability. 
[~ 16] We reverse the trial court's order and remand 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
[~ 17] GERALD W. VANDE WALLE, c.J., 
MARY MUEHLEN MARING, DALE V. SAND­
STROM, CAROL RONNING KAPSNER, n., con­
cur. 
N.D.,2000. 
In re Estate of Wirtz 
607 N.W.2d 882, 2000 ND 59 
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Intermediate Court of Appeals ofHawai'i.
 
Blossom Joshua KUNEWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
 
and
 
Gladys K. Brash, Lorraine K. Daniel and Doris K.
 
Farm, Plaintiffs,
 
v.
 
Isaac K. JOSHUA, Jr., aka Isaac Kahele Joshua, Jr.,
 
Defendant-Appellant.
 
No. 16229.
 
Aug. 28, 1996. 
In suit challenging conveyances of virtually all 
principal's property by agent to himself under 
power of attorney, the First Circuit Court ruled that 
agent exceeded authority, imposed constructive 
trust on conveyed assets, and awarded punitive 
damages. Agent appealed. The Intermediate Court 
of Appeals, Watanabe, J., held that: (I) general 
power of attorney did not authorize agent to make 
gifts to himself; (2) plaintiffs attorney fees could 
be considered when computing amount of punitive 
damages; but (3) admitting evidence of agent's re­
fusal to comply with court order for return of prop­
erty was error. 
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
II] Appeal and Error 30 ~863 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k862 Extent of Review Dependent on 
Nature of Decision Appealed from 
30k863 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Order granting summary judgment is reviewed on 
appeal under same standard applied by trial court. 
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 56(c). 
Page I 
12] Judgment 228 €==181(8) 
228 Judgment 
228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding 
228k 181 Grounds for Summary Judgment 
228k 181(5) Matters Affecting Right to 
Judgment 
228kI81(8) k. Ambiguity in Written 
Instrument. Most Cited Cases 
Where construction of written instrument is at issue 
in lawsuit, preliminary question of whether instru­
ment is ambiguous is question of law that may be 
resolved on summary judgment. 
13] Judgment 228 €==181(18) 
228 Judgment 
228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding 
228k 181 Grounds for Summary Judgment 
228k181(l5) Particular Cases 
228k 181 (18) k. Brokers or Agents, 
Cases Involving. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 228kI8I(l5.1)) 
If language of power of attorney is clear and mean­
ing of instrument can be readily ascertained from 
words used, legal effect and construction of instru­
ment are questions of law properly resolved on 
summary judgment disposition. 
141 Principal and Agent 308 C:=97 
308 Principal and Agent 
308III Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons 
308III(A) Powers of Agent 
308k95 Express Authority 
308k97 k. Construction of Letters or 
Powers of Attorney. Most Cited Cases 
Fundamental rule in construing power of attorney 
document is that intent of parties governs, as 
gleaned from entire context of instrument. 
15J Principal and Agent 308 €==103(10) 
308 Principal and Agent 
308III Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons 
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308III(A) Powers of Agent 
308k98 Implied and Apparent Authority 
308k I OJ Purchases, Sales, and Con­
veyances 
308k I03( 10) k. Purpose and Terms 
of and Consideration for Sale or Conveyance. Most 
Cited Cases 
Agent lacks authority to make gift of principal's 
property, unless authority is expressly given in 
power of attorney. 
[61 Principal and Agent 308 €==69(1) 
308 Principal and Agent 
308II Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities 
3081I(A) Execution of Agency 
308k69 Individual Interest of Agent 
308k69(1) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Principal and Agent 308 €==103(10) 
308 Principal and Agent 
308III Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons 
308IT1(A) Powers of Agent 
308k98 Implied and Apparent Authority 
308k103 Purchases, Sales, and Con­
veyances 
308k I03(1 0) k. Purpose and Terms 
of and Consideration for Sale or Conveyance. Most 
Cited Cases 
Agent may not gratuitously convey principal's 
property to himself absent express written authoriz­
ation in power of attorney. 
f7I Evidence 157 €==385 
157 Evidence 
157XI Parol or Extrinsic Evidence Affecting 
Writings 
I57XI(A) Contradicting, Varying, or Adding 
to Terms of Written Instrument 
157kJ85 k. Writings Excluding Extrinsic 
Evidence in General. Most Cited Cases 
Extrinsic evidence of principal's intent to allow 
agent to make gifts to himself or herself is not ad­
missible when power of attorney does not expressly 
authorize gift to agent. 
181 Principal and Agent 308 €==69(1) 
308 Principal and Agent 
308II Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities 
308II(A) Execution of Agency 
308k69 Individual Interest of Agent 
308k69(1) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Principal and Agent 308 €==103(10) 
308 Principal and Agent 
308III Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons 
308III(A) Powers of Agent 
308k98 Implied and Apparent Authority 
308k I03 Purchases, Sales, and Con­
veyances 
308k 103(10) k. Purpose and Terms 
of and Consideration for Sale or Conveyance. Most 
Cited Cases 
Oral authorization from principal is insufficient to 
prevent agent to make gift to himself or herself; 
written documentation of principal's clear intent in 
power of attorney is required. 
[91 Principal and Agent 308 €==69(1) 
308 Principal and Agent 
308II Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities 
308II(A) Execution of Agency 
308k69 Individual Interest of Agent 
308k69(1) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Principal and Agent 308 €z;;)103(10) 
308 Principal and Agent 
308TII Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons 
308III(A) Powers of Agent 
308k98 Implied and Apparent Authority 
308k I03 Purchases, Sales" and Con­
veyances 
308k 103(10) k. Purpose and Terms 
of and Consideration for Sale or Conveyance. Most 
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Cited Cases 
General grant of authority in power of attorney, to 
perform every act that principal could, did not au­
thorize agent to make gift of principal's property to 
himself, to exclusion of principal's other children. 
110) Principal and Agent 3081£:=79(9) 
308 Principal and Agent 
30811 Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities 
30811(A) Execution of Agency 
308k79 Actions for Negligence or Wrong­
ful Acts of Agent 
308k79(9) k. Judgment and Measure of 
Damages. Most Cited Cases 
Attorney fees incurred by plaintiff could be con­
sidered when determining amount of punitive dam­
ages to award against agent who used power of at­
torney to make unauthorized gifts to himself of vir­
tually all of principal's property to exclusion of 
principal's other children; attorney fees provide 
meaningful standard for guiding jury when award­
ing punitive damages. Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 908 comment. 
[II) Damages 115 ~87(1) 
J J5 Damages 
J 15V Exemplary Damages 
115k87 Nature and Theory of Damages Ad­
ditional to Compensation 
1 15k87( I) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Purpose of punitive damages award is to punish de­
fendant for aggravated or outrageous misconduct 
and to deter defendant and others from similar con­
duct in future, rather than to compensate plaintiff. 
112) Principal and Agent 3081£:=79(5) 
308 Principal and Agent 
30811 Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities 
308Il(A) Execution of Agency 
308k79 Actions for Negligence or Wrong­
ful Acts of Agent 
308k79(5) k. Evidence. Most Cited 
Cases 
Agent's refusal to comply with order directing re­
turn of principal's assets which agent conveyed to 
himself, in excess of authority granted under power 
of attorney, was irrelevant to agent's state of mind 
when conveyances were made and, thus, admitting 
evidence on issue of punitive damages was error. 
**560 *66 Syllabus by the Court 
The circuit court correctly ruled that a defendant 
exceeded his authority when the defendant used a 
general power of attorney from his mOlther to gift 
substantially all of her property to himself, to the 
exclusion of his four sisters. The clear and unam­
biguous language of the power of attomey did not 
expressly authorize the defendant to make a gift to 
himself, and we will not construe any broad, all­
encompassing grants of power to the defendant un­
der the power of attorney to confer thl: power to 
make a gift. 
The circuit court properly instructed the jury that it 
could consider the plaintiffs reasonable attorney 
fees in computing the amount of punitive damages. 
The instruction provided objective guidance to the 
jury in calculating the amount of punitive damages, 
thus allowing punitive damages to be more accur­
ately measured and decreasing the potential for an 
arbitrary and abusive punitive damages award. Ad­
ditionally, the instruction helped to em.ure that a 
plaintiff entitled to punitive damages can be made 
truly whole as a result of a defendant's wrongful 
and malicious act. 
The circuit court erred, however, in admitting evid­
ence at trial of the defendant's refusal to comply 
with a partial summary judgment order directing 
the defendant to return to the administrator of his 
mother's estate the assets he had wrongfully con­
veyed to himself. Such evidence was irrelevant to 
the defendant's state of mind at the time he al­
legedly committed fraud in conveying his mother's 
property to himself. Since the jury's award of punit­
ive damages may have been based on the foregoing 
evidence, we remand this case for a new trial on 
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punitive damages.
 
Edward Y. N. Kim, Kim & Kim, on the briefs,
 
Honolulu, for defendant-appellant.
 
Carroll S. Taylor (Taylor, Leong & Chee, of coun­
sel), on the brief, Honolulu, for plaintiff-appellee. 
Before BURNS,; C.J., WATANABE and HEEN, JJ.,
FNRECUSED.
FN'" On October 6, 1993, Circuit Judge 
Marie N. Milks was assigned to sit with 
the judges of the Hawai'i Intermediate 
Court of Appeals, temporarily, in place of 
then Associate Judge Walter M. Heen, who 
was recused from this case. Judge Hccn 
subsequently retired on October 30, 1994. 
WATANABE, Judge. 
This lawsuit arises out of a dispute over whether 
Defendant-Appellant Isaac K. Joshua, Jr., also 
known as Isaac Kahele Joshua, Jr. (Defendant), ex­
ceeded his authority when he used a general power 
of attorney from his mother, Rose K. Joshua 
(Mother), to gift substantially all of Mother's prop­
erty to himself, to the exclusion of his four sisters, 
Gladys K. Brash (Gladys), Lorraine K. Daniel 
(Lorraine), Doris K. Farm (Doris), and Plaintiff­
Appellee Blossom Joshua Kunewa (Plaintiff) FNI 
(collectively, Sisters). 
FNI. This lawsuit was filed by Plaintiff­
Appellee Blossom Joshua Kunewa 
(Plaintiff) against Defendant-Appellant 
Isaac K. Joshua, Jr., also known as Isaac 
Kahele Joshua, Jr., (Defendant) on March 
16, 1988. On December 20, 1988, Gladys 
K. Brash (Gladys), Lorraine K. Daniel 
(Lorraine), and Doris K. Farm (Doris) 
moved to intervene in the lawsuit as 
plaintiffs, and their motion was granted on 
April 17, 1989. In the meantime, however, 
on December 29, 1988, Plaintiff filed a 
motion for partial summary judgment 
which was granted on July 14, 1989. Be­
cause the intervention was granted after 
Plaintiffs motion for partial summary 
judgment had been filed, a question arose 
as to whether the partial summary judg­
ment could be entered in favor of Gladys, 
Lorraine, and Doris, in addition to 
Plaintiff. To obviate this question, Gladys, 
Lorraine, and Doris stipulated with De­
fendant that they would dismiss with preju­
dice the prosecution of their cla:ims against 
Defendant, but that Plaintiffs claims for 
"payment of rents and proceeds.," "fraud," 
and "willful, wanton and callous disregard 
of ... trust" would be tried. Gladys, Lor­
raine, and Doris also agreed to be bound 
by the judgment entered by the circuit 
court on the issues that were tried. 
**561 *67 Defendant appeals from the First Circuit 
Court's: (I) July 14, 1989 order granting partial 
summary judgment in Plaintiffs favor, which con­
cluded that Mother's power of attorney did not au­
thorize Defendant to convey Mother's property to 
himself without consideration and which directed 
Defendant to hold all property so transferred as 
constructive trustee for the beneficiaries of Moth­
er's estate (Partial Summary Judgment Order); (2) 
June 9, 1992 Amended Judgment based upon a spe­
cial jury verdict, awarding Plaintiff $34,670.10 in 
special damages and $95,000 in punitive damages 
(Amended Judgment); and (3) April 26, 1991 Order 
Denying Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of 
[the February 4, 1991 Order Denying] Defendant's 
Motions for (A) Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict, (B) Reconsideration of Ordell Denying 
Motion for Directed Verdict and (C) New Trial 
(April 26, 1991 Order). 
We (1) affirm the Partial Summary Judgment Or­
der, (2) affirm that part of the Amended Judgment 
which awarded Plaintiff special damages, vacate 
that part of the Amended Judgment which awarded 
Plaintiff punitive damages, and remand for a new 
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trial on the punitive damages issue, and (3) vacate 
the April 26, 1991 Order. 
BACKGROUND 
Mother was the widow of Isaac Joshua, Sr. 
(Father), who died on January 9, 1963. On Septem­
ber 15, 1947, both Mother and Father executed 
wiIls, bequeathing their individual estates to the 
other, and in the event of the death of the survivor, 
then in equal shares to their five children-Plaintiff, 
Defendant, Gladys, Lorraine, and Doris. 
In 1980, Mother was hospitalized for medical prob­
lems. After she was released from the hospital, 
Mother asked Defendant to take her to an attorney 
so that she could settle her property and business 
affairs. On June 26, 1980, Defendant took Mother 
to see attorney Matthew Pyun (Pyun), a friend of 
Defendant. At Mother's request, Pyun prepared a 
document, which Mother subsequently signed, giv­
ing Defendant a general power of attorney to man­
age Mother's affairs (June 26, 1980 power of attor­
ney). 
The June 26, 1980 power of attorney, which was re­
corded at the Hawai'i Bureau of Conveyances on 
June 27, 1980, read in relevant part, as follows: 
ROSE KAPU JOSHUA of 2105 St. Louis Drive, 
City and County of Honolulu, State of Hawaii 
[Hawai'i), 
have made, constituted and appointed and by these 
presents do make, constitute and appoint ISAAC 
KAHELE JOSHUA, JR., of86-124 Hoaha Street, 
Waianae [Wai'anae), City and County of Hon­
olulu, State of Hawaii [Hawai'i), 
my true and lawful attorney, for me in my name, 
place and stead, and for my use and benefit with 
full power and authority to do and perform every 
act, deed or thing that I might or could do if per­
sonaIly present, including without limitation, the 
following: 
* * * * * * 
2. To bargain, contract, purchase, receive and 
take real property and/or any interests therein and 
to accept the seizin and possession thereof and 
the delivery of all deeds, leases, assignments, 
agreements, options and other conveyance docu­
ments thereto, and to rent, lease, sublease, bar­
gain, sell, release, convey, mortgage, hypothec­
ate, and in every manner deal with thf: real prop­
erty I now own, and any real property I may here­
after acquire, upon such terms and conditions, 
and under such covenants as he shall think fit; 
3. To bargain and agree for, buy, sell, mortgage, 
hypothecate and in any and every way and man­
ner deal in and with goods and m'~rchandise, 
choses in action and other property in possession 
or in action; 
* * * * * * 
6. To sign, seal, execute, acknowledge and deliv­
er for me and in my name, and as my act and 
deed, such deeds, options, grants, leases, assign­
ments, covenants, indentures, agreements, mort­
gages, hypothecations, bills, checks, bonds, 
notes, receipts, evidences of debts, and such other 
**562 *68 instruments in writing of whatever 
kind and nature as may be necessary or proper in 
the premises. 
The foregoing power of attorney did not contain 
any language expressly permitting Defendant to 
make gifts of Mother's property. 
Defendant did not use the June 26, 1980 power of 
attorney to transfer title to any of Mother's property 
until the summer of 1987. On June 20, 1987, Moth­
er suffered a stroke and was hospitalized. Her treat­
ing physician, Dr. Bernard Fong (Dr. Fong), dis­
cussed with Defendant and Sisters the possibility of 
Mother not being able to live beyond thf: next four 
days. Dr. Fong also informed Defendant and Sisters 
that Mother, on the other hand, might have a pro­
longed recovery, in whieh case the cost of her care 
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
000455
-
-
-
-
-
-
I
] -
-
l
     
-
-
-
e -
-
-
.! di  
     
-
-
-
-
-
-
e
-
924 P.2d 559 Page 6 
83 Hawai'i 65, 924 P.2d 559 
(Cite as: 83 Hawai'i 65, 924 P.2d 559) 
"..,
 
and treatment could consume all of her assets. 
After the meeting with Dr. Fong, Defendant de­
cided to use the June 26, 1980 power of attorney to 
transfer all of Mother's assets to himself. Because 
Defendant initially could not locate the June 26, 
1980 power of attorney, he requested that attorney 
Blake Okimoto (Okimoto) prepare another power 
of attorney and have Mother execute it at the hos­
pital. 
Upon arrival at Mother's hospital room on June 22, 
1987, Okimoto found that Mother "was bedridden 
and unable to communicate verbally[.]" To determ­
ine whether Mother were mentally competent to ex­
ecute this second power of attorney, Okimoto ex­
plained the contents of the power of attorney docu­
ment to Mother and informed her that if she signed 
the document, she would be giving Defendant the 
ability to act on her behalf as to all property that 
she owned. Okimoto asked Mother to squeeze his 
hand if she understood what he was explaining to 
her, and Mother responded by squeezing his hand. 
Okimoto also asked Mother if it was her desire to 
convey her property to Defendant, and Mother 
again squeezed Okimoto's hand. 
Because of her physical condition, Mother was un­
able on her own to sign her name on the power of 
attorney document. Defendant, therefore, assisted 
Mother by guiding her hand to the signature line of 
the document and holding her hand steady as she 
made an "X" mark. Okimoto, who was also a not­
ary public, then signed and sealed the notarial ac­
knowledgment certificate on the document, thus 
certifying that Mother had appeared before him and 
had signed the document as her free act and deed. 
Okimoto also required Mother to sign her "X" in 
his notarial record book,FN2 which contained doc­
umentation of all notarial acts performed by 
Okimoto. Okimoto then had both Defendant and 
Defendant's wife, Maile Joshua (Maile), sign the 
power of attorney document as witnesses. He also 
required Maile and the following individuals, who 
were present in the hospital room and had wit­
nessed Mother's signing of the power of attorney 
document, to sign his record book as witnesses to 
the transaction: Doris, who would later be named as 
the personal representative of Mother's estate; Lor­
raine; and Faith Brash, Lorraine's daughter and 
Mother's granddaughter. 
FN2. Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 
456-15 (1993) requires, in part, that 
"[e]very notary public shall record at 
length in a book of records all acts, 
protests, depositions, and other things, by 
the notary noted or done in the notary's of­
ficial capacity." 
Following Mother's execution of the second power 
of attorney, Defendant located the original June 26, 
1980 power of attorney at the Bureau of Convey­
ances. Before Mother died on September 9, 1987, 
Defendant used the original power of attorney to 
transfer to himself Mother's interest in a lien-free 
home on St. Louis Drive, some real property on the 
Big Island, and some real property in California. In 
addition, Defendant put his name on the titles to 
Mother's bank accounts and car. Defendant attemp­
ted, but was not allowed, to use the power of attor­
ney to transfer Mother's common stock into his own 
name; however, he continued to use the power of 
attorney after Mother's death to negotiale Mother's 
stock dividend checks and to deposit the: same into 
his bank account. Defendant never paid Mother for 
any of the property so transferred. 
After Defendant made the foregoing transfers of 
title to Mother's property to himself, he informed 
Sisters of the transfers. He also assured them that 
they should not worry because "[i]t will all be 
equal.... When *69 **563 [M]other gets well, I will 
give everything back to [Mother]." 
After Mother's death, however, DefendaJllt changed 
his mind. At a family gathering in October 1987, 
Defendant showed Sisters a copy of Mother's will, 
the original of which was never found, and the ori­
ginal power of attorney which Mother had given 
him. Defendant then informed Sisters that Mother 
had expressed to him many times over the years of 
..~ 
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her intent to give him all of her property and that 
Mother had given him the power of attorney for 
that purpose. Defendant indicated that, in view of 
Mother's wishes, he considered all of the property 
he had transferred to himself pursuant to the power 
of attorney to be his alone. He also refused to com­
mence a probate of Mother's will or to share Moth­
er's property with Sisters in accordance with Moth­
, '11 h . FN3er s WI or t e statutes on mtestacy. 
FN3. Under the will of Rose K. Joshua 
(Mother), all of Mother's property was to 
be divided equally among her five chil­
dren. The same division of property would 
result if Mother had died intestate. HRS § 
560:2-103(1) (1993). 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On March 16, 1988, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit, al­
leging fraud and breach of trust by Defendant and 
seeking to (1) impose a constructive trust on the 
property transferred by Defendant to himself, (2) 
'lil-' 
return the transferred property to Mother's estate, 
(3) submit Mother's will to probate, (4) collect fair 
market rent from Defendant for his occupancy of 
Mother's house after the transfer, and (5) award 
Plaintiff punitive damages, attorney fees, and costs 
for Defendant's conversion of Mother's property. 
On December 29, 1988, Plaintiff filed a motion for 
partial summary judgment on two issues: (1) 
whether Mother's will should be submitted to pro­
bate; and (2) whether Defendant should be required 
to "convey to the personal representative of 
[Mother's estate] all property, real and personal, 
formerly owned by [Mother], title to which was 
conveyed into Defendant's name by Defendant act­
ing under a power of attorney given him by 
[Mother], together with any dividends, interest, 
rents, issues and profits received by Defendant 
from or on account of said property." In opposing 
the motion, Defendant provided three affidavits 
FN4 in support of his assertion that Mother had 
made several oral representations that she intended 
for Defendant to have all of her property. 
FN4. The affiants who signed the affi­
davits were as follows: Defendant; De­
fendant's wife, Maile Joshua; and Rose 
Kajioka Brash, Mother's niece. 
On July 14, 1989, the circuit court enter,ed an order 
granting Plaintiffs motion for partial summary 
judgment. In relevant part, the order r,ead as fol­
lows: 
THE COURT HEREBY FINDS: that the power 
of attorney given by [Mother] to Defendant dated 
June 26, 1980 is clear and unambiguous; and that 
said power of attorney does not contain any au­
thority for Defendant to transfer [Mother's] prop­
erty to himself, thereby effecting a gift to himself 
of her assets; 
AND THE COURT THEREFORE CON­
CLUDES: that the June 26, 1980 power of attor­
ney given by [Mother] must be strictly construed; 
that a strict reading of said power of attorney 
shows that Defendant was not empowered to 
deed over [Mother's] property to himself and 
thereby effect a gift to himself of [Mother's] as­
sets; that the affidavits submitted by Defendant 
which tend to show [Mother] wanted Defendant 
to obtain the property through the power of attor­
ney are insignificant in the light of the unambigu­
ous power of attomey strictly construe:d; that the 
affidavits submitted by Defendant are inadmiss­
ible as parol evidence and are deeml~d not ad­
missible for the Court; that Defendant holds all 
property formerly belonging to [Mother] which 
he acquired by the use of the June 26, 1980 
power of attorney and said property shall be held 
as a constructive trust for the benefit of those 
people who will take through the probate of 
[Mother's] estate[.] 
Based on the foregoing findings and conclusions, 
the circuit court ordered Defendant to deliver Moth­
er's will to Plaintiff, to hold all of Mother's property 
in constructive trust, and to not transfer or encum­
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ber the real and personal property he had trans­
ferred to himself. 
On December 19, 1990, the case proceeded to trial 
on the issue of damages. On January **564 *70 3, 
1991, the jury returned a special verdict, awarding 
Plaintiff special damages in the amount of 
"$45,671.00 less documented funeral expenses" 
and punitive damages in the amount of $95,000. 
The circuit court entered judgment for the forego­
ing amounts on February 4, 1991, and Defendant 
appealed from this judgment. However, on May 2, 
1991, Defendant's appeal was dismissed by the 
Hawai'i Supreme Court because "the judgment did 
not fully determine the amount of special damages, 
is therefore incomplete and not final, and we do not 
have jurisdiction." Thereafter, on June 9, 1992, the 
circuit court entered an amended judgment which 
determined that the amount of special damages 
awardable to Plaintiff, after deducting documented 
funeral expenses of $11,000.90, was $34,670.10. 
This appeal followed. 
Defendant argues that the circuit court committed 
reversible error in several respects. First, Defendant 
argues that the court was wrong when it granted 
Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment be­
cause a genuine triable issue of material fact existed 
as to Mother's intent in giving Defendant the power 
of attorney. Second, the court improperly instructed 
the jury that Plaintiffs attorney fees in bringing this 
lawsuit could be considered in computing the 
amount of a punitive damages award. Third, the cir­
cuit court erroneously admitted evidence of De­
fendant's refusal to comply with a prior court order 
to return Mother's assets to the administrator of 
Mother's estate. Fourth, the circuit court improperly 
allowed several of Plaintiffs witnesses to testify, 
since insufficient notice was provided to Defendant 
that the witnesses would be testifying. Finally, De­
fendant argues that the circuit court erred when it 
refused to allow Defendant to read into evidence a 
part of Plaintiffs deposition which was relevant to 
attack Plaintiffs credibility. 
DISCUSSION 
I. The Partial Summary Judgment: Whether De­
fendant Exceeded His Authority Under lhe Power 
ofAttorney 
A. Standard ofReview 
[1] On appeal, an order granting summary judgment 
is reviewed under the same standard applied by the 
trial courts. State v. Tradewinds Elec. Servo & COII­
tracting Inc., 80 Hawai'i 218, 222, 908 P.2d 1204, 
1208 (1995). Summary judgment is appropriate "if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogator­
ies, and admissions on file, together with the affi­
davits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and that the moving party is en­
titled to a judgment as a matter of law." Hawai'i 
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56(c). 
[2][3] Where the construction of a written instru­
ment is at issue in a lawsuit, the preliminary ques­
tion of whether the instrument is ambiguous is a 
question of law that may be resolved on summary 
judgment. Pelosi V. Wailea Ranch Estates, 10 
Haw.App. 424, 436, 876 P.2d 1320, 1327. cert. 
denied, 77 Hawai'i 373, 884 P.2d 1149 (1994). 
Moreover, if the language of the instrument is clear 
and the meaning of the instrument can be readily 
ascertained from the words used therein, the legal 
effect and construction of the instrument are ques­
tions of law properly resolved on summary judg­
ment disposition. Id. 
Defendant contends that the circuit court erred in 
concluding, as a matter of law, that the power of at­
torney did not authorize him to convey Mother's 
property to himself without consideration. Defend­
ant claims that because he submitted three affi­
davits which explained that Mother had intended 
that he use the power of attorney to make gifts to 
himself, a genuine issue of material fact existed as 
to the scope of his authority under the power of at­
torney, thus precluding summary judgment. We dis­
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agree. 
B. Rules Governing Construction ofPowers ofAt­
torney 
"Powers of attorney are to be construed in accord­
ance with the rules for interpretation of written in­
struments generally; in accordance with the prin­
ciples governing the law of agency; and, in the ab­
sence of proof to the contrary, in accordance with 
the prevailing laws relating to the act authorized." 3 
AmJur.2d Agency § 30, at 533-34 (1986). 
**565 *71 [4] The fundamental rule in construing 
written instruments is that the intent of the parties, 
as gleaned from the entire context of the instru­
ment, governs. Pelosi, 10 Haw.App. at 436, 876 
P.2d at 1327. "As long as the terms of [the instru­
ment] are not ambiguous, i.e., not 'capable of being 
reasonably understood in more ways than one,' we 
are required to interpret the terms 'according to 
their plain, ordinary, and accepted sense in common 
speech.' " Id. (quoting Cho Mark Oriental Food, 
'II"" 
Ltd. v. K & K Tnt'!, 73 Haw. 509, 520, 836 P.2d 
1057,1064(1992)). 
It is also well-established that powers of attorney 
"are subjected to a strict construction and are never 
interpreted to authorize acts not obviously within 
the scope of the particular matter to which they 
refer." Lopez v. Soy Young, 9 Haw. 113, liS (I 892) 
. As explained in F.A!. Stigler, Tnc. 1'. HN.C. Re­
a/~v, 595 S.W.2d 158, 161 (Tex.Civ.App.), rev'd on 
other grounds, 609 S.W.2d 754 (Tcx.1980), 
when authority is conferred upon an agent by a 
formal, written instrument, such as a power of at­
torney, the authority given the agent will be 
strictly construed so as to exclude any authority 
not specifically set forth, except authority neces­
sary to effectuate the purpose of the authority 
granted. 
(Emphasis added.) 
[5] Accordingly, it is well-settled that an agent 
lacks authority to make a gift of the principal's 
property unless that authority is expressly given by 
the language of the power of attorney. Kaname 
Fujino v. Clark, 71 F.Supp. 1,4 (D.Haw.1947) (to 
authorize gift of asset by agent, the agent must have 
such a power expressly and clearly conf.erred; even 
if principal intended to make a gift to agent, if 
power of attorney lacked express language author­
izing gift, no gift could be made), affa; 172 F.2d 
384 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 937, 69 S.Ct. 
1512,93 L.Ed. 1743, reh'g denied, 338 U.S. 839, 
70 S.Ct. 34, 94 L.Ed. 513 (1949); Aiello v. Clark, 
680 P.2d 1162, 1166 (Alaska 1984) (in absence of 
express authority to make a gift, none may be 
made); Johnson v. Fraccacreta, 348 So.2d 570, 572 
(F1a.App.1977) (agent has no power to make a gift 
of his principal's property unless that power is ex­
pressly conferred upon the agent by the instrument 
or unless such power arises as a necessary implica­
tion from the powers which are expressly con­
ferred). 
[6] Moreover, courts have routinely held that in the 
absence of express written authorization, an agent 
may not gratuitously convey the principal's prop­
erty to himself. See, e.g., Hodges v. Surratt. 366 
So.2d 768 (Fla.App.1978) (agent exceeded author­
ity in appropriating for agent's own use fiJnds in de­
cedent principal's checking account in the absence 
of clear language to that effect in the power of at­
torney). cert. denied 376 SO.2d 76 (Fla.1979); Tn re 
Estate of DeBelardino, 77 Misc.2d 253, 352 
N.Y.S.2d 858, 863 (Sur.Ct.l974) (power of attor­
ney, no matter how broadly drawn, cannot be held 
to encompass an authorization to attorney-in-fact to 
make gift to himself of principal's property; such a 
gift carries with it a presumption of impropriety and 
self-dealing, a presumption which can be overcome 
only with the clearest showing of principal's intent 
to make the gift), affd, 47 A.D.2d 589, 363 
N.Y.S.2d 974 (1975). 
[7][8] Where a power of attorney do(:s not ex­
pressly authorize the attorney-in-fact to make gifts 
to himself or herself, extrinsic evidence of the prin­
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cipal's intent to allow such gifts is not admissible. 
An attorney-in-fact may not make a gift to himself 
or herself unless there is clear intent in writing from 
the principal allowing the gift. Oral authorization is 
not acceptable. McCarter 1'. Willis. 299 S.C. 198, 
383 S.E.2d 252, 253 (App.1989). 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained 
the policy reasons underlying the rule prohibiting 
extrinsic evidence as follows: 
When one considers the manifold opportunities 
and temptations for self-dealing that are opened 
up for persons holding general powers of attor­
ney-of which outright transfers for less than value 
to the attorney-in-fact [himself or] herself are the 
most obvious-the justification for such a flat rule 
is apparent. And its justification is made even 
more apparent when one considers the ease with 
which such a rule can be accommodated by prin­
cipals and their draftsmen. 
Estate of Casey v. Comm'r ofIntemal Revenue, 948 
F.2d 895, 898 (4th Cir. 1991 ). 
**566 *72 We now examine the power of attorney 
at issue in this lawsuit according to the foregoing 
rules. 
C. The Power ofAttorney in this Case 
[9] In the instant case, the power of attorney which 
Mother gave to Defendant did not expressly author­
ize Defendant to make gifts of Mother's property. 
However, it did broadly authorize Defendant to 
"perform every act, deed or thing that [Mother] 
might or could do if personally present" and to 
"bargain, contract, purchase, receive and take real 
property and/or any interests therein and to accept 
the seizin and possession thereof and the delivery 
of all deeds, leases, assignments, agreements, op­
tions and other conveyance documents ... and to 
rent, lease, sublease, bargain, sell, release, convey, 
mortgage, hypothecate, and in every manner deal 
with the real property 1 now own, and any real 
property I may hereafter acquire, upon such terms 
and conditions ... as he shall think fit. " (Emphasis 
added.) 
Defendant contends that since the power of attorney 
which Mother conferred on him was so broad, its 
language is ambiguous as to whether it authorized 
him to make gifts of Mother's property to himself. 
Therefore, the circuit court should have considered 
extrinsic evidence of Mother's intent in giving him 
the power of attorney and denied Plaintiffs motion 
for partial summary judgment. We disagree. 
"Well established rules of interpretation of powers 
of attorney dictate that broad, all-encompassing 
grants of power to the agent must be discounted." 
Mercantile Trust Co. v. Harper, 622 S.W.2d 345, 
349 (Mo.App.1981 ) (citing Restatement (Second) of 
Agency § 34, comment h (1958)). See al50 Estate of 
Casey v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 948 F.2d at 
900-0 I (where power of attorney expressly author­
ized agent to transfer principal's assels by sale, 
lease, or mortgage, but omitted any reference to the 
power of transfer by gift, the expansive language of 
the power of attorney would be interpreted to con­
fer only those incidental, interstitial powers neces­
sary to accomplish objects as to which authority has 
been conferred and not to confer power to make a 
gift). 
Three reasons are mentioned for the application of 
the foregoing doctrine: 
First, the power to make a gift of the principal's 
property is a power that is potentially hazardous 
to the principal's interests. Consequently, this 
power will not be lightly inferred from broad, all­
encompassing grants of power to the agent. Ac­
cordingly, the agent must be circumspe'ct with re­
gard to the powers created-or the lack of them. 
Second, the main duty of an agent is loyalty to 
the interest of his principal.... Thus, in exercising 
granted powers under a power of attorney, the at­
torney in fact is bound to act for the be,llefit of his 
principal and must avoid where possible that 
which is detrimental unless expressly author­
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ized.... 
Third, it would be most unusual for an owner of 
property to grant a power of attorney authorizing 
the attorney in fact to give his property away. If a 
person has decided to make a gift of property, he 
or she usually decides as to who is going to be 
the donee. 
King v. Bankerd, 303 Md. 98, 492 A.2d 608, 613 
(1985) (citations, quotation marks, and brackets 
omitted). 
In Kaaukai v. Anahu, 30 Haw. 226 (1927), the 
Hawai'i Supreme Court held that a power of attor­
ney broadly authorizing an agent to "grant, bargain 
and sell" on behalf of the principal "any land in the 
Territory of Hawaii [Hawai'i] belonging to [him or] 
her or in which [he or] she might have an interest" 
did not confer authority on the agent to give the 
land away. Id. 
In the present case, we similarly conclude that the 
clear and unambiguous language of the general 
power of attorney given by Mother to Defendant 
did not authorize Defendant to make a gift to him­
self of Mother's property. Therefore, the circuit 
court correctly ruled as a matter of law that Defend­
ant lacked authority to make a gift of Mother's 
property to himself and properly granted Plaintiffs 
motion for partial summary judgment. 
**567 *73 II. The Punitive Damages Award 
In its charge to the jury, the circuit court gave the 
following instruction regarding how punitive dam­
ages should be calculated: 
If you allow punitive damages in this case then in 
assessing such damage you may take into consid­
eration the following items: (I) such amount as 
will deter defendant from such future conduct; 
(2) an amount as shall be an example to others 
and deter them from such conduct; (3) [t]he 
probable and reasonable expense of the litigation 
including attorney's fees, expert witness fees and 
the inconvenience and time involved in preparing 
for trial [.] The amount should not be so small as 
to be trifling nor so large as to be unjust, but such 
as candid and dispassionate minds can approve as 
a punitive example and as a warning to others 
against a similar lapse of duty. 
(Emphasis added.) 
[10] Defendant contends that the circuit court com­
mitted reversible error when it instructed the jury 
that attorney fees are an element of punitive dam­
ages. Defendant points out that the "longstanding 
rule of Hawai'i law" is that "no attorney fees may 
be awarded as damages or costs unless so provided 
by statute, stipulation or agreement" and no statute, 
stipulation, or agreement authorized the imposition 
of attorney fees in this case. Therefore, Defendant 
contends, the court's instruction provided an indir­
ect means for Plaintiff to obtain compensation for 
attorney fees where none was allowed by law. 
We find no error in the circuit court's instruction. 
A. The Law ofPunitive Damages in Hawai'i 
[II] The purpose of a punitive damages award in 
Hawai'i is not to compensate the plaintiff, but 
rather, to punish the defendant "for aggravated or 
outrageous misconduct and to deter the defendant 
and others from similar conduct in the future." Ma­
saki v. General J\.-[otors Corp., 71 Haw. 1, 6, 780 
P.2d 566, 570, reconsideration denied, 71 Haw. 
664, 833 P.2d 899 (1989). In order to recover punit­
ive damages, the plaintiff "must prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that the defendant has acted 
wantonly or oppressively or with such malice as 
implies a spirit of mischief or criminal indifference 
to civil obligations, or where there has been some 
wilful misconduct or that entire want of I;are which 
would raise the presumption of a conscious indif­
ference to consequences." I d. at 16-17, 780 P.2d at 
575. 
The Hawai'i Supreme Court has instructed that "the 
proper measurement of punitive damages should be 
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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'[t]he degree of malice, oppression, or gross negli­
gence which forms the basis for the award and the 
amount of money required to punish the defend­
ant.... , " Kang v. Harrington, 59 Haw. 652, 663, 
587 P.2d 285, 291 (1978) (quoting Howell v. Asso­
ciated Hotels, 40 Haw. 492, 501 (1954». However, 
no Hawai'i case has specifically addressed the 
question of whether a plaintiffs attorney fees may 
be considered (n determining the amount of punit­
. d FN5Ive amages. 
FN5. In Masaki v. General Motors Corp., 
71 Haw. 1,780 P.2d 566, reconsideration 
denied, 71 Haw. 664, 833 P.2d 899 (1989), 
the Hawai'i Supreme Court observed in 
dicta that "[o]ther purposes for imposing 
punitive damages which have been recog­
nized by courts and commentators include 
preserving the peace; inducing private law 
enforcement; compensating victims for 
otherwise uncompensable losses; and pay­
ing the plaintiffs attorneys' fees." 71 Haw. 
at 8 n. 2, 780 P.2d at 571 n. 2 (emphasis 
added; citation omitted). 
B. Attorney Fees as an Element ofPunitive Dam­
ages in Other Jurisdictions 
Courts in other jurisdictions disagree on whether a 
jury, or a judge sitting as fact finder, may consider 
a plaintiffs attorney fees or other litigation costs in 
determining an award of punitive damages. See An­
notation, Attorneys' Fees or Other Expenses ofLit­
igation as Element in Measuring Exemplary or 
Punitive Damages, 30 A.L.R.3d 1443 (1970). 
Several jurisdictions refuse to allow a jury to con­
sider reasonable attorney fees in measuring an 
award of punitive damages, reasoning that (1) such 
fees are compensatory in **568 *74 nature and 
therefore not a proper consideration in measuring a 
punitive damages award, or (2) the jury ought to 
have unfettered discretion in deciding the amount 
of punitive damages subject only to a trial court's 
remittitur if it deems the award excessive. See, e.g., 
Viner v. Untrecht, 26 Cal.2d 261, 158 P.2d 3 (1945) 
; Kinane v. Fay. III N.J.L. 553, 168 A. 724 (1933); 
International Elecs. Co. v. N.s. T. Metal Prods. Co., 
370 Pa. 213, 88 A.2d 40 (1952); Earl v. Tupper. 45 
Vt. 275 (1873); Fairbanks v. Witter, 18 Wis. 287 
(1864). 
The majority ofjurisdictions, however, regularly al­
low a jury to consider attorney fees in computing 
the amount of punitive damages. See e.g., Afro­
American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649 
(D.C.Cir.1966); Marshall v. Betller, 17 Ala. 832 
(1850); Markey v. Santangelo, 195 Conn. 76, 485 
A.1d 1305 (1985); Umphrey v. Sprinkel, 106 Idaho 
700,682 P.2d 1247 (1983); Anvil Inv. Ltd. Partner­
ship v. Thornhill Condominiums, Ltd., 85 
IlI.App.3d 1108,41 III.Dec. 147,407 N.E.2d 645 
(1980); Dorris v. Miller, 105 Iowa 564, 75 N.W. 
482 (1898); Newton v. Hornblower, 224 Kan. 506, 
582 P.2d 1136 (1978); St. Luke Evangelical Luther­
an Church, Inc. v. Smith, 318 Md. 337, 568 A.2d 35 
(1990); Oppenhuizen v. Wennersten, 2 Mich.App. 
288, 139 N.W.2d 765 (1966); Central Bank of Mis­
sissippi v. Butler, 517 So.2d 507 (Miss.1987); Senn 
v. Manchester Bank of St. Louis, 583 S.W.2d 119 
(Mo.1979); Jeffries AvIan, Inc. F. Gallagher. 149 
Misc.2d 552,567 N.Y.S.2d 339 (N.Y.1991); Fre­
mont Oil Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., 26 O.O.2d 109, 
192 N.E.2d 123 (Ohio Com.PI.l963); Hofer v. Lav­
ender, 679 S.W.2d 470 (Tex.1984); Debry & Hilton 
Trave! Servs., Inc. v. Capito! Int'! Airways. Inc.. 
583 P.2d ] 181 (Utah ]978); Kemp v. Miller. 166 
Va. 661. 186 S.E. 99 (1936); Olds v. Ho.~ford, 354 
P.2d 947 (Wyo. 1960), reh'g denied, 359 P.2d 406 
(Wyo.1961 ). 
Under the majority approach, " 'attorney fees are 
not allowed as compensation [to the plaintiff] but 
rather as punishment for defendant's wrongful and 
malicious act. They are not allowed in addition to 
the sum assessed as [punitive] damages., and their 
recovery is never permitted in a separate action.... ' 
" Brewer v. Home-Stake Production Co., 434 P.2d 
at 830 (quoting 25 c.J.S. Damages § 50 (1966». 
Courts that have adopted the majority V:lew gener­
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ally reason that allowing a jury to consider the 
amount of a plaintiffs attorney fees in calculating 
punitive damages diminishes the potential for arbit­
rary and abusive punitive damages awards. In St. 
Luke Evangelical Lutheran Church, Inc. 1'. Smith. 
568 A.2d 35. for example, the Maryland Court of 
Appeals held that allowing a jury to consider reas­
onable attorney fees in determining punitive dam­
ages satisfies two seemingly disparate goals: 
First, because the jury will be offered objective 
guidance in calculating the amount of its punitive 
award, punitive damages will be more accurately 
measured and the potential for abuse decreased. 
Second, the plaintiff can be made truly whole in 
precisely those kinds of cases in which the de­
fendant's wrongful conduct is found to be at its 
most flagrant, for only in such cases are punitive 
damages warranted. 
568 A.2d at 43 (citations omitted), 
The majority view is consistent with the approach 
...., advocated by the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
(1958), The Restatement recognizes that "damages 
in a tort action do not ordinarily include compensa­
tion for attorney fees or other expenses of the litiga­
tion." Id. § 914(1), at 492. However, the Restate­
ment also states that "[i]n awarding punitive dam­
ages when they are otherwise allowable, the trier of 
fact may consider the actual or probable expense 
incurred by the plaintiff in bringing the action." Id., 
comment a, at 493, See also Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 908, comment e, at 467 (in determining 
the amount of punitive damages, the trier of fact 
can consider the extent of harm to the injured per­
son, including "the fact that the plaintiff has been 
put to trouble and expense in the protection of his 
interests, as by legal proceedings in this or in other 
suits"). 
C. Attorney Fees as an Element ofPunitive Dam­
ages in Hawai 'i 
In Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Ke/co 
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 278, 109 S.Ct. 2909, 
2922, 106 L.Ed.2d 219 (1989), the United States 
Supreme Court **569 *75 held that "the propriety 
of an award of punitive damages for the conduct in 
question, and the factors the jury may consider in 
determining their amount, are questions of state 
law." (Emphasis added.) The Court thus left the re­
sponsibility for framing guidelines for punitive 
damages awards to the states. In a cogf:nt concur­
ring opinion, however, Justice Brennan lamented 
the general lack of guidance given to juries faced 
with the responsibility of calculating a punitive 
damages award: 
Without statutory (or at least common-law) 
standards for the determination of how large an 
award of punitive damages is appropriate in a 
given case, juries are left largely to themselves in 
making this important, and potentially devastat­
ing, decision. Indeed, the jury [in Browning-Fer­
ris ] was sent to the jury room with nothing more 
than the following terse instruction: 'In determin­
ing the amount of punitive damages, ... you may 
take into account the character of the defendants, 
their financial standing, and the nature of their 
acts.' [Citation omitted.] Guidance like this is 
scarcely better than no guidance at all. I do not 
suggest that the instruction itself was illl error; in­
deed, it appears to have been a correct statement 
of [state] law. The point is, rather, that the in­
struction reveals a deeper flaw: the fact that pun­
itive damages are imposed by juries guided by 
little more than the admonition to do what they 
think is best. 
492 U.S. at 281, 109 S.Ct. at 2923 (Brennan, 1., 
concurring). 
Subsequently, in Pacijic Mut. Lije Ins. Co. v. 
Has/ip, 499 U.S. 1, III S.Ct. 1032, 113 L.Ed.2d I 
(199 I), the Court was called upon to determine 
whether a due process violation had occurred when 
an Alabama jury awarded over $800,000 in punitive 
damages against an insurer whose agent had de­
frauded an insured. The award was more than four 
times the amount of the compensatory damages 
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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award, more than two hundred times the out­
of-pocket expenses incurred by the insured, and 
greatly in excess of the fine that could be imposed 
for insurance fraud under Alabama law. 
The Court's majority initially conceded "that unlim­
ited jury discretion-or unlimited judicial discretion 
for that matter-in the fixing of punitive damages 
may invite extreme results that jar one's constitu­
tional sensibilities." 1d. at 18, III S.Ct. at 1043. 
However, the Court ultimately upheld the award, 
concluding that the award had been made pursuant 
to objective criteria and had also been subjected to 
a full panoply of procedural protections. First, the 
trial court's instructions had placed reasonable con­
straints on the exercise of the jury's discretion by 
expressly describing the retribution and deterrence 
purposes of punitive damages, requiring the jury to 
consider the character and degree of the particular 
wrong, and explaining that the imposition of punit­
ive damages was not compulsory. Second, the trial 
court had conducted a post-trial hearing to scrutin­
ize the punitive damages award. Finally, the award 
had been subject to meaningful judicial review be­
cause the Alabama Supreme Court had approved 
the verdict, on appeal, after reviewing the propriety 
of the award according to the following factors: 
(a)	 whether there is a reasonable relationship 
between the punitive damages award and the 
harm likely to result from the defendant's conduct 
as well as the harm that actually has occurred; (b) 
the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's 
conduct, the duration of that conduct, the defend­
ant's awareness, any concealment, and the exist­
ence and frequency of similar past conduct; (c) 
the profitability to the defendant of the wrongful 
conduct and the desirability of removing that 
profit and of having the defendant also sustain a 
loss; (d) the "financial position" of the defendant; 
(e) all the costs of litigation; (f) the imposition of 
criminal sanctions on the defendant for its con­
duct, these to be taken in mitigation; and (g) the 
existence of other civil awards against the de­
fendant for the same conduct, these also to be 
Page 14 
taken in mitigation. 
1d. at 21-2, III S.C!. at I045 (emphasis added). 
The Court held that the application of th{: foregoing 
standards "impose[d] a sufficiently d{:finite and 
meaningful constraint on the **570 *76 discretion 
of Alabama fact finders in awarding punitive dam­
ages [,]" and "ensure[d] that punitive damages 
awards are not grossly out of proportion to the 
severity of the offense and have some understand­
able relationship to compensatory damages." !d. at 
22, III S.C!. at 1045. The award of punitive dam­
ages, therefore, "did not lack objective criteria" and 
did not "cross the line into the area of constitutional 
impropriety." Id. at 23-4, III S.Ct. at 1046. Com­
pare BMW ofNorth America. Inc. v. Gore. 517U.S. 
559, 116 S.C!. 1589. 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996), 
where the Court struck down a $2 million punitive 
damages award against BMW of North America, 
Inc. (BMW) for having knowingly failed to tell a 
BMW automobile buyer that, at a cost of $600, it 
had repainted portions of his new $40,000 car, 
thereby lowering its potential resale value by ap­
proximately ten percent. The Court held the award 
grossly excessive in light of the following: (1) the 
low level of BMW's reprehensible conduct, (2) the 
500 to I ratio between the punitive and compensat­
ory damages awards, and (3) the difference between 
the punitive damages award and the civil or crimin­
al sanctions that could be imposed for comparable 
conduct. 
If a reviewing court may consider a plaintiffs litig­
ation expenses in evaluating the propriety of a pun­
itive damages award, we see no reason to preclude 
a jury from considering such expenses in calculat­
ing the award. Indeed, lustice O'Connor suggested 
as much in her dissent in Haslip, in which she 
strongly criticized the vagueness of the ililstructions 
concerning punitive damages provided to the jury 
and strongly urged that the same factors which the 
Court held that appellate courts could consider in 
reviewing punitive damages awards "could assist 
juries to make fair, rational decisions." 499 U.S. at 
52, III S.Ct. at 1061 (O'Connor, 1., dissenting) 
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(emphasis added). As Justice O'Connor pointed out: 
Punitive damages are a powerful weapon. Im­
posed wisely and with restraint, they have the po­
tential to advance legitimate state interests. Im­
posed indiscriminately, however, they have a 
devastating potential for harm. Regrettably, com­
mon-law procedures for awarding punitive dam­
ages fall into the latter category. States routinely 
authorize civil juries to impose punitive damages 
without providing them any meaningful instruc­
tions on how to do so. Rarely is a jury told any­
thing more specific than "do what you think 
best." 
In my view, such instructions are so fraught with 
uncertainty that they defy rational implementa­
tion. Instead, they encourage inconsistent and un­
predictable results by inviting juries to rely on 
private beliefs and personal predelictions. Juries 
are permitted to target unpopular defendants, 
penalize unorthodox or controversial views, and 
redistribute wealth. Multimillion dollar losses are 
inflicted on a whim. While I do not question the 
general legitimacy of punitive damages, I see a 
strong need to provide juries with standards to 
constrain their discretion so that they may exer­
cise their power wisely, not capriciously or mali­
ciously. The Constitution requires as much. 
Id. at 42-3, III S.Ct. at 1056 (O'Connor, J., dis­
senting). 
More recently, in Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg. 512 
U.S. 415, 114 S.Ct. 2331,129 L.Ed.2d 336 (1994), 
the Court struck down a $5 million punitive dam­
ages award by an Oregon jury which was over five 
times the amount of the plaintiffs compensatory 
damages award. The Court held that because the 
Oregon Constitution prohibited judicial review of 
the amount of punitive damages awarded by a jury, 
"unless the court can affirmatively say there is no 
evidence to support the verdict," the Oregon pro­
cedure for awarding punitive damages violated the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution. Id. at ---, 114 
S.Ct. at 2332. Dissenting, Justice Ginsburg noted 
that although Oregon did not provide for a post­
verdict review and remittitur of the amount of a 
punitive damages award, it provided several pre­
verdict mechanisms which channeled the jury's dis­
cretion more tightly than in Haslip. Significantly, 
the jury was instructed that the defendant could not 
be found liable for punitive damages unless the de­
fendant's liability were established by "clear and 
convincing evidence." FN6 **571 *77 More im­
portantly, jurors were given precise instructions de­
tailing seven substantive criteria which they could 
consider in making their award, far more guidance 
than their counterparts in Haslip received. These 
criteria resembled the seven factors against which 
the Alabama Supreme Court reviewed the punitive 
damages award in Haslip. Justice Ginsburg argued 
that 
FN6. United States Supreme Court Justice 
Ginsburg noted that in Pacific Mut. Life 
fns. Co. v. Haslip. 499 U.S. 1, 6 n. I, 111 
S.Ct. 1032, 1037 n. I. 113 L.Ed.2d 1 
(1991), the "jury was told it could award 
punitive damages if 'reasonably satisfied 
from the evidence' that the defendant com­
mitted fraud." Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 
512 U.S. 415, ---- n .4, 114 S.Ct. 2331, 
2334 n .4, 129 L.Ed.2d 336 (1994). 
requir[ing] the factfinder to apply ... objective cri­
teria [when calculating punitive damages is] more 
likely to prompt rational and fair punitive damage 
decisions than are the post hoc checks [by appel­
late courts] employed in jurisdictions following 
Alabama's pattern. 
Id. at ----, J J4 S.Ct. at 2347 (Ginsburg, J., dissent­
ing). Justice Ginsburg also remarked that " 
'application of objective criteria ensures that suf­
ficiently definite and meaningful constraints are 
imposed on the finder of filct.' " Id. (quoting 
Oberg v. Honda Motor Co., 316 Or 263, 283, 
851 P.2d 1084, 1096 (1993)). 
We agree with Justices Brennan, O'Connor, and 
Ginsburg that meaningful standards are needed to 
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guide a jury in its award of punitive damages. Ac­
cordingly, we adopt the majority view that a jury 
should be allowed to consider a plaintiffs attorney 
fees in determining the amount of a punitive dam­
ages award. We also conclude that, in the instant 
case, the circuit court's instruction to the jury to this 
effect was proper. 
III. The Circuit Court's Evidentiary Rulings 
A. Evidence ofDefendant's Refusal to Comply with 
Circuit Court's Order 
[12] At trial, the jury was repeatedly allowed to 
hear evidence about Defendant's refusal to comply 
with the circuit court's Partial Summary Judgment 
order directing Defendant to return to the adminis­
trator of Mother's estate the assets he had wrong­
fully conveyed to himself. In explaining the relev­
ance of such evidence, Plaintiffs counsel stated it 
was necessary for the jury to understand that its 
task was not to determine whether Defendant 
should return property to Mother's estate, but to as­
sess the damages caused by Defendant's breach of 
duty. Plaintiffs counsel also explained that this 
evidence was relevant to establishing that Defend­
ant's behavior was willful: 
The gist of my question, Your Honor, is the mental 
intent which I have to establish for punitive dam­
ages. My analysis of the case is that the question 
of intent breaks down into two parts post Judge 
Klein's order which is a separate element of pun­
itive damages. This disobedience of the court's 
order and pre Judge Klein's order when he-what 
is his intent in breaching his fiduciary duties as 
an attorney in fact. So what I am getting at right 
now is his disregard, callous, wanton, and wilful 
disregard of Judge Klein's order and it goes into 
the punitive damages on the post Judge Klein is­
sue. 
Defendant contends that evidence of his refusal to 
comply with the Partial Summary Judgment Order 
should have been excluded at trial. Based on Kong 
v. Harrington, 59 Haw. 652, 587 P.2d 285, we 
agree. 
In Kang, supra, the Hawai'i Supreme Court ruled 
that a non-jury award of $20,000 in punitive dam­
ages was excessive because it appeared that the trial 
court, in making its determination, improperly con­
sidered a defendant's subsequent actions in attempt­
ing to perpetrate a fraud on the court, as. well as on 
the plaintiff. 59 Haw. at 660,587 P.2d at 291. In re­
ducing the punitive damages award, the supreme 
court held as follows: 
"The proper measurement of punitive damages 
should be '[t]he degree of malice, oppression, or 
gross negligence which forms the basis for the 
award and the amount of the money required to 
punish the defendant. .. .' Howell v. Associated 
Hotels. [40 Haw. 492, 50 I (1954) ]. Further, in 
determining that degree, the analysisH 5n *78 is 
limited to an examination of defendant's state of 
mind at the time of the act. O'Harm v. Pundt, 
210 Or. 533, 310 P.2d 1110 (1957). Con­
sequently, defendant's subsequent actions and 
state of mind during trial are irrelevant." 
ld. at 663, 587 P.2d at 293. Tht: supreml~ court also 
explained that 
[t]he distinction between appellant's fraud on the 
court and his fraud on appellee is cm~ial since a 
finding of fraud on the court is unrelated to the 
fraud on appellee and will not provide a basis for 
an award of punitive damages. In assessing punit­
ive damages the trial court should haNe ignored 
appellant's fraud upon the court and looked only 
to his fraud on appellee. 
ld. at 660, 587 P.2d at 291. 
In this case, Defendant's conduct in violating the 
circuit court's Partial Summary Judgment Order is 
similarly distinguishable from Defendant's fraud 
upon Sisters and cannot form a basis for an award 
of punitive damages. While Defendant's conduct 
may appropriately subject Defendant to contempt of 
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court sanctions, such evidence is irrelevant to De­
fendant's state of mind at the time he allegedly 
committed fraud in conveying Mother's property to 
himself. 
Accordingly, the circuit court erred in allowing 
such evidence to be admitted at trial. Because the 
jury's award of punitive damages may have been 
based on the foregoing evidence, we must remand 
this case for a new trial on the punitive damages is­
sue. 
B. The Circuit Court's Other Evidentiary Rulings 
In view of our remand of this case for a new trial, 
we find it unnecessary to address Defendant's re­
maining arguments on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, we affirm the 
First Circuit Court's July 14, 1989 order granting 
partial summary judgment in Plaintiffs favor. We 
vacate that part of the June 9, 1992 Amended Judg­
ment which awarded Plaintiff 595,000 in punitive 
damages and remand this case for a new trial on the 
punitive damages issue. In all other respects, we af­
firm the June 9, 1992 Amended Judgment. In view 
of our vacatur of part of the June 9, 1992 Amended 
Judgment, we also vacate the April 26, 1991 Order 
Denying Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of 
[the February 4, 1991 Order Denying] Defendant's 
Motions for (A) Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict, (B) Reconsideration of Order Denying 
Motion for Directed Verdict and (C) New Trial. 
Hawai'i App.,1996. 
Kunewa v. Joshua 
83 Hawai'i 65, 924 P.2d 559 
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Decedent's child, who was named payee upon death 
of certificate of deposit owned by decedent, 
brought damages suit against attorney-in-fact who 
cashed certificate upon maturity. The District 
Court, Chickasaw County, James L. Beeghly, 1., 
dismissed suit and appeal was taken. The Supreme 
Court, Tcmus, 1., held that: (l) attorney-in-fact did 
not engage in self-dealing or make prohibited gift 
by cashing certificate to provide support for prin­
cipal; (2) attorney-in-fact acted in principal's best 
interests by cashing disputed mature certificate, 
rather than using other certificates of deposit which 
were subject to early withdrawal penalty; and (3) 
claim that attorney-in-fact owed fiduciary duty to 
payee as third-party beneficiary was waived. 
Affirmed. 
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make gift and owner is divested of all control and 
dominion over subject of gift. 
17J Gifts 191 €=18(2) 
191 Gifts 
191 I Inter Vivos 
191kl7Delivery 
191klR Necessity 
191 k18(2) k. Necessity of Surrender­
ing Control. Most Cited Cases 
Transfer of dominion and control, required for gift, 
must be actual transfer, rather than future interest. 
18J Gifts 191 €=30(1) 
191 Gifts 
19 II Inter Vivos 
191 k30 Gifts of Deposits in Bank 
191 k30(l) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Principal and Agent 308 €=69(1) 
308 Principal and Agent 
308H Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities 
30811(A) Execution of Agency 
308k69 Individual Interest of Agent 
308k69( 1) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Attorney-in-fact did not make gift to herself by 
cashing principal's mature certificate of deposit 
which was payable on death to another, even 
though effect of transaction was to increase princip­
al's estate and residual bequest to attorney-in-fact, 
given that principal retained dominion and control 
over certificate proceeds, attorney-in-fact's ability 
to use funds remained restricted, attomey-in-fact 
did not benefit from transaction at time it occurred, 
and certificate was cashed to provide support for 
principal. 
19) Principal and Agent 308 €=69(1) 
308 Principal and Agent 
30811 Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities 
308I1(A) Execution of Agency 
308k69 Individual Interest of Agent 
308k69( I) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Attorney-in-fact did not breach fiduciary duty by 
cashing mature certificate of deposit that was pay­
able on death to attorney's sibling, rather than using 
another certificate of deposit given that it was in 
principal's best interests to use mature certificate of 
deposit to provide needed support. 
1101 Appeal and Error 30 €=170(1) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30V Presentation and Reservation in Lower 
Court of Grounds of Review 
30V(A) Issues and Questions in Lower Court 
30k170 Nature or Subject-Matter of Is­
sues or Questions 
30k170( I) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Person named as payee on death of ce:rtificate of 
deposit, whieh attorney-in-fact cashed upon matur­
ity to support principal, waived claim that attorney­
in-fact owed payee a fiduciary duty as third-party 
beneficiary by failing to raise issue in trial court. 
*169 Christopher F. O'Donohoe, New Hampton, for 
appellant. 
Richard T. Tekippe, New Hampton, for appellee. 
Considered by McGIVERIN, C.l., and LAVOR­
ATO, SNELL, ANDREASEN, and TERNUS, 11. 
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TERNUS, Justice. 
Appellant, Mary Ann Crabtree, seeks damages res­
ulting from the cashing of a certificate of deposit in 
the name of her father, Archard A. Crabtree, and 
payable on his death to Mary Ann. This transaction 
was consummated before Crabtree's death by 
Sherry Wurzer, Mary Ann's sister and Crabtree's 
daughter, who was acting under a power of attor­
ney. Because we find no merit in Mary Ann's chal­
lenge to Sherry's action, we affirm the district court 
judgment dismissing Mary Ann's claim. 
I. Background Facts and Proceedings. 
On March 4, 1991, Crabtree deposited $20,000 in a 
one-year certificate of deposit, payable on his death 
to Mary Ann. In October 1991, Crabtree had a 
stroke. After his stroke, he had problems with bal­
ance and vision, and moved to a nursing home. 
In November 1991, Crabtree executed a plenary 
power of attorney, appointing Sherry his attorney­
in-fact. Pursuant to the power of attorney, Sherry 
had "full power and authority to manage and con­
duct alI of [Crabtree's] affairs, with full power and 
authority to exercise or perform any act, power, 
duty, right or obligation" that Crabtree had the legal 
right, power or capacity to exercise or perform. The 
appointment included the power and authority "[t]o 
open, maintain or close bank accounts, ... savings 
and checking accounts; to purchase, renew or cash 
certificates of deposit.. .." 
The cost of Crabtree's care varied depending upon 
his medical condition; expenses ran between $1600 
and $2000 per month. By March 1992, the cash on 
hand was insufficient to continue into the next 
month. At the same time, Crabtree expressed a de­
sire to purchase a $4000 burial contract and a 
$1700 monument. Crabtree's assets then consisted 
of a one-half interest in a 200-acre farm and several 
certificates of deposit. AlI of the certificates ma­
tured after March 4, 1992, except the one payable at 
death to Mary Ann. 
The district court found that in consultation with 
Crabtree and with his agreement, Sherry cashed the 
$20,000 certificate dated March 4, 1991, and placed 
the money in Crabtree's checking account. Sherry 
chose this certificate to cash because it was mature 
and the only one that could be cashed without a 
penalty for early withdrawal. She then purchased 
the burial contract and monument Crabtree wanted. 
Crabtree died in December 1992. In his will, ex­
ecuted in 1989, he appointed his daughters, Mary 
Ann and Sherry, as co-executors; any assets re­
maining after the payment of his legal obligations 
were to be distributed equally to Mary Ann and 
Sherry. At the time of his death, Crabtree still 
owned certificates of deposit in excess of $20,000. 
Mary Ann filed a claim in probate seeking $20,000. 
As noted by the district court in its ruling, had 
Sherry liquidated other certificates*170 or personal 
property of Crabtree instead of the $20,000 certific­
ate, Mary Ann would have received the $20,000 
certificate when Crabtree died. Thus, the liquida­
tion of the certificate prior to Crabtree's death in­
creased the probate estate by $20,000. As a result, 
Sherry benefits by $10,000 while Mary Ann loses 
the same amount. 
The district court dismissed MalY Ann's daim, con­
cluding Sherry did not breach her fiduciary duty to 
Crabtree. On appeal, Mary Ann argues Sherry made 
a gift to herself by cashing the $20,000 certificate 
of deposit, a power not granted to Sherry under the 
power of attorney. Alternatively, Mary Ann con­
tends Sherry breached a duty to Mary Ann under 
the power of attorney not to defeat Crabtree's 
"contractual disposition" of his property unless it 
was necessary for his support or maintenance. We 
find no merit in the first argument and conclude the 
second issue was not raised in the district court. 
Therefore, we affirm. 
II. Scope ofReview. 
[1 ][2] [3] Claims in probate are triable at law. In re 
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Estate ol Voelker, 252 N.W.2d 400, 402 (Iowa 
1977). Consequently, we review for correction of 
errors of law. Iowa R.App. P. 4. We are bound by 
the trial court's findings of fact provided they are 
supported by substantial evidence. Voelker, 252 
N.W.2e1 at 402. 
III. Did Sherry Breach her Duty to Crabtree Under 
the Power ofAttorney? 
A. Sherry did not have the power to make a gift. 
Mary Ann first asserts Sherry did not have the right 
to make gifts pursuant to the power of attorney. We 
agree. 
[4][5] "The established rule is that a power of attor­
ney must be strictly construed and the instrument 
will be held to grant only those powers which are 
specified." Bloom v. Weiser, 348 So.2d 651, 653 
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1977); accord Whitlord v. Gaskill, 
119 N.C.App. 790, 460 S.E.2e1 346, 348 (1995), 
cert. granted, 342 N.C. 197,463 S.E.2d 250 (1995) 
; see Abodeely v. CaVl'as, 221 N.W.2d 494,501-02 
(Iowa 1974) (construing power of attorney as grant­
ing only powers specified therein). Because the 
power of attorney form used by Crabtree did not 
expressly grant Sherry the power to make a gift, she 
did not have that power. See Aiello v. Clark, 680 
P.2d 1162, 1166 (Alaska 1984); Johnson v. Frac­
cacreta, 348 So.2d 570, 572 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1977) 
; In re Estate of Rolater, 542 P .2d 219, 223 
(Okla.App.1975). 
B. Sherry did not breach her duty to Crabtree un­
der the power ofattorney. Mary Ann argues that by 
cashing the $20,000 certificate and thereby increas­
ing the probate estate, Sherry made a gift to herself. 
We disagree. 
[6][7] We have held in other contexts a gift is made 
when the donor has a present intention to make a 
gift and divests himself "of all control and domin­
ion over the subject of the gift." Taylor v. Grimes, 
223 Iowa 821, 826, 273 N.W. 898,901 (1937); see 
Kirchner v. Lenz, 114 Iowa 527, 530, 87 N.W. 497. 
498 (1901) (a gift is anything "which is voluntarily 
transferred by one person to another without com­
pensation") (emphasis added); Fender P. Fender, 
285 S.c. 260, 329 S.E.2d 430, 431 (1985) (attorney 
in fact may not use his position for his "personal 
benefit in a substantially gratuitous transaction"). 
The transfer of dominion and control must be actu­
al-a present, not a future, transfer. Reeves v. Lyon. 
224 Iowa 659, 662, 277 N.W. 749, 751 (1938); 
Jones v. Luing. 152 Iowa 276, 277, 132 N.W. 371. 
371 (1911). Here Crabtree's "dominion and control" 
over these funds was just as great after the transac­
tion as before, and Sherry's ability to use the funds 
for herself personally was just as restricted. Sherry 
benefited in no way from this transaction at the 
time it occurred. 
[8] The trial court found the $20,000 certificate was 
the only mature certificate and it was cashed to 
provide needed support to Crabtree. There is sub­
stantial evidence to support these findings. Thus, 
any benefit to Sherry was unintentional and merely 
fortuitous. There was no reason to believe at the 
time of the transaction that Sherry would profit 
from it in the future. Had Crabtree lived longer, 
eventually all his certificates would have been used 
to pay his expenses. Moreover, Crabtree was com­
petent to make *171 changes to his will, so there 
was no certainty that Sherry would eventually bene­
fit from this transaction as a beneficiary of the es­
tate. Thus, we conclude Sherry did not make a gift 
to herself by cashing the $20,000 certificate of de­
posit. 
[9] Mary Ann's real complaint is that Sh(:rry did not 
cash other certificates of deposit before she cashed 
the one payable on death to Mary Ann. As the trial 
court found, however, cashing other certificates of 
deposit would have reduced the monies available 
for payment of Crabtree's expenses because he 
would have had to pay an early withdrawal penalty. 
Thus, it would not have been in Crabtree's financial 
interest to cash a different ceJ1ificate. Sherry, as 
Crabtree's fiduciary, was required to act in his best 
interests. See Rolater, 542 P.2d at 223 ("in exer­
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cising granted powers, the attorney is bound to act 
for the benefit of his principal avoiding where pos­
sible that which is detrimental"); Fender, 285 S.c. 
260, 329 S.E.2d at 431 ("an agent must further the 
principal's interests"). Although not determinative, 
we also note Crabtree approved of Sherry's cashing 
of the certificate. 
In summary, we conclude Sherry's cashing of the 
certificate of deposit did not result in a gift to her. 
Although her interest in the estate was ultimately 
increased, there is no evidence this result was any­
thing other than fortuitous. Additionally, Sherry ac­
ted in Crabtree's best interest, and with his approv­
al, in cashing a mature certificate of deposit rather 
than one which would have required payment of a 
penalty. For these reasons, Sherry did not breach 
her fiduciary duty to Crabtree. 
IV. Did Sherry Violate a Duty to Mary Ann Under 
Crabtree's Power ofAttorney? 
[10] On appeal Mary Ann argues that Sherry owed 
her a duty under the power of attorney "much like 
the rights of a donee beneficiary under the doctrine 
of third party beneficiaries." This argument was not 
made to the district court. 
Although the district court ruled Sherry's "fiduciary 
duty was to Mr. Crabtree, not Mary Ann Crabtree," 
this statement was made in the context of discuss­
ing whether Sherry breached her fiduciary duty by 
making a gift to herself. There is nothing in the re­
cord to indicate the district court had a third­
party-beneficiary theory in mind when this state­
ment was made. At trial, Mary Ann simply claimed 
Sherry "engaged in self-dealing as [a] fiduciary and 
effectively made a gift to herself." No mention was 
made to the district court of the theory of third 
party beneficiary. 
We conclude the issue of third party beneficiary 
was not raised in the trial court. See Kanzmeier v. 
MeCoppin, 398 N.W.2d 826. 829-30 (Iowa 1987) 
("trial court ... did not mention the concept of third 
party beneficiary, nor did either party advance this 
theory in its trial brief'). Because Mary Ann did not 
present this issue at trial, it is waived. See Hagartv 
v. Dysart-Geneseo Community Sch. Dist., 282 
N.W.2d 92. 96 (Iowa 1979) ("we cannot permit her 
claim to be tried here on a theory not urged in the 
trial court"); General Expressways, Inc. v. Iowa 
Reciprocity Bd., 163 N'w.2d 413, 417 (Iowa 1968) 
(we only consider issues argued to and considered 
by the trial court). 
AFFIRMED. 
lowa,1996. 
Matter of Estate of Crabtree 
550 N.W.2d 168 
END OF DOCUMENT 
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
000472
-
 I 
-
-
-
 
-
-
-
-
  
.' 
West
'
law, 
680 P.2d 1162
 
(Cite as: 680 P.2d 1162)
 
Page 1 
Supreme Court of Alaska.
 
Donna Louise AIELLO, Appellant,
 
v.
 
Ray CLARK and Joyce Clark, Appellees.
 
No. 7468.
 
April 6, 1984.
 
As Modified May 8, 1984.
 
Daughter, individually and as coconservator of her 
mother's estate and who was also named as cotrust­
ee of her mother's inter vivos trust, sought to set 
aside an assignment to her brother by mother of be­
neficial interest in a note contained in the trust and 
purportedly assigned by mother as attorney in fact 
for daughter or, in the alternative, an award of dam­
ages. The Superior Court, Fourth Judicial District, 
Jay Hodges, J., refused to set aside the assignment 
or award damages, and daughter appealed. The Su­
preme Court, Moore, J., held that: (I) power of at­
torney granted by daughter to mother did not in­
clude power to make gifts; (2) son could not claim 
estoppel on part of daughter; (3) note in which 
daughter held a one-half interest was part of trust 
property even though trustor mother retained pos­
session of it; and (4) purported assignment was in 
violation of trust agreement. 
Reversed. 
West Headnotes 
11 J Principal and Agent 308 ~97 
308 Principal and Agent 
308m Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons 
3081lI(A) Powers of Agent 
308k95 Express Authority 
308k97 k. Construction of Letters or 
Powers of Attorney. Most Citcd Cascs 
Powers of attorney creating relationship of attorney 
in fact must be taken as prima facie evidence of 
nature of relationship between the parties; beyond 
this, burden is on contestant to show that a different 
type of association or purpose existed. 
121 Principal and Agent 308 ~97 
308 Principal and Agent 
3081lI Rights and Liabilities as to Thlird Persons 
3081lI(A) Powers of Agent 
308k95 Express Authority 
308k97 k. Construction of Letters or 
Powers of Attorney. Most Cited Cascs 
Intention of daughter in granting mother a power of 
attorney was required to be gleaned from the writ­
ten grant of power as a reasonable person reading 
the instrument would interpret it, where daughter 
failed to meet her burden to show that a different 
type of association or purpose other than an attor­
ney in fact existed. 
13\ Principal and Agent 308 ~103(7) 
308 Principal and Agent 
3081I1 Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons 
3081I1(A) Powers of Agent 
308k98 Implied and Apparent Authority 
308klO3 Purchases, Sales, and Con­
veyances 
308kl 03(7) k. Existence of Author­
ity to Sell or Convey. Most Cited Cases 
"Otherwise dispose of," as used in power of attor­
ney granting power to bargain, agree for, buy, sell, 
mortgage, hypothecate, and in any and every way 
and manner deal with and otherwise dispose of 
property, is a catchall phrase and adds nothing 
since it refers to such undescribed methods of dis­
position as may have been omitted and are in nature 
like those specifically enumerated. 
14J Principal and Agent 308 ~100(2) 
308 Principal and Agent 
3081lI Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons 
308III(A) Powers of Agent 
308k98 Implied and Apparent Authority 
308k I00 Principal's Property and Busi­
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ness 
308k I00(2) k. Lease of Property. 
Most Cited Cases 
Principal and Agent 308 ~100(3) 
308 Principal and Agent 
308IIl Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons 
308II1(A) Powers of Agent 
308k98 Implied and Apparent Authority 
308k100 Principal's Property and Busi­
ness 
308k 100(3) k. Mortgage of Prop­
erty. Most Cited Cases 
Principal and Agent 308 ~100(7) 
308 Principal and Agent 
308III Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons 
308Il1(A) Powers of Agent 
308k98 Implied and Apparent Authority 
308k I 00 Principal's Property and Busi­
ness 
308k100P) k. Forming Partnership. 
Most Cited Cases 
Power of attorney, which granted power to lease, 
bargain, and sell land upon such terms as grantee 
saw fit and to bargain, agree for, buy, sell, mort­
gage, hypothecate, and in any and every way and 
manner deal in and with other property and to 
make, do and transact all and every kind of busi­
ness of whatsoever nature and kind, did not include 
power of making gifts of property in which grantor 
had a beneficial interest; therefore, grantor/daughter 
was not bound by grantee/mother's attempted as­
signment of daughter's beneficial interest a promis­
sory note and the assignment was void. 
ISJ Gifts 191 ~6 
191 Gifts 
1911 Inter Vivos 
191 k6 k. Power to Make Gift. Most Cited 
Cases 
In absence of express authority to make a gift, none 
may be made. 
16J Principal and Agent 308 ~48 
308 Principal and Agent 
308H Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities 
308IJ(A) Execution of Agency 
308k48 k. Nature of Agent's Obligation. 
Most Cited Cases 
An agent must avoid acting to the detriment of his 
principal in absence of an explicit direction. 
17J Principal and Agent 308 ~137(1) 
308 Principal and Agent 
308IJ1 Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons 
308I1I(A) Powers of Agent 
308k 137 Estoppel to Deny Authority 
308k 137(1) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Son, who received an assignment of daughter's be­
neficial interest in certain property from his mother, 
who had been granted a power of attorney by 
daughter, could not claim estoppel on part of 
daughter, where he knew that mother hdd a power 
of attorney from daughter, he did not inquire into 
its limits, he did not pay for the assignment, and 
daughter did not benefit from it. 
18J Trusts 390 ~37.5 
390 Trusts 
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity 
390I(A) Express Trusts 
390k37.5 k. Necessity and Sufficiency of 
Delivery of Property. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 390k37 112) 
A note may be assigned to a trust merely by execu­
tion of the trust document; no endorsement is ne­
cessary where there are no challenges from a holder 
in due course and, if creator of a trust by appropri­
ate words or acts fully and completely constitutes 
himself trustee, no change of possession of the note 
is necessary. 
19J Trusts 390 ~37.5 
390 Trusts 
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity 
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3901(A) Express Trusts 
390k37.5 k. Necessity and Sufficiency of 
Delivery of Property. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 390k371/2) 
Trust was validly created and contained trustor/ 
mother's one-half interest in a note, even if mother 
retained possession of the note as trustor, where 
language of the trust showed necessary present in­
tent to create the trust, mother's capacity at that 
time was not contested, and trust agreement 
provided that property set forth in exhibit, which 
listed the note, would constitute the trust estate. 
[10) Trusts 390 ~58 
390 Trusts 
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity 
3901(A) Express Trusts 
390k58 k. Modification. Most Cited Cases 
Strict compliance with terms of trust providing that 
written notice of revocation be given by trustor/ 
mother to trustee/daughter was mandated in regard 
to mother's attempt to remove certain property from 
the trust, where mother suffered a gradual deterior­
ation of her physical and mental health, was de­
scribed as tired, forgetful, confused, and in need of 
full custodial care, was diagnosed as suffering from 
Alzheimer's disease, and was declared incompetent 
after establishment of the trust and after her attempt 
to remove the property from the trust. 
(111 Trusts 390 €=147(1) 
390 Trusts 
390II Construction and Operation 
390Il(B) Estate or Interest of Trustee and of 
Cestui Que Trust 
390k 146 Transfer of Estate or Interest of 
Cestui Que Trust 
390k 147 Express Trusts in General 
390k147(l) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Trustor/mother's attempted assignment of her bene­
ficial interest in a note contained in the trust was in 
violation of the trust, where her right to receive 
payments on the note was a trust asset, trust instru­
ment provided for her revocation upon written no­
tice to trustee/daughter and prohibited her from dis­
posing of trust property for less than adequate con­
sideration in money or money's worth, daughter 
was not notified in writing of the assignment, the 
written assignment was not directed to daughter and 
did not mention the trust, assignee did not pay for 
the assignment, and mother did not replace the note 
with any other property. 
*1164 Andrew 1. Kleinfeld, Fairbanks, for appel­
lant. 
Daniel T. Saluri, Fairbanks, for appellees. 
Before BURKE, C.J., and RABINOWITZ, MAT­
THEWS, COMPTON and MOORE, JJ. 
OPINION 
MOORE, Justice. 
Donna Aiello, individually and as co-conservator of 
the estate of Fern Palfy, appeals the judgment of the 
superior court refusing to set aside an Assignment 
of Beneficial Interest or, in the alternative, award 
damages. Palfy purported to act for herself and as 
attorney in fact for Aiello in assigning a note which 
they held as joint tenants. Aiello alleges that the as­
signment was beyond Palfy's general power of at­
torney and in violation of the Palfy Family Trust. 
We agree and reverse the judgment of the superior 
court. 
I. Factual Background 
Raymond Clark and Donna Aiello are the son and 
daughter of Fern Palfy. Donna Aiello (Aiello) 
signed a "General Power of Attorney" on Septem­
ber 9, 1968 and another one on April 16, 1974 mak­
ing Fern Palfy her attorney in fact at all material 
times. During the mid-1970s Palfy conveyed a great 
deal of property to Aiello; however, through her 
power of attorney, she retained use of the property 
and proceeds from sales of property. On March 24, 
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1976 Palfy sold a piece of real estate known as the 
brewery property to Daniel and Josephine Gaudi­
ane. The subject promissory note (Gaudiane note) 
and deed of trust were executed giving Palfy and 
Aiello undivided half interests with the right of sur­
vivorship in the lien on the brewery property. Ai­
ello had no direct input concerning the terms, con­
ditions or decisions to sell in the property transac­
tions of which she was a beneficiary. However, she 
was one of the payees on the Gaudiane note and a 
named beneficiary under the deed of trust. She was 
also very active in the efforts to collect the out­
standing debt. 
On October 20, 1976 Palfy created a trust to hold 
the Gaudiane note and other property. Palfy was 
Trustor of "The Palfy Family Trust." Palfy and Ai­
ello were named as Co-Trustees. Fern Palfy was to 
be the trust beneficiary during her life. Upon her 
death, Donna Aiello, as trustee, was to distribute 
Palfy's residence to Ray Clark and his daughter 
Joyce and the remainder of the Trust property to 
herself. The property placed in the Trust, to the ex­
tent it still exists, is administered pursuant to the 
Trust Agreement. 
On April 21, 1979, Palfy, purporting to act indi­
vidually and as attorney in fact for Aiello, signed an 
Assignment of Beneficial Interest. The assignment 
attempted to transfer the Gaudiane note from Palfy 
and Aiello to Ray and Joyce Clark. Daniel Gaudi­
ane and Attorney Eugene Belland jointly prepared 
the documents. Palfy signed the instrument in the 
presence of Gaudiane and his notary friend, John 
Rowlett. 
Under the assignment, Palfy retained a life estate 
and the Clarks took the remainder interest. Aiello 
was completely divested of her interest. According 
to the instrument, the assignment was "in consider­
ation of love and affection, and other good and 
valuable considerations, in hand paid ..." 
Clark testified that Palfy told him she was "going to 
do it for what she owed me, *1165 money she 
owed...." However, Clark regarded the promissory 
notes representing the money owed as outstanding, 
and therefore, he did not release Palfy from the ob­
ligations in consideration of the interest in the 
Gaudiane note. Furthermore, Clark testJified he did 
not learn of the assignment until April 30, 1979 and 
testified he did not pay anything for it at that or any 
other time. 
Aiello revoked the powers of attorney in August 
1979 when she learned Palfy had granted Gaudiane 
a two-year extension on t~e note, which was at that 
. $12 000 . FN 1tIme , III arrears. 
FN1. Unaware of the assignment which 
purported to divest her of any interest, Ai­
ello traveled to Fairbanks in the summer of 
1979 to begin foreclosure proceedings 
against the Gaudiane note. Shf: learned at 
this time that in April, Palfy, individually 
and as Aiello's attorney in fal;t, had ex­
ecuted a modification of Deed of Trust and 
Promissory Note moving the due date for 
the $12,000 installment from March 1978 
(over a year past due) to March 1981 (two 
years hence). 
Aiello testified she did not learn of the assignment 
to the Clarks until October 1981. On May 8, 1979, 
just a week after he first learned of the assignment, 
Clark testified that he told Aiello about the assign­
ment. She testified that he did not explain the trans­
action to her. Neither Clark nor Palfy (nor anyone 
else) ever sent Aiello a copy of the assignment or 
aw"written notice of the termination of her interest. 
F - On April 13, 1982, six months after learning 
of the assignment, Aiello filed suit individually and 
as co-conservator of the estate of Fern Palfy
FN3 ' 
against the Clarks. 
FN2. In fact, Aiello received a document 
prepared by the Clarks' attorney dated July 
16, 1981 titled Declaration of Default 
which she was requested to sign as benefi­
ciary and as co-conservator for Fern Palfy, 
beneficiary under the Gaudiane 1I10te. 
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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FN3. Mrs. Palfy was declared incompetent 
and Ray Clark and Donna Aiello were 
named as co-conservators based upon a 
hearing and a petition filed with the superi­
or court dated June 24, 1980. According to 
trial testimony, Palfy, age 75, suffered a 
gradual deterioration of her physical and 
mental health between the mid-1970s and 
1980. She was described as tired, forgetful, 
confused, and in need of full custodial 
care. She was diagnosed as suffering from 
Alzheimer's disease. 
II. Powers ofAttorney 
Aiello argues that Palfy, under the provisions of the 
powers of attorney acted outside the scope of her 
authority when she made a gift of Aiello's half in­
terest in the Gaudiane note to the Clarks without 
her knowledge or consent. The Clarks argue that 
the powers of attorney were held by Palfy to protect 
her equitable interest in the property and, as such, a 
gift was authorized. They further argue that Aiello 
had no more than bare legal title, and thus no 
agency relationship was ever created. 
[1][2] The powers of attorney granted by Aiello in 
1968 and 1974 were general. These were not gran­
ted in consideration of being named as payee on the 
Gaudiane note in 1976. The instruments creating 
the relationship must be taken as prima facie evid­
ence of its nature. "The intention of the donor or 
grantor is to be gathered from the instrument of cre­
ation." Brown v. Laird, 291 P. 352, 353 (Or.1930) 
citing 49 C.J. §§ 34, 40. See also 72 CJ.S. Powers 
§ 22 (1951). Beyond this, the burden is on the con­
testant to show that a different type of association 
or purpose exists. This burden was not met. Thus, 
Aiello's intention must be gleaned from the written 
grant of power as a reasonable person reading the 
instrument would interpret it. In 1968, Aiello gran­
ted Palfy power to: 
lease, ... bargain, sell ... lands ... upon such terms ... 
as she shall think fit. Also to bargain and agree 
for, buy, sell, mortgage, hypothecate, and in any 
and every way and manner deal in and with ... 
other property ... and to make, do and transact all 
and every kind of business of what nature and 
kind soever. 
[3][4] Expressions such as "and otherwise dispose 
of' are catchall phrases and add nothing for they 
refer "to such undescribed methods of disposition 
as may have been omitted (but were not) and are in 
nature like those specifically enumerated." *1166 
Fujino v. Clark, 71 F.Supp. 1,4 (D. Hawaii 1947). 
The powers of attorney held by Palfy contained 
phrases of the same nature (see above); however, 
these phrases do not transform the power granted to 
include making gifts. 
The general rule of construction is stated in Brown 
1'. Laird, 291 P. at 354 deferring to Gouldy v. Met­
calf: 75 Tex. 455, 12 S.W. 830, 831 (1889): 
The language used in the grant of general power is 
certainly very comprehensive, but the established 
rule of construction limits the authority derived 
by the general grant of power to the acts author­
ized by the language employed in granting the 
special powers. 
In Gouldy, the Texas Court further stated that:
 
When an authority is conferred upon an agent by a
 
formal instrument, as by a power of attorney, 
there are two rules of construction to be carefully 
attended to: (1) The meaning of general words in 
the instrument will be restricted by the context, 
and construed accordingly. (2) The authority will 
be construed strictly, so as to exclude the exer­
cise of any power which is not warranted either 
by the actual terms used, or as a necessary means 
of executing the authority with effect. 
12 S.W. at 831 
Thus, the authority to deal "upon such terms as she 
shall think fit" does not alter the type of acts which 
are authorized. 
A general power of attorney authorizing an agent to 
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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sell and convey property, even though it author­
izes him to sell for such price and on such terms 
as to him shall seem proper, implies a sale for the 
benefit of the principal, and does not authorize 
the agent to make a gift of the property, or to 
conveyor transfer it without a present considera­
tion inuring to the principal. 
Hodges v. Surratt, 366 So.2d 768, 773-74 
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1979) quoting Johnson v. Frac­
cacreTa, 348 So.2d 570, 572 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1977) 
The terms of the powers of attorney granted to 
Palfy were general though limited to business trans­
actions. Consistent with that, Palfy had on all prior 
occasions received valuable consideration in Ai­
ello's behalf for transfers she made as Aiello's attor­
ney in fact. As the court said in Fujillo, 71 F.Supp. 
at 4, "[a] gift is not a business transaction." Further­
more, 72 C.J.S. Powers § 25 (1951) states: "Gifts. 
Power to sell does not include authority to make a 
gift of the subject matter, or convey it without con­
sideration, and such a transfer is void." See also 
Brown 1'. Laird, 291 P. 352, 354 (Or. 1930). 
[5][6] In the absence of express authority to make a 
gift, none may be made. The agent must avoid act­
ing to the detriment of his principal "in the absence 
of an explicit direction." Estate of RolaTer, 542 
P.ld 219. 223 (Okla.App.1975). 
Clark relies upon the case of Clay v. Saute. 295 
P.2d 914 (CaI.App.1956) for the proposition that 
the agent may make a gift where the principal holds 
bare legal title and the agent holds equitable title. 
Clay is distinguishable from this case. In Clay, the 
agent conveyed property to his daughter in order to 
deprive his business associates and creditors of ac­
cess to his assets. His daughter never knew about 
these transfers and there is no evidence that she 
held any beneficial interest. The agent was declared 
incompetent, although he was not, and was later de­
termined to be competent. 
To the contrary, in this case, Aiello was holder of a 
beneficial interest in the promissory nolle and deed 
of trust and was informed of most of her interests 
although she was not active in the transactions. 
Palfy's apparent purpose in placing title in Aiello's 
name was not to evade creditors but rather to give 
her daughter a beneficial interest in the property 
which would become hers at Palfy's death, or when 
Palfy could no longer exercise the power of attor­
ney. 
The power of attorney granted to Patlfy merely 
made her an agent for Aiello. Palfy acted beyond 
the scope of her authority in making the gratuitous 
assignment to *1167 Clark, and Aiello is not bound 
by Palfy's acts and representations. 
[7] The general rule was stated in State v. Neal & 
SOilS. 489 P.2d 1016,1019 (Alaska 1971): 
[A] person who deals with another, knowing that 
the other is acting as an agent, and who fails to 
inquire into the extent of the delegated authority, 
may be held to deal at his peril. 
Clark knew that his mother held a power of attor­
ney for his sister. He did not inquire into its lim­
its. Clark did not pay for the assignmf:nt, and Ai­
ello did not benefit from it. Clark did not justifi­
ably rely to his detriment upon another's acts, and 
thus, he cannot claim estoppel on the part of Ai­
ello. We hold that Palfy's assignment of Aiello's 
beneficial interest to the Clarks is void. FN4 
FN4. It is also possible that Aiello's own 
interest was transferred to the Palfy Family 
Trust, and that a gift of this interest would 
also be invalid for reasons discussed in 
Section III, infra, of this opinion. Because 
we have already held that the powers of at­
torney did not authorize a gift, we need not 
reach and do not decide this issue. 
III. The Trust 
The Clarks argue that Palfy's own beneficial in­
'W'
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terest in the Gaudiane note was validly assigned for 
the reason that no conveyance of the property into 
the Trust was ever made, or in the alternative, that 
the Trust was revocable, and in fact had been re­
voked by Palfy. Aiello argues that the Trust Agree­
ment was valid and enforceable, but that Palfy's gift 
of her own interest was invalid for two reasons: (I) 
that she was mentally disabled and (2) that Gaudi­
ane. and perhaps Clark, exercised undue influence.
FN:l 
FN5. Palfy's mental disability or the exer­
cise of undue influence over her affairs by 
others need not be addressed. Our decision 
here makes these issues moot. 
The Trust Agreement provided in Article I: 
Trustor has contemporaneously with the execu­
tion of this Agreement, transferred and delivered 
to Trustee, or stated that she would transfer and 
deliver to Trustee, without consideration paid or 
to be paid therefor, the property set forth in Ex­
hibit "A" attached hereto and by this reference 
incorporated herein and made a part hereof. Such 
property, together with any additions of property 
made to this Trust, whether by Trustor or by an 
other person, shall constitute and be known as the 
"Trust Estate" and shall be held, administered, 
and distributed as hereinafter provided. 
Schedule A was attached to the Trust Agreement. It 
listed the Gaudiane $874,000 promissory note. The 
terms of the Trust were not contested. The testi­
mony at trial established that the property listed for 
the Trust was being administered as part of the 
Trust. 
[8J A note may be assigned merely by execution of 
the trust document. No endorsement is necessary 
where there are no challenges from a holder in due 
course. II Am.Jur.2d Bills and ~otes § 313 (1963). 
As to delivery of the note, "... if the creator of the 
trust by appropriate words or acts fully and com­
pletely constitutes himself trustee, no change of 
possession is necessary...." 89 C.J.S. Trusts § 64 
( 1955). 
[9J Even if Palfy retained possession as Trustor, a 
trust was completed as to her one-half interest. 
"Where the instrument creating the tru~,t expressly 
provides that it shall be for the benefit of the grant­
or during his life, a retention of possession by him 
is not inconsistent with the trust." 89 c.J.S. Trusts § 
64 (1955). Palfy created a valid trust. The language 
of the trust shows the necessary present intent to 
create a trust. Her capacity at that time is not con­
tested. 
For Palfy to transfer the interest held in trust would 
have required revocation of the Trust. The terms of 
the Trust are unambiguous. The Declaration of the 
Trust provided: 
*1168 This Declaration and Agreement of Trust, 
made and entered into this 21 day of October, 
1976, by and between FERN PALFY of Fairb­
anks, Alaska, (hereinafter referred to as 
"Trustor") and FERN PALFY and DONNA 
LOUISE AIELLO of Redwood City, California, 
as Co-Trustees, (hereinafter referred to as 
"Trustee"). 
The Trust was revocable as specified in Article IV: 
During the lifetime of Trustor, this Trust may be 
revoked in whole or in part by the Trustor. The 
power o/revocation shall be exercised by written 
notice delivered to the Trustee. In the event of 
such revocation, the revoked portion thereof shall 
revert to Trustor and shall constitute her separate 
property as if this Trust had not been created. 
The document provides for revocation by the Trus­
tor (Palfy) upon written notice to the Trustee (both 
Palfy and Aiello). (emphasis added) The only writ­
ing prepared by Palfy regarding the Tmst property 
was the Assignment of Beneficial Intf:rest to the 
Clarks. This was never given to Aiello. She dis­
covered it only through the Fairbanks Title Com­
pany while doing a title search. Her investigation 
was triggered by a form she was requested to sign 
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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only as Palfy's co-conservator to permit Gaudiane 
to transfer the brewery property. The parties were 
listed as Clark and Aiello as co-conservators for the 
estate of Palfy and the proposed transferee. The 
writing was not directed to the Trustee nor did it 
mention the Trust. 
[10] No other method of revocation is permissible 
FN6
under the terms of the Trust. As stated in Re­
statement 2d Trusts § 330 (1959): 
FN6. Under the facts of this case, see fn. 3, 
strict compliance with the terms of the 
Trust is mandated absent any exceptional 
reasons that might justify non-adherence to 
the requirement that written notice of re­
vocation be given the Trustee. 
(I) The settlor has power to revoke the trust if and 
to the extent that by the terms of the trust he re­
served such a power. 
Comment (a) to the same section explains: "The in­
tention of the settlor which determines the terms of 
the trust is his intention at the time of the creation 
of the trust and not his subsequent intention." 
Moreover, Comment j of § 330 states: 
Where method of revocation specified. If the settlor 
reserves a power to revoke the trust only in a par­
ticular manner ... he can revoke the trust only in 
that manner.... If the settlor reserves power to re­
voke the trust only by a notice in writing de­
livered to the trustee, he can revoke it only by de­
livering such a notice to the trustee. 
[I I] Palfy could not avoid this provision by assign­
ing her interest in the Trust because her interest was 
only a life estate. The interest which she purported 
to assign to Clark was everything but an estate for 
her life. 
The assignment was in violation of the Trust. 
Palfy's right to receive the payments on the Gaudi­
ane note was a Trust asset. Article VII, M. of the 
Trust instrument provides: 
"Notwithstanding anything herein contained to the 
contrary, no powers enumerated herein or accor­
ded to the Trustee generally pursuant to law shall 
be construed to enable the Trustor, or any other 
person, to purchase, exchange, or oth,~rwise deal 
with or dispose of all or any part of the corpus or 
income of the Trust for less than adequate con­
sideration in money or money's worth ..." 
Clark did not pay for the assignment and Palfy did 
not replace the Gaudiane note with any other prop­
erty. Therefore, neither Palfy's nor Aiello's interest 
was properly transferred to the Clarks. 
REVERSED. 
Alaska, 1984. 
Aiello v. Clark 
680 P.2d 1162 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Sophia CHELOHA, Personal Representative of the
 
Estate of Alphons Cheloha, deceased, Appellee and
 
Cross-Appellant,
 
v.
 
Robert C. CHELOHA, Appellant and Cross-Ap­

pellee.
 
No. 8-96-360.
 
July 17,1998.
 
Personal representative for uncle's estate sought ac­
counting from nephew regarding transactions he 
entered into on behalf of uncle by virtue of durable 
power of attorney. The District Court, Platte 
County, Robert R. Steinke, J., found that nephew 
had converted money from uncle's certificates of 
deposit to his own use and awarded personal rep­
resentative that amount plus postjudgment interest 
and costs. Nephew appealed and personal repres­
entative cross-appealed. The Supreme Court, Ger­
rard, J., held that: (I) nephew failed to establish ex­
press oral contract for payment of compensation for 
services rendered; (2) nephew converted uncle's 
certificates of deposit; (3) nephew converted money 
from uncle's checking account; and (4) personal 
representative was entitled to prejudgment interest 
on amount converted from certificates of deposit, 
but not amount converted from checking account. 
Affirmed, as modified. 
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Disbursements nephew made from uncle's checking 
account pursuant to power of attorney were proper, 
to the extent they represented expense reimburse­
ments and items that benefited uncle during his life­
time. 
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389k21 Defenses 
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Compensation payments nephew made to himself 
from uncle's checking account while acting as 
uncle's attorney in fact were not proper disburse­
ments, since uncle and nephew had not entered into 
express contract for payment of compensation for 
services rendered, and power of attorney did not au­
thorize nephew to compensate himself from uncle's 
property. 
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3891I(A) Right of Action and Defenses 
389k2l Defenses 
389k22 k. In General. Most Cited 
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Since power of attorney did not grant nephew the 
power to make gifts with uncle's property, nephew's 
use of uncle's money to purchase gifts for his wife 
and children was not a proper disposition of uncle's 
property. 
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389k22 k. In General. Most Cited 
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Nephew's purchase of radar detector with money 
from uncle's checking account while acting as 
uncle's attorney in fact was not proper disposition 
of uncle's property; although nephew te:stified that 
uncle authorized him to purchase radar detector so 
that he would not get speeding tickets while trans­
porting uncle to doctor's appointments, this testi­
mony was not credible. 
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Amended prejudgment interest statute applied in 
personal representative's action for accounting; 
amendment became effective before action was 
tried, and prejudgment interest statute was proced­
ural in nature. Neb.Rev.St. § 45··103.02 (1993). 
1241 Statutes 361 €'=>174 
361 Statutes 
361 VI Construction and Operation 
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
361k 174 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 361 k265) 
Statutes 361 €'=>278.10 
361 Statutes 
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361 VI Construction and Operation 
361 VI(D) Retroactivity 
361k278.10 k. Statutes Imposing Liabilit­
ies, Penalties, Duties, Obligations, or Disabilities. 
Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 361 k266) 
Statutes 361 €=:>278.13 
361 Statutes 
361 VI Construction and Operation 
361 VI(D) Retroactivity 
361 k278.12 Statutes Relating to Remedies 
and Procedures 
361 k278.13 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
(Formerly 361k267(l» 
A substantive law creates duties, rights, and obliga­
tions, whereas a procedural law prescribes the 
means and methods through and by which substant­
ive laws are enforced and applied. 
1251 Interest 219 ~12 
219 Interest 
2191 Rights and Liabilities in General 
219k8 Compensation for Use of Money 
219k12 k. Money Wrongfully Obtained, 
Held, or Used. Most Cited Cases 
Interest 219 ~31 
219 Interest 
219Il Rate 
219k31 k. Computation of Rate in General. 
Most Cited Cases 
An agent is chargeable with interest at the legal rate 
from the time that the money is wrongfully with­
held from the principal. Neb.Rev.St. § 45-104. 
1261 Interest 219 ~12 
2 l9 Interest 
2191 Rights and Liabilities in General 
219k8 Compensation for Use of Money 
219k 12 k. Money Wrongfully Obtained, 
Held, or Used. Most Cited Cases 
Since nephew, in his capacity as uncle's agent or at­
torney in fact, wrongfully converted to his own use 
and retained money belonging to unc:le without 
uncle's consent, interest was allowable pursuant to 
statute authorizing interest on money retained 
without the owner's consent. Neb.Rev.St § 45-104. 
127] Interest 219 €==39(2.15) 
219 Interest 
219ITI Time and Computation 
219k39 Time from Which Inter,est Runs in 
General 
219k39(2.5) Prejudgment Interest in Gen­
eral 
219k39(2.15) k. Liquidated or Unli­
quidated Claims in General. Most Cited Cases 
A claim is "liquidated," for purposes of prejudg­
ment interest statute, when there is no reasonable 
controversy either as to the plaintiffs right to re­
cover or as to the amount of such recovery. 
Neb.Rev.St. § 45-103.02 (1993). 
128] Interest 219 €==39(2.20) 
219 Interest 
219ITI Time and Computation 
219k39 Time from Which Intefl~st Runs in 
General 
219k39(2.5) Prejudgment Interest in Gen­
eral 
219k39(2.20) k. Particular Cases and 
Issues. Most Cited Cases 
Since damages were liquidated and no reasonable 
controversy existed as to nephew's conversion of 
money from uncle's certificates of deposit to his 
own use, uncle's personal representative was en­
titled to prejudgment interest as a matter of law on 
that amount from the time that nephew received the 
certificates of deposit. Neb.Rev.St. § 45-103.02 
( 1993). 
129] Interest 219 ~39(2.20) 
219 Interest 
219TIT Time and Computation 
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219k39 Time from Which Interest Runs in 
General 
219k39(2.5) Prejudgment Interest in Gen­
eral 
219k39(2.20) k. Particular Cases and 
Issues. Most Cited Cases 
Since, in personal representative's action for ac­
counting regarding transactions nephew entered in­
to on behalf of uncle by virtue of durable power of 
attorney, reasonable controversy existed regarding 
nephew's disbursements from uncle's checking ac­
count, personal representative's claim against neph­
ew was not liquidated, and personal representative 
was not entitled to prejudgment interest on improp­
er disbursements from the checking account. 
Neb.Rev.St. § 45-103.02 (1993). 
**294 Syllabus by the Court 
*32 1. Equity: Decedents' Estates: Accounting. 
An action for an accounting of estate property is in 
equity. 
2. Equity: Appeal and Error. In an appeal of an 
equity action, an appellate court tries factual ques­
tions de novo on the record and reaches a conclu­
sion independent of the findings of the trial court, 
provided, however, that where credible evidence is 
in conflict on a material issue of fact, the appellate 
court considers and may give weight to the fact that 
the trial judge heard and observed the witnesses and 
accepted one version of the facts rather than anoth­
er. 
3. Principal and Agent. A power of attorney au­
thorizes another to act as one's agent. 
4. Principal and Agent: Property. An agent has a 
duty to account to his or her principal for all prop­
erty or funds which he or she has received or paid 
out on behalf of the principal. 
5. Principal and Agent: Property: Proof. The 
burden is upon the agent to prove a proper disposi­
tion of all property and funds which have been en­
trusted to him or her pursuant to a power of attor­
ney, since the agent was the one who managed the 
property and funds and had control of th(: accounts. 
6. Principal and Agent. Generally, an agent is re­
quired to act solely for the benefit of his or her 
principal in all matters connected with the agency 
and adhere faithfully to the instructions of the prin­
cipal. 
7. Principal and Agent. An agent and principal are 
in a fiduciary relationship such that the agent has an 
obligation to refrain from doing any harmful act to 
the principal. 
8. Principal and Agent. An agent is prohibited 
from profiting from the agency relationship to the 
detriment of the principal. 
9. Principal and Agent: Gifts: Intent. No gift may 
be made by an attorney in fact to himself or herself 
unless the power to make such a gift is expressly 
granted in the instrument itself and there is shown a 
clear intent on the part of the principal to make 
such a gift. 
10. Principal and Agent: Intent. Absent express 
intention, an agent may not utilize his or her posi­
tion for his or her or a third party's benefit in a sub­
stantially gratuitous transfer. 
11. Equity: Contracts. A court of equity will not 
enforce a contract unless it is complete and certain 
in all its essential elements. 
12. Contracts: Parties: Intent. The parties them­
selves must agree upon the material and necessary 
details of the bargain, and if any of these be omitted 
or left obscure or indefinite so as to leave the inten­
tion of the parties uncertain respecting the substan­
tial terms, the case is not one for specific perform­
ance. 
13. Equity: Contracts: Parties. It is not a function 
of a court of equity to make a contract for the 
parties or to supply any of the material stipulations 
thereof. 
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**295 *33 14. Statutes: Time. Where an amend­
ment to a statute makes a procedural change, it is 
binding upon a tribunal on the effective date of the 
amendment and is applicable to pending cases that 
have not been tried. 
15. Statutes. A substantive law creates duties,
 
rights, and obligations, whereas a procedural law
 
prescribes the means and methods through and by
 
which substantive laws are enforced and applied.
 
16. Principal and Agent: Prejudgment Interest:
 
Time. Under Neb.Rev.Stat. § 45-104 (Reissue
 
1993), an agent is chargeable with interest at the
 
legal rate from the time that money is wrongfully
 
withheld from the principal.
 
17. Prejudgment Interest: Claims. A claim is li­

quidated when there is no reasonable controversy
 
either as to the plaintiffs right to recover or as to
 
the amount of such recovery. There must be no dis­

pute either as to the amount or as to the plaintiffs
 
right to recover.
 
Richard K. Watts, of Mills, Watts & Nicolas,
 
Osceola, for appellant.
 
Clark J. Grant, of Grant, Rogers, Maul & Grant, 
Columbus, for appellee. 
CAPORALE, WRIGHT, CONNOLLY, GERRARD 
, STEPHAN, and McCORMACK, 11. 
GERRARD, Justice. 
In this equity action, Sophia Cheloha, as personal 
representative of the estate of Alphons Cheloha, de­
ceased, filed a third amended petition in the district 
court, seeking an accounting from Alphons' brother, 
Carl C. Cheloha, and Carl's son, Robert C. Cheloha, 
as to all transactions they entered into on behalf of 
Alphons by virtue of a durable power of attorney. 
Sophia alleged that sums of money expended by 
Carl and Robert, in their capacities as Alphons' at­
torneys in fact, were not solely for the benefit of 
Alphons. Following a bench trial, the district court 
entered judgment, finding that Robert converted 
$33,495.05 in either principal or interest from certi­
ficates of deposit owned by Alphons to his own use 
and awarded Sophia that amount plus postjudgment 
interest and costs. Robert appeals, and Sophia 
cross-appeals. 
*34 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Alphons was a bachelor and retired tarmer who 
lived in rural Platte County, Nebraska. In 1986, AI­
phons was admitted to a nursing home, but some­
time later was able to return to his own home. 
However, in late July or August 1988, Alphons was 
again admitted to a nursing home, where he re­
mained until his death on October 10, 1993. 
Robert was Alphons' nephew and lived less than a 
mile from Alphons' home. During Alphons' life­
time, few people other than Robert paid any atten­
tion to Alphons or his needs. Robert cleared snow 
from Alphons' roads, trimmed his trees, provided 
transportation for him for doctor's appointments, 
and made arrangements for his medical a.nd nursing 
home care. In addition, Robert paid Alphons' bills, 
managed his finances, and provided transportation 
for him to purchase his groceries. 
Robert testified that in April 1986, he had a discus­
sion with Alphons regarding Robert's desire to be 
compensated for the services that he had been 
providing to Alphons. Robert testified that he had 
this discussion with Alphons at the nursing home in 
the presence of Robert's wife and parents. Accord­
ing to Robert, as corroborated by his mother, 
Robert told Alphons that his care was more re­
sponsibility than Robert could handle, to which AI­
phons allegedly responded, "I am so gla.d that you 
have been helping me, that you are helping me, and 
I want you to be paid." 
Robert testified that After this conversation, he dis­
cussed the matter with the family attomey, Cleo 
Robak. Robert told Robak what Alphon:; had said, 
and Robak told Robert that he was entitkd to com­
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pensation. Robak testified by deposition that he was 
never informed or heard of any agreement between 
Alphons and Robert for the payment of compensa­
tion. Robak, however, did testify that sometime 
after problems began to surface with Alphons, 
Robak told Robert that he could charge a reason­
able fee for **296 whatever work he had done for 
Alphons, although no further details were discussed 
and no legal work was embarked upon by Robak to 
specifically deal with this issue. 
On August II, 1988, Alphons executed a durable 
power of attorney, naming Carl and Robert as his 
attorneys in fact. Robak testified that in preparing 
Alphons' power of attorney, Robak had no know­
ledge of any discussion between Alphons and *35 
Robert regarding an agreement for the payment of 
compensation for services rendered by Robert pur­
suant to the power of attorney. The power of attor­
ney instrument did not contain a provision authoriz­
ing Robert to compensate himself or a provision au­
thorizing Robert to make gifts from Alphons' prop­
erty. 
On September 20, 1995, Sophia, as personal repres­
entative of the estate of Alphons, filed a third 
amended petition in equity in the district court, 
seeking an accounting from Carl and Robert as to 
all transactions they entered into on behalf of AI­
phons by virtue of the power of attorney. Sophia al­
leged that sums of money expended by Carl and 
Robert, in their capacities as Alphons' attorneys in 
fact, were not solely for the benefit of Alphons and 
were, in fact, paid to the detriment of Alphons. At 
the bench trial on the matter, Robert admitted that 
he used the power of attorney in order to convert 
$33,495.05 in certificates of deposit owned by AI­
phons to his own use. Robert, however, testified 
that he received these monies as compensation for 
services rendered by him pursuant to an oral con­
tract with Alphons. Robert also admitted to using 
the power of attorney to make various purchases 
and disbursements with money from Alphons' 
checking account. Robert, however, testified that 
these various purchases or disbursements consti­
tuted either gifts, reimbursement of expenses, or 
compensation for services rendered. 
Following the bench trial, the district court entered 
judgment, finding that Robert converted $33,495.05 
in either principal or interest from certificates of 
deposit owned by Alphons to his own use and 
awarded Sophia that amount plus postjudgment in­
terest and costs. The district court dismissed the pe­
tition as it related to Carl, since no evidence was 
submitted that he had ever come into possession, 
control, or management of Alphons' property. 
Robert appeals, and Sophia cross-appeals. We re­
moved the case to our docket pursuant to our power 
to regulate the caseloads of the Nebraska Court of 
Appeals and this court. See Neb.Rev.Stat. § 
24-1106(3) (Reissue 1995). 
II. SCOPE OF REVIEW 
[1][2] An action for an accounting of estate prop­
erty is in equity. Mischke v. Mischke, 247 Neb. 752, 
530 N.W.2d 235 (1995). In *36 an appeal of an 
equity action, an appellate court tries factual ques­
tions de novo on the record and reaches a conclu­
sion independent of the findings of the trial court, 
provided, however, that where credible evidence is 
in conflict on a material issue of fact, the appellate 
court considers and may give weight to the fact that 
the trial judge heard and observed the witnesses and 
accepted one version of the facts rather than anoth­
er. Schram Enters. v. L & H Properties. 254 Neb. 
717,578 N.W.2d 865 (1998); Mischke v. Mischke, 
supra. 
III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
Robert's four assignments of error can be consolid­
ated and restated into the following one: The trial 
court erred in finding that the conversion of AI­
phons' certificates of deposit represented a gift to 
Robert as Alphons' attorney in fact rather than com­
pensation for services rendered pursuant to an ex­
press or implied contract. 
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In her cross-appeal, Sophia assigns the following 
two errors: The trial court erred in (1) determining 
that she was not entitled to a money judgment for 
funds wrongfully converted from Alphons' check­
ing account to Robert's personal use pursuant to the 
power of attorney and (2) not awarding prejudg­
ment interest. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
1. POWER OF ATTORNEY 
[3][4][5] A power of attorney authorizes another to 
act as one's agent. Mischke v. Mischke, supra; 
**297Fletcher v. Mathew, 233 Neb. 853, 448 
N.W.2d 576 (1989). An agent has a duty to account 
to his or her principal for all property or funds 
which he or she has received or paid out on behalf 
of the principal. Walker Land & Cattle Co. v. Daub, 
223 Ncb. 343,389 N.W.2d 560 (1986). The burden 
is upon the agent to prove a proper disposition of 
all property and funds which have been entrusted to 
him or her pursuant to a power of attorney, since 
the agent was the one who managed the property 
and funds and had control of the accounts. See id. 
[6][7][8] Generally, an agent is required to act 
solely for the benefit of his or her principal in all 
matters connected with the agency and adhere faith­
fully to the instructions of the principal. Fletcher v. 
Mathew, supra. *37 An agent and principal are in a 
fiduciary relationship such that the agent has an ob­
ligation to refrain from doing any harmful act to the 
principal. Id. An agent is prohibited from profiting 
from the agency relationship to the detriment of the 
principal. Mischke v. Mischke, supra; In re Estate 
(!f Lienemann. 222 Neb. 169, 382 N.W.2d 595 
(1986). 
[9][ I0] It is well settled that no gift may be made 
by an attorney in fact to himself or herself unless 
the power to make such a gift is expressly granted 
in the instrument itself and there is shown a clear 
intent on the part of the principal to make such a 
gift. Mischke v. Mischke. supra. We adopted the 
foregoing rule in Fletcher v. Mathew, supra, in or­
der to discourage fraud and abuse by attorneys in 
fact. Thus, absent express intention, an agent may 
not utilize his or her position for his or her or a 
third party's benefit in a substantially gratuitous 
transfer. Mischke v. Mischke, supra. 
Robert asserts that his conversion of $33,495.05 in 
principal or interest from Alphons' certificates of 
deposit to his own use represented compensation 
for services rendered by him pursuant to an express 
oral contract or an implied contract and that, thus, 
the district court erred in awarding Sophia 
$33,495.05. At trial, however, Robert did not raise 
the theory that he properly converted Alphons' cer­
tificates of deposit pursuant to an implied contract. 
Therefore, on appeal, our sole inquiry is whether an 
express oral contract existed whereby Alphons 
agreed to pay Robert $33,495.05 in certificates of 
deposit as compensation for services rendered. See 
Sunrise Country Manor v. Neb. Dept. of Soc. 
Servs., 246 Neb. 726, 523 K.W.2d 499 (1994) 
(cases are heard in state appellate courts on theory 
upon which they were tried). Robert claims that an 
express oral contract existed because Alphons had 
specifically told Robert in the presence of his im­
mediate family that Alphons wanted Robert to be 
paid for his services. 
[11][12][13] A court of equity will not enforce a 
contract unless it is complete and certain in all its 
essential elements. Sayer v. Bowley, 243 Neb. 80 I, 
503 N.W.2d 166 (1993). The parties themselves 
must agree upon the material and necessary details 
of the bargain, and if any of these be omitted or left 
obscure or indefinite so as to leave the intention of 
the parties uncertain respecting *38 the substantial 
terms, the case is not one for specific performance. 
Id. It is not a function of a court of equity to make a 
contract for the parties or to supply any of the ma­
terial stipulations thereof. Id. 
[14] In the instant case, the only evidencl~ in the re­
cord that would support a mutual understanding 
between Alphons and Robert that Robert's services 
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were not rendered gratuitously was the self-serving 
testimony of Robert and the testimony of his moth­
er that Alphons told Robert that Alphons would pay 
Robert for his services. Even assuming that this 
conversation did, in fact, take place and that a con­
tract was formed between the parties, the record 
contains no evidence of a mutual understanding as 
to the specific terms of the compensation to be paid 
to Robert. While Robert testified that 4 years after 
the alleged conversation with Alphons, Alphons 
told Robert that he was entitled to a certificate of 
deposit as compensation for services rendered, 
there is no evidence in the record as to which certi­
ficate of deposit or as to the amount of the particu­
lar certificate of deposit to which Robert was en­
titled. In short, the record is devoid of any evidence 
as to the material terms of the purported contract, 
and thus, as an appellate court, it is not our function 
to supply the terms for the parties and enforce 
**298 the parties' alleged contract for the payment 
of compensation for services rendered. 
[15] [16] Moreover, contrary to Robert's claim of a 
contract for compensation of services, the record 
reveals that Robert never reported the income he re­
ceived from the certificates of deposit on his tax re­
turns, thereby supporting an inference that the certi­
ficates of deposit did not represent compensation 
for services rendered. Mutual assent to an agree­
ment is determined by the objective manifestations 
of intent by the parties, not by their subjective 
statements of intent. See Viking Broadcasting Corp. 
v. Snell Publishing Co.. 243 Neb. 92, 497 N.W.2d 
383 (1993). 
[I 7] Therefore, we determine from our de novo re­
view of the record that Robert's conversion of AI­
phons' certificates of deposit to Robert's own use 
was not pursuant to any enforceable oral contract, 
but, rather, was a substantially gratuitous transac­
tion. Moreover, since the power of attorney did not 
expressly grant Robert the power to make gifts with 
Alphons' property, Robert has failed to meet his 
burden of proof with respect to the *39 proper dis­
position of Alphons' certificates of deposit and in­
terest totaling $33,495.05. Accordingly, the district 
court was correct in awarding Sophia the sum of 
$33,495.05 with respect to the certificates of depos­
it. Robert's assignment of error is without merit. 
2. SOPHIA'S CROSS-APPEAL 
(a) Checking Account 
In her cross-appeal, Sophia asserts that the trial 
court erred in not awarding a judgml:nt against 
Robert for money he wrong-fully converted from 
Alphons' checking account to his own lise. Robert 
admits to using the power of attorney to make vari­
ous purchases and disbursements with money from 
Alphons' checking account; however, Robert con­
tends that these various purchases or disbursements 
were proper because they represented either reim­
bursement of expenses, compensation fix services 
rendered, or gifts. 
[1 8] As we address Sophia's claims in our de novo 
review, we recognize that the nature of many of the 
checking account expenditures was in dispute, and 
we have considered and given weight to the fact 
that the trial court observed the witnesses and ac­
cepted one version of facts over anothl:r with re­
spect to several of the transactions. SI~e Schram 
Enters. v. L & H Properties, 254 Neb. 717, 578 
N.W.2d 865 (1998). In that regard, there were nu­
merous checks that were written by Robert on be­
half of Alphons either for alleged expense reim­
bursements or for items that allegedly benefited A1­
phons during his lifetime. Without detailing each 
and every check, Sophia claims that se:veral pur­
chases were not solely for the benefit of Alphons 
and that certain checks were not reimbursement for 
legitimate expenses. The checks at issue~ were for 
the purchase of two filing cabinets to keep track of 
Alphons' business, the payment of real estate taxes 
on Alphons' farmstead and personal property tax on 
Alphons' pickup truck, several checks. to Wal­
green's to purchase personal hygiene items and 
medications for Alphons, the purchase of a televi­
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sion set for Alphons' room in the nursing home, the 
purchase of a vacuum for Alphons' home, the pay­
ment for repairs to Alphons' truck, the purchase of a 
camcorder that was eventually sold to Robert, and 
the payment of utilities *40 and homeowner's insur­
ance on Alphons' farmstead. The evidence was in 
dispute in many of these transactions, and the trial 
court heard several witnesses, including the admin­
istrator of the Genoa Haven Home, testify regard­
ing the issue whether Alphons was benefiting from 
the purchases and disbursements outlined above. 
Based on our de novo review of the record, we de­
termine that the trial court did not err in concluding 
that Sophia was not entitled to judgment regarding 
the aforestated disbursements. 
[19] However, based on the principles set forth in 
Fletcher v. A1athew. 233 Ncb. 853,448 N.W.2d 576 
( 1989), our de novo review of the record leads us to 
a different conclusion regarding Sophia's claims 
with respect to the alleged compensation for ser­
vices and gifts to Robert. With regard to those pur­
chases constituting alleged compensation for ser­
vices rendered, Robert testified that he purchased 
**299 a pair of shoes for himself in the amount of 
$241.50. Robert also testified that he paid himself 
$500 for handling Alphons' funeral arrangements. 
Lastly, Robert testified that he paid himself $80.15 
for moving Alphons' belongings to and from the 
various nursing homes. As previously determined, 
because the record is devoid of satisfactory proof 
that Alphons entered into a binding contract to 
compensate Robert for services rendered and be­
cause the power of attorney does not contain a pro­
vision authorizing Robert to compensate himself 
from Alphons' property, we determine that Robert 
has failed to meet his burden of proof with regard 
to the proper disposition of Alphons' money in the 
sum of$821.65. 
[20J As to those purchases made with Alphons' 
money allegedly constituting gifts, Robert wrote 
checks to Wal-Mart totaling $7,055.74. While 
Robert testified that these purchases were primarily 
for personal items for Alphons, Robert also testified 
that a portion of those purchases was for gifts for 
his wife and children pursuant to Alphons' oral au­
thorization. Despite Alphons' alleged oral authoriz­
ation, because the power of attorney did not grant 
Robert the power to make gifts with Alphons' prop­
erty and the purchases were not solely fc)r Alphons' 
benefit, we determine that Robert has failed to meet 
his burden of proof with respect to the disposition 
of Alphons' money in the amount of$7,055.74. 
[21] *41 Robert also purchased a radar detector for 
$240.14. Robert testified that Alphons authorized 
Robert to purchase a radar detector so that he would 
not get speeding tickets while transporting Alphons 
to doctor's appointments. Because we do not find 
Robert's testimony credible in that regard, we de­
termine that Robert has failed to meet his burden of 
proof with respect to the proper disposition of AI­
phons' money in the further sum of$240.14. 
Based on the foregoing, we determine that the trial 
court erred in not awarding Sophia a judgment in 
the amount of $8,117.53 for funds wrongfully con­
verted from Alphons' checking account to the bene­
fit of Robert. 
(b) Prejudgment Interest 
Sophia asserts that the trial court wrongly applied 
an old version of Nebraska's prejudgmmt interest 
statute, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 45-103.02 (Reissue 1993), 
in denying her request for an award of prejudgment 
interest. Sophia claims that under the amended ver­
sion, § 45-103.02 (Cum.Supp.1996), she is entitled 
to prejudgment interest. 
The version of § 45-103.02 that the trial court ap­
plied in the instant case provided the following: 
Except as provided in section 45-103.04, judg­
ment interest shall also accrue on decrees and 
judgments for the payment of money from the 
date of the plaintiffs first offer of settlement 
which is exceeded by the judgment until the 
rendition of judgment if all of the following con­
ditions are met: 
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(1) The offer is made in writing upon the defend­
ant ... ; 
(2) The offer is made not less than ten days prior 
to the commencement of the trial; 
(3) A copy of the offer and proof of delivery to 
the defendant ... is filed with the clerk of the 
court in which the action is pending; and 
(4) The offer is not accepted prior to trial or with­
in thirty days of the date of the offer, whichever 
occurs first. 
§ 45-103.02 (Reissue 1993). Under this version of § 
45-] 03.02, in order to receive prejudgment interest 
in a cause of action accruing after January 1, 1987, 
a litigant must comply with the *42 four require­
ments of § 45-103.02. See, Pantano v. McGowan, 
247 Ncb. 894,530 N.W.2d 912 (1995); Label Con­
cepts v. Westendorf Plastics. 247 Neb. 560, 528 
N.W.2d 335 (1995). 
However, in 1994, the Legislature amended § 
45-103.02, which now provides the following: 
(I) Except as provided in section 45-103.04, in­
terest as provided in section 45-103 shall accrue 
on the unpaid balance of unliquidated claims 
from the date of the plaintiff's first offer of settle­
ment which is exceeded by the judgment until the 
rendition of judgment if all of the following con­
ditions are met: 
**300 (a) The offer is made in writing upon the 
defendant ... ; 
(b) The offer is made not less than ten days prior 
to the commencement of the trial; 
(c) A copy of the offer and proof of delivery to 
the defendant ... is filed with the clerk of the 
court in which the action is pending; and 
(d) The offer is not accepted prior to trial or with­
in thirty days of the date of the offer, whichever 
occurs first. 
(2) Except as provided in section 45-103.04, in­
terest as provided in section 45-104 shall accrue 
on the unpaid balance of liquidated claims from 
the date the cause of action arose until the rendi­
tion ofjudgment. 
(Emphasis supplied.) § 45-103.02 
(Cum.Supp.l996). Thus, under the amended ver­
sion of § 45-103.02, compliance with the four con­
ditions is no longer a prerequisite for an award of 
prejudgment interest if interest is provlided for in 
Neb.Rev.Stat. § 45-104 (Reissue 1993) and the 
claim is liquidated. Before analyzing whether in­
terest is available pursuant to § 45-104 and the 
claim is liquidated, it is necessary for us to resolve 
the question of whether the amended prejudgment 
interest statute is applicable in the instant case. 
[22][23] Where an amendment to a statute makes a 
procedural change, it is binding upon a tribunal on 
the effective date of the amendment and is applic­
able to pending cases that have not been tried. 
Stansbury v. HEP. Inc.. 248 Neb. 706, 539 N.W.2d 
28 (1995); Behrens v. American Stores Packing 
Co., 236 Ncb. 279, 460 N.W.2d 671 (1990). See, 
also, Jackson v. Branick Indus., 254 Neb. 950, 581 
N.W.ld 53 (1998). In the instant *43 case, the 
amendment became effective July 16, 1994, and the 
case was tried on November 28 and 29, 1995. 
Therefore, the amended § 45-103.02 was in effect 
at the time of the trial, and thus, the new statute will 
apply if the amendments to the statute we:re proced­
ural in nature. 
[24] A substantive law creates duties, rights, and 
obligations, whereas a procedural law prescribes 
the means and methods through and by which sub­
stantive laws are enforced and applied. Stansbury v. 
HEP, Inc., supra. See, also, Jackson v. Branick In­
dus., supra. In the instant case, the amendments to 
§ 45-103.02 did not create a new substantive right 
to prejudgment interest on liquidated and unliquid­
ated claims, since that right was already provided 
for in the statute. Rather, the amendme:nts to the 
statute merely altered the method for exercising the 
right to prejudgment interest in a cause of action 
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where the claim is liquidated. Therefore, because 
we determine that the amendments to the statute 
were procedural in nature, the district court erred in 
not applying the amended version of § 45-103.02 to 
determine whether prejudgment interest should be 
awarded in the instant case. Nevertheless, it still 
must be resolved whether interest is provided for 
pursuant to § 45-104 and whether Sophia's claim is 
liquidated. 
[25][26] First, with regard to whether interest is 
available pursuant to § 45-104, this section states in 
relevant part that "[u]nless otherwise agreed, in­
terest shall be allowed at the rate of twelve percent 
per annum ... on money received to the use of an­
other and retained without the owner's consent, ex­
press or implied, from the receipt thereof ...." Un­
der this section, an agent is chargeable with interest 
at the legal rate from the time that the money is 
wrongfully withheld from the principal. See Pearl­
man v. Snitzer, 112 Neb. 135,198 N.W. 879 (1924) 
. In the case at bar, because Robert, in his capacity 
as Alphons' agent or attorney in fact, wrongfully 
converted to his own use and retained money be­
longing to Alphons without Alphons' consent, in­
terest is allowable pursuant to § 45-104. 
[27] Second, with regard to whether Sophia's claim 
is liquidated, it is well settled that a claim is liquid­
ated when there is no reasonable controversy either 
as to the plaintiffs right to recover or as to the 
amount of such recovery. See, Blue Tee Corp. v. 
CD/ Contractors, Inc., 247 Neb 397, 529 N.W.2d 
16 (1995); Lange Indus. v. Hallam Grain Co., 244 
Neb. 465, 507 N.W.2d 465 (1993). *44 There must 
be no dispute either as to the amount or as to the 
plaintiffs right to recover. Id. 
[28][29] Since the damages were liquidated and no 
reasonable controversy existed **301 as to Robert's 
conversion of $33,495.05 in principal and interest 
from Alphons' certificates of deposit to his own 
use, Sophia was entitled to prejudgment interest as 
a matter of law on that amount from the time that 
Robert received the certificates of deposit. See 
Fletcher v. Mathew, 233 Neb, 853,448 N.W.2d 576 
(1989). The record reveals that the amount of pre­
judgment interest on the certificates of deposit, as 
set forth in exhibit 32, shall be callculated as 
$17,873.74. However, a reasonable controversy did 
exist regarding Robert's disbursements from Al­
phons' checking account. Therefore, Sophia's claim 
on her cross-appeal is not liquidated, and Sophia is 
not entitled to prejudgment interes.t on the 
$8,117.53 in disbursements from the checking ac­
count. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's judg­

ment is modified to provide a total r,ecovery of
 
$59,486.32, and as modified, it is affirmed in all
 
other respects.
 
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
 
WHITE, c.J., participating on briefs .
 
Neb.,1998.
 
Cheloha v. Cheloha
 
255 Neb. 32, 582 N.W.2d 291
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Supreme Court of Idaho.
 
ARTHUR
 
v.
 
KILPATRICK BROS. CO.
 
No. 5203.
 
Feb. 14, 1929.
 
Appeal from District Court, Blaine County; Hugh 
A. Baker, Judge. 
Action by Edward J. Arthur against the Kilpatrick 
Bros. Company. Judgment for defendant was 
entered, and, after plaintiffs subsequent death, no­
tice of appeal was filed and served in name of de­
ceased plaintiff. On defendant's motion to dismiss 
appeal. Granted. 
West Headnotes 
Abatement and Revival 2 ~71 
2 Abatement and Revival 
2\/ Death of Party and Revival of Action 
2\/(B) Continuance or Revival of Action 
2k71 k. Nature and Necessity. Most Cited 
Cases 
Action cannot be continued in deceased's name in 
behalf of his heirs without substitution of de­
ceased's representative or successor in interest (C.S. 
§ 6652). 
Abatement and Revival 2 ~75(2) 
2 Abatement and Revival 
2\/ Death of Party and Revival of Action 
2\/(B) Continuance or Revival of Action 
2k75 Application and Proceedings There­
on 
2k75(2) k. Issues Raised or Determ­
ined, and Pleading and Proof. Most Cited Cases 
Grantee's right to continue action of deceased 
grantor to quiet title being disputed, she was re­
quired to establish validity of power of attorney un­
der which property was conveyed (C.S. § 6652). 
Principal and Agent 308 €==97 
308 Principal and Agent 
308HI Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons 
308HI(A) Powers of Agent 
308k95 Express Authority 
308k97 k. Construction of Letters or 
Powers of Attorney. Most Cited Cases 
Powers of attorney are strictly construed not to au­
thorize acts beyond those specified. 
Principal and Agent 308 €==103(7) 
308 Principal and Agent 
3081U Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons 
308II1(A) Powers of Agent 
308k98 Implied and Apparent Authority 
308kl03 Purchases, Sales, and Con­
veyances 
308k I 03(7) k. Existence of Author­
ity to Sell or Convey. Most Cited Cases 
Power of attorney containing no specifi,; authority 
to convey realty did not authorize such conveyance. 
*800 J. G. Hedrick, of Hailey, and C. T. Ward, of 
Boise, for appellant. 
Sullivan & Sullivan, of Boise, and Roy Van 
Winkle, of Hailey, for respondent. 
PER CURIAM. 
This was an action to quiet title to real property, in 
which judgment was entered in favor of defendant, 
on November 15, 1927. Some time in thl~ month of 
December, 1927, plaintiff died intestate, and no ad­
ministrator has been appointed to represent his es­
tate. On January 30, 1928, notice of appeal was 
filed and served in the name of the deceased 
plaintiff. Thereafter motion to dismiss the appeal 
was filed in this court, mainly on the ground that an 
appeal may not be taken in the Hame of a deceased 
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person, without a substitution of, or voluntary ap­
pearance*80t by, a representative of such deceased 
party. 
Edward B. Arthur, a son of the deceased plaintiff, 
filed an affidavit, to which was attached as an ex­
hibit a power of attorney executed by Edward 1. Ar­
thur, deceased, on November 16, 1926, under 
which it is claimed Edward B. Arthur was given the 
authority and power, among other things, to convey 
all property of Edward 1. Arthur, and that, pursuant 
thereto, the property in controversy had been 
deeded to Catherine J. Arthur after the entry of 
judgment in the cause and prior to the death of Ed­
ward 1. Arthur, and that she elected to continue the 
action and appeal the same in the name of the ori­
ginal party, under the provisions of C. S. § 6652. 
On the same date of the filing of the affidavit above 
referred to, a motion was filed to have Catherine 1. 
Arthur substituted as appellant, for the reason that 
she is the real party in interest. A subsequent affi­
davit of Edward B. Arthur set forth the names of 
certain heirs of Edward 1. Arthur, deceased, re­
ferred to the conveyance to Catherine 1. Arthur, and 
stated: "As no administrator has been appointed in 
this state or elsewhere for the said deceased, Ed­
ward J. Arthur, this affiant respectfully requests 
that the said action be continued in the name of Ed­
ward J. Arthur in case it should be determined by 
this court that the said premises constitute part of 
his estate." 
Affidavits were also filed by others of the Arthur 
family, deposing that respective affiants knew that 
the purpose, object, and intention of Edward J. Ar­
thur, deceased, in executing the power of attorney 
to Edward B. Arthur, was to give and grant unto the 
latter power and authority, among other things, to 
convey property of the said Edward J. Arthur. 
c. S. § 6652, provides: "An action or proceeding 
does not abate by the death or any disability of a 
party, or by the transfer of any interest therein, if 
the cause of action or proceeding survive or contin­
ue. In case of the death or any disability of a party, 
the court, on motion, may allow the action or pro­
ceeding to be continued by or against his represent­
ative or successor in interest. In case of any other 
transfer of interest the action or proceeding may be 
continued in the name of the original party, or the 
court may allow the person to whom tht: transfer is 
made to be substituted in the action or proceeding." 
Having in mind the provisions of the foregoing stat­
ute, the situation to be addressed on tht: motion to 
dismiss is (I) the request of Catherine 1. Arthur, as 
grantee of the property under deed of Edward 1. Ar­
thur, by Edward B. Arthur, attorney in fact, before 
the death of Edward 1. Arthur, to be substituted as 
appellant; and (2) if the efficacy of the deed to 
Catherine 1. Arthur be inquired into, and it is held 
to be of no force or effect by reason of failure of 
the power of attorney to extend to the right of con­
veying real estate belonging to Edward J. Arthur, 
the application to have the action continued in the 
name of Edward J. Arthur, deceased, in behalf of 
his heirs. 
If there were no question as to the sufficiency of the 
power of attorney, claimed to authorize the deeding 
of the property to Catherine J. Arthur, undoubtedly 
she would have the right to be substituted as appel­
lant, coming within the provisions of the last sen­
tence or clause of C. S. § 6652, supra, covering a 
transfer during the lifetime of the original party, 
such as is purported to have occurred herein. In 
such circumstances it is unnecessary to decide 
whether, upon the death of the transferor and ori­
ginal party, the action could be continued in his 
name, since the request is made by the transferee or 
assignee to be substituted. Her right, however, to 
continue the action or to be substituted as appellant 
being disputed, it appears to us that she must 
present satisfactory evidence of the grounds upon 
which she relies to be made a party to the action in 
her own right entirely. This involves, therefore, a 
consideration of the power of attorney, under which 
it is contended the property formerly belonging to 
Edward J. Arthur, deceased, was conveyed to her 
and is now her property, subject of course to de­
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termination of the litigation involving the title. 
The instrument is denominated "special power of 
attorney," and admittedly does not expressly give 
Edward B. Arthur the power to convey real estate 
of Edward J. Arthur, but grants him "full power and 
authority to do and perform all and every act and 
thing whatsoever requisite and necessary to be done 
in and about the premises (concerning all property 
belonging to Edward J. Arthur within the State of 
Idaho) as fully to all intents and purposes as he 
might or could do if personally present, hereby rati­
fying and confirming all that his said attorney, Ed­
ward B. Arthur shall lawfully do or cause to be 
done by virtue of these presents." It is seen that this 
power of attorney contains no authority to convey 
real estate, eo nomine, and as such instruments are 
subject to strict interpretation, without regard to pa­
rol evidence, and are not to be construed as author­
izing acts beyond those specified (see I Cal. JUT. p. 
748 et seq.), our conclusion is that the deed to Cath­
erine J. Arthur was ineffective by reason of insuffi­
ciency of the power of attorney to authorize con­
veyance of real estate. It follows, therefore, that the 
request of Catherine 1. Arthur to be substituted as 
appellant in the cause and to continue the same in 
her name and right must be denied. 
The request that the action be continued in the 
name of Edward J. Arthur, deceased, in behalf of 
his heirs, if granted, would not be a substitution, 
and, by the provisions of C. S. § 6652, "In case of 
the death *802 or any disability of a party, the 
court, on motion, may allow the action or proceed­
ing to be continued by or against his representative 
or successor in interest," it is clearly expressed that 
a substitution of a representative or successor in in­
terest of the deceased is necessary in order to have 
the action continued. 20 Cal. JUT. 544; Lowe v. Su­
perior Court, 165 Cal. 708, 134 P. 190. 
There is no proper party appellant before the court, 
and the appeal must be dismissed. It is so ordered. 
All concuT. 
Idaho 1929.
 
Arthur v. Kilpatrick Bros. Co.
 
47 Idaho 306, 274 P. 800
 
END OF DOCUMENT
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Supreme Court of Idaho.
 
EATON
 
v.
 
McWILLIAMS et al.
 
No. 5798.
 
May 26, 1932.
 
Appeal from District Court, Canyon County; John 
C. Rice, Judge. 
Action in equity by A. L. Eaton against W. H. 
McWilliams and others for the cancellation of an 
assignment of a contract of sale of real property and 
for the return of money paid thereunder. From a 
judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
Appeal and Error 30 ~1008.1(8.1) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(I) Questions of Fact, Verdicts, and 
Findings 
30XVI(I)3 Findings of Court 
30k I008 Conclusiveness in General 
30k I008.1 In General 
30k 1008.1 (8) Particular Cases 
and Questions 
30k 1008.1 (8.1) k. In General. 
Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 30kI008(l)) 
Court's finding under evidence that principal did 
not ratify agent's unauthorized act in assigning land 
contract held conclusive on appellate court. 
Principal and Agent 308 ~97 
308 Principal and Agent 
308III Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons 
308HI(A) Powers of Agent
 
308k95 Express Authority
 
308k97 k. Construction of Letters or 
Powers of Attorney. Most Cited Cases 
Power of attorney to sell land must be strictly con­
strued. 
Principal and Agent 308 ~103(6) 
308 Principal and Agent 
308111 Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons 
3081II(A) Powers of Agent 
308k98 Implied and Apparent Authority 
308k 103 Purchases, Sales, and Con­
veyances 
308kl03(6) k. Sales and Convey­
ances in General. Most Cited Cases 
Power of attorney to sell land and convey complete 
title did not include power to assign contract and 
receive payment therefor. 
Principal and Agent 308 ~122(1) 
308 Principal and Agent 
308111 Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons 
308111(A) Powers of Agent 
308k 118 Evidence as to Authority 
308k 122 Declarations and Acts of 
Agent 
308k122(1) k. Declarations and 
Acts in General. Most Cited Cases 
Statement in assignment of land contract that agent 
was lawfully authorized to execute assignment held 
not binding upon principal. 
Principal and Agent 308 ~)47(3) 
308 Principal and Agent 
308111 Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons 
308111(C) Unauthorized and Wrongful Acts 
308k147 Duty to Disclose or Ascertain 
Authority 
308k147(3) k. Special Agency. Most 
Cited Cases 
Where power of attorney authorized ag,~nt only to 
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sell land, one taking assignment of contract from 
agent, and paying him therefor, did so at his peril. 
Principal and Agent 308 €;=169(3) 
308 Principal and Agent 
308I1l Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons 
308Ill(D) Ratification 
308k 168 Implied Ratification 
308k 169 In General 
308k 169(3) k. Acts Not Amounting 
to Ratification. Most Cited Cases 
That principal attempted to secure settlement from 
agent assigning land contract without authority held 
immaterial, as regards rights of assignee, where ef­
forts were unsuccessful. 
Principal and Agent 308 ~175(2) 
308 Principal and Agent 
308IIl Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons 
308IIl(D) Ratification 
308k 175 Operation and Effect 
308k 175(2) k. Agent's Contracts. Most 
Cited Cases 
Principal's ratification of agent's sale of land upon 
credit did not impart validity to agent's unauthor­
ized assignment of contract from which principal 
received no benefit. 
*259 Herman Welker, of Weiser, John H. Norris, of 
Payette, and Walter Griffiths, of Caldwell, for ap­
pellants. 
Cleve Groome, of Caldwell, for respondent. 
LEEPER, J. 
The plaintiff was the owner of a tract of land in 
Canyon county, Idaho. On the 13th day of March, 
1928, the plaintiff executed a written power of at­
torney in favor of the defendant W. H. McWilliams, 
which authorized him only to sell and convey the 
aforesaid premises, to execute a deed therefor, and 
to do all acts necessary to convey a complete title. 
The defendant McWilliams, acting under the power 
of attorney, thereafter made a contract for the sale 
of the premises to one Earl F. McClure for the sum 
of $1,000, $100 of which was paid down, and the 
balance being payable at the rate of $100 per year. 
Pursuant to this contract, McWilliams as attorney in 
fact for Eaton executed and acknowledged a deed to 
the premises, and thereafter kept the contract, deed, 
and abstract in his possession for a considerable 
length of time, instead of depositing them in escrow 
in the First National Bank of Caldwell as provided 
by the contract. The down payment of $100 was re­
ceived by McWilliams and was never accounted for 
to Eaton. McWilliams was entitled to $:50 as com­
pensation for making the sale, and expended $17 
for conveyancing and abstracting costs. On March 
4, 1929, and prior thereto, McWilliams had en­
deavored to sell this contract to the defendant 
Pence, who had offered him $646 for it. This 
McWil1iams refused to accept, but made a deal with 
Pence that the latter should advance $500, taking 
the contract in pledge as security, together with a 
written assignment thereof, and that he 
(McWilliams) would endeavor to sell the contract 
elsewhere and out of the proceeds pay Pence. This 
McWilliams was unable to do, and later he agreed 
to take the balance of $146 from Pence, which was 
paid to him. All of this $646 was converted by 
McWilliams and he never paid over any portion of 
it to Eaton, nor did he account therefor. After the 
assignment was made the defendant Pence received 
from the purchaser on the contract the total sum of 
$164, covering payments of principal and interest 
from the year 1929, and on October 26. 1930, the 
purchaser paid the further sum of $121 to the First 
Security Bank of Payette, in which institution the 
papers had been placed by Pence. 
During the time occupied by these transactions 
Eaton was living in Montana and was never present 
in Idaho. McWilliams advised him by letter that he 
had made the sale some time in the fall of 1928, but 
nothing was remitted to him, and he did not know 
of the details of the deal with McClure until he re­
turned to Idaho in February of 1930. At that time 
McWilliams concealed the fact that he had so sold 
the contract to Pence, but admitted having drawn 
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some money on it. On August 12, 1930, Eaton 
again returned to Idaho, and saw McClure and 
Pence. He had an argument with Pence about the 
division of a $38 check given for damages to the 
land by a drainage ditch constructed across it, and 
*260 finally compromised by dividing it equally, 
Mr. Pence acting as intermediary and dividing the 
money. At that time McClure advised him that 
McWilliams had assigned the contract to Pence, 
and they had some further discussion about that 
matter. This was the first time that Eaton knew of 
the assignment, and he later went to the Payette 
bank and inspected the papers. Shortly after this, 
Eaton employed an attorney, who thereafter served 
notice upon the bank and in November, 1930, filed 
this action on behalf of Mr. Eaton, seeking cancel­
lation of the purported assignment, for the return of 
moneys theretofore paid by McClure, and for the 
delivery of the deed, contract, and abstract to him. 
Judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff 
granting him full relief, from which this appeal is 
taken by defendants McWilliams and Pence. 
We have carefully inspected the record and find no 
error. The power of attorney given to McWilliams 
clothed him only with the power to sell, and must 
be strictly construed. "In accordance with the rule 
requiring powers of attorney to be strictly con­
strued, a power of attorney to sell lands must be 
strictly construed and cannot be extended by con­
struction. Hence an authority to sell must be strictly 
pursued and acts beyond those which are legitim­
ately necessary to carry the particular power into 
effect will not bind the principal, although, in the 
absence of restrictions, the agent has the undoubted 
power to do those things which are usually done in 
making such sales." 2 C. J. 611, § 245. Obviously, 
the power to assign the contract and receive pay­
ment therefor is not included within the purview of 
the written power of attorney, by the limitations of 
authority therein expressed. Pence being the assign­
ee of the contract, and having full knowledge of the 
terms of the power of attorney, certainly knew or 
should have known that McWilliams was acting 
beyond the scope of his agency. Indeed, as a matter 
of law, that agency was entirely terminated and no 
longer existed after the sale was completed. This 
case does not involve any question as to the appar­
ent scope of an agent's authority, because the spe­
cific written limitation was known to the purchaser, 
and the record does not disclose that this was ever, 
subsequent to its execution, changed or enlarged in 
any manner by the principal. A person who makes a 
payment to an agent acting without the scope of his 
employment does so at his peril. Whalen v. Vallier, 
46 Idaho, 181,266 P. 1089; Nielson v. Westrom, 46 
Idaho, 686, 270 P. 1054. 
Appellant contends that Eaton ratified the assign­
ment and isis therefore bound. We have searched 
the record for evidence of ratification and found 
none. Eaton moved with reasonable rapidity to re­
cover his property as soon as he leamed of the 
transaction on August 12, 1930, and prior to this 
time he had no knowledge of it. Apparently he did 
not know of many facts connected with the assign­
ment, particularly the purchase price, and he never 
received any of the consideration. That he attemp­
ted to secure settlement from McWilliams is imma­
terial, in view of the fact that his efforts were un­
successful. Pence did not rely upon anything said or 
done by Eaton at any time, and it appears to us that 
almost every element essential to ratification is 
missing in this case. Black-well v. Kercheval. 29 
Idaho, 473, 160 P. 741. The finding of the court, 
upon this record, that there was no ratification is 
conclusive upon us. The statement contained in the 
assignment to the effect that McWilliams was law­
fully authorized to execute it amounts to no more 
than a declaration of the agent and is not binding 
upon Eaton. Cupples v. Stanfield, 35 Idaho, 466, 
207 P. 326; Cox v. Crane Creek Sheep Co., 34 
Idaho, 327, 200 P. 678. As to whether or not 
McWilliams was empowered to sell upon credit un­
der the terms of the power of attorney we are not 
called upon to decide, since Eaton ratified the deal. 
This ratification, however, does not impart validity 
to the transaction between McWilliams and Pence, 
of which Eaton knew nothing and from which he 
received no benefit. 
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The judgment is affirmed. Costs to respondent. 
LEE, C. 1., and BUDGE, GIVENS, and VARIAN, 
J1., concur. 
Idaho 1932.
 
Eaton v. McWilliams
 
52 Idaho 145, 12 P.2d 259
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Supreme Court ofIdaho.
 
JENSEN
 
v.
 
SIDNEY STEVENS IMPLEMENT CO.
 
No. 3621.
 
Dec. 4, 1922.
 
Appeal from District Court, Bear Lake County; 
Robt. M. Terrell, Judge. 
Action by Thomas C. Jensen against the Sidney 
Stevens Implement Company. From a judgment for 
plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed and re­
manded. 
West Headnotes 
Principal and Agent 308 €=:'48 
308 Principal and Agent 
308JJ Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities 
308J1(A) Execution of Agency 
308k48 k. Nature of Agent's Obligation. 
Most Cited Cases 
It is an agent's first duty to communicate to his 
principal any facts relating to the business of his 
agency which he should in good faith under their 
trust relations have made known to his principal. 
Principal and Agent 308 €==69(1) 
308 Principal and Agent 
308JJ Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities 
308JI(A) Execution of Agency 
308k69 Individual Interest of Agent 
308k69(1) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
The law guards the fiduciary relation between prin­
cipal and agent with jealous care, and seeks to pre­
vent the possibility of a conflict between the agent's 
duty and his personal interest, and forbids him act­
ing adversely to the interests of his principal either 
for himself or others. 
Principal and Agent 308 €=:'69(2) 
308 Principal and Agent 
308II Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities 
308II(A) Execution of Agency 
308k69 Individual Interest of Agent 
308k69(2) k. Duty of Agent to Ac­
count for Profits of Agency. Most Cited Cases 
If an agent makes a profit in the course of his 
agency because of his failure to inform his principal 
of facts known to him, or which in the exercise of 
due diligence he should have ascertained for his 
principal, the profits of such transaction as a matter 
of law will belong exclusively to the principal. 
*1003 Jones, Pomeroy & Jones, of Pocatello, and 
D. C. Kunz, of Montpelier, for appellant. 
Budge & Merrill, of Pocatello, and A. B. Gough, of 
Montpelier, for respondent. 
LEE,J. 
Respondent brought this action to recover from ap­
pellant a balance on account of wages ea.rned while 
in its employment. Appellant, by way of answer 
and *1004 cross-complaint, alleged tha.t it was a 
Utah corporation, qualified to transact business in 
the state of Idaho, and had for many years main­
tained a branch establishment at Montpelier in said 
state, where it was engaged in selling farming im­
plements and other merchandise, in the course of 
which it acquired the ownership of real property 
hereafter referred to; that until August, 1919, re­
spondent was in its employment, and his duties 
were to collect accounts, look after its real estate, 
and find purchasers for the same, collect rents, and 
attend to all of its business matters arising in that 
locality, subject to the direction of appellant; that in 
May of that year it was the owner of certain real es­
tate, specifically described, comprising about 120 
acres of farm land in Bear Lake county, which it 
listed for sale with respondent, together with other 
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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of its real estate; and that it was at the time winding 
up its affairs and closing its business at said branch 
house. It further alleges that respondent was under 
instructions, and that it was his duty, to obtain the 
best possible price for said property, and to keep 
appellant fully informed with respect to all matters 
affecting the sale of such property, but that re­
spondent failed to do so, but that respondent while 
so employed, and when occupying such fiduciary 
relationship, failed to disclose to appellant the true 
conditions regarding offers made for the farm land 
in question, and thereby induced appellant to sell 
said premises to respondent for a much less sum 
than respondent had been offered for the property 
by a prospective purchaser, to whom he afterward 
resold the same for an advance of $1,000. Appel­
lant asked to have the balance claimed for wages 
set off against the excess obtained by respondent 
upon the resale of this property, and judgment for 
the remainder. 
Respondent answered said cross-complaint, in ef­
fect admitting the relationship of principal and 
agent as alleged, that the real estate in question had 
been listed with him for sale, that he had purchased 
the same from his principal without having dis­
closed the facts to appellant as to a previous offer 
from a third party, and that, after obtaining a con­
veyance of the same, he had soon thereafter con­
tracted to resell said premises to the party who had 
made the offer before he had purchased the 
premises, for $1,000 in excess of the price for 
which he had purchased the land from his principal, 
and had subsequently closed such sale for $850 in 
excess of what he had paid his principal for the 
land. 
The cause was tried to a jury, which returned a ver­
dict in favor of respondent for his wages, and failed 
to make any direct finding upon the affirmative is­
sues tendered by the cross-complaint. 
There is practically no conflict in the testimony re­
garding the material issues presented by the plead­
ings. On May 7, 1919, respondent, by letter ad­
dressed to appellant's home office at Ogden, Utah, 
informed it that he had an offer of $2,600 cash for 
this farm. The letter does not disclosf: who was 
making this offer, but respondent testified at the tri­
al that it was in fact his own offer. Two days later 
appellant replied, rejecting the offer, but stating that 
it would accept $3,000 as its lowest price, with the 
condition that such price was subject to change at 
any time prior to acceptance. On the 12th day of 
May following, respondent again Wrotf: to appel­
lant, stating that he had decided to purchase the 
land for himself and his boys at the price of $3,000. 
This offer appellant accepted, and respondent paid 
$2,000 and gave a mortgage for the remainder. 
The witness Berry, who had been negotiating with 
respondent for the purchase of this land, testifies 
that about the 7th of May respondent, with other 
members of his family, came to his place, which 
adjoined the land in question, and that he made re­
spondent an offer of $3,600 for the land. Respond­
ent never informed appellant as to this offer, and 
gave as a reason for not doing so that the condition 
which Berry attached with regard to the lease 
caused him to believe that the offer would not be 
acceptable. Upon respondent securing title to the 
premises, negotiations were renewed between Berry 
and himself, which resulted in Berry agreeing to 
purchase the land from respondent for the sum of 
$4,000. Before the deal was consummated, Berry 
ascertained that respondent had just previously pur­
chased the land from appellant for $3,000, and de­
murred to paying this much of an advancement. Re­
spondent and Berry adjusted their differences by 
agreeing upon a consideration of $3,850, which sale 
was finally consummated on June 9th. 
There is a conflict between the testimony of Berry 
and that of respondent as to when Berry made the 
offer of $3,600 which respondent reject1ed without 
submitting the same to his principal, he giving as a 
reason that Berry's offer imposed some condition 
with reference to the lease that made such offer of 
less value than that of $3,000 which he had made. 
But it is not controverted that Berry made this offer 
prior to respondent receiving the letter from his 
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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principal quoting him a price of $3,000, so it is 
clear that respondent, after having submitted his of­
fer of $2,600, which was rejected, and prior to the 
counter proposal from his principal to sell for 
$3,000, had received from Berry an offer of $3,600, 
which he failed to disclose to his principal. Re­
spondent admits in his testimony that the statement 
contained in his letter of May 12th to his principal, 
wherein he says that a Mr. Groo was the party who 
had made the offer of $2,600, was not true, and that 
Groo had not made such an *1005 offer, but that, 
on the contrary, the offer was intended to be for 
himself. 
From these conceded facts it is clear that respond­
ent did not exercise toward his principal in the mat­
ter of the sale and purchase of this real estate such 
good faith as the law requires an agent to exercise 
toward a principal. The entire transaction was car­
ried on by correspondence, and it was his duty be­
fore purchasing this land for himself to fully dis­
close all of the facts and circumstances regarding 
the negotiations then pending with any other pro­
spective purchaser, so that appellant would be fully 
advised of the situation. The court correctly instruc­
ted the jury that: 
"Loyalty to his trust is the first duty which an agent 
owes to his principal. It follows as a necessary con­
clusion that the agent must not put himself in such a 
relationship that his interests become antagonistic 
to those of his principal. Fidelity in the agent is 
what is aimed at, and as a means of securing it the 
law will not permit the agent to place himself in a 
situation in which he may be tempted by his own 
private interest to disregard that of his principal. So 
it is the duty of the agent to make his principal a 
full and complete disclosure of all facts relative to 
the subject of his agency which it may be material 
to the principal to know. And, if an agent makes 
any profit in the course of his agency because of his 
failure to inform his principal of facts known to 
him, or which in the exercise of due diligence he 
should have ascertained for his principal, the profits 
of such transaction, as a matter of law, will belong 
exclusively to the agent's principal. The law guards 
the fiduciary relation, which the relation of princip­
al and agent is, with jealous care. It seeks to pre­
vent the possibility of a conflict between duty and 
personal interest. It demands that the agent shall 
work with an eye single to the interest of his prin­
cipal. It forbids him from acting adversely to his 
principal, either for himself or for others. * * *" 
The jury in rendering a verdict for respondent, 
failed to apply to the admitted facts in this case the 
rule of law thus given to it by the court. It was not 
until some 60 days after this transaction that appel­
lant became aware of respondent's breach of trust, 
and demanded an accounting for the $850 he had 
received for this land in excess of what he had paid 
his principal. The demand was refused, and re­
spondent subsequently brought this action to recov­
er from appellant the balance of his wages in part 
earned while the transaction relative to the land sale 
was pending. We think that appellant was entitled 
to set off its demand against respondent's claim for 
these wages, and to recover judgment for the excess 
received by respondent for the sale of said land. 
Appellant complains of that part of the court's in­
structions which is as follows: 
"Tn this connection, you are advised that, if you 
find that the defendant and cross-complainant has 
proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
transaction whereby the plaintiff purchased the land 
in question was not made in good faith, and like­
wise that the defendant and cross-complainant has 
proved each and every material allegation of its 
cross-complaint, then your verdict should be in fa­
vor of the defendant and cross-complainant." 
We think that this instruction does not correctly 
state the law applicable to the admitted facts in this 
case, because it is equivalent to an instruction that 
it was incumbent upon appellant to prove by a pre­
ponderance of the evidence that the transaction 
whereby the respondent purchased the land in ques­
tion was not made in good faith. All of the material 
facts and circumstances relating to the agency set 
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forth in the cross-complaint were in effect admitted 
by respondent, either by his pleading or his testi­
mony. The fact of his having purchased the real 
property which had been listed for sale with him, 
under both express and implied conditions that he 
should sell it for the best interests of his principal, 
prevented him from purchasing the same on his 
own account without first making a full and com­
plete disclosure to his principal of all offers of pur­
chase by others, and of all the facts and circum­
stances connected with the sale of this property. His 
admission that he did not do so would relieve the 
appellant from the requirement that it assume the 
entire burden of proof of establishing the agent's 
want of good faith. That is, the question of good 
faith on the part of respondent must be determined 
from all the facts and circumstances of the case, 
and we do not think that the burden of establishing 
this by a preponderance of the evidence shifted to 
appellant, in view of the admissions of respondent 
in his answer to the cross-complaint and also in his 
testimony. 
The cause is reversed and remanded, with instruc­
tions to grant a new trial. Costs awarded to appel­
lant. 
RICE, C. J., and McCARTHY and DUNN, 11., con­

cur.
 
BUDGE, J., took no part.
 
Idaho 1922.
 
Jensen v. Sidney Stevens Implement Co.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIALJ.>~~~~!f.rj{(1,,;Cj~'" 
By l)EBRAV.:jJfj~W1 - . 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF AD1fPl1T'f
 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
 
In the Matter of: 
Case No. CVIE0905214 
GEORGE D. PERRY, 
ORDER DISALLOWING CLAIM 
Deceased. 
On February 26, 2010, the Court conducted a hearing on the claim of the State of 
Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare (Department) against George Perry's estate. 
The Department seeks to recover Medicaid benefits paid to Mr. Perry's wife, Martha 
Perry. The personal representative ofMr. Perry's estate, Barbara McCormick, is 
represented by Peter Sisson and the Department by Corey Cartwright. The parties have 
agreed to the relevant facts and have presented written memoranda and made oral 
argument. 
1. Background. 
During George and Martha Perry's marriage, Martha owned a home at 2104 
Tendoy Drive in Boise. On November 18, 2002, by quitclaim deed, Martha transferred 
this property to herself and George. On July 31,2006, again by quitclaim deed, the 
property was transferred to George alone. 1 
Over the years, Martha's health has failed and, since October 1, 2006, she has 
received assistance from the Medicaid program to pay for her nursing home care. At the 
time of George's death, February 25,2009, Medicaid had provided over $100,000,00 in 
benefits to Martha. In March 2009, Ms McCormick, in her capacity as personal 
I The court has determined that George Perry held a valid power of attorney from Martha and that he had 
the authority to transfer the property to himself. 
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representative of George's estate, sold the Tendoy home and has preserved the net 
proceeds of the sale in an estate account. This money is the only significant asset of 
George's estate. 
On April 15,2009, the Department filed its claim against George's estate and on 
June 4,2009, Ms. McCormick filed a notice of disallowance of the claim. Pursuant to 
Idaho Code 15-3-806, on June 15,2009, the Department filed its Petition for Allowance 
of Claim which is now before the court. 
II. Issues Presented. 
The ultimate issue is: May the Department recover Medicaid benefits that it has 
paid to Martha (who is still living) from George's estate--the proceeds of the sale of the 
Tendoy home? Under the Department's reasoning, since Martha had an interest in the 
Tendoy home during the marriage (and after federal statutory changes in 1993), it may 
recover benefits paid in an amount equal to Martha's ownership interest from the 
proceeds of the sale of the home. The personal representative (PR) argues that the 
Department may only recover, from George's estate, an amount equal to Martha's 
interest in the Tendoy home at the time of her death. Since Martha is still living and 
neither this home nor its proceeds will ever pass to her, the PR denies that the 
Department may recover any amount. 
The foundation of the Department's claim is Idaho Code 15-56-218(1) which 
provides: 
Recovery of certain medical assistance.-(1) Except where exempted or waived 
in accordance with federal law medical assistance pursuant to this chapter 
paid on behalf of an individual who was fifty-five (55) year so age or older when 
the individual received such assistance may be recovered from the individual's 
estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any, for such aid paid to either or both: 
ORDER DISALLOWING CLAIM Page 2 000506
(b) While one (1) spouse survives, except where joint probate will be authorized 
pursuant to section 15-3-111, Idaho Code, a claim for recovery under this section 
may be established in the estate of the deceased spouse. 
(emphasis added) 
The only Idaho case dealing with recovery of Medicaid benefits from the estate of 
the recipient's spouse is Idaho Department ofHealth and Welfare v. Jackman 132 Idaho 
213 (1998).2 Jackman's essential holding is that the Department is not limi ted to the 
estate of the recipient for recovery of Medicaid benefits, but may recover appropriate 
amounts from the estate of the recipient's spouse. The case was remanded to the probate 
court for a determination of whether the Medicaid recipient (Hildor Knudson) had an 
interest in community property, at the time of her death, the value of which, the court 
suggested, could be recovered from her husband's estate. 
Jackman does not directly address the critical question for our case: To what 
time, during the marriage, may the court look in assessing a Medicaid recipient's interest 
in property-any time (after 1993) during the couple's marriage or the time of the 
recipient's death. 3 
The Department's claim depends upon an interpretation of the definitions of 
"estate" and "assets" found in Idaho and federal statutes. 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(1) 
provides: 
No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf 
of an individual under the State plan may be made, except that the State shall seek 
adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an 
individual under the State plan in the case of the following individuals: 
2 In re Estate ofKaminsky 141 Idaho 436 (2005) involved a claim to recover Medicaid benefits from the 
recipient's estate and was decided on the grounds that the Department's claim was untimely. 
3 Jackman certainly suggests that the time of the recipient's death is the determinative time: "The record 
before us does not disclose whether Lionel and Hildor had any community property at the time of Hildor's 
death. If they did, Lionel's interest in that community property property may therefore be part of Hildor's 
"estate" that 42 U.S.c. 1396p(b)(l)(B) and (4) authorizes the Department to recover and apply against the 
balance of the Medicaid payments." Id. at 216. (emphasis added) 
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(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when the 
individual received such medical assistance, the State shall seek adjustment or 
recovery from the individual's estate, 
This statute goes on to define "estate" in 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4): 
For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate", with respect to a deceased 
individual­
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included within 
the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; and 
(B) may include, at the option of the State ... any other real and personal property 
and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time 
of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a 
survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy 
in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement. 
(emphasis added) 
Finally, 42 U.S.C.1396p(h) contains general definition provisions: 
(1) The term "assets", with respect to an individual, includes all income and 
resources of the individual and of the individual's spouse, including any income 
or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse is entitled to but 
does not receive because of action-­
(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse, 
(B) by a person, including a court or administrative body, with legal 
authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual or such 
individual's spouse, or 
(C) by any person, including any court or administrative body, acting at 
the direction or upon the request of the individual or such individual's 
spouse. 
To paraphrase the Department's argument, it may recover from George's estate because 
Idaho Code 56-218(1) allows recovery from the estate of a recipient's spouse; 42 U.S.C. 
1396p(b)(4) includes the word "assets" in its definition of "estate" and 42 U.S.C. 
1396p(h)(1) says "assets" includes property that a person transferred to her spouse. The 
court cannot accept this interpretation. 
ORDER DISALLOWING CLAIM Page 4 000508
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The reasoning urged by the Department is similar to that presented in Estate of 
Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N. Dakota 2000). Clarence Wirtz had received Medicaid 
benefits and North Dakota sought to recover the payments from the estate of Vema Witz, 
Clarence's wife. The Wirtz court analyzed the federal statutory definitions of "estate" and 
"asset" as quoted above and held that" ... any assets conveyed by Clarence Wirtz to 
Vema Wirtz before Clarence Wirtz's death are subject to the department's recovery 
claim." Id at 886. This ruling depends, however, on an awkward interpretation of the 
term "other arrangement" in 42 U.S.c. 1396p(b)(4)(B). The North Dakota court in Wirtz 
interpreted the "other arrangement" language independently from the rest of the section. 
The bulk of the section refers to transfers of property that occur in an automatic fashion 
on the death of the owner, such as joint tenancies, survivorship transfers and life estates. 
It would have been a drafter's nightmare to list every imaginable transfer of property of 
this type. Consequently, the more natural interpretation in the context of the surrounding 
language is that "other arrangement" is meant to include transfers of a similar, automatic 
nature not any possible transfer. 
The case of Estate ofBarg, 752 N.W.2d 52 (Minn. 2008) provides a more 
reasonable interpretation of the federal statutory language. 
We conclude that there is no principled basis on which to interpret the 
federal law to allow recovery of assets in which the Medicaid recipient did not 
have an interest in at the time of her death. As explained above, the rationale 
for finding authority to recover from a surviving spouse's estate at all emanates 
from the authority granted in the federal law to recover from the "estate" of the 
Medicaid recipient. Property transferred prior to death would not be part of the 
recipient's estate. Further, as recognized by every decision except Wirtz, to the 
extent the 1993 amendments allow states to expand the definition of "estate" for 
Medicaid recovery purposes, the language of the federal law clearly limits that 
expansion to assets in which the recipient had an interest at the time of her death. 
Id at 71._(emphasis added) 
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III. Conclusion. 
The federal statutory definition of "estate" does not include transfers of property 
made by a Medicaid recipient before she died. When making a claim against the estate of 
a Medicaid recipient's spouse, the Department may only recover against property in 
which the recipient spouse had an interest at the time of her death. Martha Perry 
conveyed all of her interest in the Tendoy home during her lifetime. There was no joint 
tenancy, right of survivorship or "other arrangement" that would have conveyed any 
interest in this property to Martha at George Perry's death. The Department may not 
recover Medicaid benefits paid to Martha from the proceeds of the sale of this property. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Department's Petition for Allowance of claim is 
denied. 
DATED This 10" day of March, 2010>. I ' / 
~.~~~ 
Hon. Christo'P~ M. Bieter 
Magistrate Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, J. David Navarro, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
mailed, by United States Mail, one copy of the Order Disallowing Claim, pursuant to 
Rule 77(d) I.C.A. to each of the attorneys of record in this cause in envelopes 
addressed as follows: 
PETER SISSON 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
2402 W ,JEFFERSON STREET 
BOISE 1083702 
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MEDICAID ESTATE RECOVERY 
PO BOX 83720 
BOISE 10 83720-0036 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
Ada County, Idaho 
Date: 10 March, 2010 sC}) .•. ~~-Deputy Clerk ::J 
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ATTORNEY GENERAL	 MAR 18 2010 
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JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH . By P. 60UHNE 
Deputy Attorney General DEPUTY 
Chief, Human Services Division 
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT RECEIVED I~S TRANSCRIPTS 
Deputy Attorney General t"'J 5 tL. 0, Ii.J 
Human Services Division 
3276 Elder, Ste. B 
POBox 83720 
Boise ID 83720-0036 
Telephone: (208) 332-7961 
ISB No. 3361 
[cartwriw@dhw.idaho.gov] 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
) 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: ) Case No. CV IE 0905214 
) 
GEORGE D. PERRY, ) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
) 
Deceased. ) EXEMPT: I.e. § 31-3212 
--------------) 
TO:	 BARBARA K. MCCORMICK, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, AND HER 
ATTORNEY OF RECORD, PETER SISSON, ATTORNEY AT LAW, AND TO THE 
CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT THE STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH AND WELFARE (hereinafter "the Department"), appeals pursuant Idaho Code § 17­
201 and Rule 83, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, as follows: 
1.	 The title of the court from which the appeal is taken is the Magi strate Division of 
the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District ofthe State ofIdaho in and for the County of 
Ada, Magistrate Judge Christopher M. Bieter, presiding. 
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2. The title of the court to which the appeal is taken is the District Court of the 
Fourth Judicial District of the State ofIdaho in and for the County of Ada. 
3. The Department appeals from the ORDER DISALLOWING CLAIM filed 
March 10,2010. 
4. This appeal is taken upon matters oflaw. 
5. This matter was heard by oral argument on February 26,2010, at Boise, Idaho; 
however, no evidentiary hearing was had and no testimony or evidence was taken. The hearing 
was tape recorded and the recordings are in the possession of the clerk of the court. 
6. The issues on appeal are: 
1. Did the Magistrate err in detennining that the general power of attorney 
held by George Perry gave him authority to make a gift to himself of Martha 
Perry's real property? 
2. Did the Magistrate err in its application and interpretation of Idaho Code 
§ 56-218, in refusing to allow the Department's claim against the estate of George 
Perry? 
3. Did the Magistrate err in its application and interpretation of 42 U.S.c. 
§ 1396p as pre-empting application ofIdaho Code § 56-218? 
4. Did the Magistrate err in failing to apply the Idaho Supreme Court holding 
in Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213 (1998) to 
the facts of this case? 
5. Is the Department entitled to attorney fees on appeal? 
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Marchel e Premo, Legal AssIstant 
Division of Human Services 
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THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
GEORGE D. PERRY, Case No. CV-IE-0905214 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Deceased AND ORDER 
This case is before the Court on Appellant Idaho Department of Health and Welfare's 
(Department's) motion for stay pending appeal. For the reasons that follow, the motion will be 
granted in part and denied in part. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The Department made a claim against the Estate of George D. Perry (George) for 
reimbursement of amounts expended by the Medicaid program on behalf of George's wife Martha, 
who survives George and is confined to a nursing home. The personal representative of the estate, 
Barbara McCormick (Personal Representative), is the daughter of George and Martha.. It appears 
that she may be a beneficiary of the estate. The Personal Representative denied the claim. The 
magistrate, Hon. Christopher M. Bieter, upheld the Personal Representative's denial of the claim, 
and the Department now appeals. The present motion before the Court is to stay distribution of the 
assets of George's estate pending the outcome of this appeal. The Personal Representative has no 
objection to the stay, except to the extent necessary to pay her costs and attorney fees. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 1 
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ANALYSIS 
The Department asserts that the Personal Representative is not entitled to pay costs and 
attorney fees from estate funds because she has a fiduciary responsibility to the estate and creditors 
and therefore cannot use estate funds to advocate for her personal interests. 
Idaho Code § 15-3-720 provides: 
If any personal representative or person nominated as personal representative 
defends or prosecutes any proceeding in good faith, whether successful or not, he 
is entitled to receive from the estate his necessary expenses and disbursements 
including reasonable attorney's fees incurred. 
At least two Idaho cases have discussed whether a personal representative is entitled to 
reimbursement for attorney fees incurred in pursuing his or her own interests. In Eliasen v.
 
Fitzgerald, 105 Idaho 234, 668 P.2d 110 (1983), the court allowed attorney fees to the personal
 
representative on a finding that the litigation was pursued in good faith, including the representative's
 
resistance to efforts to remove him. In Matter ofEstate ofBerriochoa, 108 Idaho 474, 700 P.2d 96
 
(1985) the personal representative was also a beneficiary under the will and incurred attorney fees in
 
asserting his claim to certain assets of the estate. There, the court held that he was noil entitled to
 
attorney fees under the foregoing statute because he was litigating solely his own personal interests.
 
The present case is clearly distinguishable. Here, the claimant is the Department; the personal 
representative is simply defending the appeal. There is no allegation that she is doing so in bad faith. 
The fact that denial of the Department's claim may increase the amount available to the beneficiaries 
does not amount to a breach of fiduciary duty absent some showing of bad faith. Indeed a personal 
representative who is also a beneficiary would breach a fiduciary duty by failing to dispute 
unmeritorious claims, and should not be required to front the attorney fees to do so on the basis of a 
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personal interest (a greater share) if successful. The Department's interpretation wouId render the 
statue essentially meaningless, in any case in which the personal representative is also a beneficiary. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the motion is granted in part and denied in part. 
The Personal Representative shall distribute no funds or assets of the estate to any beneficiary, 
except for payment of expenses and attorney fees incurred in this appeal, until further order of the 
Court. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this J'\* day of May, 2010. 
Kathryn A ticklen 
District Judge 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from an order disallowing a creditor's claim in a probate proceeding. It 
involves Medicaid, also known as "medical assistance," and estate recovery, as provided by 
Idaho Code § 56-218. Estate recovery is a program required by federal and state law that seeks 
to recover assets of deceased Medicaid recipients, from their estates, to reimburse the taxpayers 
for expenditures made during the Medicaid recipient's life. This matter involves the 
Department's claim filed in the estate of the deceased spouse ofa Medicaid recipient. 
Course of Proceedings 
The personal representative was appointed in this estate on March 19,2009. The 
Department filed a contingent I claim, in the amount of$106,251.08, on April 15, 2009. On June 
2,2009, a Notice of Disallowance ofClaim was filed by the personal representative. On June 15, 
2009, the Department filed its Petition for Allowance of Claim. Hearing was held on the 
Department' Petition on February 26, 2010. On March 10, 2010, Judge Bieter issued his Order 
Disallowing Claim. This appeal followed. 
Statement of the Facts 
George D. Perry ("George") was born  and died February 25,2009, at the 
age of79. Martha J. Perry ("Martha") was born  and at the time this brief is 
written is believed to be still living. Martha was previously known as Martha Jean Boyle and, no 
later than September 18, 1977, was the owner, as her sole and separate property, of c<::rtain real 
property in Ada County. At some point in time later, Martha and George were marri<::d. On 
'Idaho Code § 15-3-810. 
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November 18, 2002, Martha executed a Quitclaim Deed, with the grantor named as "Martha Jean 
Boyle" and the grantee as "Martha Jean Perry & George Donald Perry." At some point, with 
Martha's health declining, George and Martha needed assistance in paying for Martha's medical 
care. About July 31,2006, George purported to transfer Martha's interest in the real property to 
himself, signing a Quitclaim Deed on behalf of Martha as her Power of Attorney. About 
September 15, 2006, George and Martha applied to the Department for medical assistance to help 
pay for Martha's medical care. Since October 1, 2006, the Department has provided payment for 
Martha's medical care, through the Medicaid program, in the sum of at least $108,364.23. (This 
was the amount on April 27, 2009. Medicaid expenditures are ongoing.) 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 2 O:\AppellanIS Brief.wpd 
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ISSUES ON APPEAL
 
1. Did the Magistrate err in detennining that the general power of attorney held by 
George Perry gave him authority to make a gift to himself ofMartha Perry's real property? 
2. Did the Magistrate err in its application and interpretation ofIdaho Code § 56­
218, in refusing to allow the Department's claim against the estate of George Perry? 
3. Did the Magistrate err in its application and interpretation of 42 V.S.c.. § 1396p as 
preempting application of Idaho Code § 56-218? 
4. Did the Magistrate err in failing to apply the Idaho Supreme Court holding in 
Idaho Department ofHealth and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6 (1998) to the 
facts of this case? 
5. Is the Department entitled to attorney fees on appeal? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 83(u)(1) sets forth the standard of review for appeals to the 
district court from the magistrate's division, as follows: 
Upon an appeal from the magistrate's division ofthe district court, not involving a 
trial de novo, the district court shall review the case on the record and determine 
the appeal as an appellate court in the same manner and upon the same standards 
of review as an appeal from the district court to the Supreme Court under the 
statutes and law ofthis state, and the appellate rules of the Supreme Court. 
Rule 83(u)(1), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The Idaho Supreme Court in Hawkins v. 
Hawkins, 99 Idaho 785, 589 P.2d 532 (1978), explained the import of Rule 83(u)(1): 
We read [I.R.c.P. 83(u)(1)] as saying that a district court, in making an 
appellate review of a magistrate's decision, should perform that task in the same 
manner as this Court performs its appellate review ofthe trial decision of a district 
court. In reviewing a magistrate's findings, therefore, the district courts should 
adhere to the well recognized rule that findings based on substantial and 
competent, though conflicting, evidence will not be set aside on appeal. Prescott 
v. Prescott, 97 Idaho 257, 542 P.2d 1176 (1975); fsaguirre v. Eschevarria, 96 
Idaho 641, 534 P.2d 471 (1975); I.R.C.P. 52(a). 
Furthermore, upon the appellate review conducted in a district court, the 
district court is, as is this Court on an appeal where the district court has been the 
factfinder, empowered to affirm, reverse, remand (including remand for a new 
trial with instructions), or modify the judgment. I.R.C.P. 83(u)(2). Where the trial 
court's findings of fact are confused or in conflict, or where findings on a 
particular issue are lacking, and resort to the record does not show clearly what 
findings are correct, the district court ordinarily will not modify the judgment. 
Frederickson v. Deep Creek frr. Co., 15 Idaho 41, 96 P. 117 (1908); 5B C,J.S. 
Appeal and Error § 1874 (1958). The district court will either remand for new 
findings, or, alternatively, act under I.c. § 1-2213(2) and I.R.C.P. 83(u)(2) and 
conduct a partial or whole trial de novo. 
Hawkins, 99 Idaho at 788-789,589 P.2d at 535-536. 
Idaho Rule ofCivil Procedure 52(a) requires that a trial court, sitting without a jury, enter 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 4 O:\Appellants Briel:wpd 
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specific findings of fact and conclusions oflaw. In the Matter ofthe Estate ofSpencer, 106 Idaho 
316, 678 P.2d 108 (Ct. App. 1984), the Idaho Court of Appeals explained this requirement: 
Rule 52(a), I.R.C.P., requires a trial court in all actions tried upon the facts 
without a jury to "find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of 
law thereon and direct the entry of the appropriate judgment." The rule also 
provides that "[i]f an opinion or memorandum decision is filed, it will be 
sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law appear therein." 
Ordinarily, in reviewing a decision of the district court on appeal from a 
magistrate, we must determine from the trial court (magistrate) record whether 
substantial evidence supports the magistrate's findings of fact and whether those 
findings support the magistrate's conclusions oflaw. Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 
559,633 P.2d 1137 (1981); Ustickv. Ustick, 104 Idaho 215,657 P.2d 1083 
(Ct.App.1983). If so, and if correct legal principles have been applied, then the 
district court's decision affirming a magistrate's judgment will be upheld. Id. Only 
where the record is so clear as to give the appellate court a complete 
understanding of the material issues and the basis ofthe magistrate's reasoning 
will the absence of findings of fact not result in a remand for adequate findings. 
See Pope v. Intermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217, 646 P.2d 988 (1982); In re 
Estate ofStibor, 96 Idaho 162,525 P.2d 357 (1974). 
Estate ofSpencer, 106 Idaho at 320,678 P.2d at 112. 
In the case of In re Estate ofStibor, 96 Idaho 162,525 P.2d 357 (1974), the Idaho 
Supreme Court was presented with a district court's affirmance ofa magistrate's refusal to admit 
a will to probate. The magistrate's decision was rendered by memorandum opinion, without the 
entry of specific findings of fact and conclusions oflaw. Id. at 163. Reversing the district court, 
the Supreme Court stated: 
Even though IRCP 52(a) recognizes that findings of fact and conclusions 
of law may be embodied in a memorandum opinion, still both the findings and 
conclusions must be specially stated if they are to fulfill their designed purpose. 
This court has held that the absence of findings of fact may be disregarded by the 
appellate court if the record is so clear that the court does not need their aid for a 
complete understanding of the issues. However, in this case the record is not that 
clear. The assignments of error are directed to the sufficiency of the evidence to 
sustain the magistrate's decision. It cannot be determined upon what facts the 
magistrate based his decision. 
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When the district judge was considering the appeal in this case, explicit 
findings of fact and separate conclusions of law by the magistrate would have 
clearly reflected the basis of the magistrate's decision, and then the district court 
more readily could have determined whether facts sustained the magistrate's 
decision and whether he had correctly applied the appropriate principles of law. 
Moreover, with such findings offact, the district court could have properly 
determined whether this was such a case as should have been tried de novo before 
the district court. I.e. § 1-2213. 
Estate ofStibor, 96 Idaho at 164,525 P.2d at 359. (citations omitted). 
II. 
MEDICAID IS NOT A FEDERAL PROGRAM 
ADMINISTERED BY THE STATE, IT IS A JOINT STATE­
FEDERAL PROGRAM. 
To the uninitiated, Medicaid law can be obscure and unintuitive.2 While outsiders may 
view Medicaid as a federal program administered by the state, it is in fact ajoint state-federal 
program. Federal enactment provides a framework and the states then enact their own laws to 
provide medical assistance to their own citizens and receive federal financial participation. 
Medicaid is intended to provide care for the needy. Unlike social security disability or 
Medicare, there are no premiums or payroll taxes for Medicaid. Instead, it is a welfare program 
funded by state and federal general fund revenues. It is intended to be the payer of last resort. 
Medicaid is a strictly means-tested program, available only to those ofthe most limited 
resources. For example, an elderly single person must have no more than $2,000 in available 
resources to qualify for assistance. 
2Indeed, one federal court has noted that Medicaid law is of"labyrinthine complexity" and called it "almost 
unintelligible to the uninitiated." Friedman v. Berger, 547 F.2d 724, 727 (2nd CiT. 1976). 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 6 O:\Appellants Brief.wpd 
000530
 
 
 
  -
 
 
i
Where a married couple is involved, and only one of them needs nursing home care, the 
law takes care not to impoverish the at-home spouse. Resources such as the couple's home and 
automobile are not counted in establishing eligibility. In this way, the nursing home spouse can 
qualify for Medicaid while the at-home spouse3 can retain the resources needed for his support. 
However, there is a trade-off for the public's largesse. Restrictions are impos4~d on both 
spouses' ability to transfer assets to third parties. Penalties are imposed for transfers of assets 
within federal "look back" dates, which are either three or five years prior to Medicaid 
application, depending on the circumstances and date of transfer. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 
1396p(c). Likewise, Idaho law criminalizes transfers of assets to qualify for Medicaid, and 
transfers of assets by either spouse, without adequate consideration, can be set aside by the 
courts. Idaho Code §§ 56-227 and 56-218(2). 
Medicaid has always been intended to provide only for the needy. In 1993, Congress 
strengthened federal law relating to estate recovery and asset transfers in response to widespread 
reports of abuse. Among the changes made were longer look back periods, an expanded 
definition of assets subject to estate recovery, and penalties for asset transfers. The legislative 
history accompanying these actions shows Congress' intent that a couple's assets be traced to 
facilitate recovery: 
Under the Committee bill, States are required to establish an estate 
recovery program that meets certain requirements. The pro&ram must identilfy 
and track resources (whether or not excluded for eli&ibility purposes) of 
individuals who receive nursing facility, home and community-based services., 
and other specified long-term care services. The program must promptly ascertain 
3In Medicaid parlance, this person is known as the "community spouse." This has nothing to do with 
community property law, since federal Medicaid law ignores state community property principles, but rather refers to the 
spouse that lives "in the community" rather than in an institution. 
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when the individual and the surviving spouse, if any, dies, and must provide £)f 
the collection ofthe amounts correctly paid by Medicaid on behalf ofthe 
individual for long-tenn care services from the estate of the individual or tbe 
survivine spouse. The tenn "estate" is defined as all real and personal property of 
a deceased individual and all other assets in which the individual had any legally 
cognizable title or interest at the time ofhis death, including assets conveyed to a 
survivor, heir, or assign through joint tenancy, survivorship, life estate, living 
trust, or other arrangement. 
H.R. Rep. 103-111, P.L. 103-66, OBRA 1993 (May 25, 1993), Section 5112. (emphasis added). 
The federal Medicaid framework anticipates transfers between spouses for the: sole 
purpose of providing a necessary living for the at-home spouse. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 
1396p(c). The federal law uses tenns such as "for the sole benefit of the individual's spouse." 42 
U.S.c. § 1396p(c)(2)(B)(i), (ii). When eligibility is detennined, all ofthe assets ofboth spouses 
are taken into consideration, without regard to whether the property is separate or community 
property or whether it has been transferred from one spouse to the other. See IDAPA 
16.03.05.735 to .752. The eligibility process involves complicated provisions meant to ensure 
that the at-home spouse has enough resources to provide for himself. See id. It is obvious that 
these provisions are not intended to provide an inheritance for the couple's heirs. To the 
contrary, they are intended to make necessary medical care available to one spouse, provide for 
the necessary living expenses of the other, and that is all.4 
III. 
ESTATE RECOVERY IS PART OF THE WHOLE 
PROCESS OF MEDICAID FOR THE ELDERLY. 
The 1993 amendments to the Medicaid law (often referred to as OBRA '93) made estate 
recovery mandatory to the states. OBRA '93 also created the anti-spousal impoverishment 
4There are also provisions to provide for minor or disabled children, but those provisions are not relevant here. 
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provisions that pennitted the spousal transfers referred to above. Prior to OBRA '93, the at-
home spouse would be left destitute and unable to provide for himself. With OBRA '93, the 
Medicaid spouse was allowed to transfer property needed for the at-home spouse's living, and 
the at-home spouse was allowed to retain sufficient resources to maintain his household. OBRA 
'93 also enacted the expanded definition of estate found in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) and Idaho 
Code § 56-218(4)(b). Of course, these enactments are all related and support the legislative 
intent quoted in the house report, above. The intent was to prevent the impoverishment ofthe at-
home spouse, but at the same time, provide for recovery of the couple's assets after both had 
passed away and no longer needed them. 
The process for this is estate recovery. Estate recovery involves the recovery ofthe assets 
of the couple from the probate estate. Probate law is uniquely state law; there is no federal 
probate law. Accordingly, there is no part of the federal-state Medicaid partnership that is more 
completely governed by state, rather than federal, law. It is state probate and marital property 
law that defines what property is available for payment of creditors from the probate f:state. 
Likewise, 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) specifically anticipates that the states will define what other 
property, not included in the probate estate, will be included in Medicaid recovery: 
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the tenn "estate", with respect to a. 
deceased individual­
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets includ'ed 
within the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; and 
(B) may include. at the option of the State (and shall include, in the case 
of an individual to whom paragraph (1 )(C)(i) applies), any other real and personal 
property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at 
the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyf:d to 
a survivor. heir. or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, 
tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement;. 
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42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (underline added). 
Estate recovery is an anticipated and expected part of providing Medicaid for the elderly. 
The restrictions on the amount of assets and resources the couple can retain are relaxed, but the 
trade-off is that once the need of the couple for those assets has ended, they must be n:~paid into 
the treasury to offset the expense to the taxpayers and provide for the needs of others similarly 
situated. Federal and state law is not intended to provide an inheritance to the able bodied heirs 
of Medicaid recipients and their spouses, at taxpayer expense, but only to provide for the elderly 
couple and return the retained assets to the treasury when they are no longer needed. 
IV. 
IDAHO LAW HAS ALWAYS PLACED THE 
RESPONSIBILITY ON SPOUSES TO PROVIDE 
NECESSARY CARE AND SUPPORT FOR EACH OTHER. 
Idaho recognizes the responsibility of spouses to provide for one another. Idaho Code § 
32-901 states that "Husband and wife contract toward each other obligations ofmutual respect, 
fidelity and support." In the case ofEdminston v. Smith, 13 Idaho 645, 92 P. 842 (1907), a wife 
entered into a contract for lodging and her landlord brought an action to recover from the 
husband. The question before the court was whether the husband could be liable for a contract 
for lodging entered into only by the wife. The Idaho Supreme Court held in the affimlative: 
On the part of the husband, it is contended that he is not liable, for the reason that 
the complaint shows that the credit was extended to the wife on her promise, and 
not upon any implied liability ofhis. 
*** 
The liability of the wife, if any, rests on her contract and promise to pay, while the 
husband's liability for a necessary, such as board and room. grows out of and is 
incident to his marital duties. and arises therefrom by operation oflaw. The wife 
is entitled to these necessaries at the husband's expense, but, ifhe neglects to 
furnish them and she cannot secure them on his credit, and can do so on the faith 
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ofher own promise to pay the bill, she is certainly entitled to procure them in that 
manner. Ifthe creditor parts with his goods on the faith ofthe wife's promise to 
pay, he is entitled to recover against her ifthe debt is not paid. The fact that she is 
obliged to obligate herself can in no way relieve the husband ofhis duty and 
responsibility in the matter. The wife has a right, on the other hand, to have the 
husband holden for the debt, so that, if it can be collected from him, she may be 
relieved of that obligation. The creditor is entitled to hold the husband, although 
he is not willing to part with his goods without the additional assurance of the 
wife's personal obligation to pay the debt. 
* * * 
We conclude that the husband is unquestionably liable for the debt. and that a 
good cause of action is stated against him. 
Edminston, 13 Idaho at _,92 P. at 843-44. Clearly, the Idaho legislature's choice in Idaho 
Code § 56-218, ofmaking one spouse's estate liable for medical expenses paid on behalf of the 
other is not unusual or unprecedented. Indeed, it only makes sense that the couple's money 
should be used first for their own care, and only after Medicaid is reimbursed, can the remainder 
be distributed to the heirs.5 
V. 
IDAHO LAW CLEARLY PROVIDES FOR RECOVERY IN 
THIS CASE. 
Idaho Code § 56-218(1) permits the Department to recover from the estate of the spouse 
of a Medicaid recipient: 
Except where exempted or waived in accordance with federal law medical 
assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an individual who was 
fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the individual received such assistan4::e 
maybe recovered from the individual's estate, and the estate of the spouse, iflmy, 
for such aid paid to either or both; 
5While the heirs sometimes complain that Medicaid recovery takes their inheritance, this program benefits them 
as well as the needy couple. Without the Medicaid program, the couple would have to liquidate their assets to pay for 
their own care. Medicaid rates are substantially lower than private pay medical rates, and therefore, the heirs are more 
likely to have something left for their inheritance because their decedent was a Medicaid recipient. 
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Idaho Code § 56-218(1) (underline added). This law, on its face, is not limited to the community 
or other property the Medicaid recipient owned at death. Indeed, there is no limitation of any 
kind on what property of the spouse's estate is subject to recovery. Where a statute is. 
unambiguous, there is no need for construction. Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v. Idaho State 
Dept. ofAgriculture, 143 Idaho 366, 368, 146 P.3d 632, 634 (2006). 
Even though federal Medicaid law, as discussed above, ignores state community property 
principles, by rule the Department recovers only property which had been community property or 
jointly held property after October 1, 1993 (the effective date of OBRA '93). IDAPA 
16.03.09.900.20 states: 
20. Limitations on Estate Claims. 
* * * 
A claim against the estate of a spouse of a participant is limited to the value of the 
assets of the estate that had been, at any time after October 1, 1993, community 
property, or the deceased participant's share ofthe separate property, and jointly 
owned property. * * * 
IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20 (underline added). However, the rules also make it clear that transfer of 
property between spouses will not eliminate the Department's right of recovery. IDAPA 
16.03.09.900.24 states: 
24. Marriage Settlement Agreement or Other Such Agreement. 
A marriage settlement agreement or other such agreement which separates assets 
for a married couple does not eliminate the debt against the estate ofthe deceased 
participant or the spouse. Transfers under a marriage settlement agreement or 
other such agreement may be voided if not for adequate consideration. (3-30-07) 
IDAPA 16.03.09.900.24 (underline added). The Department's rules have the same force and 
effect as law. Mallonee v. State, 139 Idaho 615, 619, 84 P.3d 551, 555 (2004). 
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Clearly, Idaho law pennits the Department's claim in this estate and the claim was 
required to be allowed against the estate. 
VI. 
IDAHO'S SPOUSAL RECOVERY LAW IS NOT 
PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL LAW. 
A. State Law Will Only Be Preempted Where Congress Intends to Occupy an Entire Field of 
Law or Where a State Law Directly Conflicts with Federal Law. 
The Magistrate did not use the terms "preempted" or "preemption." However, since, as 
discussed above, Idaho law unambiguously permits the Department's claim and recovery in this 
case, he could only have concluded that Idaho law is preempted by federal law. The (~ourt stated: 
The federal statutory definition of "estate" does not include transfers of 
property made by a Medicaid recipient before she died. When making a claim 
against the estate of a Medicaid recipient's spouse, the Department may only 
recover against property in which the recipient spouse had an interest at the time 
of her death. Martha Perry conveyed all ofher interest in the Tendoy home during 
her lifetime. There was no joint tenancy, right of survivorship or "other 
arrangement" that would have conveyed any interest in this property to Martha at 
George Perry's death. The Department may not recover Medicaid benefits paid to 
Martha from the proceeds of the sale of this property. 
Order Disallowing Claim, p. 6. Likewise, the case ofEstate ofBarg, 752 N.W.2d 52 (Minn. 
2008), relied upon by the Magistrate, was based on federal preemption of a portion of 
Minnesota's spousal recovery law. Therefore, the Magistrate must have concluded that Idaho 
Code § 56-218(1) is preempted by federal law. 
When it comes to preemption, however, the question is not what "[t]he federal statutory 
definition of'estate'" includes, but whether federal law directly conflicts with state law. It does 
not. 
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Federal law only preempts state law where Congress has evidenced an intent to occupy a 
given field or where state law is in direct conflict with federal law: 
[S]tate law can be pre-empted in either of two general ways. If 
Congress evidences an intent to occupy a given field, any state law falling 
within that field is pre-empted. If Congress has not entirely displaced state 
regulation over the matter in question, state law is still pre-empted to the extent 
it actually conflicts with federal law, that is, when it is impossible to compbl 
with both state and federal law, or where the state law stands as an obstacle to 
the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. 
Boundary Backpackers v. Boundary County, 128 Idaho 371, 377, 913 P.2d 1141, 1147 
(1996), quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248, 104 S.Ct. 615, 621, 78 
L.Ed.2d 443 (1984). Therefore, to show that Idaho Code § 56-218 is invalid, the personal 
representative must show that either Congress intended to occupy the entire field, or that the 
Idaho statute directly conflicts with the application of federal law. 
That Congress did not intend to occupy the entire field is abundantly clear. Congress 
intended that the states enact their own legislation governing estate recovery. The Mt:dicaid law 
specifically requires the states to establish estate recovery programs: 
[T]he State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance 
correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the case of the 
following individuals: 
* * * (B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or 
older when the individual received such medical assistance, the State 
shall seek adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate" but only 
for medical assistance consisting of­
(i) nursing facility services, home and 
community-based services, and related hospital and prescription 
drug services, or 
(ii) at the option of the State, any items or services: 
under the State plan. 
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42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (underline added). Moreover, as shown, above, certain parts of the 
Medicaid program are optional and may be adopted, or not, as the State desires. Such provisions 
require enabling legislation or rule making by the State. 
Idaho Code § 56-218 appropriately implements the estate recovery mandate of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396p. For the personal representative to show that section 56-218 is preempted, she must 
show that the Idaho statute directly conflicts with federal law. This she cannot do. 
B. The Federal Statute Anticipates Recovery ofAssets Transferred to a Surviving Spouse. 
The federal law, 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(l), defines what payments are recoverable and 
does not restrict from whom recovery is made. Medicaid does much more than pay for nursing 
care for the elderly poor. It also pays for medical care for families receiving temporary support, 
and for the blind and disabled under the AABD (Aid for the Aged, Blind and Disabled) program. 
Funds expended for such care, however, are not recoverable in an estate recovery cas(~. Rather, 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l) mandates estate recovery only for payments made to certain elderly 
persons. 
Note the language of42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(I) which restricts what payments may be 
recovered (discussion regarding from whom recovery may be made follows): 
(b) Adjustment or recovery of medical assistance correctly paid und{~r 
State plan 
(1) No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correcth~: 
paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan may be made, except that 
the State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly 
paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the case of the following 
individuals: 
(A) In the case of an individual described in subsection 
(a)( nCB) of this section. . .. 
(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or 
older when the individual received such medical assistance . . .. 
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42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1) (underline added). It is important to realize that the primary purpose of 
this section is to define what payments may be recovered, rather than from whom those payments 
are recovered. 
The Magistrate focused on the language in section 1396p(b)(1 )(B) which requires 
recovery "from the individual's estate" and rules that the State cannot reach beyond property 
owned by the recipient at death. Order Disallowing Claim, pp. 4, 6. This, however, ignores both 
the plain language and the context of the statute. 
Subsection (b)(4) defines the term "estate" as used in this subsection: 
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate", with respect 
to a deceased individual­
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other 
assets included within the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of 
State probate law; and 
(B) may include, at the option of the State (and shall include, 
in the case of an individual to whom paragraph (l)(C)(i) applies), an'~ 
other real and personal property and other assets in which the 
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent 
of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor. heir. or 
assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in 
common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (emphasis added). Importantly, the individual's estate, for purposes of 
section 1396p, goes far beyond traditional concepts of a probate estate6 and includes "'other 
assets" of the individual, as well as "assets ... conveyed to a survivor." This is important 
because "assets" has a special meaning in Medicaid law. "Assets" is defined in subsection (h) of 
section 1396p to include the property of the spouse of the recipient: 
6See also Belshe v. Hope, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 917 (Cal. App. 1995) ("Estate" for purposes of42 U.S.c. § 1396p, 
must be interpreted broadly, and included the assets of a non-testamentary trust which contained property placed there by 
the decedent recipient and which attempted to convey property to decedent's heirs avoiding estate recovery). 
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(h) Definitions
 
In this section, the following definitions shall apply:
 
(1) The term "assets", with respect to an individual, includes all 
income and resources of the individual and of the individual's spouse, 
including any income or resources which the individual or such individual's 
spouse is entitled to but does not receive because of action­
(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse, 
(B) by a person, including a court or administrative body, 
with legal authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual or 
such individual's spouse, or 
(C) by any person, including any court or administrative 
body, acting at the direction or upon the request of the individual or 
such individual's spouse. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h) (emphasis added). Thus, for estate recovery purposes, "assets" includes 
income and resources of the individual's spouse, including property transferred to the spouse 
from the Medicaid recipient. 
Therefore, by definition, the estate of the individual, for purposes of section 1396p, 
includes the property ofthe spouse. Contrary to the Magistrate's ruling that 42 U.S.C. § 1396p 
forbids recovery from the estate ofa surviving spouse, this section specifically permits recovery 
from the property of the surviving spouse. 
While it is true that federal Medicaid law (like all public assistance law) is difficult to 
construe unless the entire statute is read in context, a review of section 1396p, alone, reveals the 
intent ofCongress to view the property of the recipient and the recipient's spouse as the same 
and subject to the same limitations. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(2), the very next subsection after the 
section that defines what payments may be recovered, provides, in part, as follows: 
(2) Any adjustment or recovery under paragraph (1) may be made 
only after the death of the individual's surviving spouse, if any .... 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(2) (underline added). Recovery is permitted only after the death ofthe 
surviving spouse because the spouse is permitted to possess and use the couple's property during 
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his lifetime. If the State were limited to property in the possession of the recipient at the time of 
her death, then why would the State be prohibited from recovering until after the death of the 
spouse? 
Likewise, subsection (c) of this section imposes a penalty on the recipient for asset 
transfers by the recipient's spouse: 
(c) Taking into account certain transfers of assets 
(l)(A) In order to meet the requirements of this subsection for purposes 
of section 1396a(a)(l8) of this title, the State plan must provide that if an 
institutionalized individual or the spouse of such an individual (or, at the option 
of a State, a noninstitutionalized individual or the spouse of such an individual) 
disposes of assets for less than fair market value on or after the look-back date 
specified in subparagraph (B)Ot the individual is ineligible for medical 
assistance for services described in subparagraph (C)(i) (or, in the case of a 
noninstitutionalized individual, for the services described in subparagraph 
(C)(ii» .... 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c) (underline added). Again, if the recipient spouse could simply transfer her 
assets to her spouse and, thereby, cut off the State's claim to those assets, then it would be 
pointless to penalize the recipient for further transfers by the spouse. Instead, however, the 
spouse is only permitted to use the couple's property and cannot give it away. This is because 
the State has the right to recover from those assets after the death of the recipient and the spouse. 
If the spouse is prohibited from giving the couple's property away to avoid the State's claim 
during life, why should he be permitted to avoid the State's claim by giving the property away at 
death?? 
Clearly, the very nature of section 1396p is to treat the property of the recipient and the 
property of the recipient's spouse as the same for the purposes of estate recovery. 
?See also 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(c)(2) (Assets may only be transferred to the spouse or certain other parties having 
an interest in the property. 
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C. The Idaho Supreme Court's Decision in the Jackman Case Necessarily Upholds the 
Validity ofIdaho Code § 56-218(1). 
In the case of Idaho Department ofHealth and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 
P.2d 6 (1998), the Idaho Supreme Court upheld recovery from the estate of the non-Medicaid 
spouse. In the Jackman case, just as alleged here, the Medicaid spouse, Hildor, transferred all 
her property to her spouse, Lionel. Hildor passed away first and Lionel passed away two weeks 
later. Jackman was appointed personal representative of Lionel's estate and the Department filed 
an estate recovery claim. The personal representative challenged the Department's claim on 
numerous grounds including federal preemption. The Idaho Supreme Court upheld Idaho's 
spousal recovery law, holding that the expanded definition of estate permitted by federallaw8 and 
adopted by Idaho Code § 56-218(4)(b), together with the definition of assets found at 42 U.S.c. § 
1396p(h)(1), validated recovery of property that had, at any time after October 1, 1993, been 
community property. 
The Jackman decision must be read carefully because of the way it was decide:d. The 
final decision is an edited version, altered on re-hearing, of the original decision of the court. It 
is helpful to understand the original decision and the reason for the court's alteration on 
rehearing. In the court's first decision, the Supreme Court held wholly in favor of the 
Department. Upon Petition for Rehearing, the Supreme Court modified its decision because the 
effective date of the federal law on which they had relied in their original opinion was after the 
date of the couple's marriage settlement agreement. The court, therefore, held that recovery 
would be limited to property that had been community property after the effective date of the 
842 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(4)(B). 
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federal law, "OBRA 93.,,9 Effectively, the court upheld spousal recovery against the federal 
preemption argument, but in the Jackman case, the couple's property had been divided by a 
marriage settlement agreement in March, 1993, prior to the effective date of the law: 
We conclude that this definition of "assets" is not applicable to the 
agreement, which Jackman signed on behalf of Lionel and Hildor on March 8.. 
1993. The definition of "assets" contained in the 1993 amendments to the fed(~ral 
statute does not apply "with respect to assets disposed of on or before the date of 
the enactment of this Act [Aug. 10, 1993]." Pub.L. 103-66, § 13611 (e). Therefore, 
it does not apply to the agreement and does not allow the Department to recover 
the balance ofthe Medicaid payments from Lionel's separate property. This is true 
even though 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(4), which applies to Medicaid payments for 
calendar quarters beginning on or after October 1, 1993, authorizes the 
Department to recover the Medicaid payments from "other assets." Without the 
definition of "assets" contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(l), "other assets" are 
only those included within Hildor's estate, as defined by I.C. § 15-1-20.1..(,l2}. 
Lionel's separate property, including the community property transmuted by the 
agreement, is not part of Hildor's estate. 
Jackman, 132 Idaho at 216-7,970 P.2d at 9-10 (underline added). The definition of "assets" the 
Supreme Court is referring to is that found in 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(h), discussed above, which at 
that time was found in section 1396p(e). Therefore, what the Court was referring to, was a 
definition where "assets," for purposes of estate recovery, included the assets ofthe spouse and 
assets a spouse divests herself of, such as by signing a marriage settlement agreement or a deed. 
As noted, above, in Jackman, the court altered its decision because it determined the 
transfer of assets from Hildor to Lionel occurred prior to the enactment of OBRA '93 which 
included both 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) and 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h). The court remanded the 
matter for a detennination of what community property the parties had acquired since their 
marriage settlement agreement. The only reason the Department was not pennitted to recover the 
9This limitation is embodied in IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20, limiting spousal recovery to property that had been 
community property at any time after October 1,1993. 
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property transferred through the marriage settlement agreement was because of the timing: the 
marriage settlement agreement divided the property before the effective date ofOBRJ\ '93. 
Note that because Hildor died first, whatever property she possessed on death necessarily 
became the sole and separate property ofLionel before his death. Therefore, even in the 
Jackman case the court approved recovery ofproperty that had become the sole and sleparate 
property of Lionel. 
The Magistrate found Jackman inapplicable and believed it required property to be 
community property at the time of death of the Medicaid recipient for recovery to be made. The 
Magistrate said: 
The case was remanded to the probate court for a determination of whether thl~ 
Medicaid recipient (Hildor Knudson) had an interest in community property, at 
the time of her death, the value ofwhich, the court suggested, could be recovered 
from her husband's estate. 
Order Disallowing Claim, p. 3. However, this goes too far. In Jackman there was a marriage 
settlement agreement that divided the couple's assets before the effective date ofOBRA '93. 
This same marriage settlement agreement maintained the separate nature of proceeds from the 
separate property: 
As authorized by I.C. § 32-906(1), this provision maintained the separate 
character of the assets transmuted into Lionel's separate property by the 
agreement, as well as "the income, rents, issues, profits, capital gains, and oth~r 
earnings or increase" on this separate property. The agreement did not prevent the 
accumulation of other community property by Lionel and Hildor after the date of 
the agreement and before Hildor's death. The record before us does not disclose 
whether Lionel and Hildor had any community property at the time of Hildor':~ 
death. If they did, Lionel's interest in that community property may be part of 
Lionel's estate, and may therefore be part of Hildor's "estate" that 42 U.S.c. § 
1396p(b)(1)(B) and (4) authorizes the Department to recover and apply against the 
balance of the Medicaid payments. 
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Jackman, 132 Idaho at 216,970 P.2d at 9 (underline added). The entire issue before the Supreme 
Court was whether the Department could recover from Lionel's estate. The only context for 
property transfers was the marriage settlement agreement. The only reason the marriage 
settlement agreement made a difference was because it was executed prior to October 1, 1993. 
The whole upshot of the Supreme Court's decision was that ifthe marriage settlement agreement 
had been executed after October 1, 1993, it would have been irrelevant and the Department's 
recovery would have been permitted. Accordingly, there was no issue as to property transfers 
after October 1, 1993. The question on remand was not what Hildor owned at death, but what 
community property had accumulated after the marriage settlement agreement. The fI~asoning of 
the Magistrate swallows up the entire decision of the Court by reference to chance phraseology 
that has nothing to do with the issue before the court. 
The view of the Magistrate is that property transferred by a Medicaid recipient before 
death cannot be recovered. But in Jackman the marriage settlement agreement did exactly that. 
Therefore, if the Magistrate is correct, then the Supreme Court's entire discussion ofOBRA '93 
and its effective date, the definition of assets in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e) (now 1396p(h», and the 
expanded definition of estate are all superfluous. The Court could just as well have said, "since 
there was marriage settlement agreement and the property was transferred before her death, there 
can be no recovery." 
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THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT'S 
INTERPRETATION OF MINNESOTA LAW IN IN RE 
ESTATE OF BARGDOES NOT INVALIDATE IDAHO LAW. 
The personal representative found her challenge to Idaho law on a Minnesota Icase, In re 
Estate ofBarg, 752 N.W.2d 52 (2008). In Barg the Minnesota Supreme Court found that 
Minnesota's spousal recovery statute was partially preempted by federal law. As discussed 
above, the Jackman case relied on the interaction between Idaho law and federal law. Therefore, 
the Barg holding and the Jackman holding, in which each state's highest court was interpreting 
its own law, is not necessarily inconsistent. 
A. The Barg Decision Did Not Consider the Decisive Issue in Jackman. 
The Idaho Supreme Court, in Jackman, found 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(1)'O significant in 
their analysis. The original decision stated the following: 
Federal law encompasses recovery both from the estate of the recipient as 
well as from the estate of the surviving spouse. The federal definition of asset is 
significant. Federal law includes within the recipient's estate "all real and 
personal property and other assets included within the individual's estate ..." and 
"any other real and personal property and other assets in which the individual had 
any legal title or interest at the time ofdeath ....." 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4); I.C. § 
56-218(4). Under federal law, Hildor's assets would include her income and 
resources as well as Lionel's income and resources. The agreement does not 
affect the status ofthe assets that federal law considers to be part of the recipient's 
estate because the definition ofassets includes "income or resources which the: 
individual or such individual's spouse is entitled to but does not receive because 
of action by a person ... with legal authority to act in place of or on behalf ofthe 
individual or such individual's spouse." 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(e)(l)(B)' Jackman's 
signing of the agreement constituted action by a person on behalf ofHildor anll 
Lionel. Federal law does not prohibit the Department from recovering the balance 
of the Medicaid payments from Lionel's estate. 
l~OW 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(h)(1). 
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Jackman, original opinion, p. 4 (Exhibit C to Memorandum in Support of Petition for 
Allowance) (underline added). On rehearing, the Supreme Court did not retreat from their 
original holding except to recognize the marriage settlement agreement was executed before the 
"assets" definition of 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(h)(1)(B) came into effect: 
We conclude that this definition of "assets" is not applicable to the 
agreement, which Jackman signed on behalf of Lionel and Hildor on March 8, 
1993. The definition of "assets" contained in the 1993 amendments to the fed~:ral 
statute does not apply "with respect to assets disposed of on or before the date of 
the enactment of this Act [Aug. 10, 1993]." Pub.L. 103-66, § 13611(e). Therefore, 
it does not apply to the agreement and does not allow the Department to recover 
the balance of the Medicaid payments from Lionel's separate property. This is true 
even though 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(4), which applies to Medicaid payments for 
calendar quarters beginning on or after October 1, 1993, authorizes the 
Department to recover the Medicaid payments from "other assets." Without the 
definition of "assets" contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(l), "other assets" are 
only those included within Hildor's estate, as defined by I.e. § 15-1-201(1~. 
Lionel's separate property, including the community property transmuted by the 
agreement, is not part of Hildor's estate. 
Jackman, 132 Idaho at 216-7,970 P.2d at 9-10 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court didn't 
change its mind about the effect of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(1). In fact, by necessary implication, it 
stated that with the definition ofassets contained in 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(h)(I) the transferred 
assets would have been part of Hildor's estate, and therefore, subject to recovery. 
This is the same reasoning used by the North Dakota Supreme Court in In re Estate of 
Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 2000): 
Our inquiry, therefore, is narrowed to whether Clarence Wirtz had "real and 
personal property and other assets in which [he] had any legal title or interest at 
the time of death, including such assets conveyed" to Verna Wirtz through "other 
arrangement." 
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(1), asset is defined as: 
(1) The term "assets", with respect to an individual, includes all incom~ 
and resources of the individual and of the individual's spouse, including 
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any income or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse 
is entitled to but does not receive because of action­
(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse, 
(B) by a person, including a court or administrative body, with legal 
authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual or such 
individual's spouse, or 
(C) by any person, including any court or administrative body, acting at the 
direction or upon the request of the individual or such individual's spouse. 
See Idaho Department ofHealth and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 
P.2d 6, 9 (Id.1998) (concluding the definition does not apply to assets disposed of 
on or before August 10, 1993). 
Thus, the department can assert a claim against real or personal proper~ 
and other assets in which Clarence Wirtz had any legal title or other interest at his 
death, including income and assets conveyed through "other arrangement." 
Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d at 885 (underline added). The North Dakota Supreme Court then went on to 
decide what the terms "interest" and "other arrangement" mean in the federal statute and 
concluded: 
We conclude consideration of all the relevant statutory provisions, in light 
of the Congressional purpose to provide medical care for the needy, reveals a 
legislative intention to allow states to trace the assets ofrecipients ofmedical 
assistance and recover the benefits paid when the recipient's surviving spouse 
dies. 
We hold any assets conveyed by Clarence Wirtz to Vema Wirtz before 
Clarence Wirtz's death and traceable to her estate are subject to the department's 
recovery claim. However, the recoverable assets do not include all property ever 
held by either party during the marriage. Cf Estate ofJobe, 590 N.W.2d 162, 166 
(Minn.Ct.App.1999). 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b) contemplates only that assets in which 
the deceased recipient once held an interest will be traced. It does not provide that 
separately owned assets in the survivor's estate, or assets in which the deceased 
recipient never held an interest, are subject to the department's claim for recovery. 
Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d at 886 (italics in original; underline added). 
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in Barg, did not even consider the effect of this important 
definition of "assets" found critical in both Jackman and Wirtz. It cannot be said that if the 
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Minnesota Supreme Court had been informed of this definition it might not have reached the 
same conclusion as the Idaho and North Dakota Supreme Courts. 
8. The State of Minnesota Has Already Amended its Law to Overcome the Barg Holding. 
The Barg decision is an anomaly with limited application. It runs directly contrary to 
other state supreme court decisions such as Jackman and Wirtz. It is understandable, then, that 
Minnesota has already amended its state law to overcome the holding of its supreme (:ourt in 
Barg. Without objection, the Department provided a copy of changes made to Minnesota law in 
2009 (Exhibit F to its Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance ofClaim), for the 
express purpose of remedying the Barg decision. This legislation makes it clear that a Medicaid 
recipient's marital assets, at death, include assets jointly owned at any time during marriage, even 
when transferred by the Medicaid spouse to the non-Medicaid spouse. This is exactly the effect 
ofthe Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Jackman. 
Obviously, if Minnesota can overrule Barg by a statutory change, it is state law and not 
federal law, per se, that creates the problem. The Idaho Supreme Court's interpretation of 
Idaho's existing law already overcomes the Barg decision. Like the North Dakota Supreme 
Court in Wirtz, the Idaho Supreme Court has already held that Idaho's law permits recovery 
under the circumstances ofthis case. These holdings are not necessarily inconsistent with Barg. 
The Barg decision has limited application to Minnesota and has already been made irrelevant by 
a change in Minnesota law. 
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VIII. 
EVEN IF THE BARG CASE WERE APPLIED IN IDAHO, 
THE DEPARTMENT MUST STILL RECOVER BECAUSE 
THE GIFT OF THE DECEDENT TO HIMSELF WAS 
INVALID. 
If Barg is to be the law in Idaho, it is critical to detennine what property was transferred 
by the Medicaid recipient to her spouse. In the court below, the Department challengl~d the 
validity ofthe Quitclaim Deed by which the decedent purported to convey the Medicaid 
recipient's real property to himself, through a power of attorney. The Magistrate made no 
findings of fact in this regard, but concluded, apparently as a matter of law, that the transfer was 
valid. In a footnote, the court said: 
The court has determined that George Perry held a valid power of attorney from 
Martha and that he had the authority to transfer the property to himself. 
Order Disallowing Claim, p. I, fn 1. 
A. As a Matter of Law. the Power ofAttorney Did Not Authorize the Decedent to Make a 
Gift to Himself. 
The Medicaid recipient, Martha Perry, brought the real property of this estate into the 
marriage as her sole and separate property. Exhibit A to Memorandum in Support of Petition for 
Allowance of Claim. She later transferred the property to herself and to George, granting George 
an interest in the property. Exhibit B to Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance of 
Claim. George later transferred Martha's interest to himself. Exhibit A to Affidavit ofBarbara 
K. McCormick. However, the transfer ofMartha's interest to George, was not performed by 
Martha, but by George using his power of attorney for Martha. See id. The power of attorney, 
however, contains no provision permitting gifting, much less, self-gifting. Exhibit G to 
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Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance ofClaim. Indeed, the power of attorney 
includes some language clearly prohibiting self dealing. See Exhibit G, to Memorandum in 
Support of Petition for Allowance ofClaim, ~~ G and H. George's gift to himself was, therefore, 
invalid, and failed to eliminate Martha's interest in the real property. While this failure is 
irrelevant under Jackman, it is important ifthe court follows Barg. 
It is black-letter law that a power of attorney does not grant authority to make gifts absent 
an express provision in the power ofattorney granting that power. As stated in 3 Am" Jur. 2d 
Agency § 87, "The authority of an agent to make a gift on behalf ofthe principal must be 
express." Courts have uniformly supported this view. In Kunewa v. Joshua, 83 Hawaii 65, 924 
P.2d 559, 565 (Haw.Ct.App.l996), the court explained: 
Moreover, courts have routinely held that in the absence of express written 
authorization, an agent may not gratuitously convey the principal's property to 
himself. See, e.g., Hodges v. Surratt, 366 So.2d 768 (Fla.App.l978) (agent 
exceeded authority in appropriating for agent's own use funds in decedent 
principal's checking account in the absence of clear language to that effect in the 
power of attorney), cert. denied, 376 So.2d 76 (Fla.1979); In re Estate of 
DeBelardino, 77 Misc.2d 253,352 N.Y.S.2d 858, 863 (Sur.Ct.1974) (power of 
attorney, no matter how broadly drawn, cannot be held to encompass an 
authorization to attorney-in-fact to make gift to himself of principal's property; 
such a gift carries with it a presumption of impropriety and self-dealing, a 
presumption which can be overcome only with the clearest showing of principal's 
intent to make the gift), aJ!'d, 47 AD.2d 589, 363 N.Y.S.2d 974 (1975). 
Kunewa, 83 Hawaii at 71,924 P.2d at 565; see also Matter ofEstate ofCrabtree, 550 N.W.2d 
168 (Iowa,1996) (absent express grant in power of attorney, ofpower to make gift, 
attorney-in-fact did not have that power); Aiello v. Clark, 680 P.2d 1162, 1166 (Alaska 1984) (in 
the absence of express authority to make a gift, none may be made); Cheloha v. Cheloha, 255 
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Neb. 32, 582 N.W.2d 291 (1998) (no gift may be made by an attorney in fact to himse:lfunless 
the power to make such a gift is expressly granted in the instrument itself). 
Idaho law is consistent with these pronouncements. In Idaho, powers of attorney are 
strictly construed not to authorize acts beyond those specified. Arthur v. Kilpatrick Bros. Co., 47 
Idaho 306, 274 P. 800 (1929); accord Eaton v. McWilliams, 52 Idaho 145, 12 P.2d 259 (1932). 
In the case ofJensen v. Sidney Stevens Implement Co., 36 Idaho 348, 210 P. 1003 (1922), the 
Idaho Supreme Court said: 
... [I]f an agent makes any profit in the course ofhis agency because of his faillure 
to inform his principal of facts known to him, or which in the exercise of due 
diligence he should have ascertained for his principal, the profits of such 
transaction, as a matter oflaw, will belong exclusively to the agent's principal. 
The law guards the fiduciary relation, which the relation of principal and agent is, 
with jealous care. It seeks to prevent the possibility of a conflict between duty and 
personal interest. It demands that the agent shall work with an eye single to th{~ 
interest ofhis principal. It forbids him from acting adversely to his principal, 
either for himself or for others. 
Jensen, 36 Idaho at _,210 P. at 1005 (underline added). 
Likewise, Idaho Code § 32-912 requires an "express power of attorney" for one spouse to 
conveyor encumber community property: 
32-912. Control of community property. - Either the husband or the 
wife shall have the right to manage and control the community property, and 
either may bind the community property by contract, excWt that neither the 
husband nor wife may sell, conveyor encumber the community real estate unless 
the other joins in executing the sale agreement. deed or other instrument of 
conveyance by which the real estate is sold, conveyed or encumbered, and any 
community obligation incurred by either the husband or the wife without the 
consent in writing of the other shall not obligate the separate property of the 
spouse who did not so consent; provided, however, that the husband or wife m~ 
by express power of attorney give to the other the complete power to sell, 
conveyor encumber community property, either real or personal. All deeds, 
conveyances, bills of sale, or evidences ofdebt heretofore made in conformity 
herewith are hereby validated. 
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Idaho Code § 32-912 (emphasis added). I I The title company may have recognized this defect 
when it required the signature of Martha on the closing statement when the personal 
representative sold the real property. 12 See Exhibit D to Affidavit of Barbara K. McCormick. 
The term "express power of attorney" means more than a general power of attorney. 
Blacks Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, defines "express" as follows: 
Clear; definite; explicit; plain; direct; unmistakable; not dubious or ambiguous. 
Declared in terms; set forth in words. Directly and distinctly stated. Made known 
distinctly and explicitly, and not left to inference. Manifested by direct and 
appropriate language as distinguished from that which is inferred from conduct. 
The word is usually contrasted with "implied." 
Blacks Law Dictionary, 5th Edition (citation omitted). There is no express language in the power 
of attorney at issue. At best, the authority to make gifts at all, much less to oneself, is implied, 
not express. 
Therefore, even ifthe court were to find that Barg were controlling law in Idaho, the 
estate is still subject to the Department's claim: The deed George executed conveying Martha's 
interest in the property to himself, using his power of attorney for Martha, is ineffective to 
extinguish Martha's interest in the real property. 
liThe Uniform Power of Attorney Act, adopted in 2008, was not in effect at the time of the transft:r of Martha's 
interest to George, but it also includes the requirement for an express grant of authority to make a gift of the principle's 
property. Idaho Code *15-12-201(l)(b), (c). 
12Barbara K McCormick signed not only as personal representative for George's estate, but also as attorney in 
fact for Martha. 
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B. The Magistrate Failed to Make Any Findings of Fact That Could Support the Personal 
Representative's Argument ofInterspousal Agency. 
The personal representative argued before the magistrate that there was an exception to 
the clear law requiring an express authorization in a power of attorney to make gifts to oneself. 
See Reply Memorandum in Support ofthe Personal Representative's Objection to Department of 
Health and Welfare's Petition for Allowance of Claim, section D. However, if this argument was 
accepted by the court, it would have required findings of fact that the circumstances under which 
such "interspousal agency" could be found are present. No evidence was presented, and 
therefore, the court could, at best, make inferences from the documents and facts in the record. 
Still, such findings would be required to support such a ruling. 
As set forth in the Matter ofEstate ofSpencer, 106 Idaho 316, 320, 678 P.2d l08, 112 
(Idaho App., 1984) 
Only where the record is so clear as to give the appellate court a complete 
understanding of the material issues and the basis of the magistrate's reasoning 
will the absence of findings of fact not result in a remand for adequate findings. 
Estate ofSpencer, 106 Idaho at 320, 678 P.2d at 112 (citations omitted). In this case, the 
Magistrate failed to make any findings of fact upon which to base its ruling that gifting was 
authorized by the power of attorney. Therefore, even ifBarg is to apply to this case, and even if 
the gift isn't invalid as a matter oflaw, the matter must still be remanded for findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. 
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ATTORNEY FEES
 
Idaho Code § 12-117 provides as follows: 
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative proceeding 
or civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency or political 
subdivision and a person, the state agency or political subdivision or the court, as 
the case may be, shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, 
witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party 
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
Idaho Code § 12-117 (underline added). Idaho Code § 56-218(1) clearly and unambiguously 
permits the Department's claim in this estate. The personal representative has advanced an 
erroneous interpretation of an unambiguous statute. The Barg case relied upon by the personal 
representative is clearly not the law in Idaho. The court in Barg failed to even consider the 
critical federal definition of assets the Idaho Supreme Court found important in Jackman. The 
personal representative, in disallowing the Department's claim, has acted without a reasonable 
basis in fact or law and the Department should be awarded its attorney fees on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
1. Did the Magistrate err in determining that the general power of attorney held by 
George Perry gave him authority to make a gift to himselfofMartha Perry's real prop1erty? 
Yes. As a matter of law, the power ofattorney, lacking any express authority to make 
gifts, or gifts to oneself, is insufficient to have given the decedent authority to convey Martha 
Perry's real property to himself. The Magistrate made no findings of facts that could in any way 
support the personal representative's theory of"interspousal agency." 
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2. Did the Magistrate err in its application and interpretation of Idaho Code § 56­
218, in refusing to allow the Department's claim against the estate of George Peny? 
Yes. Idaho Code § 56-218 unambiguously pennits the Department's claim against this 
estate. 
3. Did the Magistrate err in its application and interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p as 
preempting application of Idaho Code § 56-218? 
Yes. The Idaho Supreme Court has already overruled similar preemption claims in 
Jackman, and pennitted the Department to recover from the estate of the spouse in cases such as 
this. The North Dakota Supreme Court in Wirtz reached the same conclusion. The Minnesota 
Supreme Court in Barg, relied upon by the Magistrate, did not consider the definition of "assets" 
found important in Jackman and Wirtz. 
4. Did the Magistrate err in failing to apply the Idaho Supreme Court holding in 
Idaho Department ofHealth and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213 (1998) to the facts of this 
case? 
Yes. The Magistrate's holding that assets transferred from the Medicaid recipient to her 
spouse cannot be recovered ignores the entire underlying reasoning and holding in Jackman. 
5. Is the Department entitled to attorney fees on appeal?
 
Yes. There is no reasonable basis in fact or law for the disallowance of the Department's
 
claim in this estate. 
DATED this 8 day of July, 2010, 
t8/~L ~ 
W. CO~CAiTWRIGHT 
Deputy Attorney General 
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed, 
postage pre-paid, to the following: 
PETER C SISSON 
SISSON & SISSON 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
2402 W JEFFERSON ST 
BOISE ID 83702 
DATED this ~ day of July, 2010. 
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42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c) (2000) 4 
42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(4) 21 
42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(5) 4 
42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(d) 5 
I.A.R. 35(b)(5) 3 
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
 
Nature ofthe Case 
The Personal Representative of the Estate of George D. Perry, Barbara McConnick 
("PR"), agrees with the Department's statement of the Nature of the Case as far as it goes. This 
case requires interpretation of a federal statute (42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)) and consideration of 
whether the Department's application ofIdaho law (LC. § 56-218) violates federal law and is 
therefore preempted by federal law. Federal law requires the states to make claims against the 
probate estates of Medicaid recipients to recovery correctly paid benefits. Federal law also 
allows the states to expand the definition of "estate" to include non-probate assets owned by a 
recipient at the time of the recipient's death. Idaho has chosen this expanded definition of 
"estate." LC. § 56-218(4). Nothing in the federal medical assistance statutes authorizes a direct 
medical assistance estate claim against the estate of any person other than the recipient of 
benefits. 
Under federal law, the states are permitted to pull back into a recipient's estate any 
property or other assets in which the recipient held a legal title or interest at the time of the 
recipient's death (to the extent ofthe interest). Idaho's estate recovery statute, I.c. § 56-218, 
requires that a medical assistance claim be filed against the estate of a deceased recipient, but 
also requires that a claim be asserted against the estate of a surviving spouse who neve:r received 
medical assistance benefits. The Department's interpretation and application ofLC. § 56-218 in 
this estate recovery claim conflicts with federal law because the Department asserts a elaim 
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against George's estate which does not contain any assets in which Martha held an interest at the 
time ofher death. 
Course of Proceedings 
The PR restates the course of proceedings comprehensively as follows. 
Date 
212512009 
3/1812009 
3/1912009 
3/1912009 
41712009 
4/13/2009 
Event ~ George Perry died testate Application for Informal Probate of Will filed Personal Representative appointed Letters Testamentary signed appointing Barbara McCormick as PR 
==
Information to Heirs and Devisees (giving Department notice) 
Department filed estate recovery claim against Estate 
512812009 90 day inventory served identifying all property as George's separate property 
6/4/2009 PR filed Notice ofDisallowance of Claim 
6/11/2009 Department Petitioned for Allowance of Claim 
612512009 PR filed Objection to Department's Petition for Allowance of Claim 
1112712009 PR filed Affidavit and Memo in Support ofPR's Objection to Dept's Claim 
11812010 Telephonic Status Conference with Judge Bieter. Court and parties agree that 
the Department be given three (3) weeks to file Memorandum in Support of 
Petition for Allowance and Personal Representative be given two (2) weeks 
Iafter that to file Reply Brief prior to hearing set for 2126/2010 
112912010 
2/19/2010 
Department filed Memorandum in Snpport ofPetition for Allowance ~ 
PR filed Reply Brief in Opposition to Petition for Allowance 
2/2612010 Hearing On Petition for Allowance ofClaim before The Honorable J. Bieter 
3/10/2010 Magistrate issued Order Disallowing Claim 
3/1812010 Department filed Notice of Appeal to District Court ~ 
5/3/2010 Martha Perry died 
Statement of Facts 
The PR agrees with the Department's Statement of Facts, aside from the use of the word 
"purported" in reference to the 2006 quit claim deed. The PR respectfully refers the Court to the 
Affidavit of Barbara McCormick and the exhibits attached thereto, for a more complete and 
detailed rendition of the facts. Since this appeal was filed, Martha died on May 3,2010. The 
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only property that Martha owned at the time of her death was one financial account located at 
Wells Fargo. The balance of this Wells Fargo checking account was paid to the Department on 
August 13,2010. 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUE ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the PR is entitled to attorney fees on appeal? 
Pursuant to I.A.R. 35(b)(5) and I.e. § 12-117, the PR claims attorney fees on appeal. The 
Department's decision to appeal the Magistrate's Order Disallowing Claim lacks any reasonable 
basis in fact or in law. The law does not support the Department's manner of applying I.C. § 56­
218 and making a claim against property in which the Medicaid recipient has no title or interest 
at the time of her death. If this was not apparent prior to this case, the proceedings below made 
the law in this area quite clear. 
The authorities cited in the briefing before the Magistrate, including but not limited to the 
U.S. Solicitor General's amicus briefbefore the United States Supreme Court in In Re Estate of 
Barg, 752 N.W. 2d 52 (Minn. 2008), the oral argument and The Honorable Christoph(~r M. 
Bieter's Order Disallowing Claim all support the conclusion that the Department did not have a 
reasonable basis in law or fact to bring this appeal. The Department's appeal asserts an 
erroneous interpretation of clear, unambiguous federal statutes. 
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III. ARGUMENT 
A. OVERVIEW OF STATE AND FEDERAL LAW GOVERNING RECOVERY OF 
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE BENEFITS CORRECTLY PAID 
i.	 Statutory Framework. 
The Medicaid program is jointly funded with the states as a "cooperative endeavor in 
which the Federal Government provides financial assistance to participating States to aid them in 
furnishing health care to needy persons." Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308, 100 S.Ct. 2671, 
65 L.Ed.2d 784 (1980). Participating states enact legislation and rules, incorporate them into 
state medical assistance plans, and submit those plans to the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human 
Services ("HHS") for approval. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)-(b) (2000 & Supp. III 2003). After this, 
the states can receive federal payments. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2000). Each state administers its 
own program within the federal requirements, and the Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services ("CMS"), one of several federal agencies under HHS, administers the program and 
approves state plans. Arkansas Dept. ofHealth and Human Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 
(2006). 
When determining the eligibility of a married person to receive Medicaid, states consider 
assets ofboth husband and wife as available to the spouse requesting benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 
1396r-5(c) (2000). There are several provisions in place to protect the community spouse (the 
spouse not applying for Medicaid) from being impoverished as a result of the spend-down of 
assets needed to qualify the applicant for Medicaid. The value of the couple's home is not 
included among assets considered eligible to pay for medical care. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-.5(c)(5); 42 
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U.S.C. § 1382b(a)(1) (2000). The community spouse ofa Medicaid recipient is also c~ntitled to 
an allowance of income and assets designated for his or her needs that is not consider'ed available 
to pay for the recipient spouse's medical care. 42 U.S.c. § 1396r-5(d). Furthermore, the 
recipient spouse has the right to transfer assets, including an interest in the homestead, to his or 
her community spouse. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2). Medicaid thus balances the obligation of 
community spouses to contribute to the payment ofmedical expenses for their recipient spouses 
against the accommodation of the community spouse's need for his or her own support. 
ii.	 Federal Medicaid Recovery Provisions. 
It is important to understand pre-1993 federal law on Medicaid recovery, to give context 
to the post-1993 changes, and because pre-1993 law is the basis for the sole case in Idaho upon 
which the Department relies exclusively for its position - i.e. Idaho Department ofHealth and 
Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6 (1998). Prior to amendments adopted in the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act ("0BRA") of 1993, the federal Medicaid statute stated a 
general principle that there should be no recovery of correctly paid Medicaid benefits, subject to 
several exceptions, one of which is relevant here: 
No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of 
an individual under the State plan may be made, except -­
* * * * 
(B) in the case of any other individual who was 65 years of age or older when he 
received such assistance, from his estate. 
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42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(1) (1988). Under this pre-1993 law, states were allowed, but not required, 
to recover Medicaid benefits paid to recipients 65 or older, and the statute specified the recovery 
would be from the recipient's estate). 
Section 1396p(b) was amended as part of the OBRA amendments of 19932. As 
amended, the federal law retained the general prohibition against states attempting to recover 
Medicaid payments correctly paid on behalf of an individual, with limited exceptions. 42 
U.S.c. § 1396p(b) (2000). But the 1993 amendments changed section I396p(b) in several ways. 
First, the 1993 amendments lowered the age criterion for recovery from 65 to 55. Second, the 
1993 amendments made recovery allowed by the exceptions mandatory rather than permissive. 
Third, the amendments added a definition of "estate," which itself had both mandatory and 
permissive elements. As amended, the general nonrecovery rule and the relevant exception read 
as follows: 
(1) No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf 
of an individual under the State plan may be made, except that the State shall s.eek 
adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an 
individual under the State plan in the case of the following individuals: 
* * * * 
(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when the 
individual received such medical assistance, the State shall seek adjustment or 
recovery from the individual's estate * * *. (emphasis added) 
J The statute also provided that this recovery from the recipient's estate could only be made after the death of the 
recipient's surviving spouse. 42 USc. § 1396p(b)(2) (1988). Despite this prohibition against recovel)' before the 
death ofa surviving spouse, there was no express mention of recovery from the estate ofa surviving spouse. The 
pre-1993 federal law contained no definition of the term "estate." 
2 OBRA of 1993, Pub.L. No. 103-66, § 13612(a), (c), 107 Stat. 312, 627-28 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.c. § 
I396p(b)(I), (4) (2000)). 
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Id. The amended version of section 1396p(b)(1 )(B) retained the express reference to recovery 
from the recipient's estate. Furthermore, as was true pre-amendment, this recovery from the 
recipient's estate is only permitted after the death ofthe recipient's surviving spouse.3 As with 
the pre-l 993 version, the amended federal statute contains no express authorization for, or 
reference to, recovery from a surviving spouse's estate. 
The 1993 amendments added a definition of "estate" for purposes of Medicaid recovery, 
with a mandatory provision that looks to state probate law and an optional provision that 
authorizes states to expand the definition beyond the scope of probate law: 
[T]he term "estate", with respect to a deceased individual­
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included within 
the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; and 
(B) may include, at the option ofthe State * * * any other real and personal 
property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at 
the time ofdeath (to the extent ofsuch interest), including such assets conveyed to 
a survivor, heir, or assign ofthe deceased individual through joint tenancy, 
tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (emphasis added). 
Under this provision, a state has the option to adopt a definition of "estate" for Medicaid 
recovery purposes that includes some assets which, under ordinary probate law, would not be 
part of the Medicaid recipient's estate, because they would pass immediately to someone else on 
the recipient's death. For example, when two persons hold property in joint tenancy with a right 
of survivorship and one dies, the deceased joint tenant's interest ordinarily passes directly to the 
surviving joint tenant and is not part ofthe probate estate. Under the optional expanded 
3 "Any adjustment or recovery under paragraph (1) may be made only after the death of the individual's surviving 
spouse, if any * * *." 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 7 
000571
-
 
1
 
-
  
( (
definition allowed by federal law, for Medicaid recovery purposes the interest of a deceased joint 
tenant who had received Medicaid would be included in his estate, rather than passing directly to 
the surviving joint tenant. Thus federal statutes place limits on the state's powers to define the 
scope of recovery ofmedical assistance benefits correctly paid. The limits are set forth in 42 
U.S.c. § 1396p. Arkansas Dept. ofHealth and Human Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 
(2006). 
iii. Idaho's Medicaid Recovery Provisions. 
Idaho Code I.C. § 56-218, entitled "RECOVERY OF CERTAIN MEDICAL 
ASSISTANCE" states in pertinent part, 
(1) Except where exempted or waived in accordance with federal law medical 
assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an individual who was fifty­
five (55) years of age or older when the individual received such assistiillce may 
be recovered from the individual's estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any, 
for such aid paid to either or both: ... 
(4) For purposes of this section, the term "estate" shall include: 
(a) All real and personal property and other assets included within the
 
individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probate law; and
 
(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in which th(;: 
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death, to the extent of 
such interest, including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the 
deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life 
estate, living trust or other arrangement. (emphasis added). 
Idaho has adopted verbatim the optional federal provision that authorizes states to expand 
the definition of "estate" beyond the scope of probate law. I.C. § 56-218(4). Therefore, it 
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follows that Idaho is required to abide by the interpretation of the language in the federal statute 
that CMS and HHS promulgate. Idaho's Supreme Court 
has long followed the rule that the construction given to a statute by the executive 
and administrative officers of the State is entitled to great \veight and will be 
followed by the courts unless there are cogent reasons for holding otherwise. 
Kopp v. State, 100 Idaho 160, 595 P.2d 309 (1979). This same principle holds true with regard 
to HHS's reading of the Medicaid statutes. In Wisconsin Dept ofHealth & Famity Servs. v. 
Blumer, 534 U.S. 473,497, 122 S.Ct. 962, 151 L.Ed.2d 935 (2002), the Court stated, 
The Secretary's position warrants respectful consideration. Cf. United States v. 
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 
504,512 (1994) (reliance on Secretary's "significant expertise" particularly 
appropriate in the context of "a complex and highly technical regulatory program" 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 
43-44 (1981) (Secretary granted "exceptionally broad authority" by Congress 
under the Medicaid statute). 
B. THE DEPARTMENT MUST ACT CONSISTENTLY WITH FEDERAL LA'N. 
In In the Matter ofAppeal ofStafford, 181 P.3d 456, 461 (2008), our Supreme Court 
stated, 
Following passage of the MCCA [Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act], the 
director of the Department requested the Attorney General's opinion as to whether 
legislation was required to implement its provisions. The Attorney General 
responded: 
While participation in the Medicaid program is voluntary, a state that 
chooses to participate must comply with all requirements imposed by the 
federal statutory provisions and by regulations promulgated by the Secretary 
of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.... (emphasis added). 
One of the requirements imposed on state plans in order to participate in the Medicaid 
program and receive federal funding is that the state must "comply with the provisions of [42 
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U.S.c. § 1396p] with respect to liens, adjustments and recoveries ofmedical assistance correctly 
paid, transfers of assets, and treatment of certain trusts." 42 U.S.c. § 1396a(a)(18) (2000). To 
the extent a state statute "seeks to reach further than § 1396p(b)(I), it cannot stand." Bucholtz v. 
Belshe, 114 F.3d 923,925 (9th Cir. 1997). The same holds true for state regulations, such as 
IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20 and 16.03.09.900.24, which cannot reach further than 42 U.S.C. § 
1396p(b)(1). 
The Department does not have a choice in this matter. It must follow federal law 
governing Medicaid estate recovery claims4• The Department argues that Idaho law is "clear" 
and supports its claim against George's estate. Appellant's Brief, p. 11-13. This contention does 
not withstand scrutiny. Once mandatory federal restrictions on the scope of estate recovery are 
considered, it becomes very clear that the Department's claim asserted in George's estate 
violates federal law as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p. 
Idaho law currently allows the state to seek recovery for medical assistance paid "from 
the individual's estate, and the estate ofthe spouse, if any, for such aid paid to either or both." 
I.e. § 56-218(1). The PR has challenged the manner in which the Department applies I.e. § 56­
218(1), not the language of that statute itself. This is because there may exist some 
circumstances in which an asset in which the Medicaid recipient holds an inten~st at dt::ath passes 
to the surviving spouse's estate upon the Medicaid spouse's death. In that circumstance, the 
asset would be recoverable from the surviving spouse's estate. For example, assets held jointly 
with rights of survivorship would fall into this category. So the actuallanguagt~ used in I.c. § 
4 The Department does recognize that it "is bound by federal law." Department's Memorandum in Support, p. 15, 
f.n. 11. 
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56-218(1) is not offensive to the federal mandate, only the manner in which the Depmtment has 
chosen to exercise estate recovery claims against community spouse estates in Idaho. 
In order to be consistent with federal law, the Department's claims against a Medicaid 
spouse's estate must be against "assets in which the individual [Medicaid recipient] ha.d any legal 
title or interest at the time of death, to the extent of such interest." The Department's claim in 
this probate, however, is against assets in which the Medicaid recipient (Martha) has no legal 
title or interest at the time ofher death. The Magistrate recognized this core issue in his Order 
Disallowing Claim, p. 3, stating, 
Jackman does not directly address the critical question for our case: To what 
time, during the marriage, may the court look in assessing a Medicaid recipient's 
interest in property - any time (after 1993) during the couple's marriage or the 
time of the recipient's death. (fn. omitted). 
The Magistrate sought an answer from the Department's counsel at the hearing on this 
very issue. He asked counsel, 
And where does the authority come from that says that the interest in that prop,erty 
may be determined at any time in the marriage of these people after '93? What 
says that it's not the time that the recipient dies, but it includes a period of timE: 
when she had an interest other than - other than at the time ofher death? 
Tr., p. 25, LL. 21 through p. 26, LL. 3. 
The Department's counsel was unable to answer that question. His first response was "I 
think I can help that by analogy, Your Honor. And that's if you look at a different section that's 
not part of our case here..." Tr., p. 26, LL. 4-7. The Court continued to press for an answer to 
this question and counsel for the Department remained unable to present one. See Tr., p. 28, LL. 
2 through p. 33, LL. 18. Finally, the basis for the Department's position came out. The 
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Magistrate stated, "your argument depends on a definition of assets and that's different, you're 
arguing, then, than the definition of the estate of the person." Tr. LL. 19-22. Department's 
counsel answered "Yes." Tr., p. 33, LL. 23. 
The Magistrate stated in his Order Disallowing Claim, p. 4, 
To paraphrase the Department's argument, it may recover from George's estate 
because Idaho Code 56-218(1) allows recovery from the estate ofa recipient's 
spouse; 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4) includes the word "assets" in its definition of 
"estate" and 42 U.S.C. 1396p(h)(1) says "assets" includes property that a person 
transferred to her spouse. The court cannot accept this interpretation. 
(emphasis added). 
As discussed below, the Magistrate properly ruled in rejecting the Department's argument. 
C.	 FEDERAL LAW PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW 
Congress may preempt state law in several ways. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 
479 U.S. 272, 280, 107 S.Ct. 683, 93 L.Ed.2d 613 (1987). Even when Congress has not chosen 
to displace state law expressly or by fully occupying the field, "federal law may nonetheless pre­
empt state law to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law. " Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 
479 U.S. at 281, 107 S.Ct. 683. Conflict preemption occurs when compliance with both state 
and federal laws is impossible. Fla. Lime Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142­
143,83 S.Ct. 1210, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963). Conflict preemption also occurs when th<::: state law 
is "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objective:s of 
Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941). 
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D. THE DEPARTMENT'S APPLICATION OF I.C. § 56-218 AND ITS REGULATIONS 
CONFLICT WITH FEDERAL LAW AND ARE PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL LAW. 
i. The Department's Claim, Based On An Erroneous Application Of I.C. § 56-218, 
Conflicts With Federal Law. 
The Department argues that because I.C. § 56-218 appropriately implements the estate 
recovery mandate of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p, the PR cannot show that this statute conflicts with 
federal law. Appellant's Brief, p. 15. This argument entirely misses the mark. It is the 
Department's practice of using I.e. § 56-218 to improperly expand the scope of estate recovery 
claims that violates federal law. If the Department applied the language ofI.C .. § 56-218 
consistently with federal law and only made claims against assets in which the Medicaid 
recipient had an interest in at death, there would be no conflict. But conflict preemption occurs 
when the state law is "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution ofthe full purposes and 
objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 
(1941). Compliance with both state and federal law is impossible when the Department makes 
overly broad estate recovery claims based on I.C. § 56-218 that violate federal law. 
In 1998, our Supreme Court in Idaho Department ofHealth and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 
Idaho 213, 215, 970 P.2d 6,8-10 (1998), held that the version ofI.C. § 56-218 then in effect 
(pre-OBRA 1993) authorized the Department to recover against the surviving spouse's estate but 
expressly recognized that such recovery was limited by federal law to assets that were part of the 
Medicaid recipient's estate as defined under state probate law. The Jackman Court recognized 
that federal law does preempt the authority granted to the Department by I.e. § 56-218, and held 
that the only asset that might be recoverable from the surviving spouse's estate was community 
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property accumulated by the couple after the execution of their marriage settlement agreement. 
Id. at 215-216. Our Supreme Court has already recognized, therefore, that federal law does 
preempt in the area of Medicaid recovery claims - i.e. with respect to I.C. § 56-218. The 
Department argues that estate recovery is really controlled by state law. Appellant's Brief, p. 11­
12. Our Supreme Court in Jackman and Stafford, as well as the plethora of federal authority 
cited supra, completely rebuts this contention. 
ii.	 The Department's Regulations Conflict With Federal Law. 
As discussed infra, the Department has misread and misapplied Jackman for over a 
decade. Unfortunately, what ensued after the Jackman decision in 1998 was that the Department 
enacted rules, adopted policies and made claims in married couple Medicaid cases as if the Court 
had ruled on the very issue it explicitly did not rule upon. Simply because the Department enacts 
regulations on its misreading of the Jackman decision and no one objects does not melID those 
regulations are consistent with federal law. 
In Jackman, the Court held that the community spouse's separate property, including the 
community property transmuted by agreement, was not part of the Medicaid recipient's estate 
and not subject to the Department's recovery claim. Jackman, 132 Idaho at 216-217. The 
Department cites IDAPA 16.03.09.900.24, its regulation allowing it to void a marriagt: 
settlement agreement, as support that Idaho law controls, not federal law. Appellant's Brief, p. 
12. This regulation proves nothing except that the Department enacted an overly broad 
regulation that violates federal law based on an erroneous reading ofJackman and that this 
regulation has gone unchallenged. 
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The Department also cites IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20 as support for its position stating, "By 
rule, the Department makes its recovery from property in which the Medicaid jpouse had an 
interest at some point in the past. IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20." (emphasis added). !d. This 
regulation is just as offensive as the statute in Minnesota that was struck down by the Minnesota 
Supreme Court in In Re Estate ofBarg, 752 N.W. 2d 52 (Minn. 2008) because it was 
inconsistent with federallaw5 Barg is discussed in detail in the next section of this brief. 
E. A RECENT MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT DECISION AND TH~= 
PROCEDURAL AFTERMATH OF THAT DECISION ARE DIRECTLY ON POINT 
AND SUPPORT AFFIRMING THE MAGISTRATE'S ORDER. 
In Re Estate ofBarg, 752 N.W. 2d 52 (Minn. 2008) is the latest state court decision on 
point and is on all fours with the instant case. The Court's analysis in Barg provides an in-depth 
and exhaustive review of other state court cases analyzing the issue. Reading Barg in its entirety 
is very instructive because Minnesota's department ofhealth and welfare made the very same 
argument in support of its recovery action as the Department makes in this action. Thl~ facts of 
Barg, when pared down to the essentials, are essentially the same facts present in this probate. 
For the Court's convenience, the PR has appended a complete copy ofBarg to this Memorandum 
as Appendix 1. 
In Barg, supra at 73-74, the Minnesota Supreme Court struck down a provision ofthe 
state's Medicaid estate recovery statute that allowed recovery from the estate ofa surviving 
5 The offending Minnesota statute allowed recovery against assets of the estate "that were marital property or jointly 
owned property at any time during the marriage." Both IDAPA 16.03.09.900.24 and 16.03.09.900.20 are in conflict 
with federal law and are therefore preempted by it. These regulations must be repealed or amended to comport with 
clear federal mandate that the Department may only recover against resources in which the Medicaid recipient had 
an interest in at death. 
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spouse for any assets jointly owned by the couple at any point during their marriage. In that 
case, Mrs. Barg transferred her partial interest in the couple's home to her husband when she 
entered a nursing home. She died without leaving a probate estate and her husband died soon 
thereafter. The county then sought recovery against Mr. Barg's estate for the amount of 
Medicaid benefits paid out on behalf of Mrs. Barg. The Barg Court determined that the county 
could recover only from assets that the Medicaid recipient had a legal interest in at the: time of 
her death. Mrs. Barg had no legal interest in any property when she died because she had 
transferred her interests to her husband while she was alive. Therefore, the Court ruled that the 
county had no way to seek recovery from Mr. Barg's estate6• Id. 
The Supreme Court of Minnesota discussed 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) in depth. This 
discussion is directly applicable to the instant case because Idaho has adopted the federal 
language in that statute verbatim in I.e. § 56-218. In discussing the statutes at issm: the Court 
addressed and rejected the state's argument that the "other arrangement" phrase opened the door 
for the broader recovery allowed under Minnesota's statute. The Court stated in pertinent part, 
We turn to a determination of whether the scope of recovery from a 
surviving spouse's estate allowed under Minnesota law is consistent: with 
federal law. Subdivision 2 ofMinn.Stat. § 2568.15 allows the state to recover 
from a surviving spouse's estate "the value of the assets of the estate that were 
marital property or jointly owned property at any time during the marriage. " 
(Emphasis added.) The County argues that this broad estate recovery authority 
does not conflict with federal law because the pre-1993 version of section 
1396p(b) should be construed broadly and the 1993 amendments were intended to 
expand, not restrict, state estate recovery authority. In asserting this argument for 
6 These are the same facts present in the instant case. Martha transferred her interest in the couple's horne to her 
husband in 2006, prior to applying for Medicaid benefits. She retained no legal interest in that real property, nor in 
the proceeds from the sale of that real property, which are the only assets that make up her husband's estate. 
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broad estate recovery authority, the County emphasizes that it is consistent with 
the dual goals of federal law of recouping Medicaid expenses to make assistance 
available to more qualifying recipients, while protecting community spouses firom 
pauperization during their lifetimes. The Estate argues that, because section 
l396p(b)(1) allows recovery only from a recipient's estate and section 
1396p(b)(4) allows expansion ofthe estate only to include assets in which the 
recipient had an interest at the time of death, the "any time during the marriage" 
recovery allowed by subdivision 2 is preempted. 
The County's argument would take us too far down the path of favorilllg 
the purpose of the law at the expense of the plain meaning of its language. 
Significantly, no court has embraced the County's argument that the pre­
1993 federal law authorized recovery from a surviving spouse's estate of 
assets that were jointly owned during the marriage but transferred by the 
recipient spouse prior to her death.... 
We return again to the language of the federal statute. The federal optional 
definition of "estate" allows inclusion of 
any other real and personal property and other assets in which the 
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the 
extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a 
survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint 
tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, 
or other arrangement. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) (emphasis added). The "including" clause further 
describes the assets that a state may include in this expanded estate. The clause 
describes those assets in two ways--first by the limiting adjective "such," and 
second by the language describing how and to whom "such assets" are 
"conveyed." The "such" limitation plainly refers back to the immediately 
preceding clause describing the assets as those "in which the individual had any 
legal title or interest at the time of death." The including clause then describes to 
whom "such" assets may have been conveyed--a "survivor, heir, or assign ofthe 
deceased individual." [d. (emphasis added). And finally, the clause describes 
several methods by which the conveyance of "such" assets might take place -­
"through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, 
or other arrangement." !d. 
Inclusion in the list of examples of "such assets" is predicated on the recipient 
having a legal interest at the time of death. When we construe a federal statute we 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 17
 
000581
 
1396p(b)(I
 
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
-
 
"'­
must, if at all possible, give effect "to every word Congress used." Reiter v. 
Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979). To 
read "other arrangement" to include a lifetime transfer would be to read the words 
"at the time of death" out of the statute. The conclusion that "other arrangement" 
cannot include lifetime transfers is further supported by the additional context. 
"[O]ther arrangement" ends a list of examples of conveyances that occur at the: 
time of death. The list of recipients of the conveyance, "a survivor, heir, or assign 
of the deceased individual," leaves no doubt that the "individual," a Medicaid 
recipient, must have died for the conveyance to occur. A recipient cannot have 
heirs or survivors during his or her lifetime. Nor can there be an "assign of the 
deceased" during the recipient's lifetime. In light of the plain statutory language 
and its context, the conclusion of the Wirtz court that"other arrangement" is 
sufficiently ambiguous to include lifetime transfers is unreasonable. 
We conclude that there is no principled basis on which to interpret the: 
federal law to allow recovery of assets in which the Medicaid recipient did 
not have an interest at the time of her death. As explained above, the 
rationale for finding authority to recover from a surviving spouse's estate at 
all emanates from the authority granted in the federal law to recover from 
the"estate" of the Medicaid recipient. Property transferred prior to deatl! 
would not be part of the recipient's estate. Further, as recognized by every 
decision except Wirtz, to the extent the 1993 amendments allow states to 
expand the def"mition of "estate" for Medicaid recovery purposes, the 
language of the federal law clearly limits that expansion to assets in which 
the recipient had an interest at the time of her death. Accordingly, we hold 
that Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 2, is partially preempted to the extent th;nt it 
authorizes recovery from the surviving spouse's estate of assets that the 
recipient owned as marital property or as jointly-owned property at any time 
during the marriage. To be recoverable, the assets must have been SUbject to 
an interest of the Medicaid recipient at the time of her death. (Emphasis 
added) 
/d. at 68-71. 
The State of Minnesota filed a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court seeking to 
overturn the Minnesota Supreme Court's ruling in Barg. In May of 2009, the U.S. Solicitor 
General submitted an amicus curiae brief authored by not only that office but joined by the 
attorneys from the Department ofHHS in response to the U.S. Supreme Court's order inviting 
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the Solicitor General to express the views of the United States. This is the most recent legal 
briefing by HHS on the issue. The United States' brief examines and rejects each and every 
argument posited by the State of Minnesota seeking to expand Medicaid estate recovery beyond 
that allowed by federal law. For the Court's convenience, the entire United States Solicitor 
General's amicus curiae brief is appended hereto as Appendix 2. 
The import of the United States' briefing in this matter cannot be overemphasized. The 
legal positions taken in that brief represent HHS's interpretations of federal law. CMS, as noted 
above, is governed by HHS. By accepting federal support for its Medicaid program, Idaho is 
legally obligated to abide by HHS/CMS interpretations of federal Medicaid law. Congress has 
extended HHS extremely broad authority in the Medicaid area. Blumer, supra. 
In its 2009 briefing, HHS expressly rejects the interpretation and application that the 
Department relies upon in using I.C. § 56-218 to support the claim made against the Estate of 
George Perry. The United States/HHS in Barg, supra at p. 8-9, stated in pertinent part, 
The Minnesota Supreme Court's decision is correct and does not warrant 
further review. The federal Medicaid Act permits recovery of correctly paid 
benefits from the estate of the reCipient's surviving spouse, but limits that 
recovery to the value of assets in which the recipient had a legal interest alt 
the time of her death ... 
A. The Decision Of The Minnesota Supreme Court Is Correct 
1. The Minnesota Supreme Court correctly concluded that the 
Medicaid Act forbids petitioner from seeking to recover correctly paid 
benefits from assets in which the Medicaid recipient had no legal in.terest at 
the time of her death. 
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· .. the Medicaid Act, which permits recovery only after the death of 
the recipient's surviving spouse7, 42 U.S.c. 1396p(b)(2), authorizes a StatE~ to 
file a reimbursement claim against the surviving spouse's estate, !ID to the 
value of any assets in which the Medicaid recipient had a legal interest at the 
time of her death. 
The Minnesota estate-recovery law exceeds the scope of that 
authorization. It permits the State to recover from a surviving spouse's 
estate "the value of the assets of the estate that were marital property or 
jointly owned property at any time during the marriage, " Minn. Stat. Ann. § 
256B.15, subd. 2 (2007) (emphasis added), without regard to whether the 
recipient retained an interest in the assets at the time of her death. Becau:se a 
State may not recover correctly paid Medicaid benefits except to the extent 
authorized by federal law, see 42 U.S.c. 1396p(b)(1), Minnesota's statute 
conflicts with federal law and is therefore preempted. .. . (emphasis added). 
The United States Supreme Court decided not to grant cert and did not review the 
Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Barg. 
F. IDAHO'S APPELLATE COURTS HAVE NOT DECIDED THE ISSUE AT ]JAR 
In 2005, our Supreme Court considered the Department's claim filed in the probate of a 
Medicaid recipient's estate whose spouse survived him. In Re Estate ofKaminsky, 141 Idaho 
436, 111 P. 3d 121 (2005). Although the issue in Kaminsky was the timeliness of the 
Department's claim, the Court did recognize that the Department's recovery claim was properly 
made only against the Medicaid recipient's estate. The Court stated, 
Only persons with few financial resources qualify for assistance and assistanct: 
comes with strings attached. Included in these strings is a right on the part of 
the State, pursuant to I.C. § 56-218, to obtain reimbursement of Medicaid 
7 The Department argues that because federal estate recovery does not occur until after both spouses die, this 
somehow is in conflict with the clear statutory language which mandates that only assets in which the Medicaid 
recipient had an interest in at death are subject to recovery. Appellant's Brief, p. 17-18. The Department's 
argument finds no support in the statutes. Nor does the argument find support in logic. Permitting recovery after 
both spouses have died makes sense because it is only at that time that a final determination can be made as to what, 
if any, interest the Medicaid spouse has in any property at her death. 
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assistance from the estate of a recipient. Under any reasonable definition, 
this right of recovery constitutes a "claim" against the recipient's estate. 
(emphasis added). 
Id. at 439. 
i. The Jackman Decision Is Neither Dispositive Nor Controlling. 
As it argued below, the Department's primary argument on appeal is that Idaho 
Department ofHealth and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6 (1998) is dispositive. 
Appellant's Brief, p. 19-22. A thorough reading of the Department's briefing and the case law 
reveals the following: 1) The Department cites and relies heavily upon a Jackman opinion that 
Idaho's Supreme Court withdrew. The withdrawn opinion is not Idaho law, has absolutely no 
precedentia1 value and is not binding upon this Court or any court; and 2) The Department relies 
on dicta in the substituted and published Jackman decision to bootstrap itself into a position of 
arguing that somehow the law is settled in this area by the withdrawn Jackman opinion8• 
8 The Department also confuses pre-eligibility transfers and look-back rules with post-eligibility rights. From that 
confusion it then makes an incorrect assertion regarding the community spouse's right to property post-eligibility. 
Appel1ant's Brief, p. 18. The look back period referred to in 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(c) applies when one spouse applies 
for Medicaid. Contrary to the Department's argument, once one spouse qualifies for Medicaid, any resources 
belonging to the community spouse are solely the property of that spouse and the community spouse can do 
whatever he wants with them. 42 U.S.C. § I396r-5(c)(4). 
The import of this statute was discussed in a June 29, 19991etter to Idaho attorney Rod Gere from Rob{:rt Reed, 
Chief of the Medicaid Branch of the HHS Division of Medicaid and State Operations for Region X. This letter was 
copied to Karl Kurtz, then acting Director of the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, and stated in part, 
Thus, after the eligibility determination any resources belonging to the community spouse are 
solely the property of that spouse. That spouse can do whatever he or she wants to with them, 
including leaving them, via a will, to particular heirs that do not include the institutionalized 
spouse. 
See also, April 5, 2000 letter from Ronald Preston, HHS Associate Regional Administrator for Region I stating in 
part, 
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In its November 2, 1998 Jackman decision, the opinion clearly notes "Substitute Opinion 
The Court's Prior Opinion Dated June 16, 1998, Is Hereby Withdrawn." See Department Exhibit 
E, p. 2. The Internal Rules Of The Idaho Supreme Court (amended January 3, 2008) found on 
the Idaho State Judiciary website under Idaho Court Rules (www.isc.idabo.gov), Rule 15(t) 
states in full: 
(t) Unpublished Opinions of the Court. At or after the oral conference following 
the presentation of oral argument or the submission of the case to the Court on the 
briefs, the Court, by unanimous consent of all justices, may determine not to 
publish the final opinion of the Court. If an opinion is not published, it may not 
be cited as authority or precedent in any court. (emphasis added). 
The June 16, 1998 Jackman opinion was never published. The Court withdrew it and 
issued a substitute opinion. The June 16, 1998 Jackman opinion may not be cited as authority or 
precedent in this Court, or any other for that matter. Yet the Department cited the withdrawn 
opinion repeatedly before the Magistrate. Department's Memorandum in Support of Petition for 
Allowance, p. 13-14. Even more surprisingly, the Department again cites that withdrawn and 
unpublished opinion before this Court, even though the PR raised Idaho Supreme Court Rule 
15(t) in the briefing below. See PR's Reply Memo, p. 19; Appellant's Brief, p. 23. The 
Department's continued reliance on and citation to this unpublished opinion is improper. The 
withdrawn Jackman opinion carries absolutely no weight on the issue before this COUli and the 
Thus. after the month in which an institutionalized spouse is determined eligible for Medicaid, any 
resources belonging to the community spouse are solely the property of that spouse. That is, the 
community spouse can do whatever he or she wants to with them. 
The above-cited HHS letters are attached hereto for the Court's convenience as Appendix 3. The 
Department errs when it asserts thaI federal law treats the property of the recipient and that ofthe spouse as 
the same for purposes of estate recovery. Appellant's Brief, p. 18. Clearly it does not. 
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Department is prohibited by rule from citing it as authority or precedent in any Idaho court. It 
certainly in no way establishes law in Idaho. Yet the Department would have this Court 
speculate as to what our highest Court would have opined had it ruled on the issue at bar, 
because of reasoning or rationale in an opinion that the Court never published and withdrew9• 
That leaves the Department with the November 2, 1998 Jackman decision that was 
published to support its position. The fundamental problem with the Departmtmt's reliance on 
the published Jackman decision is that the Court was dealing with a situation that pre··dated the 
OBRA-1993 amendments. The Supreme Court in Jackman stated repeatedly and was very 
careful to make sure that its opinion was restricted to the version of federal law applicable to the 
controversy before it - in other words the decision was applicable only to cases arising pre-
OBRA 1993. Jackman was explicitly restricted to the facts in that case. The Court made this 
very clear when it stated its holding that, "We conclude that section 56-218(1) of the Idaho Code 
(I.e.), as it existed at times applicable to this case, ... " (emphasis added). Jackman, supra at 
214. 
The Court also stated, 
We conclude that this [the post-OBRA 1993] definition of "assets" Js not 
applicable to the agreement, which Jackman signed on behalf of Lionel and 
Hi1dor on March 8, 1993. The defmition of "assets" contained in the 1993 
amendments to the federal statute does not apply "with respect to assets 
disposed of on or before the date of the enactment of this Act [Aug. 10, 1993]." 
Pub. L. 103-66, § 13611(e). Therefore, it [the post-OBRA 1993 definition qf 
"assets"] does not apply to the agreement and does not allow the DepartmleDt 
to recover the balance of Medicaid payments from Lionel's separate property. 
9 Either the Department has misstated the holding of the published Jackman decision in its brief on app(:al (see last 
four lines of ftrst full paragraph, Appellant's Brief, p. 19) or it is once again improperly citing the unpublished 
opinion. In either event, the Department is ascribing a holding to Jackman that the Court simply did not make. 
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Jackman, supra at 216. 
The Department argues that because the Court discussed the OBRA 1993 amendments 
that this somehow settles the issue. Appellant's Brief, p. 22. Justice Johnson's statements in 
Jackman, upon which the Department so heavily relies, are simply dicta or dictum. "Dicta" is 
defined as, 
Opinions of a judge which do not embody the resolution or determination of the 
specific case before the court. Expressions in the court's opinion which go 
beyond the facts before court and therefore are individual views of author of 
opinion and not binding in subsequent cases as legal precedent. (emphasis 
added) 
Dictum is defined as follows: 
The word is generally used as an abbreviated form ofobiter dictum, .. " 
Statements and comments in an opinion concerning some rule of law or legal 
proposition not necessarily involved nor essential to determination of the c:ase 
in hand are obiter dicta, and lack the force of an adjudication. ... (emphasis 
added). 
Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1991). 
Justice Johnson's comments on how to interpret the post-OBRA amendments in federal 
law were not involved in or necessary to the holding in the published Jackman decision which 
was a pre-OBRA 1993 case. The Court says as much - repeatedly. The Department itself 
admits as much when it states that, "there was no issue as to property transfers after October 1, 
1993" at issue in Jackman and the question before the Jackman Court "was not what Hildor [the 
Medicaid recipient] owned at death. 10" (emphasis added). Appellant's Brief, p. 22. 
10 While briefing the matter before the Supreme Court in 1998, the Department also admitted that any 
comments the Court might make on the issue of whether the definition of "assets" in the post-OBRA 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 24
 
000588
 
 
 
The Magistrate also appropriately recognized that Jackman does not control this post-
OBRA 1993 case and does not support the Department's misapplication ofLe. § 56-218. The 
following exchange occurred between counsel and the Court. 
THE COURT ... I really have been struggling to deal with the definitions 
of estate and assets in both the state and federal's schemes.... I perceive the 
State as saying that Jackman [sic] allows the Court to look at any time, any 
period of time, in which the recipient of benefits had an interest in property.. 
. . I don't see that Jackman [sic] says that. ... Because I think we've got to 
look at the published opinion, not the first one. What does that leave us. 
And I don't think it leaves us much. 
At least that's how it feels to me, that it doesn't necessarily say to me that 
the State may look to any period of time after 1993 that a Medicaid beneficiary, 
Medicaid recipient had an interest in property. I don't think it [Jackman] mak(lS 
that determination.... I don't think it [JackmanI makes a determination of 
where in that period of time the estate may look at the recipient's interest in 
property. (emphasis added). 
Tr., p. 12, LL. 18 through p. 13, LL. 25. 
No matter how much the Department would like to draw implications or speculate about 
the Jackman decision based on the unpublished opinion, the fact remains -Jackman does not 
control the outcome of this case. This Court should affirm the Magistrate's Order Disallowing 
amendments was applicable in defming the breadth of an estate recovery action was dicta. The Department 
stated in its Limited Response to Petition for Rehearing, p. 8 (provided below in the Department's 
Exhibits), "While not essential for the court's decision in this case, the property Hildor conveyed to Lionel 
through the marriage settlement agreement is certainly part of the definition of "estate" and is subject to 
recovery in this case." (emphasis added). The Department admitted in its briefing before the Magistrate 
and this Court that it is relying upon an "implication" that it draws from that opinion. Department's M~:mo 
in Support, p. 14; Appellant's Brief, p. 24. The Department's perceived "implication" in the Jackman 
decision - what is really dicta - is entirely insufficient to establish law in Idaho on the post-OBRA issue 
before this Court. 
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Claim, and do so unencumbered by the Department's efforts to shackle the Court's analysis with 
dicta from the Jackman opinion. 11 
G. FEDERAL LAW CONTAINED IN 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(B)(4)(B) IS CLEAR AND 
UNAMBIGUOUS. THE DEPARTMENT'S POSITION, BASED ON THE GENERAL 
DEFINITION OF "ASSETS" IN 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(h)(1), IS WITHOUT MERIT. 
Federal law says nothing about allowing recovery from assets in which the M(:dicaid 
recipient does not have an interest at death 12. The U.S. Solicitor General's bri(~fbefore the U.S. 
Supreme Court plainly rejects the Department's argument relying on the definition of "assets" in 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(1) stating, 
2. Petitioner [State of Minnesota] argues (Pet. 25-28) that the text of the 
Medicaid Act imposes no limit on permissible recovery from the estate of the 
Medicaid recipient's surviving spouse, because the Act defines the term 
"assets" to include "all income and resources of the individual and of the 
individual's spouse." 42 U.S.c. 1396p(h)(1). According to petitioner, "[b]y 
including resources of both 'the individual' and 'of the individuals spouse' in 
the meaning of 'assets,' Congress clearly intended that the spouse's resources 
fall within the scope of § 1396p(b)(4)(B)." Pet. 27. 
Petitioner is incorrect. Although the general statutory definition of 
"assets" does encompass resources of both "the individual" (i.e., the 
Medicaid recipient) and "The individual's spouse," the particular provision 
II Even if the Court concluded that the Jackman opinion's dicta upon which the Department relies was actually a 
holding in the case, the Court should still rule in the PR's favor for all the reasons urged by the PRo It is well past 
time for Idaho law to be brought into line with mandatory federal statutes which require that estate recovery in Idaho 
be limited to recovery against assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest in at death. 
12 See e.g., 42 CFR § 433.36(h) entitled "Adjustment and recoveries" states as follows: 
(1)	 The agency may make an adjustment or recovery from funds for Medicaid claims cOITectly paid
 
for an individual as follows:
 
(i)	 From the estate ofany individual who was 65 years of age or older when he or she 
received Medicaid; and 
(ii)	 From the estate or upon sale of the property subject to a lien when the individual is 
institutionalized as described in paragraph (g)(2) of this section. (emphasis added). 
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of the Medicaid Act at issue here refers specifically to any "assets in whiet~ 
the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death." 42 U.S.c. 
1396p(b)(4)(B) (emphasis added). Petitioner's argument fmds it necessary to 
rewrite that clause to read "'any * * * assets in which [either or both the 
individual and the individual's spouse] had any legal title or interest.'" Pet. 26 
(brackets and asterisk in original) (emphasis added). But this editing doe!! 
nothing less than make the statute say the opposite of what it says. The plain 
language of the operative provision of the Act refutes petitioner's reading~~.[3 
4. Because Section 1396p(b) leaves no ambiguity about limiting spousal 
estate recovery to the value of assets in which the Medicaid recipient had l! 
legal interest at the time of death, the presumption against preemption dOles 
not come into play, Pet. 28 ... (emphasis added). 
U.S. Solicitor amicus brief, p. 10-12. 
The Department fails to even mention the U.S. Solicitor General's briefing in its 
Appellant's Brief. The PR anticipates it will argue, as it did below, that it is not governed by 
HHS's position as expressed in the amicus briefl4. The U.S. Solicitor General's position is in 
fact HHS's (and therefore CMS's) opinion on the issue. As noted above, a federal agE:ncy 
interpreting federal statutes is entitled to great weight by the court and HHS has extremely broad 
authority in the Medicaid area. Blumer, supra. The Secretary ofHHS in essence spoke through 
its counsel in presenting its position before the U.S. Supreme Court in Barg. The U.S. Supreme 
Court agreed with the U.S. Solicitor General and refused to grant cert in Barg. 
13 (footnote 2 in the original) In describing the operation of the amended estate-recovery provision, the :legislative 
history of the 1993 amendments also focused on the assets of the individual who had received Medicaid benefits, 
rather than the resources of both the individual and his or her spouse. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 213, 103d Cong., 151 
Sess. 835 (1993) ("At the option of the State, the estate against [which] '" '" '" recovery is sought may include any 
real or personal property or other assets in which the beneficiary had any legal title or interest at the time of death, 
including the home.") (emphasis added) (footnote original) 
14 See Department's Memo in Support, p. IS, f.n. 11. 
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i.	 Basic Rules Of Statutory Construction Support The Magistrate's Decision. 
Applying well-established rules of statutory construction also supports the conclusion 
that the Department's position is without merit. Subsection 42 U.S.c. § I 396p(b)(4)'s definition 
of "estate" is specific to "this subsection." That definition is specific to subsection (b) of 42 U.S. 
C. § 1396p. In contrast, subsection 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(h)(I)'s definition of "assets" applies 
generally to "this section (i.e. all of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p) and is included in the "definitions" 
section at the end of the statute. When interpreting statutory definitions and provisions, specific 
definitions take precedence over general definitions. See e.g., In re Drainage District No.3, 40 
Idaho 549, 553,235 P.2d 895 (1925), citing Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec. 387. The 
more specific definition of "estate" under (b)(4) supplants or takes precedence over the broader, 
more general definition of assets in (h)(l), thereby imposing limits on what is recoverable in 
Medicaid recovery actions. The Department's interpretation attempts to superimpose the 
general definition of "assets" improperly upon the specific definition of "estate" that applies in 
42 U.S. C. § I396p(b)(4)(B). The U.S. Solicitor General explicitly rejected this flawed statutory 
analysis. See U.S. Solicitor General amicus brief, supra at 10-12. 
ii.	 The Department Has Misread Or Failed To Read The Barg Opinion. 
The Department argues that the Barg court did not consider the definition of the word 
"assets" in its opinion. The Department also argues that had the Barg Court simply considered 
the definition of "assets", it would have ruled as the court did in In re Estate a/Wirtz, 607 
N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 2000). Appellant's Brief, p. 25-26. In its request for attorney fees on appeal, 
the Department reiterates this contention stating, "the court in Barg failed to even consider the 
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critical federal definition of assets the Idaho Supreme Court found important in Jackman." 
Appellant's Brief, p. 32. Even a cursory reading ofBarg rebuts these arguments completely. 
The Barg Court discussed and rejected Estate ofWirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N.D.2000), and 
explicitly addressed and rejected the Department's definition of "assets" argument stating, 
... Indeed, of the courts that have interpreted federal law to allow 
direct claims against the estate of a surviving spouse, only one has construed 
that authority to extend to assets that were transferred before the death of 
the Medicaid recipient, and that court relied on language from the 1993 
amendments to support that extension. See In re Estate ofWirtz. 607 N.W.2d 
882, 885-86 (N.D.2000). 
Other courts that have recognized authority to recover from a source other 
than the Medicaid recipient's estate have construed that authority to reach only 
assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at the time of her death, that 
is, assets which were part of the recipient's estate as defined by traditional statl~ 
probate law or included in the estate under an expanded definition allowed by the 
1993 amendments to federal law. See Bucholtz, 114 F.3d at 925-27 (limiting 
recovery to assets that were part of recipient's estate as defined by state probatl~ 
law); Kizer, 887 F.2d at 1006 (same); Jackman, 970 P.2d at 8-10 (holding th,at 
recovery from surviving spouse's estate allowed by Idaho Medicaid recov(~ry 
statute is limited by federal law to assets that were part of the Medicaid 
recipient's estate as dermed under state probate law); Thompson, 586 N.W.2d 
at 851 n. 3 (recognizing that "expansive definition of' estate' in [section] 
1396p(b)(4) extends only to assets in which the medical assistance ben(~fits 
recipient 'had any legal title or interest in at the time of death'''); see also In re 
Estate ofSmith, No. M2005-0141O-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 3114250 at *4 
(Tenn.Ct.App. Nov. 1, 2006) (explaining that courts that have allowed recovery 
against estates of surviving spouses have required that recipient had intl~rest in 
assets at time ofdeath).... 
As noted above, the only decision to deviate from this limiting 
principle requiring an interest at the time of death is Wirtz. .,. Concluding 
that the words "interest" and "other arrangement" are ambiguous, the court relied 
on the Congressional intent it perceived "to allow states a wide latitude in seeking 
Medicaid benefit recoveries." Id. at 885-86. . .. 
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We cannot agree that the "other arrangement" language in the 1993 
amendment is ambiguous in the sense implied in Wirtz. The plain meaning of 
"other arrangement," read in the context of section 1396p(b)(4), is 
arrangements other than those expressly listed that also convey assets at the 
time of the Medicaid recipient's death.... 
We conclude that there is no principled basis on which to interpret the 
federal law to allow recovery of assets in which the Medicaid recipient didl 
not have an interest at the time of her death. As explained above. the 
rationale for finding authority to recover from a surviving spouse's estate at 
all emanates from the authority granted in the federal law to recover frOD! 
the "estate" of the Medicaid recipient. Property transferred prior to deatl! 
would not be part of the recipient's estate. Further. as recognized by even~ 
decision except Wirtz, to the extent the 1993 amendments allow states to 
expand the definition of "estate" for Medicaid recovery purposes, lhe 
language of the federal law clearly limits that expansion to assets in which 
the recipient had an interest at the time of her death. Accordingly, we hold 
that Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 2, is partially preempted to the extent th~lt it 
authorizes recovery from the surviving spouse's estate of assets that the 
recipient owned as marital property or as jointly-owned property at any time 
during the marriage. To be recoverable. the assets must have been subject to 
an interest of the Medicaid recipient at the time of her death. (Emphasis 
added) 
Barg, supra at 68-71. Either the Department failed to read Barg or it has misread it. 
iii. Wirtz Is An Anomoly That Should Not Be Followed In Idaho. 
The Department argues that Barg is an anomaly with limited application that "runs 
contrary to other state supreme court decisions such as Jackman and In re Estate ofWirtz ... " 
Appellant's Brief, p. 26. As the Barg Court's comprehensive state survey makl~s clear, Wirtz is 
in fact the anomaly. Jackman cannot be cited for the proposition the Department would like to 
cite it for (i.e. the unpublished opinion), so that leaves Wirtz standing alone. The Department's 
argument inherently recognizes the weakness in the Wirtz court's reasoning because the 
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Department does not even assert the same position that the Wirtz court relied upon to justify its 
decision - i.e. a tortured reading of the words "other arrangement." See Barg, supra at 70. 
Recognizing the clear weight of cogent, well-reasoned authority, the Magistrate rejected 
the untenable "asset" definition argument and the Wirtz reasoning. The Magistrate stated, 
To paraphrase the Department's argument, it may recover from George's estate 
because Idaho Code 56-218(1) allows recovery from the estate of a recipient's 
spouse; 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4) includes the word "assets" in its definition of 
"estate" and 42 U.S.c. 1396p(h)(l) says "assets" includes property that a person 
transferred to her spouse. The court cannot accept this interpretation. 
The reasoning urged by the Department is similar to that presented in 
Estate of Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N.Dakota 2000). Clarence Wirtz had received 
Medicaid benefits and North Dakota sought to recover the payments from the 
estate of Verna Witz [sic], Clarence's wife. The Wirtz court analyzed the federal 
statutory definitions of "estate" and "asset" as quoted above and held that " ... any 
assets conveyed by Clarence Wirtz to Verna Wirtz before Clarence Wiliz's death 
are subject to the department's recovery claim." Id. at 886. This ruling depends. 
however, on an awkward interpretation of the term "other arrangement" in 42 
U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4)(B). The North Dakota court in Wirtz interpreted the "other 
arrangement" language independently from the rest of the section. The bulk of 
the section refers to transfers of property that occur in an automatic fashion on the 
death of the owner, such as joint tenancies, survivorship transfers and life estates. 
It would have been a drafter's nightmare to list every imaginable transfer of 
property of this type. Consequently, the more natural interpretation in J-he context 
ofthe surrounding language is that "other arrangement" is meant to include 
transfers of a similar, automatic nature not any possible transfer. (emphasis 
original). 
Order Disallowing Claim, p. 4-5. The Magistrate went on to note that the Minnesota Supreme 
Court in Barg, supra at 71, provided a "more reasonable interpretation of the federal statutory 
language." Jd. 
The Magistrate concluded. 
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The federal statutory definition of "estate" does not include transfers made by a 
Medicaid recipient before she died. When making a claim against the estate of a 
Medicaid recipient's spouse, the Department may only recover against property in 
which the recipient spouse had an interest at the time of her death. Martha PelTY 
conveyed all of her interest in the Tendoy home during her lifetime. There was 
no joint tenancy, right of survivorship or "other arrangement" that would have 
conveyed any interest in this property to Martha at George Perry's death. The 
Department may not recovery Medicaid benefits paid to Martha from the 
proceeds from the sale of this property. 
Order Disallowing Claim, p. 6. The Magistrate was correct and this Court should affinn 
that decision. 
H. MINNESOTA'S POST-BARG LEGISLATION DOES NOT SUPPORT THE 
DEPARTMENT'S POSITION IN THIS CASE. 
The Department argues that because the State of Minnesota has amended its statutes in an 
attempt to overcome the Barg holding, this proves that federal law governing estate recovery 
claims are actually dictated by state law. Appellant's Brief, p. 26. This argument simply ignores 
federal law and ignores the state of the law in Idaho I5. Federal law limits the scope of estate 
recovery to assets in which the Medicaid recipient has an interest in at death. State law then 
15 The Department asserts that it is "obvious" that federal provisions are intended to allow recovery "of the 
couple's assets." Appellant's Brief, p. 8-9. It is interesting to note, however, that when the Departmenl 
cites and relies on the House Committee Report 42 U.S.c. § I396p(b)(4) in its brief, p. 7-9, it underscores a 
lot oflanguage but consistently fails to highlight the very language that is key to the resolution of the issue 
at bar. The Department ignores the fact that right after the words "estate of the individual or the surviving 
spouse" the House Report contains the following language, 
The term "estate" is defined as all real and personal property of a deceased individual and all 
other assets in which the individual had any legally cognizable title or interest at the time of 
death, including assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign through joint tenancy, survivorship, 
life estate, living trust or other arrangement. (emphasis added) 
Appellant's Brief, p. 8. This is the exact same language the Department ignores when it cites 42 U.S.C. § 
I396p(b)(4) and argues that federal law does not control the breadth of estate recovery. Appellant's Brief, p, 8-10. 
The Department consistently ignores the language that limits the overly broad approach it has practiced for years 
and which violates federal law. This same limiting language appears in I.c. § 56-218(4). The Departm~nt cannot 
prevail by simply ignoring clear, controlling, mandatory federal language. 
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enters into the analysis to dett:nnine whether the Medicaid recipient retained an interest in any 
assets at death. As the Magistrate found, pursuant to state law Martha retains no interest in the 
house sale proceeds that make up George's estate because she conveyed her interest in the home 
to George in 2006. 
Simply because a state legislature enacts a law in a blatant attempt to skirt mandatory 
federal limitations on estate n:covery claims does not mean that the state law will withstand 
challenge. In fact, a recent district court decision out ofMinnesota illustrates that courts in that 
state continue to uphold the federal limitations contained in 42 U.S.c. § 1396p despite: contrary 
state law. See Douglas County v. Lindgren (Minn., 7th Jud. Dist., No. 21-CV-09-477, August 4, 
2010) (Minnesota court grants summary judgment against the county concluding that the 
Minnesota law authorizing recovery against third parties of correctly paid medical assistance 
benefits conflicts with, and is thus preempted by, federal Medicaid law.). 
Minnesota has not "remedied" anything by its new law. It has only made math~rs worse 
by clouding marital property law in Minnesota and raising serious practical and constitutional 
concerns. The changes in the Minnesota statute impair the separate property rights of all married 
individuals, because their property rights will be modified by operation oflaw ifone or the other 
applies for medical assistance benefits. This obviously discriminates against married individuals 
and their spouses on the basis of receipt of federally secured benefits. Further litigation 
challenging these statutes is sure to follow in Minnesota. The Minnesota legislature's recent 
actions do nothing to change the conclusion that the Department's claim herein violatt::s federal 
law. 
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I. THE DEPARTMENT'S POLICY ARGUMENTS ARE IRRELEVANT. 
The Department repeatedly invites this Court to engage in a policy debate on the intent 
behind the federal law, contending that the estate recovery laws are not intended to protect an 
inheritance for children. Appellant's Brief, p. 7-8, 10-11, 17. The Department's opinion of 
public policy, Congressional intent, or the purpose of the Medicaid statutes is irrelevant. This 
Court need not, indeed may not, engage in policy interpretations when faced with clear, 
unambiguous federal statutes. 
Analysis of a statute or regulation always begins with the literal language of the 
enactment. Friends ofFarm to Market v. Valley County, 137 Idaho 192, 197,46 
P.3d 9, 14 (2002) (citations omitted). Our Supreme Court has established that it 
will not look to the legislative intent of a regulation where the express written 
language of the regulation is unambiguous. Friends ofFarm to Market, 137 
Idaho at 197,46 P.3d at 14 (citing Lawless v. Davis, 98 Idaho 175, 560 P.2d 497 
(1977». "Where the language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the 
legislative body must be given effect, and there is no occasion for a court to 
construe the language,," Id. If the language is clear and unambiguous, then a 
court may not interpret the language to include an unwritten legislative intent. 
Stafford, supra at 464-465. As Minnesota's Supreme Court noted in discussing the same types 
of policy arguments made by the Department in this case, "[that] argument would take us too far 
down the path of favoring the purpose of the law at the expense of the plain meaning of its 
language." Barg, supra at 69. 
J. THE DEPARTMENT IS PRECLUDED FROM RAISING ISSUES FOR TUE; FIRST 
TIME ON APPEAL. 
The Department cites I.C. § 32-901 as authority to support its reading of I.C. § 56-218. 
Appellant's Brief, p. 10-11. The Department did not raise this argument in the proceedings 
below. Issues not raised below may not be considered for the first time on appeal. State v. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 34
 
000598
 
 
tes.,
 
 
  
  
 
age ..  
  
:
 
Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195,824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992). Similarly, the Department relh::s on 
IDAPA 16.03.09.900.24 for the first time on appeal. Appellant's Brief, p. 12. These arguments 
are not entitled to consideration on appeal I6• 
K. GEORGE, AS HIS WIFE'S AGENT, HAD LEGAL AUTHORITY TO ENGAGE IN 
THE TRANSFER AT ISSUE ON HER BEHALF. 
i.	 Martha's Power Of Attorney Satisfied The Requirements Of I.e. § 32-912. 
The Department asserts that George's action in utilizing the power of attorney violates 
I.e. § 32-912. Appellant's Brief, p. 27-30. This assertion is incorrect. A thorough review of the 
power of attorney itselftotally rebuts the Department's contention. The power of attorney form 
Martha signed is incredibly comprehensive. It starts out stating in all capital letters that the 
"powers granted by this document are broad and sweeping." The power of attorney then goes 
into great detail explaining a very wide variety of powers that are granted to George, as agent. 
Those powers include, under paragraph (H), entitled "Estate, trust, and other bl~neficiary 
16 Even if the Court did consider I.c. § 32-901, the Department's argument lacks merit and does nothing to 
advance its position. Again, the U.S. Solicitor General and HHS most recently rejected the exact same type 
of argument stating, 
3. Petitioner's reading of the Medicaid Act also fmds little support in the Act's other 
provisions concerning the treatment of spousal assets. See Pet. 27-28. As petitioner notes, th{: 
Medicaid Act generally considers the community spouse's assets for purposes of determining 
whether an institutionalized individual is eligible to receive benefits. But the Act also exempts 
certain property, such as the couple's home, from consideration, 42 U.S.c. 1382b(a)(10, 1396r­
5(c)(5), and allows the community spouse to retain certain amounts of resources and income that 
are not considered available to pay for the applicant's medical care, 42 U.S.C. 1396r-5(d) and 
(f)(2). Moreover, once the institutionalized spouse is determined to be eligible for benefits, 
the Medicaid Act provides that "no resources of the community spouse shall be deemed 
available to the institutionalized spouse." 42 U.S.C. 1396r-5(c)(4). The Medicaid Act, in 
short, imposes significant limitations on petitioner's asserted principle that "spouses are 
expected to support each other." Pet. 27. To read Section 1396p(b)(4)(B) in accordance with 
its plain terms thus is consistent with the broader statutory scheme. (emphasis added). 
U.S. Solicitor General amicus brief, p. 11. 
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transactions" the power "To ... exercise ... any ... gift ... for the principal.,,1? Martha 
expressly authorized George as her agent to make gifts on her behalf. A "gift" is "a voluntary 
transfer ofproperty to another made gratuitously and without consideration." Black's Law 
Dictionary (6th ed. 1991). By including the qualifier that George, as agent, may exercise "any 
gift" on her behalf, Martha broadened that power to authorize George to make gifts to any 
person, including himself. The Magistrate held that although this language was not the "clearest 
kind of authority" he agreed that the gifting language in paragraph H "certainly can be read that 
way." Tr., p. 11, LL. 12-13. Martha's power ofattomey satisfied I.e. § 32-912.18 
The gifting authority that Martha gave to George must also be read in conjunction with 
the other powers Martha granted to her husband, specifically the power to exercise all powers 
with respect to Medicaid" that she could exercise. Paragraph (K) entitled, "Benefits from Social 
Security, Medicare, Medicaid, or other governmental programs, or military service" authorizes 
Martha's husband as her agent 
"To ... file ... claims to any benefit or assistance under any federal, state, local 
or foreign statute; and in general, exercise all powers with respect to ... 
government benefits, including but not limited to Medicare and Medicaid~, 
which the principal could exercise if present and under no disabili~y. 
(emphasis added). 
17 The full sentence that contains this language states, "To accept, receipt for, exercise, release:, reject, renounce, 
assign, disclaim, demand, sue for, claim and recover any legacy, bequest, devise, gift or other property interest or 
payment due or payable to or for the principal." (emphasis added). 
18The fact that a title company required the PR to sign off on the closing statement for Martha is not equivalent to a 
legal finding that Martha's power ofattomey was somehow deficient, as the Department implies. Appellant's Brief, 
p. 30. That signature requirement is simply the title insurer covering its bases because the couple was married at the 
time of the closing and Martha was still alive. It is standard procedure for a title insurer to have everyone possible 
sign off as a liability avoidance precaution. 
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As discussed supra, conveying the Medicaid spouse's interest in the couple's home to the 
community spouse is expressly sanctioned by federal law. Such a transfer is typical in cases of 
married couples where one needs long-term care and will be qualifying for Medicaid benefits. 
Martha's power of attorney not only contemplated that her agent/husband could make such an 
interspousal transfer, it expressly authorized it. The combination of the comprehensive power to 
"exercise any gift" and the comprehensive power to "exercise all powers with respect to ... 
Medicaid" expressly establishes that George acted well within his authority as Martha's agent in 
executing the deed that the Department challenges. 
The Department cites a number of cases from other jurisdictions to support its argument 
that Martha's power of attorney was somehow insufficient. Appellant's Brief, p. 28-29. All of 
these cases are easily distinguishable from the instant case. In none of those cases did the power 
of attorney contain the specific gifting and Medicaid planning language that Martha's power of 
attorney contains. In none of those cases did the power of attorney contain any gifting language 
whatsoever. ]n none of those cases was an interspousal transfer at issue. In none ofthose cases 
was Medicaid at issue. 
In addition, every case the Department cites involved agents who were not spouses. In 
the Department's cited cases, the non-spouse agents were conveying assets to themselves or to 
other third parties, often in contravention of the principal's estate distribution plan or somehow 
in contravention to what the principal would have intended. In this case, Martha's agent was her 
husband, conveying Martha's interest in a home in which he was residing, to himself, while his 
wife was in a nursing home. Martha had already taken action to put George's name on the title 
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herself, indicating her intent he have ownership of the home. George is the natural object of 
Martha's bounty. 
The interspousal transfer makes sense and was contemplated by the power of attorney 
Martha put in place specifically to allow such actions. There simply are no concerns present in 
this case regarding financial abuse of the principal, negation of the principal's estate plan or 
fraud on the principal as was at issue in the cases the Department relies upon. 
"Powers of attorney are to be construed in accordance with the rules of interpn~tationof 
written instruments generally....,,19 In construing a written instrument, a court must consider 
it as a whole and give meaning to all provisions of the writing to the extent possible.2o "The 
intention of the donor or grantor is to be gathered from the instrument of creation.,,21 Reading 
the power of attorney in its entirety, one is struck by the comprehensiveness ofthe do(;ument. In 
addition to the introductory language indicating that the powers conveyed to George are broad 
and all-encompassing, the powers under each paragraph provide great detail emphasizing and 
. hI' 22undersconng t at conc USlOn . 
19 3 Am.Jur.2d Agency § 30, at 533-34 (1986). 
20 Selkirk Seed Co. v. State Insurance Fund, 135 Idaho 434,437,18 P.3d 956 (2000), citing Magic Valley 
Radiology Associates, P.A. v. Professional Business Services, Inc., 119 Idaho 558, 565, 808 P.2d 1303, 1310 (1991). 
21 49 C.J. §§ 34,40. See also 72 C.J.S. Powers § 22 (1951) 
22 Paragraph (A) entitled "Real property transactions" authorizes George to deal with her real property 
on such tenns and conditions ... as my Agent shall deem proper; and to ... convey . .. and in any 
way or manner deal with all or any part ofany interest in real property whatsoever, irrc1uding 
specifically, but without limitation, real property lying and being situated in the State ofIdaho" 
under such terms and conditions . .. as my Agent shall deem proper. (emphasis added). 
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The Department argues that Martha's power of attorney contained restrictions on 
George's authority in ~~ G and H. Appellant's Brief, p. 28. The language referred to prohibits 
the agent from designating himself as a beneficiary under an insurance contract (~ G) and 
changing the principal's will or trust so that the agent benefits from that change (~H). These 
standard provisions, however, do not prohibit George from engaging in the interspousal transfer 
at issue and simply do not apply to this case23 • 
ii. Martha's Power Of Attorney Met The Requirements Of I.e. § 15-5-501 et seq.. 
I.C. § 15-5-501 et seq. was in effect at the time Martha signed the powt:r of attorney. I.C. 
§ 15-5-502 stated in pertinent part, 
All acts done by an attorney in fact pursuant to a durable power of attorney during 
any period of disability or incapacity ofthe principal have the same effc:::ct and ... 
The authority granted under this paragraph also includes the authority to "cancel" notes, mortgages, security interest, 
or deeds to secure debt, which is equivalent to "giving away" assets of the principal. Paragraph (B) entitled 
"Tangible personal property transactions" includes the power to, 
in any way or manner deal with all or any part ofany real or personal property whatsoever, 
tangible or intangible, or any interest therein, that I own at the time of execution or may thereafter 
acquire, under such terms and conditions, and under such covenants, as my Agent shall deem 
proper." (emphasis added). 
Paragraph (H), discussed above, also includes language granting the agent power to "... in general, exercise all 
powers with respect to estates and trusts which the principal could exercise if present and und{:r no disability." The 
other paragraphs in Martha's power of attorney consistently imbue George with authority to act with total and 
absolute discretion. The Department's counsel actually agreed with this conclusion when he stated at the hearing, " . 
. . this is a very comprehensive power of attorney." Tr., p. 7, LL. 5-6. 
23 This language is typical "anti-slayer" language which is included in such forms to prohibit an agent trom 
engaging in transactions that are contrary to public policy, such as the agent taking out life insurance or changing an 
estate plan to name himself as beneficiary and then murdering the principal and thereby profiting from those actions. 
The meaning of these boilerplate restrictions should not stretched beyond reason, as the Department's argument 
encourages. None of the concerns that underpin these type of "agent as bad actor" provisions is present in this case 
where we have an agent/spouse who is the natural object of the principal's bounty acting in a manner that is fully 
authorized by other language in the power of attorney and acting in a manner that Martha would have wanted. 
Martha would have signed the deed at issue were she able to do so. Instead, she authorized her husband to do it for 
her under a power of attorney that was adequate to accomplish her wishes in this regard. 
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bind the principal and his successors in interest, as if the principal were competent 
and not disabled. 
The power of attorney meets I.e. § 15-5-501 's requirement that it contain words "showing the 
intent of the principal that the authority conferred shall be exercisable notwithstanding the 
principal's subsequent disability or incapacity." The Idaho statute which gov(~rns Martha's 
power of attorney did not mandate that Martha was required to use any specific language or 
"terms of art" in order to imbue her spouse/agent with the requisite authority to make the 
interspousal transfer at issue. Yet as discussed above, the power of attorney does contain such 
language. The power of attorney at issue is completely sufficient under the law then in effect to 
grant Martha's spouse/agent, George, the full and complete authority to engag(~ in the 
interspousal transfer at issue. 
iii. Idaho's Recently Enacted Uniform Power Of Attorney Act Also Supports The 
Magistrate's Ruling. 
In 2008, Idaho's legislature overhauled our Uniform Power ofAttorney Act and required 
that specific gifting language be included in the power of attorney if the principal wanted her 
agent to have that authority. I.e. § lS-lZ-Z01(1)(b)24. These changes were made, in part, to 
guard against elder abuse. In the official comments to Article 2 of the Model Act it states, 
The rationale for requiring a grant of specific authority to perfOlm the acts 
enumerated in subsection (a) [adopted as I.C. § 15-12-201(1)] is the risk thos«~ 
acts pose to the principal's property and estate.... 
Subsection (b) [I.C. § 15-12-201(1)(b)] contains an additional safeguard 
for the principal. It establishes as a default rule that an agent who is not aln 
ancestor, spouse, or descendant of the principal may not exercise authority to 
24 This Act was constructed from a review and revision of the National Conference ofCommissioners On Uniform 
State Laws' Uniform Power of Attorney Act dated July, 2006 ("Model Act"). 
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create in the agent or in an individual the agent is legally obligated to support, an 
interest in the principal's property. For example, a non-relative agent with ~~ift 
making authority could not make a gift to the agent or a dependent of the 
agent without the principal's express authority in the power of attorney. 
This comment underscores the point that the concerns present when examining an agent 
making a gift to himself are generally not present when a spouse/agent is involved. George 
utilized the powers given him by his wife to convey Martha's interest in the couple's home to 
himself. The new Uniform Act, I.e. § 15-12-217(2), specifically recognizes that then: will 
continue to be powers of attorney which contains language "granting general authority with 
respect to gifts" which authorize the agent to make gifts to themselves. Although the standards 
encompassed in the new Act are more restrictive than those that governed Martha's power of 
attorney, even the new law recognizes the fact that powers of attorney are to b(: read less 
stringently when the spouse is the one engaging in an interspousal transfer25 . 
In this case, when all of these factors are considered, the Magistrate correctly concluded 
that George acted consistently with the authority granted him in Martha's power of attorney. 
The amendments made in 2008 and the policy rationales behind those amendments lend 
additional support for the legal conclusion Martha's power of attorney was sufficient to allow 
George as her agent to effectuate the interspousal transfer. 
25 In addition, the new Act's I.e. § 15-12-217(3) indicates that even if the principal's objectives are not 
actually known to the agent, the agent may make gifts of the principal's property in what he detennines to 
be the principal's best interest, taking into account such facts as the nature of the principal's property, the 
principal's foreseeable need for maintenance, the principal's history of making gifts, and eligibility for 
government benefit program assistance. Thus even under the new Act it appears pennissible for an 
agent/spouse with gifting power to engage in exactly the type of interspousal Medicaid-motivated transfer 
at issue in this case. 
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iv. The Court Should Infer From The Undisputed Facts And Circumstances That 
Common Law Interspousal Agency Existed And Validates The Transfer. 
In Lowry v. Ireland Bank, 116 Idaho 708, 713, 779 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1989), the Court 
stated, 
We have noted that community real property can be validly encumbered 
only ifboth spouses join in executing the instrument of encumbrance. I.C. § 32­
912. The statute evim:es a legislative policy ofprotecting community real 
property from creditors, unless both spouses agree in writing to incur the debt. 
Thus, the statute usually requires two signatures. However, an exception to this 
general rule exists if one spouse is authorized to act as an agent for the 
management and disposition of community real property. Noble v. Glenns 
Ferry Bank, Ltd., 91 Idaho 364, 367, 421 P.2d 444, 447 (1966). Our SupremE~ 
Court has held that such an agency may be created by an express power of 
attorney, as authorized by I.C. § 32-912, or may be inferred from the 
circumstances and conduct of the parties. Noble, 91 Idaho at 368, 421 P.2d at 
448. 
See also, Noble v. Glenns Ferry Bank Ltd., 91 Idaho 364,421 P.2d 444 (1966) (existence 
of the wife's agency was a question of fact to be determined by the finder of the facts 
from the husband's and wife's dealings, circumstances, and conduct). 
George and Martha's dealings, circumstances and conduct support a ruling that an 
interspousal agency can be inferred from the undisputed facts of this case. Consideration of the 
facts and circumstances present, including the actions Martha took in putting the power of 
attorney in place, the comprehensive language it contains, and the Magistrate's factual findings 
(discussed below), supports this Court affirming the interspousal conveyance based on the 
alternative ground of common law interspousal agency. 
v. The Magistrate Made Findings of Fact On The Power Of Attorney Issue. 
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The Department argues that the Magistrate made a legal conclusion unsupported by 
findings of fact when he stated, "The court has determined that George Perry held a valid power 
of attorney from Martha and that he had the authority to transfer the property to himself." Order 
Disallowing Claim, f.n. 1. Appellant's Brief, p. 27, 31. The Department ignores what occurred 
at the hearing. The Magistrate's legal conclusion as stated in the Order was supported by 
explicit findings of fact made at the hearing. There is no prohibition against a magistrate making 
oral findings of fact. See e.g., State v. Revenaugh, 133 Idaho 774, 776, 992 P.2d 769 (1999). 
The Magistrate ruled from the bench on the power ofattorney issue stating, 
The power of attorney issue was - is interesting to me and -- b{:cause ] 
don't think that that - that paragraph where the word gift is written, paragraph H, 
is the clearest kind of authority to make a gift ofproperty. It certainly can be 
read that way. .. 
But I think - when everything - all of the language in that power of 
attorney is considered, it's so - the intent that you just can't get around is 
that document was entitled to give George Perry as broad of authority as 
possible, it seems to me, including the right to deal with interest in real 
property. 
So I'm going to make a determination for purposes of this case that 
that is a valid power of attorney for purposes of dealing with - including 
giving Martha Perry's interest in that property. 
So I'm going to decide that question for purposes of this case. (t~mphasis 
added) 
Tr., p. 11, LL. 8-25; p. 12, LL. 1-11. 
The Magistrate clearly ruled not only that paragraph H in the power of attorney was 
sufficient to satisfy I.e. § 32-912, but also that the comprehensive nature ofth{: document 
supported a conclusion that Martha's power of attorney gave George sufficient authorilty to 
legally effectuate the interspousal transfer. The Magistrate found as a matter of fact that Martha 
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intended to give George the necessary authority in the power of attorney to transfer the property 
to himself. There is no need, as the Department argues, to remand for further factual :5ndings in 
order to support the Magistrate's legal conclusion on the power of attorney issue, nor to find that 
interspousal agency existed under the circumstances of this case sufficient to uphold the transfer 
on that basis as well. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing reasons, the Personal Representative respectfully requests that the 
Court affirm the Magistrate's Order Disallowing Claim in its entirety. 
DATED this 26th day ofAugust, 2010. 
PETER C. SISSON 
Attorney for Personal Representative 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 44
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Appeal from the District Court, Mille lacs County, Steven P. Ruble, J. 
55 
Mille lacs County Attorney, Melissa M. Saterbak, Asst. Mille Lacs County Attorney, Milaca, MN, for appellant Mille Lacs
 
County.
 
Thomas J. Meinz, Princeton, MN, for respondent Michael Barg. 
Julian J. Zweber, st. Paul, MN, for amid curiae Elder law section of the Minnesota State Bar Association and National 
senior Citizens law Center. 
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Robin Christopher Vue-Benson, Asst. Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, for clmicus curiae
 
Minnesota Commissioner of Human services.
 
Heard, considered, and decided by the court en bane. 
OPINION 
MEYER, Justice. 
The Mille lacs County Family serviceS and Welfare Department (County) filed a claim against the Estah~ of Francis E. 
Barg (Estate), seeking to recover Medicaid benefits correctly paid on behalf of his predeceased Wife, Dolores Barg. The 
Estate partially allowed the claim, and disallowed the other part. The district court, concluding that Dolores Barg's 
interest in the couple's property was limited because she had conveyed it to her husband before her death, evaluated 
her interest as a life estate, and upheld the partial disallowance. The County appealed, argUing that it was e'ntitled to 
recovery from the full value of the property. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, partially allOWing the claim 
and evaluating Dolores Barg's interest in the property as a joint tenancy interest equivalent to one-half the value of the 
h .....".//r1",..,,,, I....r..:t.... n ..t/"t .. t", .. I" AlI.r Il.~~ 1.",_ll./~-"_~_~_e-!-r~.-L-_-.LL'~~------------------
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property. In re Estate ofBiJrg, 722 
57
 
N.W.2d 492, 497 (Minn.App.2006). We affirm in part and reverse in part. 
Factual and Procedural BiJckground. 
The parties have stipulated to the facts in this case. Dolores J. Barg was born in 1926, married Fralnds E. Barg in 
1948, and remained married to him until her death in 2004. In 1962 and 1967, in two separate transa<:tions, the Bargs 
took title as joint tenants to real property in Princeton, Minnesota. Their home was located on this property. On October 
24, 2001, Dolores Barg entered a nursing home in Mille Lacs County, at first paying the costs herself. In December 2001, 
she applied for long-term Medicaid benefits.(fnl) 
An asset assessment for Dolores Barg was completed in February 2002. The Bargs' marital assets including their 
homestead totaled $137,272.63.(fn2) Approval for long-term Medicaid benefits was given retroactive tel December 1, 
2001. 
On February 27, 2002, Frands Barg executed his Will, nominating the couple's son Michael F. Barg i)S personal 
representative, leaving his estate to his surviving descendants, and making no provision for his wife. Dolores Barg 
transferred her joint tenancy interest in the homestead property to Francis Barg on July 2, 2002, when her daughter and 
guardian of her estate, Barbara Anderson, executed a Guardian's Deed. Also in July 2002, Barbara Anderson deleted 
Dolores Barg's name from certificates of deposit the couple held jointly at Bremer Bank. There is no alle~ation that these 
actions were improper or fraudulent. 
On January 1, 2004, Dolores Barg died, having received $108,413.53 in Medicaid benefits. At the time of her death, 
assets belonging to either Dolores or Francis Barg included three certificates of deposit, a checking account, and an IRA 
account, all in the name of Frands Barg alone; one certificate of deposit payable to the funeral home for Dolores Barg's 
funeral; two vehicles, together worth approXimately $9,000; the homestead titled in Frands Barg's name, valued at 
$120,800; and miscellaneous household goods and furniture. All of these assets had been joint/v held at some time 
during the couple's 55-year marriage. 
On May 27, 2004, Francis Barg died, never haVing received Medicaid benefits. On July 30, 2004, the County filed a 
claim against Francis Barg's estate, seeking to recover $108,413.53, the full amount Dolores Barg had received in 
Medicaid benefits. 
Michael Barg disallowed $44,533.53 Of the claim, and allowed $63,880. The County petitioned for an allowance of 
the full claim, arguing that the entire value of the marital property, both the homestead and the certificatl!S of deposit, 
was subject to its claim because Dolores Barg's joint tenancy interest gave her a right to use of the entire property. The 
district court concluded that Dolores Barg's interest in the property at the time of her death was 
58 
eqUivalent to a life estate, and upheld the partial disallowance. 
The County appealed. The court of appeals explained that, based on In re Estate ofGu//berg, 652 N.W.2d 709 
(Minn.App. 2(02), the County's ability to recover against Francis Barg's estate was limited to Dolores's interest in marital 
or jointly owned property at the time of her death. BiJrg, 722 N.W.2d at 496. The court decided that property law 
principles should be applied to determine the nature of that interest and that under federal law and Gu//berg, Dolores 
Barg retained a joint tenancy interest in the homestead at the time of her death. Id. at 497. The court valuled that 
interest as an undivided one-half of the property's value, and remanded the case to the district COlirt for a recalculation 
of the amount of the claim that was allowable. !d. 
The County petitioned for review. The Estate opposed review but sought conditional cross-review on th,e issue of 
whether federal law permits the State to recover at all from a surviving spouse's estate. We granted reView, as well as 
cross-review, and asked for briefing on whether the Estate had adequately preserved for review the issue of "whether 
the county may recover Medicaid benefits correctly paid on behalf of a predeceased spouse from the estate of a 
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surviving spouse." We granted requests by the Minnesota Commissioner of Human Services to file an clmicus curiae brief 
aligned with the County and to participate in oral argument.(fn3) We also granted requests by the Eldt!l' Law Section of 
the Minnesota State Bar Association and the National Senior Otizens Law Center to file an amicus curicle brief aligned 
with the Estate. After oral argurrlent, we asked the parties for supplementary briefing on the relationship of the 2003 and 
2005 amendments of Minn.Stat. § 2568.15, subds. 1 and 1c-1k (2006), to the authority the County ar~lues exists under 
Minn,Stat. § 2568.15, subd. 1a (2006) and Minn.Stat. § 2568.15, subd. 2 (2006), and how that relationship affects 
preemption analysis and the scope of recovery permissible under Minnesota law. 
Statutory Framework. 
Congress enacted Medicaid in 1965 as TItle XIX of the Sodal Security Act to ensure medical care to individuals who 
do not have the resources to cover essential medical services. Martin ex rei. Hoffv. Oty ofRochester, 642 N.W.2d 1, 9 
(Minn. 2002). Medicaid was intended to be the payor of last resort. Id. The program is jointly funded with the states as a 
"cooperative endeavor in which the Federal Government provides financial assistance to partidpating States to aid them 
in furnishing health care to needy persons." HarTis v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308, 100 5.0.2671,65 L.Ed.2d 784 (1980). 
Participating states enact legislation and rules, incorporate them into state medical assistance plans, and submit those 
plans to the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services for approval. 42 U.S.c. § 1396a(a)·(b) (2000 & Supp. III 
2003). After this, the states can receive federal payments. 42 U.S.c. § 1396 (2000). Each state administers its own 
program within the federal requirerrlel1ts, and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)(fn-') administer 
59 
the program and approve state plans. Martin, 642 N.W.2d at 9. One of the reqUirements imposed on state plans is that 
they must "comply with the provisions of [42 U.S.c. § 1396p) with respect to liens, adjustments and reclJveries of 
medical assistance correctly paid, transfers of assets, and treatment of certain trusts." 42 U.S.c.. § 1396cI(a)(18) (2000). 
To receive Medicaid, a person must qualify as either "categorically" or "medically" needy. 6"tate ofAtkinson v. Minn. 
Dep'tofHuman Servs., 564 N.W.2d 209, 210-11 (Minn.1997). A person is "categorically needy" if he is eligible for other 
specified federal assistance programs. Id at 211. A person is "medically needy" if he incurs medical expenses that 
reduce his incorrle to roughly the level of those who are categorically needy. Id. To qualify as medically needy a pe~n 
may have income no higher than a defined threshold and may own assets of no more than a defined value. ld. If the 
assets of a Medicaid applicant and her spouse exceed the qualifying threshold, they must "spend down" their assets until 
they are at or below the qualifying threshold. Id. If a potential Medicaid recipient transfers assets below fair market value 
within a certain period of time before eligibility, the redpient is deemed ineligible for benefits for a time period mandated 
by statute. 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(c) (2000). This provision prevents people who are not needy from becoming eligible for 
Medicaid by transferring their assets away. 
When determining the eligibility of a married person to receive Medicaid, states consider assets of both husband and 
wife as available to the spouse requesting benefits. 42 U.S.c. § 1396r-5(c) (2000). But there are several provisions in 
place to protect the community spouse(fn5) from being impoverished as a result of the spend-down of as-.ets needed to 
qualify the applicant for Medicaid. see Atkinson, 564 N.W.2d at 211; 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5 (2000). The valLie of the 
couple's home is not included among assets considered eligible to pay for medical care. Id. § 1396r-S(c)(S); 42 U.S.c. § 
1382b(a)(1) (2000). The community spouse of a Medicaid recipient is also entitled to an allowance of income and assets 
designated for his or her needs that is not considered available to pay for the recipient spouse's medical Que. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396r-5(d). Furthermore, the recipient spouse has the right to transfer assets, including an interest in the homestead, 
to his or her community spouse. 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(c)(2). Medicaid thus balances the obligation of community spouses to 
contribute to the payment of medical expenses for their recipient spouses against the accommodation of the community 
spouse's need to provide for his or her own support. 
Federal Medicilid Recovery Provisions. 
Although it is not applicable to the facts before us, it is useful to start with the pre-1993 federal law on Medicaid 
recovery, because it is relied on in the parties' arguments and is the basis for the rationale of several relevant cases. 
Prior to amendments adopted in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1993, the federal Medicaid statute 
stated a general principle that there should be no recovery of correctly paid Medicaid benefits, subject 
60 
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to several exceptions, one of which is relevant here: 
No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the 
State plan may be made, except -­
(8) in the case of any other individual who was 65 years of age or older when he received such
 
assistance, from his estate.
 
42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(l) (1988). Under this pre-1993 law, states were allowed, but not required, tlO recover Medicaid 
benefits paid to recipients 65 or older, and the statute specified the recovery would be from the recipiE!nt'S estate. The 
statute also provided that this recovery from the recipient's estate could only be made after the death of the recipient's 
surviving spouse. fa § 1396P(b)(2) (1988). Despite this prohibition against recovery before the death of a surviving 
spouse, there was no express mention of recovery from the estate of a surviving spouse. The pre-1993 federal law 
contained no definition of "estate." 
Section 1396P(b) was amended as part of the OBM amendments of 1993. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1993, Pub.L. No. 103-66, § 13612(a), (c), 107 Stat. 312, 627-28 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.c. § 1396P(b)(1), (4) 
(2000». As amended, the federal law retained the general prohibition against states attempting to recover Medicaid 
payments correctly paid on behalf of an individual, with limited exceptions. 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b) (2000). But the 1993 
amendments changed section 1396p(b) in several ways. First, they lowered the age criterion for recovery from 65 to 55. 
Second, they made recovery allowed by the exceptions mandatory rather than permissive. Third, they added a definition 
of "estate," which itself had both mandatory and permissive elements. As amended, the general nonrec,overy rule and 
the relevant exception read as follows: 
(1) No adjusbnent or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under 
the State plan may be made, except that the State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical 
assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the case of the following 
individuals: 
(8) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when the individual received such 
medical assistance, the State shall seek adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate • • •. 
fd. The amended version of section 1396P(b)(1)(B) retained the express reference to recovery from the recipient's 
estate. Furthermore, as was true pre-amendment, this recovery from the recipient'S estate is only permitted after the 
death of the recipient's surviving spouse: "Any adjustment or recovery under paragraph (1) may be made- only afferthe 
death of the individual's surviving spouse, if any • * *." 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(2) (emphasis added). And hke the pre­
1993 version, the amended federal statute contains no express authorization for, or reference to, recovel1f from a 
surviVing spouse's estate. 
The 1993 amendments added a definition of "estate" for purposes of Medicaid recovery, with a mandcltory provision 
that looks to state probate law and an optional provision that authorizes states to expand the definition beyond the 
scope of probate law: 
[TJhe term "estate", with respect to a deceased individual·· 
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included within the individual's estate, as 
defined 
61 
for purposes of State probate law; and 
(B) may include, at the option of the State * * * any other real and personal property and other assets in 
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which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time ofdeath (to the extent of such interest), 
including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint 
tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement. 
42 U.S.c. § 1396P(b)(4) (emphasis added). Under this provision, a state has the option to adopt a definition of 
"estate" for Medicaid recovery purposes that includes some assets which, under ordinary probate law, would not be part 
of the Medicaid recipient's estate, because they would pass immediately to someone else on the recip~!!nt's death. For 
example, when two persons hold property in joint tenancy with a right of survivorship and one dies, the deceased joint 
tenant's interest ordinarily passes directly to the surviving joint tenant and is not part of the probate ~..tate. Under the 
optional expanded definition allowed by federal law, for Medicaid recovery purposes the interest of a deceased joint 
tenant who had received Medicaid would be included in his estate, rather than passing directly to the SUrviving joint 
tenant. 
Minnesota s Medicaid Recovery Laws. 
Minnesota has long had a policy of requiring partidpants in the Medicaid program and their spouses to use their own 
assets to pay their share of the cost of care during or after enrollment. Minn.Stat. § 2568.15, subd. 1(a) (2006). To 
implement this policy, since 1987 Minnesota law has proVided for recovery of Medicaid benefits paid from the estate of a 
recipient or the estate of the recipient's surviving spouse. Minn.Stat. § 2568.15, subd. 1a (originally enalcted as Act of 
June 12, 1987, ch. 403, art. 2, § 82, 1987 Minn. Laws 3255,3347). As relevant here, subdivision 1a provides that, "on 
the death of the survivor of a married couple, either or both of whom received medical assistance, • • ~. the total 
amount paid for medical assistance rendered for the person and spouse shall be filed as a claim against the estate of the 
[recipient] or the estare ofthe surviving spouse." Id. (emphasis added). A claim against the estate of a surviving spouse 
for medical assistance provided to the recipient spouse may be made up to "the value of the assets of the estate that 
were marital property or jointly owned property at any time dUring the marriage." Id., subd. 2 (emphasis added). 
The broad estate recovery authority contained in subdivisions 1a and 2 was supplemented in 2003 by amendments 
to the statute expanding subdivision 1 and adding subdivisions 1c-1k. Act of June 5, 2003, ch. 1.4, art. 1:2, §§ 40-50, 
2003 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 1751, 2205-17. These amendments implement the optional expanded definition of 
"estate" authorized in the 1993 amendments to the federal law. 5eeMinn.Stat. § 2568.15, subd. 1(a)(2) (2006); 42 
U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(4)(B). The 2003 amendments to the Minnesota estate recovery law modify common liJW to proVide for 
continuation of a recipient's life estate or joint tenancy interest in real property after his death for the purpose of 
recovering medical assistance, Minn.Stat. § 2568.15, SUbd' 1(a)(3) (2006), and include that continued interest in the 
recipient's estate. Mlnn.Stat. § 2568.15, subds. 19, 1h(b), 1i(a), 1j. The 2003 amendments also establish specific 
procedures for exerdsing claims against these continued life estate and joint tenancy interests, CIS well as procedures 
and waiting periods that differ according to whether the recipient's spouse, dependent children, or other relatives 
62 
living in the homestead survive the recipient. Act of June 5, 2003, ch. 14, art. 12, §§ 48-49,2003 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. 
5ess. 1751,2213-17 (codified as amended at Minn.Stat. § 2568.15, subds. li and 1j). In this case, the County filed its 
claim under subdivisions 1a and 2 and did not rely on provisions added in the 2003 amendments. 
The issues presented in this case involve several questions about the relationship between the recovery provisions of
 
federal and Minnesota Medicaid law. The court of appeals held that a partial disallowance of the County's claim was
 
proper, relying on its earlier decision in Gullberg that the broad authorization in subdivision 2 for recovery up to the value
 
of all assets of the estate that were marital property or jointly owned at any time dUring the maniagewas partially
 
preempted by the 1993 amendments to the federal law that limit the expanded estate to assets in which the recipient
 
spouse had a legal interest at the time ofher death. BiJrg, 722 N.W.2d at 595-96 (citing Gullberg, 652 N.W.2d at 714).
 
The County, and its supporting amicus curiae the Commissioner of the Department of Human 5ervices, argue that
 
the court of appeals was wrong, both here and in Gullberg, in finding any preemption of the broad estate recovery
 
authorized in subdivisions 1a and 2. They contend that there was nothing in the federal statute prior to thE! 1993
 
amendments that limited the states' authority to pursue estate recovery of Medicaid benefits paid, and that: the 1993
 
amendments were intended by Congress to expand state options, not limit them. Alternatively, the County argues that
 
even if recovery is limited to the assets in which the recipient had an interest at the time of her death, Dolores Barg had
 
an interest in the property notwithstanding the conveyance to her husband, and the court of appeals erred in valUing
 
that interest as only one-half the value of the homestead.
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The Estate and its supporting amid curiae counter that federal law authorizes recovery only from a recipient's estate, 
and Minnesota law that allows recovery from a surviving spouse's estate is therefore preempted.(fn6) The Estate argues 
that recovery is also barred because, to the extent recovery is allowed from the estate of a surviving spouse, federal law 
limits that recovery to the value of assets in which the recipient had a legal interest at the time of her death, and 
subdivision 2 of section 2568.15 is preempted to the extent it allows broader recovery. Rnally, the Estate argues that 
there should be no recovery here because Dolores Barg had no legal interest 
63 
in the homestead or the certificates of deposit at the time of her death, having conveyed her interest to her husband 
during her lifetime. 
Thus, the issues presented are as follows. Rrst, does federal law preempt the authorization in Minn.Stat. § 2568.15, 
subd. la, for recovery of Medicaid benefits paid for a recipient spouse from the estate of the surviving spouse? second, if 
such recovery from a surviving spouse's estate is not preempted, does federal law limit the recovery to assets in which 
the recipient had an interest at the time of her death, preempting the broader recovery allowed in Minn.Stat. § 2568.15, 
subd. 2, as to assets owned as marital property or in joint tenancy at any time during the marriage? Third, if recovery is 
limited to assets in which the recipient had an interest at the time of her death what, if any, interest did Dolores Barg 
have in the homestead or the certificates of deposit at the time of her death, and specifically, was the court of appeals 
correct in holding that Dolores Barg had a joint tenancy interest for purposes of estate recovery even though she 
transferred that interest to her husband during her lifetime? We address these issues in turn, after first reviewing basic 
preemption principles. 
I. 
Whether federal law preempts state law is primarily an issue of statutory interpretation, which we rE!View de novo. 
Martin, 642 N.W.2d at 9. The application of law to stipulated facts is a question of law, which we also review de novo. 
Morton 8/dgs., Inc. v. Comm'rofRevenue, 488 N.W.2d 254,257 (Minn. 1992). 
Congressional purpose is II' the ultimate touchstone'" of the preemption inqUiry. Malone v. WhIte Motor Corp., 435 
U.S. 497, 504,98 S.Ct. 1185, 55 LEd.2d 443 (1978) (quoting RetailOerks Int1 Ass'n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhom, 375 
U.S. 96, 103,84 S.O. 219, 11 LEd.2d 179 (1963». Our primary focus in the analysis must be to ascertalin the intent of 
Congress. see cal. Fed. Sdv. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280-81, 107S.Ct. 683,93 L.Ed.2d 613 (1987). The 
United States Supreme Court has explained that "[c]onsideration of issues arising under the Supremacy Clause' start[s] 
with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by Federal Act unless that 
[is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.... Gpollone v. liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516, 11:2 S.Ct. 2608, 
120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe ElevatrJrCorp., 331 U.S. 218, 230.67 S.Ct. 1146.91 L.Ed. 1447 
(1947». Thus. preemption is generally disfavored. Martin, 642 N.W.2d at 11 (citing Gpollone, 505 U.S. at: 516, 518,112 
S.Ct. 2608). 
Congress may preempt state law in several ways. cal. Fed. Sdv. & Loan Ass'n, 479 U.S. at 280, 107 S.Ct. 683. First, 
it may do SO with express language preempting state law. Id. second, it may do so by fully occupying the field, that is, 
"congressional intent to pre-empt state law in a particular area may be inferred where the scheme of federal regulation 
is sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress . 'eft no room' for supplementary state 
regulation." Id at 280-81, 107 S.O. 683 (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230,67 S.Ct. 1146). Here, it is clear that Congress 
neither expressly preempted state law nor so completely occupied the field as to leave no room for state action, because 
the Medicaid program specifically permits and even requires action by participating states. Martin, 642 N.W.2d at 11. 
The third kind of preemption is at issue in this case. Even when Congress 
64 
has not chosen to displace state law expressly or by fully occupying the field, "federal law may nonetheless pre-empt 
state law to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law." Cdl. Fed. Sdv. & Loan Ass'n, 479 U.S. at 281, 107 S.Ct. 683. 
Conflict preemption occurs when compliance with both state and federal laws is impossible, Fla. Lime Avocado Growers, 
Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143,83 s.n. 1210, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963). or when the state law is "an obs.tacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. DrJV1dowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 
S.Ct. 399,85 L.Ed. 581 (1941). 
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II. 
We now turn to the question of whether Minn.Stat. § 2568.15, subd. la, which requires Medicaid recovery against 
the estate of a surviving spouse, is preempted by federal law, particularly 42 U.S.c. § 1396P(b)(1)(8). Because only 
conflict preemption may be applicable, we seek to determine whether compliance with both statutes is impossible or 
whether the state law stands as an obstade to accomplishment of the purposes of the federal law. 
The County seeks recovery here under subdivision 1a of section 2568.15, which authorizes--indeed requires-­
recovery of Medicaid benefits from the estate of the surviving spouse of a recipient. The Estate argues that this state law 
authorization to recover from the estate of the surviving spouse is preempted because it conflicts with 42 U.S.c. § 1396p 
(b)(l), which prohibits recovery of correctly paid Medicaid benefits except from the estate of the recipient of the 
benefits. 
The federal statute establishes a general prohibition against recovery of correctly paid Medicaid benefits, subject to 
three specified exceptions: 
( 1) No adjustment or recovery ofany medical assistance correctly paid on be!k1/fofan individual under 
the State plan may be made, except that the State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical 
assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the CiJse ofthe foIlo....ing 
individuals: 
42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(l) (emphasis added). Only one exception potentially applies to the circumstance of this case: 
(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when the individual received such 
medical assistance, the State shall seek adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate· • •. 
Id. § 1396p(b)(l)(B) (emphasis added). Because this express exception to the general rule against r,ecovery of 
Medicaid benefits directs that recovery come from the recipient's estate and makes no reference to a surviving spouse's 
estate, the Estate argues that recovery from the surviving spouse's estate is not allowed under federalla'w. Because 
exceptions to a general statement of polley are to be construed narrowly, Comm'r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739, 109 S.O. 
1455, 103 LEd.2d 753 (1989), it appears on its face that recovery from the surviving spouse's estate is not permitted by 
federal law. 
Two courts have agreed with this analysis and conduded that section 1396p(b)(l)(B) authorizes recovery only from 
the recipient's estate and does not allow recovery from the estate of a surviving spouse. Hines v. Dep't 01'Pub. Aid, 221 
m.2d 222, 302 I11.Dec. 711,850 N.E.2d 148, 152-53 (2006); In re Estate ofBudney, 197 Wis.2d 948,541 N.W.2d 245, 
246 (1995), rev. denied546 N.W.2d 471 (Wis. 1996). The Wisconsin Court of Appeals explained that the federal statute 
never "counter[ed] the initial blanket prohibition" 
65 
on recovery by authoriZing recovery from the surviving spouse's estate. Budney, 541 N.W.2d at 246. The Illinois
 
Supreme Court noted that under federal and Illinois law, the state had authority to seek reimbursement from the
 
recipient's estate after the death of his surviving spouse. Hines, 302 III.Dec. 711,850 N.E.2d at 153. But instead, as
 
here, the state sought recovery from the estate of the surviving spouse. Id. The court explained that feder;~llaw allows
 
only three exceptions under which a state may seek reimbursement and "[alII are specifically directed to the estate of
 
the recipient. No provision is made for collection from the estate of the recipient's spouse." Id. ThE! court declined to add
 
to the unambiguous language of the federal statute or to recognize exceptions beyond those specified in the federal law.
 
Id. 
The Commissioner argues that Hinesand Budney were wrongly decided, misinterpreting the federal statute,
 
particularly in light of the presumption against preemption. The County contends that this statutory exception to the
 
nonrecovery principle allows recovery generally against individuals who received benefits after age 55, and does not
 
narrowly limit the sources of recovery. The County asserts that the reference to the individual's estate is merely a
 
designation of the timing for recovery rather than a limit on the scope of recovery, because the language does not say
 
that the state may recover "only" from the individual's estate. The County argues that, absent such express limiting
 
language, and applying the presumption against preemption, section 1396P(b)(1)(B) merely specifies one potential
 
source of recovery, the recipient's estate, and does not preclude others, such as a spouse's estate.
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In our view, the plain language of section 1396P(b)(1)(B) comports far more closely with the inte!rpretation of the 
Illinois Supreme Court in HInes than with the County's expansive view of the authority imparted by that provision. 
Moreover, we know of no court that has adopted the County's broad view of that language alone. Indeed, in explaining 
the then-existing law in a report on proposed OBRA amendments in 1993, a House Report referred only to the possibility 
of recovery from the estate of the recipient, even when describing recovery after the death of a surviving spouse: 
Under current law, a State has the option of seeking recovery of amounts correctly paid on behalf of an 
individual under its Medicaid program from the individual's estate if the individual was 65 yea~; or older at 
the time he or she received Medicaid benefits. The State may not seek recovery from the benE~ficiary's 
estate until the death of the surviving spouse, if any, and only if the individual has no surviving minor or 
disabled child. 
H.R.Rep. No. 103-111, at 208 (1993), as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 535 (emphasis added). In contrast, 
describing the proposed 1993 amendments to the Medicaid recovery law passed by the House, the same House Report 
stated that newly-required state estate recovery programs would have to "provide for the collection of the amounts 
correctly paid by Medicaid on behalf of the individual for long-term care services from the estate of the individual or the 
surviving spouse," Id. Thus, when the House wanted to describe recovery from the surviving spouse's 4~ate, it said so 
clearly. 
Nevertheless, despite the seemingly plain language providing only for recovery from the recipient's estate, we 
acknowledge that several courts have interpreted the federal recovery provisions to allow recovery from the estate of a 
surviving 
66 
spouse. The courts reaching this condusion have for the most part relied on the 1993 amendments to the federal law 
that allow the states to adopt an expanded definition of estate for purposes of Medicaid recovery. For e>(ample, the New 
York Court of Appeals explained, in dicta, that although federal law did not expressly provide for recovery of Medicaid 
payments from the "secondarily dying spouse's estate," the 1993 amendments gave the states power to recover against 
the spouse's estate for certain categories of assets. In re Estate ofOaig, 82 N.Y.2d 388, 604 N.Y.S.2d 908, 624 N.E.2d 
1003, 1006 (1993). The North Dakota Supreme Court agreed with the O'aiginterpretation that the 1993 expanded estate 
provision gave the states the option to recover against a surviving spouse's estate assets conveyed through joint tenancy 
or right of survivorship. In re Estate of Thompson, 586 N.W.2d 847,850 (N.D.1998). Indeed, the court in Thompson 
rejected the ruling in Budney that recovery against a surviVing spouse's estate is not allowed under federal law on the 
basis that the Budneycourt had not considered the optional expanded definition of "estate." Thompson, 586 N.W.2d at 
850. The North Dakota court concluded that "consideration of all the relevant statutory provisions, in light of the 
Congressional purpose to provide medical care for the needy, reveals a legislative intention to allow states to trace the 
assets of recipients of medical assistance and recover the benefits paid when the recipient's surviving spouse dies." Id. at 
851. The court explained that. under the drcumstances, it made no difference whether recovery was from one estate or 
the other: 
Because the expansive federal definition of "estate" in 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(4) extends only to assets in 
which the medical assistance benefits recipient "had any legal title or interest in at the time of death," it is 
a IT7iJtter of little moment whether the department seeks to ~ver the benefits paidby tiling a dclim in 
the estate ofthe recipient after the death ofthe recipient's surviving spouse or by filing a claim in the 
surviving spouse's estate. 
Id n. 3 (emphasis added). Finallv, in Idaho lJepiJrtment ofHealth and We/fare v. JacklT7iJn, 1.32 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 
6,9-10 (1998), the Supreme Court of Idaho also ruled that some recovery of Medicaid benefits could be made from the 
estate of a surviving spouse, but held that such recovery was preempted by federal law except to the extent of assets 
that had been in the recipient's estate as defined by state probate law. 
These courts provide little explanation for their conclusions that the statutory language expressly mentioning 
recovery only from the recipient's estate also allows recovery from the surviving spouse's estate. We infer that the courts 
viewed the authority to recover from assets that were part of the recipient's estate after the death of the surviVing 
spouse to fairly imply authority to recover those assets from the surviving spouse's estate to which they had passed on 
the death of the recipient. In other words, to the extent assets in the surviVing spouse's estate are there be!Cause they 
had passed to the surviving spouse from the estate of the recipient, recovery from those assets in the surviving spouse's 
estate is, in essence, recovery from the recipient's estate. 
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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals appears to have made a similar unspoken inference in assessing preemption of 
California Medicaid recovery laws in two cases. Bucholtz v. Belshe, 114 F.3d 923 (9th Or.1997); atiz~~s Action League v. 
Kizer, 887 F.2d 1003 (9th Or.1989), cert. dffiied, 494 U.S. 1056, 1105.0. 1524, 108 L.Ed.2d 764 (1990). In both cases, 
the 
67 
Ninth Orcuit addressed whether California's Medicaid recovery law was preempted by pre-1993 amendment federal law. 
The California law allowed the state to seek recovery not only from the estate of the deceased Medicaid recipient, but 
,,' against any recipient of the property of that decedent by distribution or survival:" Kizer, 88:7 F.2d at 1005 (quoting Cal. 
Welf. & Inst.Code § 14009.5 (West Supp.1989». Thus, California law allowed the state to tra(:e assets of the deceased 
Medicaid recipient and seek reimbursement from the recipients of those assets. 
In Kizerthe plaintiffs were individuals who had owned property in joint tenancy with a Medicaid recipient and had 
succeeded to ownership by right of survivorship upon the death of the Medicaid recipient. fd. at 1005. To deterrnine 
whether California's claimed right of recovery from these surviving joint tenants was inconsistent with federal law, the 
court looked to section 1396P(b)(1)(B), which, as discussed above, provided the general prohibition against recovery with 
the exception for individuals who were 65 years old when they received assistance. fd. at 1006. The Ninth Orcuit noted 
that the federal statute provided only for recovery from the individual's "estate," and in the absence of a federal statutory 
definition of estate, looked to common law for the meaning of the term. fd. at 1006. The court held that an "estate" 
under common law did not include property held in joint tenancy at death, and therefore the California law that allowed 
recovery against such property went beyond the recipient's estate and was too broad. fd. at 1008. The court in Kizerdid 
not expressly address the issue of whether assets within the definition of "estate" could only be reached by a claim 
against the recipient's estate, or whether federal law would permit the state to follow those assets and make the claim 
against a surviving joint tenant--or, as here, a surviving spouse. 
Several years later, still applying pre-1993 federal law, the Ninth Orcuit again addressed a preemption challenge to 
the same broad California Medicaid recovery provision. Bucholtz, 114 F.3d at 924. At issue in Bucholtz was application of 
the state recovery law to assets of Medicaid recipients that had been subject to three forms of joint interests: inter vivos 
trusts, tenancy in common, and community property. fd. at 924. The court applied the Kizerprinciple thilt II' use of the 
word "estate" in the [federal] recoupment provision limits a state's recovery to property which descends to the recipient's 
heir or the beneficiaries of the recipient's will upon death,'" id. at 925 (quoting Kizer, 887 F.2d at 1005), to each of the 
forms of shared interest at issue. The court concluded that, like the joint tenancy in Kizer, property held lin an inter vivos 
trust is not part of the decedent's estate under California common law, and therefore was not part of the estate subject 
to recovery under the federal law. fd. at 926. In contrast, the court explained, a decedent's interest in pnoperty held in 
tenancy in common or community property is subject to disposition and administration as part of the decledent's estate 
under California law. fd. at 926-27. The Ninth Orcuit concluded not only that the decedent's interest in property held in 
those forms was subject to recovery under the federal law, but also held, albeit without explanation, that recovery could 
be sought from the heirs or beneficiaries who received that property: "[California] may, however, pursue people who 
received property held by the decedent in the form of tenancy in common or community property:' fd. at 928 (emphasis 
added). Like other courts, the Ninth Orcuit seems to have inferred that the federal law's reference to recclvery from the 
Medicaid recipient's "estate" conferred 
68 
authority to follow the assets from that estate and recover them from the people who received the property. 
Thus, the courts that have considered the issue are split on the question of whether the narrow reference in section 
1396P(b)(1) to recovery from the estate of the Medicaid recipient allows recovery only through a direct claim against that 
estate, or whether recovery is also allowed from those who received covered assets from the Medicaid recipient's estate, 
including the estate of a surviving spouse. Were this an ordinary question of statutory interpretaticlO, we w4)uld condude 
that the plain language of the federal statute prOVides only for recovery against the Medicaid recipient's estate, as the 
Illinois court persuasively reasoned in Hines. But we are influenced by the principle that preemption of stah~ laws is 
disfavored, combined with the fact that allOWing recovery against a surviving spouse's estate is consistent with both the 
federal provision precluding recovery from the Medicaid recipient's estate until after the death of a survivin9 spouse as 
well as with the purposes of the federallegislation.(fn7) These additional considerations lead us to conclude that the split 
in authority, in these particular circumstances, illustrates sufficient ambiguity about the intent of the federal estate 
recovery language that we cannot say that Minnesota's reqUirement in Minn.Stat. § 2568.15, subd. la, to Sf~k 
reimbursement from the estate of a surviving spouse conflicts with federal law such that it is preempted. 
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Accordingly, we hold that federal law does not preclude all recovery from the estate of a survivin9 spouse, and the 
authorization in subdivision la to make a claim against the estate of a surviving spouse is therefore not preempted. The 
question remains whether federal law limits the scope of recovery against the estate of a surviving spouse and, in 
particular, whether that recovery may reach all property previously held by the Medicaid recipient spouse either as 
marital property or jointly with the surviving spouse during the marriage, as allowed by Minn.Stat. § 2568.15, subd. 2. 
III. 
We tum to a determination of whether the scope of recovery from a surviving spouse's estate allowed under 
Minnesota law is consistent with federal law. Subdivision 2 of Minn.Stat. § 2568.15 allows the state to recover from a 
surviving spouse's estate "the value of the assets of the estate that were marital property or jointly owned property at 
any time during the marriage." (Emphasis added.) The County argues that this broad estate recovery authority does not 
conflict with federal law because the pre-1993 version of section 1396P(b} should be construed broadly and the 1993 
amendments were intended to expand, not restrict, state estate recovery authority. In asserting this 
argument for broad estate recovery authority, the County emphasizes that it is consistent with the dual goals of federal 
law of recouping Medicaid expenses to make assistance available to more qualifying recipients, while protecting 
community spouses from pauperization during their lifetimes. The Estate argues that, because section 1396P(b}(1} 
allows recovery only from a recipient's estate and section 1396P(b}(4} allows expansion of the estate only to include 
assets in which the recipient had an interest at the time of death, the "any time during the marriage" recovery allowed 
by subdivision 2 is preempted. 
The County's argument would take us too far down the path of favoring the purpose of the law at the expense of 
the plain meaning of its language. Significantly, no court has embraced the County's argument that the pre-1993 federal 
law authorized recovery from a surviving spouse's estate of assets that were jointly owned during the m,3rriage but 
transferred by the recipient spouse prior to her death. Indeed, of the courts that have interpreted federal law to allow 
direct claims against the estate of a surviving spouse, only one has construed that authority to extend to assets that 
were transferred before the death of the Medicaid recipient, and that court relied on language from the 1993 
amendments to support that extension. see In re Estate of Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882,885-86 (N.D.2000). 
Other courts that have recognized authority to recover from a source other than the Medicaid recipient's estate have 
construed that authority to reach only assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at the time o,f her death, 
that is, assets which were part of the recipient's estate as defined by traditional state probate law or included in the 
estate under an expanded definition allowed by the 1993 amendments to federal law. see Bucholtz, 114 F.3d at 925-27 
(limiting recovery to assets that were part of recipient's estate as defined by state probate law); Kizer, 887 F.2d at 1006 
(same); Jackman, 970 P.2d at 8-10 (holding that recovery from surviving spouse's estate allowed by Idaho Medicaid 
recovery statute is limited by federal law to assets that were part of the Medicaid recipient's estate as defined under 
state probate law); Thompson, 586 N. W.2d at 851 n. 3 (recognizing that "expansive definition of •estate' in (section] 
1396p(b)(4} extends only to assets in which the medical assistance benefits recipient' had any legal title clr interest in at 
the time of death"'}; see a/so In re Estate ofSmith, No. M2005-01410-COA-R3-CV, 2006 Wl 3114250 at •." 
(Tenn.ct.App. Nov. 1, 2006) (explaining that courts that have allowed recovery against estates of surviving spouses have 
required that recipient had interest in assets at time of death). 
Similarly, in relying on the 1993 amendments as authority for recovery from a surviVing spouse's estatl!, our court of 
appeals acknowledged that the 1993 amendments limit the assets subject to recovery to those in which thE! Medicaid 
recipient had a legal interest at the time of her death. see Gu//berg, 652 NW.2d at 714 (hokling that Minn.5tat. § 
2568.15, subd. 2, authorization to reach assets that were marital property or owned jointly at any time dUfl!ng the 
marriage, is partially preempted by federal law limitation to assets in which recipient had interest at time of death). And 
the court of appeals acknowledged that limitation again in this case. &1rg, 722 NW.2d at 496 ("After Gul/bt.~, the 
state's ability to recover was limited to the recipient's interest in marital or jointly owned property at the time of the 
recipient's death."). 
As noted above, the only decision to deviate from this limiting principle requiring 
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an interest at the time of death is mrtz. Although the North Dakota court had acknowledged in its earlier Thompson 
decision that recovery allowed under section 1396P(b} is limited to assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest 
at the time of death (indeed that was the basis on which the court rationalized allowing recovery from the surviving 
spouse's estate), 586 N.W.2d at 851 n. 3, the court held in Wirtzthat any assets conveyed by the ME!CIicaid recipient to 
his spouse before his death were subject to recovery from the surviving spouse's estate, 607 N.W.2d at 886. The court 
stated that limiting recovery under section 1396P(b} to "assets in the surviVing spouse's estate that the Medicaid 
recipient had legal title to and conveyed through joint tenancy, tenancy-in-common, SUrvivorship, life estate, or living 
trust" would ignore the words "interest" and "other arrangement" in the federal law. Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d at 885. 
Concluding that the words "interest" and "other arrangement" are ambiguous, the court relied on the Congressional 
intent it perceived "to allow states a wide latitude in seeking Medicaid benefit recoveries." Id. at 885-136. The court did 
not explain why the same purpose acknowledged in Thompson was consistent with the limitation to rt:!Covery from assets 
in which the recipient had an interest at the time of death, yet also justified abandoning that limitation in Wirtz. 
We cannot agree that the "other arrangement" language in the 1993 amendment is ambiguous in the sense implied 
in Wirtz. The plain meaning of "other arrangement," read in the context of section 1396P(b}(4}, is arrcmgements other 
than those expressly listed that also convey assets at the time of the Medicaid recipient's death. 
We return again to the language of the federal statute. The federal optional definition of "estate" clllows inclusion of 
any other real and personal property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest 
at the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or 
assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, 
living trust, or other arrangement. 
42 U.S.c. § 1396P(b}(4}(B} (emphasis added). The "including" clause further describes the assets that a state may 
include in thiS expanded estate. The clause describes those assets in two ways--first by the limiting adjE!Ctive "such," and 
second by the language describing how and to whom "such assets" are "conveyed." The "such" limitation plainly refers 
back to the immediately preceding clause describing the assets as those "in which the individual had an't' legal title or 
interest at the time of death." The including clause then describes to whom "such" assets may have bee'n conveyed·-a 
"survivor, heir, or assign ofthe deceased individual." Id. {emphasis added}. And finally, the clause describes several 
methods by which the conveyance of "such" assets might take place .- "through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, 
survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement." Id. 
Inclusion in the list of examples of "such assets" is predicated on the recipient having a legal interest at the time of 
death. When we construe a federal statute we must, if at all possible, give effect "to every word Congress used." Reiter 
v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339, 99 5.0. 2326, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979). To read "other arrangement" to include a
 
lifetime transfer would be to read the words "at the time of death" out of the statute. The conclusion that "other
 
arrangement" cannot
 
71 
include lifetime transfers is further supported by the additional context. "[O]ther arrangement" ends a list of examples of 
conveyances that occur at the time of death. The list of recipients of the conveyance, "a survivor" heir, or assign of the 
deceased indiVidual," leaves no doubt that the "individual," a Medicaid recipient, must have died for the conveyance to 
occur. A recipient cannot have heirs or survivors dUring his or her lifetime. Nor can there be an "(Issign of the deceased" 
during the recipient's lifetime. In light of the plain statutory language and its context, the conclusion of tht! Wlrlzcourt 
that "other arrangement" is sufficiently ambiguous to include lifetime transfers is unreasonable. 
We conclude that there is no principled basis on which to interpret the federal law to allow recovery of assets in 
which the Medicaid recipient did not have an interest at the time of her death. As explained above, the rationale for 
finding authority to recover from a surviving spouse's estate at all emanates from the authority gr;!nted in the federal law 
to recover from the "estate" of the Medicaid recipient. Property transferred prior to death would nl,t be part of the 
recipient's estate. Further, as recognized by every decision except Wirtz, to the extent the 1993 amendments allow 
states to expand the definition of "estate" for Medicaid recovery purposes, the language of the federal law dearly limits 
that expansion to assets in which the recipient had an interest at the time of her death. Accordingly, we hold that 
Mlnn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 2, is partially preempted to the extent that it authorizes recovery from the surviving spouse's 
estate of assets that the recipient owned as marital property or as jointly-owned property at any timedurinl~ the 
marriage. To be recoverable, the assets must have been subject to an interest of the Medicaid recipient at the time of 
her death. 
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IV. 
This brings us to the question of whether Dolores Barg had any interest in property at the time of her death that 
would allow the County to make a claim against the estate of her surviving spouse, despite her transfl:!f' of her joint 
interest in the property prior to her death. As we have noted, the court of appeals acknowledged the interest-at-time-of­
death limitation on spousal estate recovery, but nevertheless found that for these purposes Dolores retained a joint 
tenancy interest at the time of her death that made the value of that interest recoverable from Francis's estate. Barg, 
722 N.W.2d at 496, 497. Eschewing reference to either marital property law or probate law to determine the nature of 
any interest at the time of death, the court of appeals looked to standard real property law and Gu//berg in deciding that 
Dolores retained a joint tenancy interest. [d. at 496-97. We do not agree. 
The court of appeals determined that Dolores retained a joint tenancy interest in the property baSE!d on its 
understanding that the court in Gu//berg had recognized a continuing joint tenancy interest because the lifetime transfer 
was an "other arrangement," and because the court apparently understood section 1396P(b)(4) to "explidtly allow[] a 
state to broaden the definition [of estate] beyond the meaning used in probate law and to include joint-tenancy interests 
that have been prevkJusly conveyed to a spouse." [d. at 497. Section 1396P(b)(4) cannot be construed to include lifetime 
transfers of property in the phrase "other arrangement" because the plain language and the context n!l~uire that phrase 
to be limited to conveyances occurring upon the death of the recipient. For that reason, we cannot 
72 
agree with the court of appeals' characterization of section 1396p(b)(4) as allOWing the expanded definition of estate to 
include "previously conveyed" joint tenancy interests. The language of section 1396P(b)(4) requires that any interest 
included in the expanded estate must be one in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at the time of her death, 
not one that was previously conveyed. We conclude that Dolores did not retain a joint tenancy interest in the property at 
the time of her death, because that interest was effectively and legally transferred before her death. 
The question remains whether Dolores had any other interest in the property at the time of her deal:h that may be 
considered part of an expanded estate for recovery purposes under Minnesota law. We agree with the court of appeals 
that courts should not look to marital property Jaw to find such an interest, because the statute in which marital property 
is defined limits the definition to the purposes of that chapter. Minn.Stat. § 518.003, subds. 1, 3b (2006);(fn8) see Barg, 
722 N.W.2d at 496. Similarly, we agree that the recognizable interests at the time of death cannot be limited to those 
defined by probate law, because the purpose of section 1396P(b)(4) Is to allow states to expand the definition of estate 
beyond probate law. See Barg, 722 N.W.2d at 497. We therefore agree that real property law prindples, informed by 
principles of probate law, should be the basis for ascertaining any interests at the time of death. Any interest recognized 
must be consistent with the underlying foundational rationale that recovery from a surviving spouse's estate is allowed 
only because of its relationship to the recipient's estate, from which federal law expressly allows recovery. With those 
principles in mind, we caution that for an interest to be traceable to and recoverable from a surviving spouse's estate, 
the interest must be (1) an interest recognized by law, (2) which the Medicaid recipient held at the time o,f death, and 
(3) that resulted in a conveyance of an interest of some value to the surviving spouse that occurred as a result of the 
recipient's death. Further, to the extent the interest is not part of the standard probate estate, Minnesota law must have 
expanded the definition of estate to indude the interest, as authorized by section 1396P(b)(4). 
Dolores's joint ownership in the homestead and certificates of deposit no longer existed at the time of her death. No 
other recognizable interest has been identified. 
The County argues that the reference to marital property in subdiVision 2 reflects the Minnesota legislclture's intent 
to make all marital property subject to spousal estate recovery. But subdivision 2 makes no reference to an interest at 
the time of death or to re-defining the probate estate to include all marital property, even property transferred prior to 
death. This is not surprising because subdivision 2 was enacted long before the optional estate definition authOrity was 
added to federal law. 
The district court indicated that because Dolores was married to Francis even after the transfer of her interest in the 
homestead, she retained some interest in the property. But whatever that interest, it dissipated at Dolores's death, 
rather than resulting in transfer of an interest of value to Francis. 
We conclude that Dolores had no interest in assets at the time of her death that were part of a probate estate or an 
expanded estate definition permissible under federal Jaw, and therefore there is no 
hlln<:,'lldemn,lnwriler,neUslates/MN/hnnk.dr<ll:" , " ... I.~~ ....,,_,,_,_I 
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basis for the County's claim against the estate. 
Finally, we note that in 2003 the Minnesota legislature amended section 2568.15 by extending thE! definition of 
estate for Medicaid recovery purposes to include assets owned by a recipient spouse in joint tenancy or life estate at the 
time of her death. Act of June 5, 2003, ch. 14, art. 12, §§ 40-50, 2003 Minn. laws 1st Spec. 5ess. 1751, 2205-2217 
(codified as amended at Minn.Stat. § 2568.15, subds. 1, lc-lk). The amendments do not mention the other forms of 
conveyance at death listed in the federal definition of "estate," except that the "right of survivorship" is mentioned with 
respect to joint tenancies. ld. subds. 1(a)(6), Ig, Ih(b). Thus, the legislature chose only to indude twcl forms of 
ownership in the expanded definition of estate. Also, as provided in the federal law, the inclusion of joint tenancy and life 
estate interests in the recipient's estate is expressly limited to interests the recipient owned at the time of death. 
Minn.Stat. § 2568.15, subds. Ih(b)(2), U(a). The amendments further limit the scope of recovery by e)(ernpting from the 
reach of subdivisions Ie through lk a "homestead owned of record, on the date the recipient dies, by the recipient and 
the recipient's spouse as joint tenants with a right of survivorship." Minn.Stat. § 2568.15, subd. 1(a)(6). In 2005, the 
legislature retroactively made the provisions continuing life estates and joint tenandes effective only fat' life estate and 
joint tenancy interests created on or after August 1, 2003. Act of July 14, 2005, 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 4, art. 7, 2005 Minn. 
Laws 2454, 2649 (codified at Minn.Stat. § 2568.15, subd. l(c». 
It is difficult to discern the intended reach of the 2003 amendments.(fn9) If the pre-2003 law allowed recovery 
against the surviving spouse's estate as argued by the County, there was little need to enact the 2003 almendments to 
reach those assets in the case of a recipient who leaves a surviving spouse. The parties apparently agree that the 2003 
amendments do not apply to or influence this case, for reasons that are not clear to us. 
It suffices to say that even if the 2003 amendments were applicable, they would provide no basis fClr the County's 
claim. The new subdivision Ii specifically applies to circumstances in which a Medicaid recipient against whom a recovery 
claim could otherwise be filed is survived by a spouse. Minn.Stat. § 2568.15, subd. li(b). That subdivision prOVides 
procedures for filing a claim without making a recovery until the death of the surviving spouse. ld., subdl. 1(f). If this 
subdivision were to be applied to this case, several limitations would preclude recovery. Dolores Barg, the recipient, 
owned no life estate or joint tenancy interest at the time of her death. If she had owned a joint tenancy at the time of 
her death, it would have been a homestead owned of record by her and her spouse as joint tenants with a right of 
survivorship, and thus exempted from the reach of subdivision Ii. ld., subd. 1(a)(6). Finally, that joint tenancy was 
established in the 19605, well before August 1, 2003. 
In summary, we hold that federal law does not preempt all Medicaid recovery from spousal estates, .md Minn.Stat. § 
2568.15, sUbd. la, is therefore not preempted to the extent it allows claims against the estate of a surviving spouse of a 
Medicaid recipient. However, the allowable scope of spousal estate recovery is limited. Subdivision 2 of sE!ction 256B.15 
is preempted to the extent that it allows recovery from assets in which the deceased Medicaid recipient did not have a 
legal interest at the time of death, and to 
74 
the extent that it permits recovery beyond the extent of the recipient's interest. Rnally, we hold that Dolores Barg had no 
interest in property at the time of her death that can form the basis for recovery against the estate of Francis Barg. 
v. 
We have concluded that the County's claim for full recovery against all the assets in Francis Barg's estate was 
preempted by federal law because recovery is limited to assets in which Dolores had an interest at the tim(~ of her death, 
but the question of the appropriate remedy remains, because the County argues that the Estate waived the right to deny 
the claim in its entirety. Although we have decided as a matter of law in our preemption analysis that the state is 
preempted from requiring reimbursement from assets in a spouse's estate in which the recipient spouse had no interest 
at the time of her death, that does not resolve the remedy issue here. Although a state may not compel payment from a 
spouse's estate beyond the scope authorized by federal law, federal preemption does not preclude an estate from 
voluntarily paying all or part of a claim that could not be compelled. 
Here, the Estate only partially disallowed the County's claim, thus allowing the remainder of the claim. ,Minnesota 
Statutes § 524.3-a06(a) (2006) provides that, on petition of the personal representative after notice to the daimant, the 
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court may "for cause shown permit the personal representative to disallow" a previously-allowed claim. But the personal
 
representative made no such request here. When questioned at the hearing in district court whether the personal
 
representative was challenging the entire claim of the County, the representative affirmed that he wa!; challenging only
 
the part already disallowed. When the district court affirmed that partial disallowance and the County appealed, the
 
Estate did not file a notice of review in the court of appeals to challenge the implidt award to the County of the allowed
 
part of its claim. A respondent who does not file a notice of review to challenge an adverse ruling of the district court
 
waives that issue in the court of appeals. See Minn. R. av.App. P. 106; Ford v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R.
 
Co., 294 N.W.2d 844, 845 (Minn. 1980). Having partially allowed the County's claim and having then failed to properly
 
seek a reversal of that allowance in both the district court and court of appeals, the Estate will not be permitted to seek
 
that relief for the first time in this court.
 
Accordingly, the decision of the court of appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court's denial of the
 
County's claim for full recovery is affirmed. The court's remand for an award to the County based on the existence of a
 
joint tenancy interest is reversed. The matter is remanded to the district court for entry of judgment based on the partial
 
allowance made, but not subsequently challenged, by the Estate.
 
Affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
ANDERSON, PAUL H., J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 
DIETZEN, J., not having been a member of this court at the time of the argument and submission, took no part in
 
the consideration or decision of this case.
 
Footnotes: 
FN1. "Medicaid" is the popular name for this cooperative federal-state program. See42 U.S.c. § 13S16-1396v (2000).
 
In Minnesota it is referred to as "medical assistance." Minn. Stat. § 2568.02, subd. 8 (2006).
 
FN2. For purposes of determining eligibility of one spouse for Medicaid, the value of a couple's home is excluded. 42 
U.S.c. § 1396r-5(c)(2), (5) (2000); 42 U.S.c. § 1382b(a)(1)(2oo0). In the asset assessment for Dolores IBarg, $104,875
 
was excluded. This amount corresponds to the value of the home, one jointly-owned vehicle, and a buriall lot. When
 
completing the asset assessment, a portion of the couple's resources is reserved for the needs of the spouse not
 
applying for Medicaid. 42 U.S.c. § 1396r-5(c)(2), (f)(2)(A) (2000). Protected assets for the nonrecipient !;pouse, Francis
 
Barg, were calculated to be $24,607.
 
FN3. The Commissioner's motion to supplement the record on review is granted as to the following documents:
 
North Dakota Medicaid State Plan, Transmittal No. 95-016; Indiana Medicaid State Plan, Transmittal No. 05-012; Idaho
 
Medicaid State Plan, Transmittal No. 01-006; and Minnesota Medicaid State Plan, Transmittal No.. 06-10. The motion is
 
denied as to the e-mail correspondence dated November 4, 1999.
 
FN4. Formerly the Health care Financing Administration (HCFA). See Wis. Dep't ofHealth & Family Sl!~. v. Blumer,
 
534 U.S. 473, 479 n. 1, 122 5.0. 962, 151 LEd.2d 935 (2002).
 
FN5. Throughout this opinion, our discussion of spouses is premised on circumstances similar to those' of the Bargs.
 
One spouse, who we refer to as the recipient spouse, applies for and receives Medicaid benefits. The other, who we refer
 
to as the community or surviving spouse, receives no Medicaid benefits and survives the recipient spouse.
 
FN6. The Estate sought cross-review on this issue of "whether the county may recover Medicaid benefits correctly
 
paid on behalf of a predeceased spouse from the estate of a surviving spouse." We requested briefing on whether that
 
issue had been adequately preserved for review. The County argues that the Estate failed to preserve the issue because
 
it only partially disallowed the County's claim, it confirmed before the district court that only the disallowed portion of the
 
claim was contested, and it asked the court of appeals to affirm the district court's decision. The County's arguments go
 
to the scope of the remedy available in this case, an issue that we address infra. But this issue also has a IE!gal aspect
 
independent of the specifIC scope of recovery available in this case. That legal component is necessary to a thorough
 
analysis of the preemption issues presented here, and we will therefore address the issue in that context. No new or
 
controverted facts are needed in order to address this purely legal question, and no prejudice will result from our
 
consideration of the issue because the parties addressed the issue in their briefs to the district court, the court of
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appeals, and this court. See Watson v. United Setvs. Auto. Assn, 566 N.W.2d 683,687-88 (Minn. 199'7). 
FN7. The United States Supreme Court has described Congress's passage of the anti-impoverishment provisions as 
an effort to "protect community spouses from •pauperization' while preventing financially secure couples from obtaining 
Medicaid assistance." Wis. Dep't ofHealth aFamily Setvs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, <$80, 122 S.O. 962, 151 L.Ed.2d 935 
(2002). Allowing recovery from a spouse's estate does not risk impoverishing a community spouse, bE!Cause the spouse 
must be dead for the recovery to occur. Nor does it impede the furnishing of Medicaid benefits to other impoverished 
individuals; indeed, it can be expected to do quite the opposite. See West Virginia v. u.s. Dep't ofHaJIth aHuman 
5"er\o5'., 289 F.3d 281, 285 (4th Or.2002) (noting that Congress expected the estate recovery provisions to allow 
government to realize savings of $300 million over flve years, and that the savings have been even g,.,eater). 
FN8. Formerly Minn.Stat. § SI8.54, subds. 1, 5 (2004). 
FN9. The parties' supplemental briefs shed little light on this question. 
MN 
N.W.2d 
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QUESTIONPRESB~ED 
The Medicaid prosram, 42 U.S.C. 1396 en seq., gen­
erally forbids parttcipatin, States from recovering cor­
rec:tly paid beneftts. The statute requlree, however, that 
a State seek to recover the coat of DUrBin. home !ervicee 
paid OD behalf of aD individual over the age of 66 from 
tbe individual's probate eetate, after both the individual 
and her surviving apouae have died. The statute also 
pennlt8 (but does not require) a State to recover hom 
"any other real and personal property and other Ulets 
In which the Individual had any legal Utle or interest at 
the time 01 death (to the extent 01 such interest), includ­
ing such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of 
the deceased individual through Joint tenancy, tenancy 
in common, SUrvivorship, lite estate, living trust. or oth­
er arrangement." ~ U.S.C. 1396p(bX4)(B). 
The question presented ts whether, UDder Section 
1396P(b)(4)(B), a State that seeks to recover correctly 
paid beneftts tram the estate of the recipient's surviving 
spouse ta ltmited to recovering the value of useta In 
which the recipient bad a legal interest at the time of 
her death. 
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MINNE9OI'A. FAMILY SBRVICES AND WKLFARE
 
DEPARTMENT, ET AL., PETITIONERS
 
fl. 
MICHAEL F. HAaG 
ON PTif'If'ION FORA WlU'l'OFCBRf'IORARI 
ro 771.SUPRBM6 COURf'OF MlNN8SOf'A 
BRIEF FOa THB UNlI'ED STATES AS A.lUClJ8 CUlllAB 
Thia brief is tiled in reapOlUl8 to the Court's order 
invitinl the Solicitor General to expreae the viewa of the 
United Statea. In the view ot the United State8, the peti­
tion for a writ ot certiorari should be dented. 
STA.TEMENT 
1. .. The Medicaid Pl"OII'aDI. established in 1966 in 
Title XIX of the Sodal Security Act (MedIcaid Act). 42 
U.S.C. 1396 ., aeq., is a cooperative federal-etate pr0­
gram under which the tederalgovemment provld. fund­
lnl to Statu to provide medical auiltance to eligible 
needy pertlODi. Ham. v. McRa.I, «8 U.S. 297. 301 
(1980). 
To participate in the Medicaid prorram. a State must 
develop a plan epeeitytng, among other thing., the eat&­
goriea ot Individuall who win receive medical sulttanee 
(1) 
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\l.Dder the plaA uacl the apeelfta Idnda ofmedlcal care ancl 
..'I"¥t~ tha~ wtU be covereeL a u.s.o. laeea. State 
Mecltcatd plana are nmfl'W'ed bJ' the Centel"ll tor MedI­
care aacl Medicaid s.-riae. COMS) CtOnDerV th. BeaJtb 
0 .... Ftnaa~ Admlftlatratton) 1ft the DtIpArim.s~ ot 
a_tb aDd Ruman 8erYtcee (AHS). 48 U.S.O. 1888; ... 
se Feci. R... sa,48" (2001). U OMS approv. a Staw'. 
plaD.. the State t. th..-.atter eUaible for federal retm. 
ba.........t for a apedtleet pereentap of the amoaDt. 
Illexpeuded • • • _ medical .....taDee ODder the State 
plan." .u U.S.C. 18geb<a)(1), 18Hd(b). 
b. Tbe Medicaid Act ..-qu..... parttdpatJns Statee 
to provide Medicaid benetlta to the Mcateprical­
Iy needy." that fa. tb~ pel'Wcma eJIaIble tor ftaaac:ial __ 
ei8tanee uDder apecifted lederaJ prop-amL A.~tU 
Y. Roi".,.,., 47'7 U.S. IN, 167 (1986); aee a V.S.ct 
18Na<a)(10)(A)(J)(IV). (VI) and (VI!). 
The Act &lao permtta 8tatee to extend btta.ftt. to 
the --meclle~fteeCl7.· that. ... "penlO~ lacldn• the abO­
1t7 to Pa.F tar medial e:xpeneee, but with lDcomee too 
1..... to quaU(J tor catAtlOrlaallllNdat.Ulce." 8e1twftJtserY. 
GrdtI POftIMr., 451 U.S. N, 8'7 (1981); ... a U.S.C. 
18Na(a)(10)(C). To quallfT .. medtcaJb' 1leed7. a penon 
mq h... Ineame no hlper tbaD a defIJu!d tJuoeaho1d aad 
mQ O'WII -.ta ot DO more thaa a deftned y"a.. It the 
_ete of a MedJcald appUcaat e.o.ad the quaU(yfa. 
t.bretthold••be muet ".pend down" her ....&.8 until thq 
..... at or below the quaJlt,ylDa tJuoeuolcl. S.. 42 U .8.C. 
189&1(a)(1'7). 
WIleD • married penOD .. lnatitutionallHd In a nun­tn. home or oth.. tadlIt,', the Medfeald Act eoD8fdere the 
_eeta of both the tDadtattOllallsed .po", and the non­
bwdt.adonalwed. or Hcommunit7." apoa.. In determtn· 
Ina the appUout·. eUctbDlty to.. ~D.ftte. 48 U .8.C. 
000632
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1898r-6(c). To preveDt the cOlDlllUDI~apou.. C&"OID beia8 
Impov.....bed naalt. of • required apeDd-chnwn or 
UMt8, tile data pte certaiD uaeta, aacb .. the 
coapl.'a bom. aDd aD automobUe, d U.S.C. l_t~aX1), 
laaer-a<c)(Ii), Aftd aU~ the comm1llllt7 apoaae to retaiD 
• ftrtaID 1.... of l'eIIOUI"Cee aDd lllcome that. .... not COIl­
alderecl ••ailable to Pt9 for the appllCUlt'. medteal care, 
-&2 U.8.0. 1....-l(d) d (t)(S). See WUootwiti D.re qf 
H..uA .. FGWlU. S Y. BI",...,., 8M U.9••-nI, .. 
(2002) (aati-lmpcwerlaluDeat pI'OVIaIoaa are LatentJed to 
MpI'Ot4tCt. comm uDit.7 apou_ froom ·pauperi..uoo' wha. 
PNYtllltm. tbuanetal17 aecare coup... from obtaln' n • 
Medteald ~"). FurthenaOl"e, IIltboup the :Medl­
cald Act pnerall7 torblcla a Med:leafd appUcaat or her 
spoue from tzoaDaferrlq ....... at below ~ yalae In 
order to become eUaible tor bendig, U U.8.0. 
18Mp(c)(1)(A). the atatuta ..p.....17 permlta the applt­
cant. to ........,....... tDclacUq -1A~tIII the hom. 
8teaCI. to the COIDIDUDft,y apou_, .. U .8.0. UI98P(,c)(2). 
ODce the lDatitudonalfMd apouae Ie determiDe4 1~ be 
.I~ble for beDeftq, tbe atat.ute provfd.. that "no re­
lIOarce. of the commaDit7 apoaae aball be deemed avail­
able to the bYtitatloaallzecl apoaa..II 402 U.S.O. laser­
IS(c)(4). 
o. Aa a pneral raJ.. the MecUca!d ~ torbld8 State. 
tram _eki.. r8Coyel7 of Medicaid beDeflta that were 
eorrect17 .-Id. a U.S.O. 18Mp(bX1); _ aiM) 42 U ..9.C. 
1398.(a)(18). The .tat.UN prOYtdea aD esc:eptloD, llIow­
ever, tor NOOYft7 from tbe _tata of certatD lnetltattoa­
aItsed aDd older beaeftotartea. 
B.fore 1998, the Medicaid Act'. recOYe17 provtafoll 
permitted, but did 11M require, Statea to reccwer benllfttll 
paid OD b.ba1t of certalllllldh1daala, from the Imdtvldu· 
ala' eatatea. d U.S.C. 18Np(b)(1)(B) (1081). tn 1998, 
000633
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Congreae amended Section 1396p to reqaire States to 
recover correctl,. paid benetita in eertatD drcwnataDce8. 
Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA 1993), Pub. 
L. No. 103-66, I 13612, 107 Stat. 62'7. AA amended, the 
Act'. e.tat..reeovery pruvlaloD requires States to aeek 
recoveq in the cue ot an iJlwvidual who was perma­
nently iaatitutionalUed, "2 U.S.C. 1396P(b)(lXA), and UJ. 
the cue of a person who received, at age 56 or thereat­
ter, nursin, tacilit,. serneee, home and community­
based servicee, or related hospital and prescription drug 
services, 4Z U.S.C. 1996p(b)(I)(B). In addition, a State 
haa the option to seek recovery ot the coat orot.her itema 
or aervleea paid on behalf ot individuals over the age ot 
56. Ibid. The recovel')' "may be made only after the 
death ot the individual's surviving spouse, it &n)"," and 
only at a time when the indivfdual hu no 8urvfvtnr chil­
dren Qnder the age at 21 or children who are blind or 
dllabled. 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(2) and (2)(A). Such recov­
erJ may be waived in caaea where it "'would work an un­
due hardship." 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(3). 
The statute provide. tor recovery of the COlt of bene­
ftta paid on behalf of an individQal over the age of 65 
from "the Individual'. estate." 42 U.S.C. 1396P(b)(1)(B). 
The term "eatate," tor tbOl!le pul'pOIeB, "shall include all 
real and personal propert,. and other MIIeta Included 
within the indfvtdual', estate, 81 denned tor purpoae. of 
State probate law." 42 U.S.C. 1396p(bX4)(A). The stat­
ute further provides that an individual's "estate" 
may inelude, at the option ot the State • • ., any 
other real and per80nal property and other aaaeta In 
which the individual had aD¥ legal title or Intereat at 
the time of death (to the extent at such interest), in­
c1udlns luch auete conveyed to a survivor, heir, or 
asaip ot t,he deceaaed individual through joint ten­
:~ 000634
i a
ree
cover)" adi i -
4 1)( m
f-
f y m -
l
  
f
r
f an) ,
-
l
 -
 W -
at -
i
l's
s oe UI'pOI88  
l's aa s
-
D
b -
l aaet
-
5 
ancy, tenancy In common, survivonhip, life estate, 
living t.ru.t, or other arrangement. 
42 U.S.C. 1396P(b)(")(B). 
2. Since 1987, Mlnneeota law h.. provided for recov­
ery of Medicaid beneftta from the estate of a reclplent.'s 
survivtng apouee, ae well .. from the eetate of • recipi­
ent.. Act of JUDe 12, 1987, ch. 408, art. 2, f 82 (Minn. St&t... 
Ann. t 2668.15 (2007). MInnesota's estate-recovery law 
provid. that M[a] claim aaainat the estate of a surviving 
spouse who did not receive medical usiatance, for medl­
eal aulstanee rendered lor the predeceased apouee, is 
lfmtted to the value of the asNtI of the estate that were 
marital property or Jointly owned property at any time 
durtnl tile marriage." MInD. Stat. AnD. 1 256B.l&, BUbel. 
2(2007). 
8. In 2()().6, petitioner tiled a claim against the estate 
of Francll Barr, In whleb he .ought recovery of Medicaid 
benetita paid on behalf of Mr. Barg's predeceaaed 
spouse, Dolores Bar,. Pet. App. 4L I 
.. Darin. their marri..e, the Sarp purchased real 
property In Princeton, Minnesota, to wblch thq took 
title &IS joint tenanta. In 2001, Me. Barg entered anura­
lng home, and shortly thereafter applted lor, and re­
ceived, long-term Medicaid benefttl. Pet. App. !a-Sa. 
Ms. Bug subsequently tranaferred her joint tenancy 
intere8t in the homestead property to Mr. Barg. At the 
time of the tr8JUlfer, the l118eued value of the property 
wu S120,800. Ma. Barg also terminated her ownenhlp 
interest in certificates of deposit the couple had held 
jointly. It!.. at 3.-4.. 
I On March 2, 200t, this CourtsnnWd the State ~MlnDeIota'. eon­
dltlonal motion to IntriC'. II a I*tllUpedwi~ petitionerVO&. An 
reteNneee in thJa brief to '"petIUonr' ref... to peUtioaIr VOL 
0td ~:0t 600Z 91 'Inc :~ 
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Ma. Barl died In ZOO4, havln. received a total of 
'los.~la.68 In medlc:al·...latance beneftta tbroulh the 
.ta~ Medleald proll'UD. Mr. Bars cUed an montU 
later. Pet. App. u. 
b. In h18 claim aca1nat Mr. B...... atate. petitioner 
lOulht \0 recover the tull amount 01 Medlcald benetlta 
paid OD bebaltot ML Bq. PeL App. 4L Respondent, 
who" the repreaentatfote of Mr. BaJ'I"l ..ute, allowed 
..,880 .. a claim ..aiMt the Atate. but d1eallowed 
$44.538.63. Ibid.· 
Petitioner tlled a claim·allowance petition in state 
coart. 'nie diatrict court upheld the partial dlaallOWaDce. 
PeL App. 48a-61L The court reUed on the MiDneeota 
Court of Appeala' dec1lloD In I" " E.~ 01 G14llIwrr, 
661 N.W.2d 701 (200%), which held that. Minnaota'. 
Atate-reeoyel'11aw fa preempted luotar .. it permit. 
reeov..,. up "to the value of tbe uaeta or th...tate that 
were marit&1 propertY' at aD1 poiDt in the marrfap, be­
caue a U.S.C. 13gep(b)(2XB) permitl rec:overy on1r"to 
the extent of" the Medicaid recipient', IDtereei at the 
time otdeaLb. G~. 862 N.W.2d at 714. The court 
concluded that, at time ofher death, MI. SUI'. interest 
in the ueete of Mr. BuT' e.tate tha& were marital prop­
erv, includin,alit..tate mterellt In the homntad and 
a perso.... property aDOWUlC!8, totaled N8,880. Pet. App. 
6Oa·61L 
c. The Minnesota Court. of Appeal. revened ad 
remanded tor reweulation 01 petitioner'. allowable 
claim. Pet. App. 52&-Ua. Like the dlttrlet court., the 
• a-pondenr• .-u-r lIlowlllCl of.. IIJIIIIWltlJ l"IItAId «III 
tM...... thll& Ma. Bq(l)bM...w .....tn tbebom.tMd, 
valued at".11&diedimatMrdeItII,dIIpite tbe In_YIvoIInM­
r... and (2)..._titl.d to.p.naaaI pros-tJaIJowmeIlD tile amoanl 
~ seooo. See Pe&. App. _ 
: LoO:lJ 000636
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court of appeals concluded that., under rederal law, the 
claim was neeeaaariJ7limited to the value of Me. Barl'. 
interest in specltled aaaete at the time at her death. 
Id.. at 68a (citing Gullb..,." 652 N.W.2d at 714). The 
court 01 appeala conclnded, however, that Ms. Bar". 
interest in t.he homestead at the time 01 her death W8II • 
joint teD.allq intereet,. valued sa a one-half interest In the 
property's value of $120,800, or $60,0&00. I do at 62a. 
d. The Minnesota Supreme Coart afftrmed in part 
and reversed in part, concluding that petitioner wu not 
entitled to full reeovery from Mr. Barl's estate. Pet. 
App.1a-45a. 
~ an initial matter. the conrt rejected respondent's 
contention that federal law completely preempts Minne­
Iota's estate-recovery law fuolar u It permit. reeovery 
from the estate of the Medicaid recipient'. surviving 
apouse. Pet. App. 19a-30.. The court concladed that 
allowing recovery from a surviving spouse's ettats 18 Con­
st.tent with both the Act's preelusion ol recovel'1 from 
the Medicaid recipient'. estate unUl after the death 01 a 
surviving spouse, 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(2)(A), u well .. the 
pUrp08es of the Medicaid Act', recovery provisiona. Pet. 
App.29a. 
The court concluded, however, that federal law Itmlte 
the scope of recovery qalnat a sut'Viving spoule's 
estate to the value ot useta in which tbe recipient spouse 
had an interest "at the time or death," 42 U.S.C. 
1396P(b)(4)(B), and thereby preempt8 Minne,ota', 
estate-recovery law insofar 88 it pennJta the Stats 
to reach any other asaetl "that were marital proper­
t.y or joinUy owned property at an, time durillg tIN mtlr­
nag_." Pet. App. 31a (quot1n, MInn. Stat. Ann. 
I 256B.16, subd. 2 (2007); see ilL at 308-37a. 
lId ~0:01 60BZ 91 '(nr "CN :NH::I :~ 
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The court tGrther coDcluded that Ma. 8are did Dot 
h.... &IS¥ lDtereat III the homeatead or baDk acc:OUDta at. 
the tJme of her death, beeau.. ah. had tl'uaf.rred her 
iD..... ill tlioee ...t.e to Mr. 8 .... beIw'e.e died. The 
court therefore held that petitioner hed no 1.... entitle­
ment. to ••tiaI.cUOD 0' the SteW. cllaim lroaI tboee __ 
_u. Pet.. App. lTa~ Bat. becauae reepondeat b.s 
part;ialq aUvwed pet.ltlOll8l"a C:JabD. aDd D8Yer cbaneapeS 
the dlatrict eoart·.......d 01 that. partial allOW1lDC. of 
.,880, the MlDDe.ota Supreme Court held that ped­
tloner eould rec091!l" that amount. 1tJ. at ..... 468. 
DI8C1JII8ION 
The M'iallMOta Supreme Court'. dedmoD .. eorrect 
aDd doea Dot "III"UTIUIt lUrtber nvtew. n. federal 
Medtc:aid Act JMI"IDitil recoYWJ' atCOIT8CtJ7 paid beD.tIw 
trom the atate of the reclpl_t'a nrririuc apouee, bat 
ttmlta that recO'f'er" to the yalue of __til lD wbleb tale 
rec:1pleat. had a le~ bltereet at the UIDe ofh_ death. 
AltboaSb the ....wt bI tibia c:Me dUI'en froID tile NMIlt 
b:a /.,.,... BnoN qfW""', eoT N.W.2d 881 (N.D. aooo), the 
dtftenac:e ID&7 not; reflect a dtaq'reem.Dt about. tile 
mean1Da 01 tederal KedJc:akt law. but 01117 cItY.leat COD­
el_o... abou' wh.... UDder .tate law, .. tIIdtvfduai re­
tIdu alepllDt4ll'Ut III &IMUI COIIY8J'Id to • apoo... The 
petttloa tor • wrtt of eertJOI'U'I .1l0000d be denied. 
A.. ft. o.c..- 01 ..............."JI'" Cotut Ia c...
 
r.a 
1. The MlDDeaota Supnme Colllt correotl7 con­
eluded that the MecUcaid Act torblda petitioDer trom
--irina' to reoover co~paid benetlte trom .-eta In 
..hleh the Medicaid recipient had DO lep.llDtene& at the 
time of her death. 
.
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Und.. the Medicaid Act. • State general17 m&¥ DOt. 
Mek to nteO'91tr COl I ectlT paid Medleald benetlta. a 
U.S.C. 18Hp(b)(1). The Act prorid... bowwyer, that. 
State (1) "'... Mel&. reeqy~ ot II~ home Uld re­
lated baletlta palcl on behalfofUllDdtYldual oyer the ... 
ot &6 froID "the lDdh1chtu·•••tate" .. deftAed by .tate 
probate law; aDcS (2) mow, 8& lte optJOII, d4lftn. "th. Indt­
'ridual'. _tate"' more broadl,y to malad. AII7 ..__.... In 
wbich the iDc:UYldual had Ul7lepl title or Inter.., -' the 
tlm. 01 death (to tbe extent. of aucb Intereat). iDdudJDar 
such uaeta coDveyed to • aanWor, hell' or -'aD of the 
deee_d IDclhidaal tbrouall Joint teDaDq. tenanC!7 In 
COIiUIlOa, aantronhlp, ute _tate, 1tnnS tr1a.... 01' other 
lII'I"UlPJDeDt."' a U.S.O. 11Mp(b)(1)(B), (b)(4)(A) aDd 
(D). Tbua, til. M.s:tcald Am.. which permita neover,r 
onb alter the deatb of the reetpt_t'••,u.IYhc apoa.., 
a U.S.C. 1898P(b)(JI), aathon.. a State to m•• reim­
bUneDleat claim t the lIamvtnc .~'. eataC4. 
up to tbe ...&1_ of IUQ' to. In which the Medicaid rec:i~ 
ieat had • 1••&1 iDternL at. the time other death. 
Th. Mlnneaota .tate-reeovel')' law exceed. the acope 
of that authOriaattOD. It pennlta the State to reeover 
from a .al"Ytvbla apouee'a _tate MU1e value of the ....ta 
01 the ..tate that were marital propel1:.y orJotDtI,y owned 
Propert7 ca' GA. U"N d"ring tIN mAf"t"'iag.," Minn. Stat.. 
AIm. • 2688.16, .beI. a (100'1) (mnphuia added), without 
recard to wh.ther tbe recipient. retaiaed .. iDtere.t lD 
the ....ta at the time of her datil. Becau.. a State !DaY 
DOt. ncoYer cornet1J' paid Medicaid beneftta except to 
the extellt authorised boY federal law, He a U.9.0. 
18Hp(b)(1), Mlnne80ta'. atatute coatUc:ta with lederaJ 
law and fa tIIereioN preempted. S•• Col~_ , •. 
Sq..,. 4' Loa" A •• '" v. GKanu, 479 U.S. m. 280-282 
(198'7>. 
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2. Petitioner argues (Pet. 20-28) that the tat of the 
Medicaid Ad imposes no limit on permiaaible recoverJ 
from t.he estate of the Medlc:aid recipient's surviving 
spoue., because t.he Act deftnel the term .....ete" to in­
clude "alllncome and resoQI'Cea of the individual and ot 
the individual's spouse." 42 U.S.C.l396p(hXl). Accord­
ing to petitioner, u(b17 ineludln, resources of both 'the 
Individual' and 'of the individual', epouee' in the meaning 
of 'aBeete: Congren clearly Intended that the spouae's 
resources fall within the scope of IlS96P(bX4XB)." Pet. 
27. 
Petitioner is incorrect. Although the general atatu­
tory defmition of "aBsete" does enrompaae resources ot 
both "the iDdfTidual" (i. .. , the Medfeaid recipient) and 
"the individual', epoule," the partic:ular provleton of the 
MedIcaid Act at flsue here reten specltlcally to ~ "as­
seta in which tla. indi11iclv.al had any legal tltJe or inter­
eat at the time of death." 42 U.S.C.1396p(b)(4)(B) (em­
phaals added). PetlUol1er's argument finds It necueary 
to rewrite that elauee to read "'any • • • useta in 
whjch [sithlW Of' boCA tM individual and tM i·ncliviclteal'. 
",oua.) had an,. legal title or intereat.'" Pet. 28 (brack­
'"	 etl and asteriks in original) (emphaeie added). But this 
editing doea nothlu,leea than make the statute say the 
opposite of what It "ye. The plain language of the oper­
ative provision of the Aet retutes petitioner's reading.' 
• In d8letfbm, the QP8I'StJoa of the amended ~~~ 
vilJon. the legtalattfw hiItory of th. 1_ amendmenta alto loc:uMd on 
the USN 01 the individual who hid received Medicaid beneftq, rather 
thUl the .-.o~ at both dle individual and hiI or he' lpoute. See 
g.R. Cont. Rep, No. 211, lCltd eon,., 11& Sea 886 (1988) (..At eM 
option of the State. the ettate Iplnat [whN:h) • • • reetJ1I«1l1lOU1b~ 
may Include Illy real 01' personal POI*t7 '" other ...... In wbfell toW 
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3. Petitioner's readiDJ of the Medicaid Act aJao linda 
little support in the Act's other provfaiona concerning the 
treatment of spousal aaeeta. See Pet. 27-28. AI, peti­
tioner note., the Medicaid Act generally eoulden the 
community spou.e'. uaeta for purpoeee of determining 
whether an institutionalized individual ia elipble to re­
ceive benefitl. But the Act also exempts certam prop­
erty, such as the couple'. home, from consideration, 4! 
U.S.C. 1382b(aXl), 1396r-5(c)(5), and aJlowa the commu­
nity spouse to retain certain amounts of reaoureea and 
income t.hat are not considered available to pay for the 
appllcant'l medical care, 42 U.S.C. 1396r-5(d) and (1)(2). 
Moreover, once the irultitutionalized spou•• fa deter­
mined to be eligible for beneflta, the Medicaid Act pro­
videa that uno resources of the community spouse shall 
be deemed available to the fnltftuUonaJfzed spouse." 42 
U.S.C. 1396r-5(cX4). The Medicaid Act, in abort, Im­
poe.. eignllleant UmftaUona on petitioner's asserted 
prfndple that "spouses are expected to support each 
other." Pet. 27. To read Section 1396P(b)(4XB) in accor­
dance with ita plaiD terms thus is consistent with the 
broader stat.utory scheme. 
4. Because Section 1396p(b) leavee DO ambiguity 
about limiting spousal estate recovery to the value of 
asaete in which the Medieafd recipient had a legal inter­
est at the time of death, the presumption agaInat pre­
emption does not come into play, Pet. 28 (cfttnr Mtdtrrm­
ic, I'M. v. LoA.,., 518 U.S. 470, 486 (l996)~en alsum­
ing, arguendo, that thil presumption hu force In the COD­
text of a comprehensive federal-state cooperative pro­
gram like Medicaid in which the State'. program Is sub­
~ hid any Ifill Utle or InterMt at t.lM time atdeath, iueludfnl 
the home.., (empbllUldded). 
~td ~:0t 60BZ 9t ·(nc :~ 
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jed to federal approval. And for simUar reMone, petI­
tioner's aUlle.tion that. the declslon below improperl,. 
enforces agaiNt Lbe State "[ajn ambipoua condiUon" on 
lobe ac:eeptaDce of federal funda under Spending Clauae 
legtalatfoD lacks IIDf merit. PeL 28 n.8 (citing Ariitlgtcm 
C",," SeA.. Did. BtL 0/Edvc. v. Mu",h" 648 U.S. 291, 
296 (2006». 
Petitioner aIao ern (Pet. 2O-ZS, 28 n.S) In .eertiD. 
that the MlnOe80ta Supreme Court'. Interpretation ot 
Section 1896P(b)(4}(B) la inconsistent with the interpre­
tation of the responsible federal agency. HRB hae nei­
t.her promulgated replatlon. nor iuued guidance iDter­
preting Section 1396p(b)(4)(B) to authorfze the kind ot 
estate recovery that petitioner urges in this cue. To be 
8ure, CMS in 2007 approved Minnesota', state plan 
amendment inCOrporatiol ita statutory apoueaJ recovery 
proviaiona. See Pet. App.89&-98.. But eMS', approval 
fa not the equivalent ot blndin, Interpretive guidance. 
Cf. 42 a.F.R. 48O.16(a)(1) (a etate piau or plan aDlend­
ment Is deemed approved If eMS does oot act within 90 
days after submiseion). Moreover, CMS', approval fol­
lowed binding Judicial declaloDi In MJnnesota'. own 
conN lnterpretml the Medicaid Act to limit recovery to 
888eta in whicb the Medicaid recipieot had aD interest at 
time of death. See, "11., /11 " E'tale o/~,662 
N.W.2d 709, 714 (Minn. CL App. 20(2). A.a aet forth 
above In this brief, see p. 9, _pro, BHS 1110 Interprets 
the Medicaid Act to limit recovery in that manner. 
B. Th. Dedaon Below DoeI Not WUTUIt FurtII..Rm." 
1. Petitioner contend. (Pet. 24-25) that review fa 
warranted to resolve a conflict between the dedeion be­
low and the North Dakota Supreme Court's dect8loD In 
: \o.GfJ 
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WiTtI. tupN.· In WiTt•• much as in thia cue. a Medicaid 
recipient had t.raDafen-ed .Nta to bfa apouae before hi' 
death. and tbe State sought to recover the COlt of the 
Medicaid benefits from the spouse's estate alter her 
death. The court held that the State was pennitted un­
der 42 U.S.C. 1896P(b)(4)(B) to reeover the value of any 
assets uiJl which the deceaaed rectplent once held an in­
tereet," inclUding useta conveyed to hi, spouse betore 
bis death. Wim,6O'1 N.W.2d at 886. 
But the ditfereut result. in thia caae and in Wim may 
not. renect a disagreement about the meaning of federal 
Medicaid law. Notably, the North Dakota Supreme 
Court, Uke the Minnesota Supreme Court. stated that 
the State "[could] assert a claim agaIDat real or penonal 
4 Ju the Mlnnaota Supreme Cout1. noted (PeL App. 21&-22&), two 
oth. ,tate courtl haw eonc:luded that Sect10a 139Gp(b) autborl_ re­
covery ual1 from t.he ....of. Medieaid recipient, and not !rom the 
__ olhia or her apouee. See HiJMI v. Dqore"..,. 01PtIb. Aid, 860 
N.E.2d 148 (DL 20(8);1,,,,..EItc*ofBwlnq, 641 N.W.%d 246CWfa. Ct. 
App. 1996). But. tboee deci8tou and the decllllcm belotr .... not III COD­
met. Both Hirtallftd 11wltwr .... ~t with tile prfDdple that. 
State 111&1 reemw from the atate fila ft&dic:ald ndpi.at', ~ 
spclUM If it. aerdla Ita opdoa UDdtr Sec:ticln 189Gp(b)(4)(B) to deftDe 
Lb. tndMdu..•• ..w..men ~ thaD It It deftDed =derltate pr0­
bate 1... See HiftM, 860 N.E.%d It 168-1601 (apIaiIdna' tbat. the ttate 
lepJatw'e could hP. det!Ded the redpCenf. 8Itate tD web a... to 
~. tor ret:o'of/r1 01 ~ ..... ttom th.....~ hfa IUI'VIvtnI 
.pollNo but h..J ebOMD not to do.o); Budnq, 541 N.W.2d at 2411r 
n.! (boldln, thllt • .w.e lItatut.e authorilinllWl recovery from a lUI" 
vtvtnl .pou.'. _tate exceeded the State'. authorit7 and.. a UAC. 
1398P(b), without conaktc1nr whftlwr It would have been p81'mfutb1. 
(or the StaW to ~G"ft'Om tile 1Urvtv1ng1IpCNM'11itatl the VIIu, fA 
...... In which tJI. recipient had III IntC'eIt It the time 01 death). a. 
.pondenth..... ln anyiMlllt.doeanotchal1lllp theMiJmeIotaSupreme 
Court', cone1uaton that • State It permIUed to neOYer ftoom th, -.ate 
or. sunMftI spouae III 101M dmJmaMacee. see BP. IIIOpp.1, 8-9, 19. 
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property, and other ueete iD whieh [the recipient] had 
an)' legal UUe or other Inwnet ac Ai. dM:&l1&." WirtJ,8O"1 
N.W.2d at. 886 (emphaaia added); see also ibid. ("Our 
inquiry • • • fa • • • whether [the recipient] had 
'real and personal propert)' aDd other ....ta tD wbleb 
[be] had any legal tiUe or interelt at eM U".,. 0/d«JUa"") 
(emphaa18 added). Although ita reasoning fa not enUrel,. 
clear, t.he court In Win. appeared to conelude that the 
recipient in that cue, despite formal conveyance ot cer­
tain aesete before death, retained an tntereH in the rele­
vant propertJ until hia death. when the interelt W'&I COD­
veyed to h18 apouee through "other arrangement." 60'1 
N.W.2d at 886 (quotUla 42 U.S.C.1396p(b)(4XB». The 
court did not. el.boRte on the nature of that Intereat, 
although it referred to the State', arpment that 
the recipient had retained. "marital or equitable inter­
eat" iD the .....ta at the tim. of hit death, i<L at 888. 8Ild 
noted that other COUN had interpreted SeetloD 
1396p(b)(4)(B) to reach etate-Iaw eommuDity-propel't7 
aad homtltead lnteresta, td. at 885. 
The dittereat reaultl reached by the North Dakota 
Supreme Court and the eourt below on similar faet8 thu. 
may reflect not eontlictin. interpretaUone of federal 
Medicaid law, but only different views of when, under 
state law, a apoue. ret.alna a legal mtereet in property 
cODveyed to hte or her lpoaee. Compare Win_, 607 
N.W.2d at 886-888, with Pet. App. 38&-4Oa (cOftcJadtn. 
that, after MI. Bar. tranaterred her Jntereat In the 
homestead and bank accounts, ahe no longer had alepl 
Interest that could have been conveyed to Mr. BU'I upon 
her death), and id. at 40. (Dotin, that Minnesota law 
"makee no reference to • • • re-deftning the probate 
eatat8 to include all marital property. even property 
traD.ferred prior to death"). 
SId ~a:01 600Z 91 'I"C 
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EveD If the decla1oll8lD Wim and thIa eue do retlect 
a dtaagreement .. t.o proper interpretation of the Medi­
caid Act, thle Court', rwlew would DO~ be warraDted. 
The MlanElllOta Supnme eourrllntwpretadon of federal 
law II correct. aDd to date, oDIJ the North Dakota Su­
preme Court baa allowed Medfc:atd rec:oYeQ' foUcnrfDI aD 
inter vtvoe traIlater ot II8IetI betweeu spouaee. Aanm­In. -aueado thai; Lbe Nortb Dakota Supreme Coart mJa.. 
undentood federal Medtcl1d law, rather thaD ,1mP17 
applied a peculiar teatare of ttl own properiJ law, the 
North Dakota eourt hu not had lUI opportQDiv to eoll­
sider HHSt, Interpretlttcm, aDd the confJlet may work 
itaelf out as the fllue fa further Iddreaaed in the lower 
conN. 
2. Although petittoner (Pet. 31-38) ia correct that 
.tate-recovery etrorta are lmportaDt to the Medicaid 
prol!'UD, quutfou concernin, the scope of the Acto', 
eatate-recovef7 pro-riai01l8 ba.,. Dot arfaeD frequently, 
and relativeq lew Stata have opted to seek estate recoY­
eq to the maximum extent permitted b7 federal law. 
See otrIc:e at AIIfstaDt Secreta17 tor PoliC1 • Eftlua­
tioD, BUS, Polq Bf'. No." M,dictlidB..RccowJ1l 
Cou.eticme tbJ•• (Sept. 2(06) (oob me Statee mate 
maximum use of federal poUq opUona); eee aI80 Pet.. 81. 
Moreover. altbou,b the fedenl Medicaid Act Um1t11 
estate rec:oveJ7 to thou ....ta III whleh the Medicaid 
recipient had • legal iDtereet at the time of her death. the 
natun and extent of euch lDtereeta remain larP!1 the 
domam ot state law. Notably, M.lDDeeota'. Governor hu 
propoeed redetlnins marital property fntereata to permit 
ree0gel7 of medical 88m-taDC. tram the estate ot the 
later-IurvWin,lpouse ill thll context. See {;OW, nor', 
RfCOm~Mi1l,..-oeaSta.tI B1UII/.c, 1010-11 Bi­
mnicU Bwdg." HUfflGft SIf"I1fc.. DIfJ'r 182 (Jill. 2'1, 
6td lot1l.Ban 60IiE 91 ·tnC : loDl:f 000645
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2009). That. proposal has not become law, nor hal it been 
reviewed by the Secretary of HHB. The proposal. how­
ever, suggests that Mlnneeota may be able to work tcr 
ward greater auet recovery consistent. with the clear 
terms of federal Medicaid law. 
CONCLUSION 
The petition tor a writ otcertiorari should be denied. 
Respectfully sabmitted. 
ELENA KAGAN 
Solicitor G~DAVID S. CADSAm,.. ~ C01&,...1 ToNY WEST 
AIm,", AttorMr (;ft.,-alJANICK L. ROrFMAN 
A,1OriGU Gnnal C~",tl ED1rlN 9. KNEEDLER 
D",..t,Solit:itor G.MralCAROLJ.BBNNETT 
D~ AlIQdct. GItUt'Gl LEONDRA R. bUGERCow:u. hriltGftt to tA. Solicitor 
GflNf'GlLBSLI& M. STAFFORD 
BAJUIARA J. COLLINS TEAL LtmIY MILLSR 
A~AUOt"ft". 
D.-port"..,g ofH.altJa GM
 
H",fflOfI SWlliCII
 
M..\y2009 
'CN~ 
000646
6 
a
t -
.
 
 
,.. O'll"'" 
c,", ,,,z 
. s
,.
l o,",,,,. 
."an"..,  UI  
1I.ffI  
K C  
 
nw G. t.,- l 
,.." tw  
C  
et
.t  
tJTJI
 
-
'''-''
 
Appendix 3
 000647
 
 
"	 ... ~\~. 
. ~. 
R f~ !Iiili! ~llill II if ·Ill!:! ~ r~fr r II 
~	 1. I,iti IIi	 • ."Ii' ll, W 11 I· fa. •. hI !. 0	 (I 
1
. ~. '1-1'1& .it ·lir11 i~fl:\ .	 It t lit 8 11~ l!f[~\ ~	 al I .. t f.!'t s . 
i .r . CA 1:11 e: I-I itI Iif"l ;t it11 rill ~ I! I f!i d ., !l ji) it r 1J: ~ ~ L .. tll t.f i· a j-r'lR 
. .	 ~;z fl:o ~I r S I i !~i~ $. fi- _.	 ~ qo"-l
. ~ : 'Io.t I a. f ,. ig	 ~ 
...'\.. 
.,.. 
'a.' 1 (
\ . 
,Igx 'IC-'.':' .f II": .~ : .•. 
. ..-.~ cw· 
! 
~ 
000648
 .. i;"i\~.-.
l !~1 l~f ~  'tJ ti ~ i' fj'l!  .. - :.. l 5 ,II' If' B ~ ~ i{ t1 - g  
• B" !It.-! Itt! 111 11rt- sr ~ ~l IS I R. ( i I" -·1'1 I I ... ,,}II 1-1 f,I • 
. '" I' Jll' I r :!, ill~ fii[~ I. 
\ ifl:~f II .... 11lf [~I- 1.:a.1l I;lJ'J II" _==1 g 
" f r ! ~ 5_ _ :t $I • IF ~ &: t .. II t a ,. I Fl a- -
\ 
I 
- ... f !  I !"ll. ,
~I·· Ifl&.!~r . I · f ~ I~~~ 
. . ~ 0_ .. _ ~ I x
. °1 ·a·· ~1 I. g '. Slo~l 
. • '1".2. I a. f ,. I" ~ 
,. .'\.  
( 
Af ••• 11IlH .A""~ IAA 
'-' 
-
HEALTIt CARE F1NANC'IN<i 
ADMINISTRAnON 
-
DF..PARTMENT OF HEALTH A I·IUMAN SARVler\! 
........
 
1.·J(r~lr~ 
Gt~l__4f 
n....... MJ\ 1l!Z1I)) 
April 5, ~ 
OriaR ~ 8attcita. A"omey· At·lM\' 
22... WalCI SlC'ftt 
Suite 212 
Plymouth. M&bUChusen. 02360 
Dear Mit. Barrar. 
"his ft in reply lo)"CJW Jete« ~ t11a.rer olll1o~. by eumm......y IpouM!ll You Idvited 
us tNc it iJ lhe pulCifiot't crabe 1>iv1,fc)n urMcdiul A~sistanee(DMA) that the post-diaihihty 
I,_",fer mede by COIMWnity ~ ausa Mtdiuid d....lirication ,.""'. YOIl re.IfUl'SlN 
dall we nacir, DMA oril.. fteCd to come iltlo compliance ~Jlh Federal law. 
tJndet the tfMSf'er orblets prO'o't.UonI ia f 1917(c) vt'thc SQ(1aI Security Aa (tbe Adl). lJanSft~ 
bctWftn spouteS are c'Ccmpt From lay transfer pcaala, Uwder t"- "f'O'IUI ~ 
",ovWona or1192-' ortIR Aet. 0IICe ~")' iJ cleIeta tetOUreet__~ftit1 
tpOvIe.e no Ionpr COl to Ihe , after aile .... 
in wfHdI ... institutionalized is eHa*It tor Medicaid. 1lIIY mour~ bcIo"'. 
to the communit, tpwlC ... 1UIcJy rI•• "open, or.... Sf*'Ie. lhat" the con__ ity 'PO"te 
an do whateftr he Of ahc want, to wtall tItem. 
ROftttld Pr~toa 
"~~j.e Resi.JftIII Admm;s1rllOC' 
000649
'-' 
nRVlCf\S  l 1 G 
3 n
 
~ ~h.~~hu~'.02360
0
.......,. 
'.')( r~1 r..u..c 
  
I~ZlI)
l' O) ter l  ll1ow.t, c    u '
U';fiot- or,.,. )i , nce l
f "'''' I lU '    l ...., l l'Slcd
d it. ;"'0 cleral
 i o' ' t t 5o(
ft e' ll ....
 .,.......   
.............. 1~'te4 ............... 11I  
.,.. ........... 
l  ,.  spa. at ..   J 'I
We will be wrifinS alcc'H to Mark F. Reynolds. Ad .. Commt-mnet. DMA. adrisi"a him thlt 
SeliC pohcy rteed~ to be ftYi1d '0 be COII.)ftkmt with Ftderal reqtlircmeldl We .ppt~atc )'OUt 
intem1 in tbe Mcd'.c:aid ptOlr4m and 1br hriftsing this ",lfl« to our ".fftbon. 
P1ft. contact Allen Bryan it"yotl MVO layq~ions. lie C3II~be /IC (M') ~6!;, 1246 
~~ .... , ( 
.roJI... JU~ 
S;''''''
SEP 1B2010 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
By J. RANDALL
 
DEPUTY
 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
) 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: ) Case No. CV IE 09052] 4 
) 
GEORGE D. PERRY, ) 
) 
Deceased. ) 
----------------) 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District 
of the State ofIdaho, in and for the County ofAda. 
HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER M. BIETER, PRESIDING 
S. KAY CHRISTENSEN, ISB No. 3101 
CHIEF, CONTRACTS AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DIVISION 
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT 
Deputy Attorney General 
3276 Elder, Ste. B 
POBox 83720 
Boise ID 83720-0009 
Telephone: (208) 332-7961 
ISB No. 3361 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
PETER C SISSON 
SISSON & SISSON 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
2402 W JEFFERSON ST 
BOISE ID 83702 
ISB No. 4682 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
000650
  
. .
 
 
 
 
- - - - - ---------------- - --) 
  
  
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS	 11 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES	 iv 
ARGUMENT	 1 
THE POWER OF ATTORNEY CONTAINS NO EXPRESS GIFTING AUTHORIZATION 
AND THIS FACT IS DISPOSITIVE IN THIS APPEAL. 1 
A.	 Standard of Review 1 
B.	 The Personal Representative's Interpretation of the Power of Attorney Is 
Incredibly Strained and Not Reasonable 2 
C.	 The Lack of Express Gifting Power Is Fatal to George's Purported Transfer of the 
Property to Himself 4 
D.	 The Power of Attorney Didn't Grant Gifting Powers Before the Uniform Power of 
Attorney Act ,md Does Not Grant Them after 5 
E.	 There Was Absolutely No Benefit to Martha in George Transferring Martha's 
Real Property to Himself , 7 
F.	 The Alleged "Finding of Fact" Is, at Best, a Conclusion of Law , 9 
G.	 The Failure of George's Gift of Martha's Property to HimselfIs Sufficient to 
Require Reversal of the Magistrate and the Allowance of the Department's Claim 
....................................................... , 10 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW	 , 11 
A.	 The Personal Representative Is Asking the Court to Eviscerate Idaho's Medicaid 
Payment System 11 
B.	 Standard of Review 12 
MEDICAID IS A PROGRAM FOR THE POOR AND IS NOT INTENDED TO SUBSIDIZE 
THE INHERITANCE OF NON-DEPENDENT CHILDREN OF MEDICAID 
RECIPIENTS 12 
A.	 Medicaid Estate Recovery Is Simple in Concept 12 
B.	 The History of Estate Recovery Reveals a Clear Intent to Recover the Assets of 
this Estate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 13 
THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE RELIES UPON A SINGLE PHRASE OF THE 
FEDERAL MEDICAID LAW READ OUT OF CONTEXT " 17 
A.	 The Personal Representative's Entire Preemption Case Relies on Reading a 
Phrase of42 U.S.C. § 1396p out of Context , 17 
B.	 Subsection (b)(4) Was Intended to Expand the Scope of Property to Be 
Recovered, Not Limit it " 18 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - ii	 C:\Documents and Seltings\cartwriw\Desktop\Appellants Reply Brief.wpd 
000651
 
 ..................................................... 
  ....................................... 
 ................................................................ 
........................ 
  ................................................ 
   
................................ 
  
................................................ 
 
............................ 
 
............................................ 
  ............... 
   
 
................................... ........ 
 ........................................... 
 
................................................... 
 ................................................ 
........................................................... 
 .......................... 
  
                                                       
....................... 
 
  ............................. 
 
............................................. 
 t \
C.	 The Jackman Court Ignored the Same Preemption Arguments Being Made Here 
....................................................... , 20 
D.	 The 1993 Changes in OBRA '93 Are Central to the Court's Holding in Jackman 
....................................................... " 22 
E.	 The Solicitor General's BriefIs Not Legal Authority , 24 
F.	 Other Provisions of State and Federal Law Make Sense Only Ifthe Property of 
this Estate Is Recoverable " 27 
G.	 The Department's Construction ofIdaho Code § 56-218 Is Entitled to Deference 
....................................................... " 29 
THE LAW IN IDAHO IS WHAT IS IMPORTANT IN THIS CASE	 " 31 
A.	 The Correct Question Is Whether the Property of this Estate, Even If Martha 
Transferred It,. Remains an "Asset" Subject to Estate Recovery 31 
B.	 Barg Has No Applicability in Idaho , 34 
ABSURDITY, INEQUITY AND UNFAIRNESS WOULD RESULT FROM THE PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE'S INTERPRETATION 34 
CONCLUSION ,	 35 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - iii	 C:\Documenls and Settings\cartwriw\Desklop\Appellants Reply Briefwpd 
000652
 
....... 
 
....... 
 ............. ....... 
 
.................................. ....... 
 
........................................... 
 ...................... 
 
.............. 
 ........................... ....... 
.......................... , ....... 
.............................................................. 
 ll \ l \ ppel a. l
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES
 
CASES 
Chavez v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 212, 192 P.3d 1036 (2008) 1, 2 
Cohen v. Commissioner ofDiv. ofMedical Assistance, 423 Mass. 399, 668 N.E.2d 769 (1996) 
......................................................................... 13, 14 
Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 224 P.3d 458 (2008) 
Department ofHealth and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6 (1998) .... 19-23,34 
Douglas County v. Lindgren (Minn., 7th Jud. Dist., No. 21-CV-09-477, August 4,2010) .... 25 
Estate ofBarg, 752 N.W.2d 52 (Minn. 2008) 10,25,26,34 
Estate ofHull v. Williams, 126 Idaho 437,885 P.2d 1153 (App. 1994) 20 
Gray v. Tri-Way Const. Services, Inc., 147 Idaho 378, 210 P.3d 63 (2009) 24 
Henderson v. Henderson Inv. Properties, L.L.c., 148 Idaho 638, 227 P.3d 568 (2010) 10 
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941) 16 
In re Estate ofLaughead, 696 N.W.2d 312 (Iowa 2005) 33 
In re Estate q{Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 2000) 19,25 
J.R. Simplot Co., Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Com'n, 120 Idaho 849, 820 P.2d 1206 (1991) 30 
Jones v. HealthSouth Treasure Valley Hosp., 147 Idaho 109,206 P.3d 473 (2009) 24 
Kopp v. State, 100 Idaho 160,595 P.2d 309 (1979) 29,30 
Panike & Sons Farms, Inc. v. Smith, 147 Idaho 562, 212 P.3d 992 (2009) 10 
State Dept. ofHuman Services v. Willingham, 206 Or.App. 156, 136 P.3d 66 (2006) 33 
State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 160 P.3d 739 (2007) 24 
State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 25 P.3d 850 (2001) 12 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - iv C:IDocuments and Setlings\cartwriwIDesktop\Appellants Reply Brief.wpd 
12 
000653
 
 ............................. 
  
 ............ 
 
.............................. 
 ................... 
................ 
....... 
.................... 
    ............................... 
............................... 
...... 
.......... 
................................ 
.................. 
  ......... 
.................................... 
..................................... 
t
27 Vas v. Barg, 129 S.Ct. 2859 (2009) 
STATUTES 
42 U.S.C. § 1382(a) 11 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) 19,21,27 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) 16-20,32,33 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c) 27 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h) 15,23, 32, 34 
42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(5) 8 
Idaho Code § 15-12-201(1) 5-7 
Idaho Code § 15-12-217(3) 7 
Idaho Code § 15-3-715(21) 1 
Idaho Code § 15-5-502 (1982) 5 
Idaho Code § 32-901 31 
Idaho Code § 32-912 4 
Idaho Code § 56-218 11, 13,21,29,32,33 
Idaho Code § 56-218(1) (1988) 13 
Idaho Code § 56-218(2) 29 
Idaho Code § 56-218(4)(b) 33 
Unifonn Fraudulent Transfers Act, Chapter 9 of Title 55, Idaho Code 29 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 
APPELLANT' S REPLY BRIEF - v C:\Documents and Settings\cartwriw\DeskloplAppellants Reply Brief.wpd 
14 
000654
............................................... 
........................................................... 
.................................................... 
.............................................. 
.......................................................... 
................................................. 
....................................................... 
.................................................... 
...................................................... 
...................................................... 
.................................................... 
.......................................................... 
........................................................... 
........................................... 
.................................................. 
........................................................ 
..................................................... 
.................... 
 ................................................... 
H.R. Rep. 103-111, P.L. 103-66, OBRA 1993 (May 25, 1993), Section 5112 15, 18
 
H.R. Rep. No. 105(II), 100th Cong., 1ST Sess. 1987 14
 
IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20 30
 
IDAPA 16.03.09.900.24 30
 
OBRA '93 21-24, 30, 32
 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - vi C:lDocuments and Setlings\cartwriw\DesktoplAppellants Reply Brief.wpd 
000655
...........  
.................................  
.......................................................  
.......................................................  
.........................................................  
ting \cartwriw D ~ \  
ARGUMENT
 
I. 
THE POWER OF ATTORNEY CONTAINS NO EXPRESS 
GIFTING AUTHORIZATION AND THIS FACT IS 
DISPOSITIVE IN THIS APPEAL. 
The personal representative contends that because George Perry, using his power of 
attorney for Martha, conveyed Martha's property to himself before she died, I the Department 
may not recover the property and it can be distributed to George's heirs. This argument relies on 
the validity of the purported transfer. If the transfer by George to himself was invalid" then the 
personal representative's argument completely fails and, even if Medicaid law is interpreted as 
the personal representative suggests, the Magistrate must be reversed and the Department's claim 
allowed. 
A. Standard ofReview. 
The standard of review for interpretation of an instrument, such as the power of attorney 
in this case, is set forth in the case of Chavez v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 212, 192 P.3d 1036 (2008): 
This Court's standard of review of a lower court's interpretation of an 
instrument depends on whether the instrument is ambiguous. C & G, Inc. v. Rule, 
135 Idaho 763, 765, 25 P.3d 76, 78 (2001) (citing DeLancey v. DeLancey, 110 
Idaho 63, 65, 714 P.2d 32, 34 (1986)). The question of whether an instlUment is 
ambiguous is a question oflaw, over which this Court exercises free review.ld. In 
deciding whether a document is ambiguous, this Court must seek to determine 
whether it is "reasonably subject to conflicting interpretation." Bondy v. Levy, 121 
Idaho 993, 997, 829 P.2d 1342, 1346 (1992). "In the absence of ambiguity, thl;: 
document must be construed in its plain, ordinary and proper sense, aceording to 
the meaning derived from the plain wording of the instrument." C & G., 135 Idaho 
IWhen this matter began, Martha Perry was still alive. The Department has been informed by the personal 
representative that Martha passed away on May 4,2010. 
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at 765, 25 P.3d at 78 (citing Juker v. Am. Livestock Ins. Co., 102 Idaho 644, 645, 
637 P.2d 792, 793 (1981)). 
Chavez, 146 Idaho at 219, 192 P.3d at 1043. Here, the power of attorney is unambiguous. The 
fact that the power of attorney lacks any express gifting power is not "reasonably subject to 
conflicting interpretation." Therefore, the interpretation ofthe power of attorney is a question of 
law. Even if it were ambiguous, then evidence of intent would be required, ofwhich there is 
none but the document itself. 
8. The Personal Representative's Interpretation ofthe Power ofAttorney Is Incredibly 
Strained and Not Reasonable. 
The personal representative takes seven sequential words out of context and constructs a 
nonsensical sentence that he claims grants power to the principle to make a gift to himself of 
Martha's real property. She contends the power of attorney gave George powE:r "To ... exercise 
... any ... gift ... for the principle." See Respondent's Brief, p. 36 (top). She then incorrectly 
states that the full sentence is found in footnote 17 ofher brief. Actually the seven words are 
taken from a much longer sentence with 164 words: 
(H) Estate, trust, and other beneficiary transactions. To accept, receipt 
for, exercise, release, reject, renounce, assign, disclaim, demand, sue for, claim 
and recover any legacy, bequest, devise, gift or other property interest or payment 
due or payable to or for the principal; assert any interest in and exercist: any power 
over any trust, estate or property subject to fiduciary control; establish a revocable 
trust solely for the benefit of the principal that terminates at the death ofthe 
principal and is then distributable to the legal representative ofthe estate ofthl~ 
principal; and, in general, exercise all powers with respect to estates and trusts 
which the principal could exercise if present and under no disability; provided, 
however, that the Agent may not make or change a will and may not revoke or 
amend a trust revocable or amendable by the principal or require the trustee of any 
trust for the benefit of the principal to pay income or principal to the Agent unless 
specific authority to that end is given. 
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Exhibit "G" to the Department's Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance of Claim, ~ 
H (underline added). This paragraph is clearly intended to grant the agent the power to accept 
gifts and exercise powers for the benefit of the principle. In no way can this language be 
reasonably construed to grant George the power to make gifts to himself of Martha's property. 
Indeed, the same paragraph contains several clauses prohibiting self dealing: 
... establish a revocable trust solely for the benefit of the principal that terminates 
at the death of the principal and is then distributable to the legal representative: of 
the estate of the principal ... provided, however, that the Agent may not make;: or 
change a will and may not revoke or amend a trust revocable or amendable by the 
principal or require the trustee of any trust for the benefit of the principal to pa~ 
income or principal to the Agent unless specific authority to that end is given. 
Exhibit "G" to the Department's Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance of Claim, ~ 
H (underline added). 
If a text is long enough, words can be pieced together to say almost anything. For 
example, some people claim to find hidden messages in the Bible.2 The phrase extracted by the 
personal representative is: "To ... exercise ... any ... gift ... for the principk" Respondent's 
Brief, p. 36 (top). What does it mean to "exercise" as gift? One can "make" a gift, "~~ve" a gift, 
"accept" a gift, but "exercise" a gift? One can exercise a "power," but a not a ·"gift." Such a 
construction exists only in the imagination of the personal representative. In sl~arching the 
"allstates" and "allfeds" databases on Westlaw, this construction is not found in any case.3 
2See e.g. http://www.nmsr.org/biblecod.htm. 
3The personal representative's claim that'll B of the power of attorney permits gifting of /personal property 
(Respondent's Brief, p. 39 fn. 22 (carried over from previous page» is similarly vacuous. Broad authority 1:0 purchase, 
seJ I and transact business is not authority to make a gift, especially to oneself. 
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The simple fact is that the power of attorney lacks any express provision giving George 
the power to make gifts to himself ofMartha's real property. 
C. The Lack of Express Gifting Power Is Fatal to George's Purported Transfer ofthe 
Property to Himself. 
The personal representative seems to argue that even without express gifting authority, 
the gift should still be valid because the power of attorney is "incredibly comprehensive" and 
because "one is struck by the comprehensiveness of the document." Responde:nt's Brief, pp. 35 
and 38. The argument seems to be that the right to make gifts should be inferred from the tone of 
the document. However, this argument is a two-edged sword. The fact that the power of 
attorney is comprehensive suggests the drafter omitted gifting powers on purpose. 
More importantly, it is express gifting language that is required by the authorities cited by 
the Department at section VIII(A) of the Appellant's Briefand that is required by Idaho Code § 
32-912: 
32-912. Control of community property. - Either the husband or th(l 
wife shall have the right to manage and control the community property, and 
either may bind the community property by contract, excypt that neither the 
husband nor wife may sell, conveyor encumber the community real estate unless 
the other joins in executing the sale agreement, deed or other instrument of 
conveyance by which the real estate is sold, conveyed or encumbered, and any 
community obligation incurred by either the husband or the wife without the 
consent in writing ofthe other shall not obligate the separate property of the 
spouse who did not so consent; provided, however, that the husband or wife ltll!Y 
by express power of attorney give to the other the complete power to sell, 
conveyor encumber community property, either real or personal. All deeds, 
conveyances, bills of sale, or evidences ofdebt heretofore made in confonnity 
herewith are hereby validated. 
Idaho Code § 32-912 (emphasis added). There is nothing "express" in the power of attorney 
used by George in his attempt to convey Martha's property to himself. 
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D. The Power of Attorney Didn't Grant Gifting Powers Before the Unifonn Power of 
Attorney Act and Does Not Grant Them after. 
The personal representative claims that the power of attorney "Met The Requirements of 
I.e. § 15-5-501 et. seq." Respondent's Brief, p. 39. The personal representative seems to 
suggest that under the fonner law, George's gifting to himself would have been authorized. This 
is incorrect. The section cited by the personal representative reads as follows: 
15-5-502. Durable Power of Attorney Not Affected by Disability. All 
acts done by an attorney in fact pursuant to a durable power of attorney during any 
period of disability or incapacity of the principle have the same effect ~md inure to 
the benefit of and bind the principle and his successors in interest as if the 
principle were competent and not disabled. 
Idaho Code § 15-5-502 (1982) (underline added). This section (nor any other section of the old 
law) grants powers to the agent that are not found within the four comers of the power of 
attorney. 
The personal representative also suggests the Unifonn Power of Attorney Act,. adopted in 
2008, would not have required express gifting language for an agent who was also a spouse. 
Respondent's Brief, pp. 40-41. This is also incorrect. Idaho Code § 15-12-201(1) provides as 
follows: 
15-12-201. Authority that requires specific grant - Grant of general 
authority 
(1) An agent under a power of attorney may exercise the following 
authority on behalf of the principal or with the principal's property only ifthe 
power of attorney expressly grants the agent the authority and exercise is not 
otherwise prohibited by other agreement or instrwnent to which the authority or 
property is subject: 
(a) Create, amend, revoke or tenninate an inter vivos trust; 
(b) Make a gift; 
(c) Create or change rights of survivorship; 
(d) Create or change a beneficiary designation; 
(e) Delegate authority granted under the power of attorney; 
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(f) Waive the principal's right to be a beneficiary of a joint and survivor 
annuity, including a survivor benefit under a retirement plan; or 
(g) Exercise fiduciary powers that the principal has authority to delegate. 
Idaho Code § 15-12-201 (underline added). The personal representative points to the comments 
in the Uniform act for the proposition that the "default rule" would not apply to the spouse as 
agent. Respondent's Brief, p. 40 (bottom). The personal representative quotes the foUowing 
language in the comment, but incorrectly inserts the bracketed material making it appear that this 
comment applies to the requirement for an express authorization to make a gift: 
Subsection (b) [I.e. § 15-12-201(l)(b)] contains an additional safeguard 
for the principal. It establishes as a default rule that an agent who is not an 
ancestor, spouse, or descendant ofthe principal may not exercise authority to 
create in the agent or in an individual the agent is legally obligated to support, an 
interest in the principal's property. For example, a non-relative agent with gift 
making authority could not make a gift to the agent or a dependant of the agent 
without the principal's express authority in the power of attorney. In contrast, a 
spouse-agent with express gift-making authority could implement the principa.l's 
expectation that annual family gifts be continued without additional authority in 
the power of attorney. 
Official Comment to Article 2 of the Uniform Power of Attorney Act. However, contrary to the 
personal representative's insertion, the comment does not apply to section 15-12-20 I(l )(b) at all, 
it applies to section l5-l2-201(2t which provides as follows: 
(2) Notwithstanding a grant of authority to exercise authority in 
subsection (1) of this section, unless the power of attorney otherwise provides, an 
agent that is not an ancestor, spouse or descendant of the principal, may not 
exercise authority under a power of attorney to create in the agent, or in an 
individual to whom the agent owes a legal obligation of support, an interest in the 
principal's property, whether by gift, right of survivorship, beneficiary 
designation, disclaimer or otherwise. 
4That this comment applies to subsection (2) is clearly and correctly shown by the compiler ofth(: Idaho Code in 
the Official Comment following Idaho Code § 15-12-201 in the official Michie publication of Titles 14-17" at page 468 
(second column, halfway down). 
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Idaho Code § 15-12-201(2). In other words, subsection (1) prohibits the making of gifts, or 
doing the other things specified in that section, without express authority, and subsection (2) 
imposes an additional restriction that applies to non-relatives. The comment in no way suggests 
that an agent-spouse can make gifts, whether to himself or others, without an express grant of 
authority. 
Therefore, neither the original power of attorney law, nor the current power ofattorney 
law permits the making of gifts without express authority within the power of attorney. 
E. There Was Absolutely No Benefit to Martha in George Transferring Martha's Real 
Property to Himself. 
The personal representative also incorrectly makes it appear that Idaho Code § 15-12­
217(3) would permit George's gift to himself in this case. Respondent's Brief, p. 41, fn. 25. 
However, section 15-12-217 doesn't eliminate the requirement for express gifting authority. 
Instead, it applies where gifting has already been authorized. Moreover, this sl~ction imposes 
additional requirements for making gifts: 
(3) An agent may make a gift ofthe principal's property only as the agent 
determines is consistent with the principal's objectives if actually known by the 
agent and, if unknown, as the agent determines is consistent with the principal's 
best interest based on all relevant factors, inclUding, but not limited to: 
(a) The value and nature of the principal's property; 
(b) The principal's foreseeable obligations and need for maintl;:nance; 
(c) Minimization of taxes, including income, estate, inheritanc1e,
 
generation-skipping transfer and gift taxes;
 
(d) Eligibility for a benefit, a program, or assistance under a statute or 
governmental regulation; and 
(e) The principal's personal history of making or joining in making gifts. 
Idaho Code § 15-12-217 (underline added). 
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The personal representative suggests that the transfer was in Martha's best int{:rest in light 
of eligibility for government benefit programs. Respondent's Brief, p. 41, fn. 25. Thi s ignores 
the fact that the home is not counted when it comes to eligibility for Medicaid. 42 U.S.C. § 
I396r-5(c)(5). It was completely unnecessary for Martha to divest herself of the home in order to 
qualify for Medicaid. This transfer benefitted George, not Martha. There was nothing in this for 
Martha at all. 
The personal representative makes several other statements that are completely 
unsupported by any evidence in the record. She states that "Martha would have signed the deed 
at issue were she able to do so." Respondent's Brief, p. 39, fn. 23. There is absolutely no 
evidence in the record to support that claim. To the contrary, the evidence in the record is that 
Martha, as the personal representative states, "put George's name on the title,,5 to the property-
while retaining her own interest in the property. Moreover, she gave George a power of attorney 
that did not include gifting powers, and to the contrary, imposed specific restrictions on self 
dealing.6 See,-r,-r G and H of the Power ofAttorney (Exhibit "G" to the Department's 
Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance ofClaim). Contrary to the suggestions of the 
personal representative, the power of attorney did not give all power to Georgt::, it limited those 
powers. The only evidence ofMartha's intent to be found in the record is the documt::nts 
5Respondent's Brief, pp. 37-8. 
6The personal representative calls these anti-self-dealing provisions "standard provisions" and "boilerplate." 
Respondent's Brief, p. 39 (first paragraph and fn. 23). However, it is ~ H that the personal representative relies upon. 
Therefore, apparently, the personal representative's view is that part of~ H is important and represents the intent of the 
principle, but the other parts of that same paragraph are mere "boilerplate." These sections are as important as any others 
in the power of attorney and demonstrate that George, as the agent, was not given "comprehensive" authority; he was 
given limited authority as the document clearly shows, and was limited to the powers actually expressed therein. 
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themselves, which documents evidence the intent to retain, not give away, her interest in her real 
property. 
Also, there is no evidence that Martha was not competent to sign a Quitclaim Deed at the 
time George purported to transfer the property to himself. Likewise, there is no evidence in the 
record to support the personal representative's claim of title company "standard procedure" as 
stated at Respondent's Brief, p. 36, fn. 18. There is also no evidence that transfers of the home 
are "typical in cases ofmarried couples" as stated at Respondent's Brief, p. 37. 
Finally, the personal representative states that there are no concerns here of"negation of 
the principle's estate plan." Respondent's Brief, p. 38. That assumes, however, evidence of an 
estate plan contrary to the plain language ofthe documents in the record. The documl~nts in the 
record suggest only an intent on Martha's part to retain her property, not give it away. No 
evidence to the contrary is found in the record. 
F. The Alleged "Finding of Fact" Is, at Best. a Conclusion of Law. 
The personal representative claims the Magistrate made oral findings of fact to support 
the personal representative's claim of "interspousal agency." Respondent's Brief, p. 43. There 
are, however, no findings of fact. There are simply unexplained and unsupported conclusions of 
law. The statements of the Magistrate cited by the personal representative are the Magistrate's 
conclusions drawn from the four comers of the document itself. The lines quoted by the personal 
representative are the following: 
The power of attorney issue was - is interesting to me and - because I 
don't think that that - that paragraph where the word gift is written, paragraph H, 
is the clearest kind of authority to make a gift ofproperty. It certainly can be r,ead 
that way... 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRlEF - 9 C:\Documenls and SeUingslcartwriw\DeskloplAppeIl2.nls Reply Brief.wpd 
000664
 
 
 
 
       1e
 
l t tti s\ t t  
But I think - when everything - all of the language in that power of 
attorney is considered, it's so - the intent that you just can't get around is that 
document was entitled to give George Perry as broad of authority as possible, it 
seems to me, including the right to deal with interest in real property. So I'm 
going to make a determination for purposes of this case that that is a valid power 
of attorney for purposes ofdealing with - including giving Martha Perry's int(;:rest 
in that property. 
So I'm going to decide that question for purposes ofthis case. (emphasis 
added) 
Respondent's Brief, p. 43 (emphasis by personal representative omitted; underline added). There 
is nothing here but reference to the document itself. This is a legal, not a factual detelmination. 
Henderson v. Henderson Inv. Properties, L.L.c., 148 Idaho 638, ,227 P.3d 568,570 (2010); 
Panike & Sons Farms, Inc. v. Smith, 147 Idaho 562, 566, 212 P.3d 992,996 (2009). The 
Magistrate made no findings of fact that would support the personal representative's claim that 
there was somehow implied spousal authority for George's selfdealing. 
G. The Failure of Georg(;~'s Gift ofMartha's Property to HimselfIs Sufficient to Require 
Reversal of the Magistrate and the Allowance of the Department's Claim. 
The personal representative's disallowance of the Department's claim rests entirely upon 
the Minnesota case ofEstate ofBarg, 752 N.W.2d 52 (Minn. 2008). The holding in the Barg 
case was that the state could recover only property in which the decedent had "any title or 
interest" at the time ofdeath. In this case, it is clear that George's purported conveyance to 
himself fails and, therefore, Martha had an interest in the real property, or its proceeds, both at 
the time ofher death and George's. Therefore, the Department's claim, even ifBarg is applied 
in Idaho, must be allowed in this case. The Magistrate's Order Disallowing Claim should be 
reversed. 
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II. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. The Personal Representative Is Asking the Court to Eviscerate Idaho's Medicaid Payment 
System. 
The personal representative attempts to minimize the importance ofher attack on the 
Department's recovery of Medicaid payments by claiming she is merely challenging the 
"application" of Idaho Code § 56-218, as if the Department is on some frolic unexpected by the 
legislature that passed this law. However, the fact scenario presented in this case is exactly the 
kind of case this law was enacted to deal with. Either an elderly Medicaid recipient has a spouse 
or does not. Where a single person applies for long term care Medicaid, she must have spent all 
her available resources except the last $2,000 before she can be eligible. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a). 
She can keep her house if she intends to return home, but it is completely subjl~ct to estate 
recovery. Her heirs will receive nothing until Medicaid is repaid in full. However, under the 
personal representative's argument, if one of a married couple needs assistance, she may simply 
convey her home to her spouse, and it is then forever protected from estate recovery. Her heirs 
will get the house when she and her husband pass away (or, according to the view of the personal 
representative, the husband can simply give the property to the children whenever he likes). The 
taxpayers are left holding the bag and have subsidized and protected the inheritance of the 
Medicaid recipient's non-dependent children. 
Obviously, when the legislature approved a plan to protect the elderly poor and their 
spouses, this is not what they had in mind. This is what is in issue in this case. The personal 
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representative wishes the court to nullify the requirement to reimburse Medicaid anytime the 
Medicaid recipient has a spouse.7 
B. Standard of Review. 
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which the court exercises free 
review. Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 224 P.3d 458 (2008) citing 
State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 829, 25 P.3d 850,852 (2001). 
III. 
MEDICAID IS A PROGRAM FOR THE POOR AND IS NOT 
INTENDED TO SUBSIDIZE THE INHERITANCE OF NON­
DEPENDENT CHILDREN OF MEDICAID RECIPIENTS. 
A. Medicaid Estate Recovery Is Simple in Concept. 
Medicaid for elderly c:ouples is simple in concept. Long term care is Vl~ry expensive. 
Many elderly couples are unable to pay for needed medical care. Medicare dOles not cover long 
term care. Medicaid is not insurance as Medicare or Social Security is. There is no payroll tax to 
support it. It is a public welfirre program funded by the general funds ofthe state and federal 
government. It is intended to be the payer of last resort. The elderly can obtain medical 
assistance (Medicaid) without divesting themselves of all their assets. Where a couple is 
involved, there are complex rules to allow one spouse to obtain needed medical care while the 
other remains living in the community. When both spouses have passed away, their assets are 
recovered to reimburse the Medicaid program and provide for others who are in need. 
7The personal representative has also asked the court to strike down the Department's rules, also approved by 
the legislature, which implement the recovery law where there is a spouse. Respondent's Brief, p. 15. 
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B. The History of Estate Recovery Reveals a Clear Intent to Recover the Assets of this 
Estate. 
The history of Idaho's estate recovery program is relevant here. While Idaho has long 
had estate recovery laws relating to public assistance, the first iteration of Idaho's modem estate 
recovery law was passed in 1988. The first paragraph provides as follows: 
56-218 Recovery of certain medical assistance. 
(1) Medical assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an 
individual who was sixty-five (65) years of age or older when the individual 
received such assistance may be recovered from the estate, or if there be no estate 
the estate of the surviving spouse, if any, shall be charged for such aid paid to 
either or both; provid(~d, however, that claim for such medical assistance corre:ctly 
paid to the individual may be established against the estate, but there shall be no 
adjustment or recovery thereof until after the death of the surviving spouse, if any, 
and only at a time when the individual has no surviving child who is under 
twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind or permanently and totally disabled. 
Transfers of real or p(;~rsonal property by recipients of such aid without adequate 
consideration are voidable and may be set aside by an action in the district court. 
Idaho Code § 56-218(1) (1988). Not coincidentally, 1988 was the year Congress passed the 
Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act (MCCA). The MCCA included provisions that for the first 
time permitted one spouse to qualify for Medicaid long term care without impoverishing the 
community (or at-horne) spouse. 8 This process includes allowing spouses to make transfers 
between themselves. The concern of the legislature to be able to recoup these transferred assets 
can be read in the language of the original estate recovery statute. 
Congress has always sought to counter the attempts of some to use the Medicaid program, 
not as a payer oflast resort, but as an estate planning tool to protect and retain their own assets. 
The language of the congressional committee, cited by the court in Cohen v. Commissioner of 
Div. ofMedical Assistance, 423 Mass. 399,668 N.E.2d 769 (1996) is often quoted: 
8The MCCA was later repealed, but the anti-spousal-impoverishment provisions for Medicaid were retained. 
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The Committee feels compelled to state the obvious. Medicaid is, and 
always has been, a program to provide basic health coverage to people who do not 
have sufficient income or resources to provide for themselves. When affluent 
individuals use Medicaid qualifying trusts and similar "techniques" to qualify for 
the program, they are diverting scarce Federal and State resources from 
low-income elderly and disabled individuals, and poor women and children. This 
is unacceptable to the Committee. 
H.R.Rep. No. 265, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 72 (1985). 
Cohen, 423 Mass. at 403-4, 668 N.E.2d at 772. By 1988, the committee report for the MCCA 
continued to echo these same concerns: 
The Committee is informed that a number of States have not made 
effective use of the authorities under current law to prevent affluent individuals 
from disposing of resources in order to qualify for Medicaid nursing home 
coverage. In the view of the Committee. Medicaid-an entitlement program for 
the poor-should not facilitate the transfer of accumulated wealth from nursing 
home patients to their non-dependent children. 
H.R. Rep. No. 105(II), 100th Cong., 1ST Sess. 1987, p. 73 (reprinted at 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
857,896,1987 WL 61566, p. 31). 
The battle had not ceased, of course, in 1993, when OBRA '93 was passed.9 This law 
included provisions which expanded the powers of the states to recover Medicaid benefits. The 
accompanying legislative history shows Congress's intent that assets divided for purposes of 
Medicaid eligibility be tracked and recovered. 
Under the Committee bill, States are required to establish an estate 
recovery program that meets certain requirements. The proeram must identilfr. 
and track resources (whether or not excluded for elieibility purposes) of 
individuals who receive nursing facility. home and community-based services, 
and other specified long-term care services. The program must promptIy ascertain 
9The battle still hasn't ended, of course. In 2006 the president signed the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 giving 
the states additional tools to assure couple's assets are used for their own care or available for recovery, rather than being 
protected for the Medicaid couple's heirs. The provisions of the DRA go to enhanced asset transfer penaltJies and the 
treatment of annuities and are not in issue here. 
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when the individual and the surviving spouse, if any, dies, and must provide for 
the collection of the amounts correctly paid by Medicaid on behalf of the 
individual for long-term care services from the estate of the individual or the 
surviving spouse. The term "estate" is defined as all real and personal property of 
a deceased individual and all other assets in which the individual had any legally 
cognizable title or interest at the time of his death, including assets conveyed to a 
survivor, heir, or assign through joint tenancy, survivorship, life estate, living 
trust, or other arrangement. 
H.R. Rep. 103-111, P.L. 103-66, OBRA 1993 (May 25, 1993), Section 5112. (emphasis added). 
Among the tools provided in OBRA '93 is the addition ofa definition of "asst::ts" for 
purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p which provides as follows: 
(h) Definitions
 
In this section" the following definitions shall apply:
 
(1) The term "assets", with respect to an individual, includes all 
income and resources of the individual and ofthe individual's spouse, including 
any income or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse is 
entitled to but does not receive because of action­
(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse, 
(B) by a person, including a court or administrative body, with legal 
authority to act in place of or on behalf ofthe individual or such individual's 
spouse, or 
(C) by any person, including any court or administrative body, acting at 
the direction or upon the request of the individual or such individual's spouse. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p{h)(1) (emphasis added). "This section," of course, is 1396p. "Assets" 
includes the "resources" of the individual and the spouse and includes resourC4:;:S transferred by 
the individual or the spouse. "Resources" are defined in subsection (h)(5): 
(5) The term "resources" has the meaning given such term in st::ction 
1382b of this title, without regard (in the case of an institutionalized individual) to 
the exclusion describ(~d in subsection (a)(1) of such section. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(5). The reference to section 1382b and the exclusion in subsection (a)(1), 
is to the couple's home. In other words, the "assets" defined in subsection (h){l) specifically 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 15 C:\Documents and Seltings\cartwriw\Desktop\Appellants Reply Brief.wpd 
000670
 
l u
 
S Sl
 
 
 
lID
-
 
S
S
 
S
IS t
includes the couple's home whether held by one, the other or both. It is hard to imagine language 
that more clearly includes the property at issue in this case. 
Another tool given to the states by OBRA '93 was the expanded definition of estate found 
in 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(4): 
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate", with respect to a 
deceased individual­
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included 
within the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; and 
(B) may include, at the option of the State (and shall include, in the case 
of an individual to whom paragraph (1)(C)(i) applies), any other real and personal 
property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or :interest at 
the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to 
a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, 
tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement. 
42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(4) (emphasis added). The personal representative argues that the definition 
of assets in subsection (h) doesn't apply to this section. However, subsection (h) says, "[i]n this 
section" and doesn't make an exception for subsection (b). Subsection (b), of course, is the 
section that mandates estate recovery. 
The personal representative urges the court to ignore the legislative history and find that 
Idaho's estate recovery law preempted by federal law. Respondent's Brief, p. 34. However, the 
personal representative herself cites Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 
581 (1941), for the proposition that "Conflict preemption also occurs when the state law is 'an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'" 
Respondent's Brief at 12. If one is to determine whether the state law is "an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress" one must inquire 
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into what the purposes and objectives of Congress are. Clearly the intent of Congress and the 
legislature is relevant and important to deciding this case. 1O 
Understanding that Congress has said that Medicaid is for the poor, that it "should not 
facilitate the transfer of accumulated wealth from nursing home patients to their non-dependent 
children," and that the state should "track resources (whether or not excluded for eligibility 
purposes)" and collect them "from the estate of the individual or the surviving spouse," one can 
only make one of three conclusions: (1) Congress didn't mean what it said; (2) Congress made a 
huge mistake in drafting the law; or (3) the personal representative is wrong. 
IV. 
THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE RELIES UPON A 
SINGLE PHRASE OF THE FEDERAL MEDICAID LAW 
READ OUT OF CONTEXT. 
A. The Personal Representative's Entire Preemption Case Relies on Reading a Phrase of 42 
U.S.C. § 1396p out of Context. 
The personal representative's argument is that any property transferred by a Medicaid 
recipient to her spouse, while she is alive, is forever off-limits to Medicaid estate recovery. She 
arrives at this argument because 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) contains the following language: 
(B) may include, at the option of the State (and shall include, in the case 
of an individual to whom paragraph (1 )(C)(i) applies), any other real and personal 
property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at 
the time of death (to the extent of such interest) .... 
IOThe personal representative also states that where a statute is unambiguous it must be read literal1y and no 
legislative intent is necessary. Respondent's Brief, p. 34. The personal representative, however, offers her own statutory 
construction and interpretation asserting that "asset" in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) doesn't mean what the definition in 
subsection (h) says it means. Respondent's Brief, p. 28. If we are to read the statute literally, then the definition of 
"asset" provided in subsection (h)(l) must be applied in subsection (b)(4). 
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42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B). The argument is that if the individual divests herself of her property 
during life, it may not then be recovered after her death. 
The problem with this argument is, of course, that it is overly simplistic and totally 
ignores the entire body of Medicaid law including (1) an eligibility system that permits spouses 
to freely transfer property between themselves,11 (2) a definition of "assets" that includes 
property transferred to the spouse during the eligibility process and specifically includes the 
home,12 (3) the expansive nature of subsection (b)(4) and it's purpose in recapluring the couple's 
assets,13 (4) the legislative history and purpose ofCongress,14 and (5) the absurd and unfair 
results of this narrow interpretation. I5 
B. Subsection (b)(4) Was Intended to Expand the Scope of Property to Be Recovered, Not 
Limit it. 
Recall that subsection (b)(4) was part ofOBRA '93 and that part oftht:: intent ofOBRA 
'93 was to "identify and track resources (whether or not excluded for eligibility purposes) ... and 
... provide for the collection of the amounts correctly paid by Medicaid ...from the estate of the 
individual or the surviving spouse." H.R. Rep. 103-111, P.L. 103-66, OBRA 1993 (May 25, 
1993), Section 5112 (cited above). This section is very broad and expansive: 
11 See discussion beginning at page 13 of this Brief.
 
I2See discussion on page 15 of this Brief.
 
I3See discussion on page 16 of this Brief.
 
14See discussion beginning at page 13 of this Brief.
 
15See discussion beginning at page 34 of this Brief.
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(4) For purposes of this subsection, 16 the tenn "estate", with respect to a 
deceased individual­
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets17 included 
within the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; 18 and 
(B) may include, at the option ofthe State (and shall include, in the case 
of an individual to whom paragraph (1 )(C)(i) applies), any other real and personal 
property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at 
the time of death (to the extent of such interest), includinK such assets conveyed 
to a survivor, heir, or assign ofthe deceased individual through joint tenancy, 
tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (emphasis added). 
Thus, when the language relied upon by the personal representative is read in context 
with the remainder ofthe subsection and the definition of "assets" in subsection (h), it becomes 
clear. The phrase beginning with "including" shows the breadth of this section. In case the 
drafters missed something, they included the words "or other arrangement." The North Dakota 
Supreme Court found this language sufficiently expansive to include property such as that at 
issue in this case. In re Estate a/Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 2000).19 
The personal representative contends that the "including" phrase only applies to property 
which passes instantly at death. Respondent's Brief, p. 7. This distinction, however, is not found 
16The "subsection" is 42 US.c. § 1396p(b) which includes the federal mandate that statl~s pursue estate 
recovery. See 42 US.c. § 1396p(b)(I). 
17The personal representative says the word "assets" used here should not be given the definition found at 
subsection (h)(I) of this section. Respondent's Briefp. 28. However, if Congress did not want the expansive definition 
of "assets" to apply here, it could have used the word "property" or some other undefined word. 
18The personal representative, taking the Department's argument out of context, says "[t]he Department argues 
that estate recovery is really controlled by state law." Respondent's Brief, p. 14. Of course, what the Department 
actually said was that state law defines what property is available for purposes of both state probate law and Medicaid 
estate recovery. Appellant's Brief, pp. 9-10. This subsection and the following clearly confirms the Department's 
position. 
19The personal representative suggests the Department believes Wirtz to be weak because the Department does 
not rely solely on the "other arrangement" language. This is simply because the issue in this case is controlled by Idaho 
Department ofHealth and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6 (1998), discussed below, and Wirtz is merely 
persuasive authority. 
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anywhere in the law and is not supported by the language of the law itself. For example, where a 
living trust is created the "legal title or interest" is passed immediately. Estate ofHull v. 
Williams, 126 Idaho 437, 443, 885 P.2d 1153, 1159 (App. 1994). The beneficiary holds only the 
beneficial, not legal, interest, and no legal interest passes on death. Subsection (b)(4), when read 
in context, is clearly intended to capture all property the Medicaid recipient, by whatever means, 
may have attempted to shelter or protect. 
C. The Jackman Court Ignored the Same Preemption Arguments Being Made Here. 
The record in this case includes a lengthy binder of exhibits included with the 
Departments Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance of Claim. Induded in these 
exhibits is the full set ofbriefs filed in the Supreme Court in Idaho Department ofHealth and 
Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6 (1998). The Department provided thf:se 
documents so the court could see that these very same preemption arguments have already been 
made to the Idaho Supreme Court.20 The Respondent's Brief in Jackman gives as an issue on 
appeal, the following: 
3. Does Federal Medicaid law allow the state to recover a recipient's 
Medicaid costs from the estate of the surviving spouse beyond a tracing of the 
recipient's assets owned at the time of death. 
Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance of Claim, Exhibit "D" Respondent's Brief, p. 
5. The discussion of this issue begins at page 16 of the brief and continues to page 23. These 
same preemption arguments were continued in the Respondent's Rehearing Brief. Ml~morandum 
20The Department also provided a copy of the superceded decision in the Jackman case. Contrary to the claims 
of the personal representative (Respondent's Brief, p. 22), the Department has never cited that decision as JlUthority. 
However, like the underlying briefing it is important to provide context for the Court's ultimate holding, especially in 
light of the identical arguments being made in this case. The personal representative, apparently, would prc~fer Jackman 
be taken out of context. 
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in Support of Petition for Allowance of Claim, Exhibit "D" Rehearing Brief, pp. 27-33. The 
Respondent in Jackman also made the same arguments the personal representative makes here 
regarding the inapplicability ofthe federal definition of"assets" at pp. 27-8. Yet, the only place 
that the Idaho Supreme Court found the Department preempted was in the appllication of Idaho 
Code § 56-218 to a transfer of property that took place before the effective date ofOBRA '93. 
The remainder of the court's discussion deals with the timing of the particular transfer in the 
Jackman case. The court stated: 
This is true even though 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4), which applies to Medicai<1 
payments for calendar quarters be2innin2 on or after October 1, 1993, 
authorizes the Department to recover the Medicaid payments from "othe1r 
assets." Without the definition of "assets" contained in 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(e)(11. 
"other assets" are only those included within Hildor's estate, as defined by I.C:.....§. 
15-1-201(15). 
Jackman, 132 Idaho at 9-10,970 P.2d at 216-7 (emphasis added). Once the OBRA '93 changes 
were in place, the preemption argument failed. 
The personal representative argues as follows: 
Conflict preemption occurs when compliance with both state and federal laws is 
impossible. Fla. Lime Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143,83 
S.Ct. 1210, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963). Conflict preemption also occurs when the 
state law is "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes 
and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 
85 L.Ed. 581 (1941). 
Respondent's Brief, p. 12 (underline added). The Medicaid system exists to provide health care 
for the poor. The personal representative does not explain how Idaho Code § 56-218" in any 
way, makes compliance with the federal Medicaid law impossible. Certainly the personal 
representative is not arguing that the "full purposes and objectives of Congress" include 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 21 C:\Documents and Settings\cartwriw\DesktoplAppellants Reply Brief.wpd 
000676
 
 
 
u \
preserving an inheritance for non-dependent children. Therefore, the personal representative has 
not shown how both federal Medicaid law and Idaho Code § 56-218 are in conflict. 
D. The 1993 Changes in OBRA '93 Are Central to the Court's Holding in Jackman. 
The personal representative argues that the Supreme court's discussion of OBRA '93 in 
Jackman is merely dicta. Respondent's Brief, p. 24. Similarly, the personal represenltative 
suggests that Jackman is a pre-OBRA '93 case and is, therefore, not relevant. Respondent's 
Brief, pp. 13, 23-4. Actually, Jackman is a post-OBRA '93 case with a pre-OBRA '93 property 
transfer. The discussion ofOBRA '93 is central to the court's holding, and Jackman is an 
important case because it demonstrates what Congress did with OBRA '93 and how the outcome 
of the case would have been different had the transfer been after the effective date of OBRA '93. 
If the personal represt:ntative is correct, the Court could have simply said that the assets 
were transferred before death, and therefore, the Department cannot have a claim. That is not 
what the Court did. The court began with the over-arching holding: 
The Department asserts that I.C. § 56-218, as it existed21 at times
 
applicable to this case, authorized recovery of the balance of the Medicaid
 
payments from Lionel's estate. We agree.
 
Jackman, 132 Idaho at 8,970 P.2d at 215. The Court then goes on to state that the Department 
was preempted from recovering the assets conveyed by the Medicaid recipient to her husband 
before the effective date of OBRA '93. If the Court had agreed with the personal representative's 
preemption argument in this case, it could have simply said that transferred property was out of 
2J The personal representative reads this "as it existed" language out of context and says that the court was 
limiting it's holding to the facts of the case because it was pre-OBRA '93. Respondent's Brief, p. 23. However, if one 
reads the context, it is clear the court is talking about the "if there be no estate" language that existed in the original 
statute (see page 13) and was changed in 1998, the same year Jackman was decided. 
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the Department's reach forever. However, the Court went to great pains to discuss the effective 
date of OBRA '93 and the effect that had on their holding in the case. The court discussed the 
expanded definition of estate enacted by OBRA '93 and discussed the federal definition of 
"assets." There was no disagreement by the court on the legal effect of the federal definition of 
"assets." Rather, the court merely concluded that because the marriage settlement agreement was 
executed before the effective date of OBRA '93, it did not apply to the transfeJTed property: 
We conclude that this definition of "assets" is not applicable to the 
agreement, which Jackman signed on behalfofLionel and Hildor on March 8, 
1993. The definition of "assets" contained in the 1993 amendments to the federal 
statute does not apply "with respect to assets disposed of on or before the date of 
the enactment ofthis Act [Aug. 10, 1993]." Pub.L. 103-66, § 13611(e). 
Therefore, it does not apply to the agreement and does not allow the Departm(;:nt 
to recover the balance of the Medicaid payments from Lionel's separat1e property. 
This is true even though 42 V.S.c. § 1396p(b)(4), which applies to Medic~lIid 
payments for calendar quarters beginning on or after October 1, 1993, 
authorizes the Department to recover the Medicaid payments from "othelr 
assets." Without the defmition of "assets" contained in 42 V.S.c. § 
1396p(e)(I), "other assets" are only those included within Hildor's estate, as 
defined by I.C. § 15-1-201(15). Lionel's separate property, including the 
community property transmuted by the agreement, is not part of Hildor's estate. 
Jackman, 132 Idaho at 9-10, 970 P.2d at 216-7 (emphasis added). The obvious and necessary 
inference is that with "the detinition of 'assets' contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p([h])(1), 'other 
assets '" would include the property transferred by the Medicaid recipient to her husband through 
the marriage settlement agreement. 
The personal representative says that the Department is asking this court to "speculate as 
to what our highest Court would have opined had it ruled on the issue at bar." Respondent's 
Brief, p. 23. However, the necessary implication from the Court's language is direct and the 
inference is necessary and unavoidable. Things that are necessarily implied are not speculative, 
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they are real and can have legal effect. There can be implied consent (State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 
300,302-03, 160 P.3d 739, 741-42 (2007», implied authority (Jones v. HealthSouth Treasure 
Valley Hosp., 147 Idaho 109, 112,206 P.3d 473, 476 (2009», and implied promises (Gray v. 
Tri-Way Const. Services, Inc., 147 Idaho 378, 387, 210 P.3d 63, 72 (2009» among other things. 
There is no need to speculate about the meaning of the Court here. The Court was cle:arly 
explaining the effect of OBRi\ '93 when it comes to spousal recovery in Idaho.22 
E. The Solicitor General's BriefIs Not Legal Authority. 
The personal representative is incredulous that the "Department fails to even mention" 
the Solicitor General's brief. Respondent's Brief, p. 27. The reason for this, of course, is that the 
Solicitor General's brief is not legal authority and is not binding on anyone. The personal 
representative, without any authority at all says: "The U.S. Solicitor General's position is in fact 
HHS's (and therefore CMS's) opinion on the issue." Respondent's Brief, p. 27. However, the 
personal representative grants government attorneys, including the undersigned, too much 
authority. While an attorney may represent an agency, a governmental agency's official 
pronouncements come through the promulgation of regulations and rules. The: Deparbnent is not 
bound by the statements of a government attorney in an amicus brief, however well re:asoned it 
may be.23 Likewise, undersigned does not have authority to make official pronouncements for 
the Department of Health and Welfare. Those are made by rule-making. 
22At page 26, fn.ll of Respondent's Brief, the personal representative states that even if the court finds the 
Court's discussion of OBRA '93 to be part of the Supreme Court's holding, it should still rule in favor of the personal 
representative. The personal represt:ntative seems to be suggesting this court over-rule the Idaho Supreme Court. 
23lt is easy to think of Medicaid as a federal program and the states as mere contract administrators. This is not 
the case. The two sovereigns are partners in this program. If the federal government believes a state has failed to abide 
by its rules, it can deny federal financial participation, whereupon the state has administrative and legal remedies. 
Neither party is bound by the statements of the other's attorney in briefing. 
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That said, the personal representative has only cited those portions of the Solicitor 
General's brief with which it agrees. The Solicitor General's brief also finds that In re Estate of 
Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N.D.. 2000) is not necessarily in conflict and suggests that the Supreme 
Court deny certiorari because the state of Minnesota is remedying it's problem by the: same 
legislation the personal representative says is "clouding marital property law in Minnesota and 
raising serious practical and c:onstitutional concems.,,24 Respondent's Brief, p .. 33. 
The Solicitor General recognized that the issue here is really what state: law allows to be 
recovered, and noted that Wirtz is not necessarily in conflict with the Minnesota Supreme Court's 
holding in Barg: 
Although its reasoning is not entirely clear, the court in Wirtz appeared to 
conclude that the recipient in that case, despite formal conveyance of clertain 
assets before death, retained an interest in the relevant property until his death, 
when the interest was conveyed to his spouse through "other arrangeml~nt." 607 
N.W.2d at 885 (quoting 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4)(B)). The court did not daborate on 
the nature of that interest, although it referred to the State's argument that the 
recipient had retained a "marital or equitable interest" in the assets at the time of 
his death, id. at 883, and noted that other courts had interpreted Section 
1396p(b)(4)(B) to reach state-law community-property and homestead interests, 
id. at 885. 
The different results reached by the North Dakota Supreme Court and the 
court below on similar facts thus may reflect not conflicting interpretations of 
federal Medicaid law, but only different views of when, under state law, a spouse 
retains a legal interest in property conveyed to his or her spouse. 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Minnesota's Petition for Certiorari, p. 14 
(underline added). 
24The personal representative cites the case of Douglas County v. Lindgren (Minn., 7th Jud. DisL. No. 
21-CV-09-477, August 4, 2010) and leaves the reader with the impression that the Douglas Coun~y case invalidated 
Minnesota's new marital property law. This is incorrect. The Douglas County case had nothing to do with the issues 
presented here. A copy of that case is attached as Appendix A. 
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Continuing to recognize the importance of state law on this issue, the Solicitor General 
noted that Minnesota was already enacting legislation to change the outcome of the Barg 
decision: 
Moreover, although the federal Medicaid Act limits estate recovery to 
those assets in which the Medicaid recipient had a legal interest at the time of her 
death, the nature and extent of such interests remain largely the domain of state 
law. Notably, Minnesota's Governor has proposed redefining marital property 
interests to permit recovery of medical assistance from the estate of the: 
later-surviving spouse in this context. See Governor's Recommendation, 
Minnesota State Budget, 2010-11 Biennial Budget, Human Services Dep't 132 
(Jan. 27, 2009). That proposal has not become law, nor has it been reviewed by 
the Secretary of HHS. The proposal, however, suggests that Minnesota may be 
able to work toward greater asset recovery consistent with the clear tenns of 
federal Medicaid law.25 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Minnesota's Petition for Certiorari, pp. 15-16 
(underline added). The Department provided a copy of this legislation as Exhibit "F" to the 
Department's Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance of Claim. 
So, if the Solicitor General's brief is entitled to as much weight as the personal 
representative claims, then the Barg case is oflittle or no application in Idaho, since Idaho is a 
community property state and Minnesota is not, and Idaho's marital property and probate laws 
are quite distinct from Minnesota's. 
A final word concerning the Solicitor General's brief: The personal representative 
claimed that the Supreme Court agreed with the Solicitor General. Respondent's Brie:f, p. 27. 
However, unless the personal representative has knowledge not available to the rest oEus, the 
reasons for the denial of certiorari remain unknown and could have been for a hundre:d different 
25The personal representative speculates that Minnesota's new law will be found unconstitutional. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 33. The Solic:itor General didn't seem to be so pessimistic. 
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reasons. All the denial of certiorari states is: "Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court 
of Minnesota denied." Vas v. Barg, 129 S.Ct. 2859 (2009). 
F. Other Provisions of State and Federal Law Make Sense Only If the Property of this Estate 
Is Recoverable. 
At page 4 of Respondent's Brief, the personal representative correctly notes that in 
determining eligibility of a married person, the assets ofboth the husband and wife are 
considered. As already noted transfers of assets can be freely made from one spouse to the other. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2). Since both ofa couple's assets are considered for eligibility purposes, 
it doesn't really matter. Somehow, in the mind of the personal representative, all this changes at 
recovery time. The assets of both spouses no longer matter. It is only what the Medi<;aid spouse 
had (generally nothing ifthey transfer the home to the spouse) at death that can be recovered. 
Still, even where the Medicaid spouse dies first, no recovery can be made from her estate until 
after the death of the non-Medicaid spouse. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(2). This doesn't make sense. 
The personal representative says this is because "it is only at that time that a final dett;:rmination 
can be made as to what, if any, interest the Medicaid spouse has in any property at her death." 
Respondent's Brief, p. 20. Yet, below, the personal representative contended that Martha's 
interests could be decided now, even while she was still alive.26 Even ifit were true that 
determination of property rights requires waiting until after the death of both, that is a problem 
for the state probate courts, not for federal Medicaid. No, the reason is more simple: the non­
26In her "Reply Memorandum in Support of Objection to Department's Petition for Allowance of Claim," the 
personal representative said, 'The Court should find that Martha has absolutely no interest in the house sale proceeds that 
make up George Perry's estate, and that she will not have any such interest at her death." Reply Memorandum etc. p. 15. 
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Medicaid spouse is entitled to use the couple's assets for his own support during his lifetime; 
after both are dead and the assets are no longer needed, they are subject to recovery. 
Along this same line, the personal representative quotes a few lines of a 1999 letter to the 
Department she claims stands for the proposition that "once one spouse qualifies for Medicaid, 
any resources belonging to the community spouse are solely the property ofthat spouse and the 
community spouse can do whatever he wants with them." However, when the letter is read in 
context, it becomes clear that the question that was asked was whether the Medicaid spouse 
would suffer an eligibility penalty if her spouse transferred assets without adequate consideration. 
The question was not whether the spouse can do "whatever he wants" with the couple's assets. 
When eligibility is being established, if an applicant has transferred assets without 
adequate consideration within what is known as a "look-back" period, an eligibility penalty is 
imposed: the person cannot be eligible for Medicaid until a certain amount of time has passed 
calculated by how much the applicant has given away. The question asked by Mr. Gere was 
whether the Medicaid spouse, once eligibility has been established, would suffer an eligibility 
penalty if her spouse transfen'ed assets without adequate consideration: 
The transfer of assets from the community spouse to his or her heirs via a will is 
not grounds for invoking a penalty against the institutionalized spouse for 
transferring assets for less than fair market value. 
Respondent's Brief, Appendix 3 (underline added). In concluding, the letter states: 
In the event an institutionalized spouse has already been determined eligible for 
Medicaid, the resources belonging to the community spouse have no impact QI! 
the institutionalized spouse's eligibility, and transferring those resources to 
various heirs via a will likewise does not affect the institutionalized spouse's 
eligibility. 
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Respondent's Brief, Appendix 3 (underline added). Clearly, the language stating the spouse "can 
do whatever he or she wants to with them" refers to not having an effect on the eligibJility of the 
Medicaid spouse. 
Idaho Code § 56-218(2) provides: 
(2) Transfers of real or personal property, on or after the look-back dates 
defined in 42 U.S.C. 1396p, by recipients of such aid, or their spouses, without 
adequate consideration are voidable and may be set aside by an action in the 
district court. 
Idaho Code § 56-218(2) (underline added). This language has been in Idaho Code § 56-218 since 
the original 1988 law. See page 13. Idaho Code § 56-218 is a specific version ofthe more 
general fraudulent transfers act found at Chapter 9 of Title 55. Virtually every state has a similar 
act. Therefore, while it is true that the non-Medicaid spouse can "do whatever he ... wants to" 
with the assets without affecting the Medicaid spouse's eligibility, any transfer without adequate 
consideration is voidable. 
G. The Department's Construction ofIdaho Code § 56-218 Is Entitled to Deference. 
The personal representative may find Idaho Code § 56-218(2) "offensive" just as it does 
the Department's regulations.?7 However, the personal representative cites Kopp v. State, 100 
Idaho 160, 595 P.2d 309 (1979) for the proposition that agency construction is entitled to "great 
weight and will be followed by the courts unless there are cogent reasons for holding otherwise." 
The actual quote is: 
27Respondent's Brief, p. 15.
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The construction given a statute by the executive and administrative 
officers of the State is entitled to great weight and will be followed by the Court 
unless there are cogent reasons for holding otherwise.28 
Kopp, 100 Idaho at 163,595 P.2d at 312. While the personal representative intended this to 
apply to the federal Medicaid agency, it would apply to the same extent to the Department. Kopp 
after all was referring to a state, not federal, agency. 
The Department's rules establish the Department's construction of its law in this area. 
The Department has cited IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20 and .24. Rule 900.20 makes it clear that the 
Department's claim against a spouse's estate extends to all property that had been jointly owned 
or separately owned by the Medicaid spouse after the effective date ofOBRA '93. Rule 900.24 
states: 
24. Marriage Settlement Agreement or Other Such Agreement.
 
A marriage settlement agreement or other such agreement which separates assets
 
for a married couple does not eliminate the debt against the estate of the deceased
 
participant or the spouse. * * *
 
IDAPA 16.03.09.900.24 (underline added). The personal representative deflects the court from 
the important part of this rule by referring to avoidance language in the final s(mtence (omitted 
above). Respondent's Brief., p. 14. However, this rule is important because a marriage 
settlement agreement is a living transfer of assets. This is the agreement in qu,estion in Jackman. 
But it also includes "other such agreement which separates assets for a married couple" which 
would include the Quitclaim Deed in this case. This rule makes it clear that the transfer of an 
28The Department recognizes that this holding in Kopp has been greatly weakened in later cases including J.R. 
Simp/at Co., Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Com 'n, 120 Idaho 849,820 P.2d 1206 (1991). 
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asset from one spouse to the other does not eliminate the Medicaid debt recoverable from the 
estate of either spouse.29 
v. 
THE LAW IN IDAHO IS WHAT IS IMPORTANT IN THIS 
CASE. 
A. The Correct Question Is Whether the Property of this Estate, Even If Martha Transferred 
It, Remains an "Asset" Subject to Estate Recovery. 
The personal representative refers (out of context again) to a colloquy with the Magistrate 
and claims the Department "was unable to answer that question." Respondent' s Brie1~ p. 11. 
The problem was not the Department's response to the Magistrate's question, however, but, with 
respect to the Magistrate, the fact that the Magistrate was asking the wrong qw~stion. The 
Magistrate asked: 
THE COURT:: Get me to - to the place statutorily that the timing includes 
- sort of the time of death is certainly part of the - of the equation because in the 
federal statute and in the state statute 218(4)(B), that's what they're looking at. 
But get me to the part that says - that was transferred, which I'm assuming you're 
arguing means at any time during their marriage and when she was receiving -- I 
mean, would it also include a transfer made before she was receiving any - any 
Medicaid benefits? 
Tr. p. 24, 1. 19 to p. 25. 1. 6 (underline added). The Magistrate was focusing on the question of 
the timing of the transfer (if it took place) between Martha and George. The underlying 
assumption was that if Martha had executed a Quitclaim Deed to George, then the property was 
29The personal representative complains that in citing this rule and Idaho Code § 32-901, the Department is 
raising new issues for the first time on appeal. Respondent's Brief, p. 34. The personal representative is confusing 
"issues" with "authorities." The issue has always been the same one: Whether Martha's property conveyed by George to 
himself is subject to recovery. The Department is merely citing additional authorities relating to this issue. If additional 
authorities could not be cited much of the Respondent's Brief would have to be excluded. 
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no longer an "asset" subject to recovery. This assumption, of course, was wrong and the 
Department attempted to refocus on the Magistrate on the correct question: 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: If! could be a little bit bold, Your Honor. I think 
that-
THE COURT:: Be bold, please. 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: I think that's the wrong question. 
COURT: Okay. 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: I think that the correct question is not was this 
property transferred. The correct question is was this property the property of the 
individual. 
Tr. p. 25, 11. 9-20 (underline added). This is the correct question because, the whole point of the 
definition of assets in 42 U.S"c. § 1396p(h)(l) is that the term assets includes property 
transferred by the Medicaid recipient to the spouse. It wasn't important when the asset was 
transferred (so long as it was after OBRA '93), or even ifit was transferred. The important 
question was whether even after any purported transfer, it is subject to recovery under the 
expanded definition of estate found in 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(4). In this case, it clearly was. 
There are several factors that make this so. The first, of course, is the definition of asset 
found in 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(h)(1) which as been thoroughly discussed. Another is Idaho Code § 
56-218(1) itself, which effectively alters marital property law in Idaho when it comes to the 
property of Medicaid recipients and their spouses. Idaho Code § 56-218(1) sta.tes that: 
... medical assistance ... may be recovered from the individual's estate, and the 
estate of the spouse, if any, for such aid paid to either or both .... 
Idaho Code § 56-218(1). This statute affects both probate and marital property law. The 
legislature is not required to put all statutes affecting probate in the probate code and is not 
required to put all statutes affecting marital property in the marital property law. It can place 
statutes affecting these matters anywhere it likes. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 32 C:\Documents and Settings\cartwriw\Desktop\Appellants Reply Brief.wpd 
000687
 
 
 
The Department attempted to explain this to the court in the lines following those already 
quoted above. At Tr. p. 26, L 4 to p. 28, 1. 1, the Department explained how Idaho Code § 56­
218 can change marital property law by reference to a more obvious example fDund in Idaho 
Code § 56-2l8(4)(b). That s(~ction, which adopts the language found in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) 
states, in part, as follows: 
(4) For purposes ofthis section, the term "estate" shall include: 
* * * 
(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets ... including 
such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign ofthe deceased individual 
through .. .life estate .... 
Idaho Code § 56-218(4). This section modifies the common law in Idaho when it comes to life 
estates. In essence, it says that where a Medicaid recipient transfers real property to a "survivor, 
heir, or assign" and retains a life estate, that life estate interest is not extinguished on death, but 
remains an "asset" of the estate.30 The Department concluded: 
That is the same thing, is the effective date ofthe law says that we've 
modified Idaho's property transfer and marital property law, or the legislature has, 
by Idaho Code section 56-218 to say ifthis person is on Medicaid in the futun~ 
this property remains subject to recovery. 
Tr. p. 27, 11. 20-25 (underline added). 
Because the correct question is, under Idaho law (together with the federal definition of 
assets and expanded definition of estate) is the property in this estate an "assef" subject to 
recovery, the whole tortured "at the time of death" argument become irrelevant. This is not an 
attempt to grab back property transferred away. Rather, this is merely recognizing that under 
30See e.g. State Dept. ofHuman Services v. Willingham, 206 Or.App. 156, 136 P.3d 66 (2006) ("For purposes 
of the recovery of medical assistance paid by the state during the lifetime of the holder of a life estate interest, the life 
estate continues to exist after the death of the person holding the interest"); In re Estate ofLaughead, 696 N.W.2d 312 
(Iowa 2005) (life estate in farm owned by deceased Medicaid recipient was required to be included in the estate for 
purposes of estate recovery). 
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Idaho and federal law, whether transferred or not, the property ofthis estate, like the life estate 
discussed above, is an "asset" of Martha's subject to estate recovery. 
B. Barg Has No Applicability in Idaho. 
The personal representative claims that In Re Estate ofBarg, 752 N.W. 2d 52 (Minn. 
2008) "is on all fours" with this case. In light ofthe fact that it is state law, not federal law, that 
governs what property is subject to estate recovery, this seem highly unlikely. While the 
Minnesota Supreme Court can best interpret Minnesota's probate and marital property laws, 
other states are better at interpreting their own laws as the Idaho Supreme Court has done in 
Jackman. 
As noted in the Appellant's Brief, beginning at page 23, the Barg court did not even 
consider the federal definition of "assets" found in 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(h). The personal 
representative contends otherwise, apparently because the court there used the word "assets." 
However, one can search high and low and find no reference (even oblique) to the definition of 
assets in 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(h). It was simply not raised before the Minnesota Supreme Court. 
Barg isn't even good law in Minnesota any more. 
VI. 
ABSURDITY, INEQUITY AND UNFAIRNESS WOULD 
RESULT FROM THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S 
INTERPRETATION. 
As already mentioned on page 11, above, if the personal representative's argument is 
correct, then those who are single must reimburse Medicaid and can pass no property to their 
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heirs until Medicaid is paid in full, while those with spouses have no obligation to reimburse 
Medicaid and their non-dependent children receive a windfall3l at taxpayer expense. 
Likewise, if a married couple (or perhaps the couple's children) get the advice of an 
attorney, they will not have to reimburse Medicaid, but ifthey are too ignorant or unsophisticated 
to transfer their assets away, their estate will have to pay. 
Again, under the personal representative's argument, where the Medicaid spouse dies 
first, a horne which becomes the sole and separate property of the surviving spouse by operation 
oflaw will be subject to recovery, but on the other hand, if the Medicaid spouse had signed a 
Quitclaim Deed, making the property the non-Medicaid spouse's sole and separate property, a 
moment before death, there can be no recovery. 
CONCLUSION 
The fact that the powt:r of attorney lacked express language allowing George Perry to 
make a gift, especially to himself, of Martha's real property, is sufficient, all alone, to require the 
Magistrate's Order Disallowing Claim should be reversed. Even if the conveyance Wlere valid, 
the Department retains the right to recover the property of this estate as "assets" oftht: estate 
under both state and federal law. 
DATED this 16 day of September, 2010. 
/4~~~~. CgR YCARTWRIGHT 
Depufy Attorney General 
31 lt is not unfair to use this word. If Medicaid had not paid their antecedent's medica] bills, their inheritance 
would have been consumed by those costs. 
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STATE OF MINNESOTA IN DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT COLIAT 
COUNTY OF DOUGLAS DOUGLAS COUNTY SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
_______--El.J...E...aP _ 
Douglas County, AUG 04 2nlO 
Plaintiff, ~urt File No.: 21-CV-09-477 
COUr1Ad~C" 
v. --------=::--­Deputy 
Alexandra Kjerstyn Lindgren and ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
Bruce Dale Lindgren, SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION 
Defendants. 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on May 19,2010 on cross motions for 
Summary Judgment. A hearing was held in front of the Honorable David R. Batu~y at the: 
Douglas County Courthouse, Alexandria, Minnesota. Plaintiff, Douglas County, was 
represented by attorney Megan Burkhammer. Defendant Alexandra Lindgren was represc~nted 
by attorney JoEllen Doebbert. Defendant Bruce Lindgren was present and unrepresented. The 
matter was taken under advisement on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on M~LY 12, 
__.7010._. 
. ..•... __........:.:==..:._.-_._-" _ _ .
 
Based upon the file and records herein, the Court hereby makes the foHowing: 
ORDER 
1. Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED. 
2. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 
3. The attached Memorandum is hereby incorporated by reference, and approved in 
all respects.
 
It is so ORDERED this..ill­if; of~~~:;,..t:=-__, 
Hon. David R. Battey
 
Judge of District Court
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JUDGMENT 
I hereby certify that the foregoing Order constitutes the Judgment of this Court. 
Dated: Au 'K 4_ .2010 
.J'. • ..•• • ~. ... 
Rhonda Bot 
Deputy Court Administrator 
. ..:.----_.._---_ .•_-_.-' ..__ ._---- -._.- --'~_ ... _". - ­
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Douglas County Court Administrator 
By; :mu.o ?$ru..uJ 
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MEMORANDUM 
Plaintiff Douglas County brings this claim against Defendants Alexandra Lindgren and 
Bruce Lindgren, alleging it is entitled to recover the value of certain gifts given to Defendants by 
their mother. The parties agree that this is a legal issue, and for the purpose ofthi:; motion, none 
ofthe facts are disputed. Douglas County moved for partial summary judgment with respect to 
the gifted homestead, alleging that, pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 256B.0595, suM. 
4b(5), Defendants are required to pay a portion of their mother's long-tenn medicill assistlmce, 
originally paid for by Medicaid. Defendants move for summary judgment, claiming that !;ection 
256B.0595, subd. 4b(5) is preempted by federal law. 
Facts 
On December 31, 2003, Dale and Marlys Lindgren ("Mr. Lindgren and Mrs. Lindgren"), 
transferred an undivided one-half interest in their home to their children, Alexandra and B,ruce 
Lindgren ("Defendants"). On March 18, 2004, Mr. and Mrs. Lindgren transferred the rest of 
their interest in the home to Defendants. At the time, the house was valued at $109,000. 
- O~-November "9, 200t~. £~~ ~ ~itted to-ilie-Be~yHoin~,'allumiig------'-- .-­
facility in Alexandria, Minnesota. Alexandra Lindgren then applied for long-term care benefits 
on her mother's behalf beginning in January, 2006. Douglas County approved the applicalion. 
However, because of the uncompensated transfers, Minnesota and Federal law required Mrs. 
Lindgren be subject to a penalty period during which she was ineligible for medical assistance. 
Despite the statutorily-mandated ineligibility period, Bethany Home requested a waiver 
of the penalty period because continued denial of eligibility would lead to undue hardship. Mrs. 
Lindgren's bills were not being paid, and she was facing eviction. Douglas County granted the 
waiver, and at the same time infonned Mrs. Lindgren that the case would be referred to the 
3 
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Douglas County Attorney's office. During the thirty six months following the homestead's
 
transfer, Mrs. Lindgren received $53,893.30 in government-paid medical assistance. EVt:ntually
 
Mrs. Lindgren passed away on October 13,2009, and this action was brought by Douglas
 
County against Defendants, the recipients of the transfer, pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section
 
256B.0595, subd. 4b(5) to recover the $53,893.30.
 
Analysis
 
MINNESOTA STATlITES SECTION 2568.0595, SUBD. 4b(5) IS PREEMEPTEJ)I, AND
 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS APPROPRIATE
 
A. Summary Judgment Standard 
"Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence, viewed in the light most filvorable
 
to the nonmoving party, shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving
 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Stringer v. Minnesota Vikings Football Club.
 
UC, 705 N.W.2d 746, 753 (Minn. 2005) (citing Minn. R Civ. P. 56.03). A court is to e~:amine
 
all "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,--and-admissions on-£Je;together with the
 
.	 Jlffi.fl.av:i.~:.inji~sjnE:Q.MJI!Q1~9nfC?r SUnmlMY:J~g!p~~t.. Mj~. R. qy';l;'.5~.Q3.Suror.!~_ . 
judgment should be granted only when it is clear no fact issue remains, and it wO\l~d be 
unnecessary to inquire further into the facts. Larson v. Independent School Dist. No. 314. 
Braham, 252 N.W.2d 128, 130 (Minn. 1977). 
For the purpose of these Motions, the only issue this Court must decide is whether
 
Minnesota's statutorily-created claim being asserted against Defendants is preempted by 11ederal
 
law. If that provision is not preempted, then it is clear that Defendants are liable. If the
 
provision is preempted, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment.
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B.	 Minnesota's Statutory Cause Of Action Against Transferees Under MiDlJtsota 
Statutes Section 256B.0595, 5ubd. 4b(5) Directly Conflicts With Federall,aw 
And Is Preempted 
Medical assistance, better known as Medicaid, is an "enonnously complic.ated" program. 
Stephenson \I. 8halala, 87 FJd 350, 356 (9th Cir. 1996). To properly role on the!.e Motions, it is 
essential to understand the relevant statutory framework governing Medicaid. In 1965, (;ongress 
enacted Medicaid as a part of the Social Security Act. In re Estate ofBarg, 752 N.W.2d 52, 58 
(Minn. 2008). The program is jointly funded with the stateS.- Id. To receive-fundin-g;astate 
must create a medical assistance plan by enacting legislation and rules governing Medicaiid 
within the state, and submit that plan to the United States Secretary of Health and Human 
Services. Jd. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396). Each state administers its own plan, however those 
plans must comply with the Federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a). Relevant to this elise is section 
1396a(18), which requires that states "comply with the provisions of section 1396p of this title 
with respect to liens, adj ustments and recoveries ofmedical assistance correctly paid." 
(emphasis added). 
-. 'i~~M~e-;~ia: metUc-;l assi~tmce f~~ ~-~edype;S~~is'gov~~ by-ChaptCr256B. 
Eligibility for medical assistance is governed. by Minnesota Statutes sections 256B.055­
256B.057. When a person be.lieves that she is eligible under one of these sections" she may 
apply for assistance. Even if someone is otherwise eligible, that person may be deemed 
ineligible if she transferred property for less than fair market value within seventy-two months 
prior to the application. Minn. Stat. § 256B.0595. The person is deemed to be ineligible ior an 
amount oftime based on the amount of the uncompensated transfer. ld. subd. 2(b). Despite this 
penalty period, the determining agency must waive that penalty period if not doing so would 
cause undue hardship. [d. at subd. 4b(5). When the penalty is waived, a cause of IIlction arises 
5
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against the transferee for any amount ofmedical assistance paid within seventy-h~o months from 
the date of application for assistance, or for the uncompensated amount, whichevc:r is less. [d. 
Defendant asserts that 42 U.S.C. § 1396p preempts Minnesota Statutes se(:tion 
256B.0595. To make this detennination, the Court must look at the language of those sec:tions. 
Federal Law - 42 U.S.C. § 1396p 
Section 1396p addresses, among other things, a state's ability to recoup correctly paid 
medical assistance. Specifically, subdivision (b)(I) states: 
''No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of 
an individual under the State plan may be made, except that the State shall seek 
adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an 
individual under the State plan in the case of the following individuals: 
(A) [Inapplicable exception]. 
(B) [Inapplicable exception]. 
(C) [Inapplicable exception]!' 
Minnesota Law - Minn. Stat § 2S6B.0595, subd. 4b(5) 
Minnesota Statutes section 256B.0595 governs prohibitions on and penalti1cs for 
also enumerates exceptions to this prohibition. Subdivision 4b(5) is one of those c:xceptio:ns. It 
states: 
"[A person or a person's spouse who made a transfer prohibited by subdivision Ib 
is not ineligible for medical assistance services if] the local agency determines 
that denial of eligibility for medical assistance services would cause undue 
hardship and grants a waiver of a penalty resulting from a transfer for less 
than fair market value because there exists an imminent threat to· the 
individual's health and well-being... When a waiver is granted. a ceruse of 
action exists against the person to whom the assets were transferred/or that 
portion ofmedical assistance services granted within 72 months of tlae date 
the transferor applied for medical assistance and satisfied all other 
requirements for eligibility, or the amount of the uncompensated trlans!er, 
whichever is less, together with the costs incurred due to the action. The 
action shall be brought by the state unless the state delegates this 
6 
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responsibility to the local agency responsible for providing medical 
assistance under this chapter." (emphasis added). 
Pr~emption Standard 
Defendants allege that Federal law, specifically 42 U.S.c. § 1396p, preempts 
Minnesota's statutory cause of action set forth in Minnesota Statutes section 256B.0595, subd. 
4b(5). The preemption doctrine is rooted in the Supremacy Clause of the United States 
Constitution], and invalidates any state law contradicting or interfering with an Act of Congress. 
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504,516 (1992) ("state law that conflictswith federal law 
is 'without effect. n') (citation omitted). Congressional intent is the basis by which the Court 
determines whether a state law is preempted. Gade v. Nat 'I Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass 'n, 505 U.S. 
88, 96 (1992). Preemption is generaJly disfavored, unless the Congress clearly intended it. 
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516. 
There are three main categories of preemption: (1) express preemption, which occms 
when Congress specifically states its intent to preempt in the text of the Federalla.w; (2) field 
the field" in that area of law; and (3) conflict preemption, which applies when state and fe:deral 
law directly conflict, making it impossible to comply with the requirements ofboth. Engl'ish v. 
General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 92, 98-99 (1990). A preemption analysis requires an examination of 
Congressional intent, using both the text and purpose of the statute. Medtronic, /r.!c. 'V. La"", 518 
U.S. 470,484-5 (1996). Defendants argue that the conflict preemption doctrine applies, and 
preempts Minnesota's statutory cause of action in section 256B.0595, subd. 4b(5). 
The language of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1) is clear. It directs that states shall not Te<;over 
correctly-paid medical assistance unless recovery would fall under one of the three: listed 
] The "Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pur:suance 
thereof...shalJ be the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2. 
7 
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exceptions. Id. ("No adjustment or recovery ofany medical assistance correctly paid on behalf 
of an individual under the State plan may be made...n) (emphasis added). There is no dispute 
that Minnesota's statutory cause of action against a transferee who received prop~~rty from a 
medical assistance recipient does not faJl within one of the exceptions listed in sel;tion 
1396P(b)(1). Thus, bringing an action against a transferee under Minnesota's section 
256B.0595, subd. 4b(5) conflicts with the Federal mandate prohibiting recovery under th~~ State 
plan for correctly-paid medic:a1 assistance. Even in light of the presumption against preemption, 
this Court fails to see how bringing a cause ofaction-pursuantto·section256B.0595,-subd. 4b(5) 
would not violate 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l). Minnesota's statutory cause of action under section 
256B.0595, subd. 4b(5) is preempted by 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b). 
The County argues that "section 256.0595 does not conflict with and is not preempted by 
the federal estate recovery laws embodied in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p because Minnesota Statutes 
section 256.059~ has nothing whatsoever to with estate recovery." Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Sum. J. 8. 
This statement, however, misinterprets section 1396p. Section 1396p does not simply apply to 
r~~~~rin~~-fr;;:;~di~d~F~··~;t~t~,·id;a'.:sa· ~~~s "~tt~~ptt~ recover Q,;y ~ed[car~~istmCe 
correctly paid. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(bXI) ("No adjustment or recovery ofany medical 
assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan may be made...") 
(emphasis added). This prefatory language is not qualified or limited. and it applic~s to any 
attempt by a state to recover correctly-paid medical assistance. 
When bringing a cause of action under section 256B.OS95. subd. 4b(S). it i!; impos!lible to 
comply with 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b). and the conflict preemption doctrine requires this Cowt find 
the cause of action created by section 256B.0595, subd. 4b(S) preempted. 
8
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Legislative Inunt and Policy 
The County argues that legislative intent and public policy dictate a fmding that the cause 
of action created by section 2568.0595 subd. 4b(5) not be preempted. For this proposition, the 
County cites a portion of the House Report for the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act OIf 1988 
("MCCA"), which states, "in the view of the Committee, Medicaid-an entitlement prognlIn for 
the poor-should not facilitate the transfer of accumulated wealth from nursing home patients to 
their non-dependent children." H.R. Rep. No. 100-105, at 73 (1988), reprinted in 1988 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 857,896. While this quote is on-point, it must be taken in context. The relevant 
portion of the MCCA was added to the bill because a number of states were not eiIectively 
utilizing the ineligibility period for medical assistance recipients who transferred J)1'operty for 
less than market value. Id. lbus, the MCCA created a mandatory ineligibility period for Ithose 
people who disposed of assets for less than fair market value. 
The County is correct; Congress was in fact concerned that people would transfer nssets 
for less than fair market value. However it addressed the issue by requiring a period of 
ineligibili~ f~;tho~~~odi;r it eiici n~t:k;;~'~j;~tli~~~sibilitY i~~'~tes w~~te sepilra~' . 
claims against third parties for medical assistance correctly paid. The Court acknowledge!> that. 
from a policy standpoint, preempting Minnesota's cause of action against transferees coulcllead 
to individuals transferring large amoWlts of assets to non-dependent children in hopes of 
receiving publicly-funded assistance; however, it is clear Congress considered this, and added 
the ineligibility period to combat this potential problem. 
For those reasons, the Court finds that 42 U.S.C. section 1396p(b) preempts Minne~;ota 
Statutes section 2568.0595, subd. 4b(5). Because section 256B.0595, subd. 4b(5) iis preempted, 
summary judgment is granted in favor of the Defendants. 
9 
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State of Minnesota 
Douglas County 
JOELLEN PFEIFLE DOEBBERT 
1022 BROADWAY 
POBOX 1175 
ALEXANDRIA MN 56308 
District Court 
Seventh Judicial District 
Court File Number: 21-CV-09-477! 
Case Type: Civil OtherlMisc. 
Notil~e of Entry of
 
Jfudgment
 
In Re: DOUGLAS COUNTY \IS Alexandra Kjentyn L1Ddgren-,--Bru~e-Dale 
Lindgren 
You are notifie~ that judgment was entered on August 04,2010. 
Dated: August 4,2010 
Court Administrator 
B . ......l.-L\~~~.,JIw&.A..y 
Deputy Court Administrator 
Douglas County District Court 
305 8th Avenue W 
Alexandria MN 56308 
320-762-3033 
cc: MEGAN ELIZABETH BURKHAMMER 
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the last knoWn address'of-~a¢h, pursuant to Minnesota Rules of Civil Pro(:edure, Rule 
77.04. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
IN THE MATIER OF: 
GEORGE D. PERRY, Case No. CV-IE-0905214 
Deceased. MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
This case is before the court on a motion for attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117. 
For the reasons that follow, the motion will be denied. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This is an appeal from a magistrate's order denying the Idaho Department of Health and 
Welfare's (the Department's) claim for Medicaid reimbursement from the estate of George D. PelTY. 
Barbara McCormick (McCormick) is the personal representative of the estate. After filing the 
appeal, the Department sought a stay of disbursement or distribution of any estate funds pending the 
outcome of the appeal. The personal representative did not oppose the stay, except to the extent that 
such a stay would prohibit payment of her attorney fees in defending the appeal. The Court 
ultimately granted the stay except for payment of McCormick's counsel's fees. McCormick then 
filed the pending request for attorney fees and costs incurred in relation to the Department's motion 
to stay, pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 1 
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ANALYSIS 
Idaho Code § 12-117 provides in relevant part: 
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative proceeding or 
civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency or political 
subdivision and a person, the state agency or political subdivision or the court, as 
the case may be, shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, 
witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party 
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
(2) If a party to an administrative proceeding or to a civil judicial proceeding 
prevails on a portion of the case, and the state agency or political subdivision or 
the court, as the case may be, finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law with respect to that portion of the case, it shall 
award the partially prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and 
other reasonable expenses with respect to that portion of the case on which it 
prevailed. 
This Court is not convinced that Idaho Code § 12-117 is applicable to a motion during the 
course of an appeal (or any other civil action.) While subsection (2) of the statute addresses an award 
to a party who prevails on a portion of the case, it appears that the language is designed to allow a 
court to apportion attorney fees after the outcome of the case, not at each event or decision within the 
case. This is intended to be similar to the language in Rule 54(d)(1)(B) regarding detc:nnination of th 
prevailing party and apportionment of costs. For these reasons, the Court denies the motion for costs 
and fees at this time, without prejudice to renewing it at the conclusion of the appeal. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this 11v~ day of October 2010. 
Kathryn . Sticklen 
District Judge 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, J. David Navarro, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I havemailed.by 
United States Mail, one copy of the MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER as notice 
pursuant to Rule 77(d) LR.C.P. to each of the attorneys of record in this cause in envelopes 
addressed as follows: 
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT
 
IDAHO ATIORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
 
PO BOX 83720
 
BOISE, ID 83720-0036
 
PETER C. SISSON
 
SISSON & SISSON, THE ELDER LAW FIRM, PLLC
 
2402 W JEFFERSON ST
 
BOISE, ID 83702
 
HON. MAGISTRATE CHRISTOPHER BIETER 
VIA: INTERDEPARTNIENTAL MAIL 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
Ada County, daho 
Date: _10(13[( 0 
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A.M. _ 
I~AR 16 2011 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIST~t4~IS,fePHER D. RICH, rk 
By NICOL TYLER 
DEPUTVTHE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: Case No. CV-IE-2009-05214 
GEORGE D. PERRY, MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
Deceased. 
Currently before the Court is an appeal from the March 10, 2005, order of the Honorable 
Christopher M. Bieter, dismissing the State's Medicaid reimbursement claim in probate 
proceedings. For the reasons stated below, the opinion of the magistrate will be affirmed. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
George D. Perry ("George") died February 25, 2009. His late wife, Martha J. Perry 
("Martha" or "recipient"), was the owner, as her sole and separate property, of certain real 
property in Ada County prior to her marriage to George. On November 18, 2002, well into the 
couple's marriage, Martha executed a quitclaim deed on the real property, with the grantor 
named as "Martha Jean Boyle" (her prior name) and the grantee as "Martha Jean Perry & 
George Donald Perry." Several years later, with Martha's health declining, George and Martha 
needed assistance in paying for Martha's medical care. To qualify for government assistance 
with medical costs, the couple and Martha, individually, could not exceed certain maximum asset 
criteria. On or about July 31, 2006, George made the transfer now in dispute, assigning 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 1 
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Martha's remaining interest in the real property to himself alone, by signing a quitclaim deed on 
behalf of Martha pursuant to a power of attorney. 
A few months later, on or about September 15, 2006, George and Martha applied to the 
Department of Health and Welfare for medical assistance to help pay for Martha's medical care. 
Since October 1, 2006, Martha has been a recipient of medical payments. The Department 
provided payments for Martha's medical care through the Medicaid program in the sum of at 
least $108,364.23. 
Although it was Martha's health which was in decline, George predeceased Martha. 
After George passed away, the Appellant, Human Services Division of the State Attorney General, 
(the State) sought funds from his estate, specifically from the sale of the property, as reimbursement 
for taxpayer funds previously expended on his wife's behalf. The magistrate denied this request, 
holding that because Martha had conveyed her interests in the property during her lifetime, she had 
no interest in the property from which the State could seek reimbursement. The Attorney General 
subsequently filed this appeal. Martha, the recipient, died while this appeal was pending. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A.	 Whether the magistrate erred in determining that the general power of attorney held 
by George Perry gave him authority to make a gift to himself of Martha Perry's real 
property. 
B.	 Whether the magistrate erred in its application and interpretation ofIdaho Code § 56­
218, in refusing to allow the State's claim against the estate of George Perry. 
c.	 Whether the magistrate erred in its application and interpretation of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396p as preempting application ofIdaho Code § 56-218. 
D.	 Whether the magistrate erred in failing to apply the Idaho Supreme Court holding 
in Idaho Depanment ofHealth and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 
6 (1998) to the facts ofthis case. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 2
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E. Whether the State is entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When a district judge considers an appeal from a magistrate judge, the district judge is acting 
as an appellate court, not as a trial court. State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 826 P.2d 1306, 1308 
(1992); IRCP 83(u)(1). Accordingly, the standards of review are the same as those applied by the 
Idaho Supreme Court or Court of Appeals in a regular appeal: the district court upholds the lower 
court's factual findings if based on substantial and competent, though connicting, evidence; and 
affirms conclusions of law which demonstrate proper application of legal principJles to the facts 
found. Hentges v. Hentges, 115 Idaho 192, 194,765 P.2d 1094 (Cl. App. 1988). Interpretation of 
an instrument, such as the power of attorney, is a question of law. Chavez v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 
212,192 P.3d 1036 (2008) 
Where issues on appeal involve questions of law, a reviewing court exercises free review. 
Clements Farms, Inc. v. Ben Fish & Son, 120 Idaho 185,814 P.2d 917 (1991). An issue involving 
statutory construction and interpretation is a question of law, which is reviewed de novo. State 
Dept. ofHealth and Welfare v. Housel, 140 Idaho 96,100,102,90 P.3d 321,325,327 (S. Cl. 2004). 
ANALYSIS 
I. Power of Attorney and Transfer of Property 
The parties agree that the transfer of Martha's interest in the property to George was not 
performed by Martha, but by George acting pursuant to a power of attorney from Martha. The 
State argues that the magistrate erred in its determination that George had the authority and valid 
power of attorney to transfer Martha's interest in the property to himself. The State argues that 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 3 
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George could only make a valid transfer with an express power of attorney, which specifically 
granted him the authority to make gifts of Martha's property on her behalf. It argues that the 
magistrate failed to make any requisite factual inquiry regarding whether Martha consented to the 
transfer by interspousal agency or any other form of consent. 
Although not addressed in detail in the magistrate's written opinion, at the hearing this issue 
was addressed and decided by the magistrate. The magistrate made a factual and legal 
determination regarding the extent of the authority granted to George, and [<Jund that although the 
gifting language in paragraph H was not the "clearest kind of authority," "[i]t certainly can be read 
that way"; and considering "all of the language in that power of attorney"', "the document was 
entitled to give George Pen)' as broad of authority as possible, .. including the right to deal with 
interest in real property." 
Idaho Code § 32-912 prohibits either spouse, individually, from conveying the community 
estate, unless by use of an "express power of attorney." 
As cited by the parties, the opening statement of the power of attorney, which declares in all 
capital letters that "powers granted by this document are broad and sweeping." A subsequent 
section states: 
(H) Estate, tmst, and other beneficiary transactions. To accept, receipt for, 
exercise, release, reject, renounce, assign, disclaim, demand, sue for, claim 
and recover any legacy, bequest, devise, gift or other property interest or 
payment due or payable to or for the principal; assert any interest in and 
exercise any power over any trust, estate or property subject to fiduciary 
control; establish a revocable trust solely for the benefit of the principal 
that terminates at the death of the principal and is then distributable to the 
legal representative of the estate of the principal; and, in general, exercise 
all powers with respect to estates and trusts which the principal could 
exercise if present and under no disability; provided, however, thaI: the 
Agent may not make or change a will and may not revoke or amend a trust 
revocable or amendable by the principal or require the trustee of any trust 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 4
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for the benefit of the principal to pay income or principal to the Agent 
unless specific authority to that end is given. (emphasis added) 
The Court agrees with the State that the language relied upon by the personal representative 
in Paragraph H is attenuated, and appears to refer to the agent's ability to act with regards to 
additional property that the principal may obtain. However, Paragraph A of the power of attorney 
allowed George to convey Martha's interests in real property as he deemed proper. The power of 
attorney was executed in 2005 prior to the enactment of the current Uniform Power of Attorney Act, 
Idaho Code § 5-12-101 et seq, in 2008. The present act requires express authority to make gifts, but 
it is not applicable here. No authority has been cited requiring such language prior to the adoption 
of the act. Based on the record before it, this Court affirms the interpretation by the magistrate. 
II. Statutory Interpretation and Preemption 
This appeal also involves a question of statutory interpretation. A statute must be construed
 
as a whole, taking the literal words of the statute, which words must be given their plain, usual, and
 
ordinary meaning. Thomson v. City ofLewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 50 P.3d 488 (2002); State v. Hart,
 
135 Idaho 827, 25 l' .3d 850 (2001). If a statute is not ambiguous, the court does not construe it, but
 
simply applies the ordinary meaning. Hansen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 663, 735
 
l' .2d 974 (1987). Unless the result is palpably absurd, or legislative intent is dearly to the contrary,
 
a court must assume that the legislature means what is clearly stated in the statute. Miller v. State,
 
110 Idaho 298, 715 P.2d 968 (1986); Garza v. State, 139 Idaho 533, 82 1'.3d 445 (2003).
 
Both parties agree that the Medicaid program is a jointly funded and "cooperative endeavor
 
in which the Federal Government provides financial assistance to participating States to aid them in
 
furnishing health care to needy persons." Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308, 100 S.Ct. 2671, 65
 
L.Ed.2d 784 (1980). Thus, participating states enact legislation and rules, incorporate them into
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state medical assistance plans, and submit those plans to the US. Secretary of Health and Human 
Services ("HHS") for approval. 42 US.C. § 1396a(a)-(b) (2000 & Supp. III 2003). 
At issue in this case are those provisions dealing with the ability of the State to recover costs 
of medical care from the estate of the recipient and the recipient's spouse. The State argues that the 
state and federal provisions allow it to recover costs from the estate of the recipient and the 
recipient's spouse if those assets were once part of the recipient's estate and were transferred from 
the recipient to the recipient's spouse. In other words, the State argues that I.e. § 56-218(1) allows 
recovery from the estate of a recipient's spouse, including any "assets" within the definition of 
"estate" under 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4). The definition of "assets" includes property transferred to 
one's spouse prior to death under 42 US.e. 1396p(h)(1). 
The personal representative argues that the magistrate's position is correct. The magistrate 
held that the State's ability to recover costs is limited to those "assets" which were transferred to the 
recipient's spouse at the time of death by operation of law. Because the recipient transferred her 
property prior to her death, and because that transfer was not of the same nature considered in the 
statutes allowing state cost recovery, the magistrate disallowed the State's claim. 
A. Interpretation, Construction, and Application of 42 U.S.c. § 13961~(b)(4) 
Title 42 of the United States Code, Section 1396p is entitled "Liens, adjustments and 
recoveries, and transfers of assets." Subsection (b) addresses "[a]djustment or recovery of medical 
assistance correctly paid under a State plan" and requires "the State shall seek adjustment or 
recovery from the [receiving] individual's estate" under certain circumstances. 42 US.C. § 
1396p(b)(1)(A),(C)(i). Subsequent sections further define what is meant by an individual's "estate," 
and define which forms of property are subject either to mandatory or discretionary recovery by a 
state. Those provisions state: 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 6 
000710
 
61,( )( )
, 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
1 ,­.) 
16 
17 
113 
19 
20 
21 
2" 
23 
24 
26 
...... 
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate", with respect to a 
deceased individual-­
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included 
within the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; 
and 
(B) may include, at the option of the State (and shall include, in the case of 
an individual to whom paragraph (l)(C)(i) applies), any other real and 
personal property and other assets in which the individual had any legal 
title or interest at the time of death (to the extent of such interest), 
including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the 
deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, 
survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement. 
The State disputes the magistrate and personal representative's interpretation, which places 
emphasis on the phrases limiting the property and assets ofthe recipient ofbenefits held "at the time 
of death." The magistrate found that this definition of "estate" did not permit a state agency to look 
back and recover property interests that the recipient divested prior to death. This Court agrees. 
The language and definition of "estate" is broad, and includes all interests, including any which may 
have automatically transferred upon the death of the recipient. However, it goes without saying that 
where a recipient has long ago been divested of any particular interest, it would not fall within that 
individual's estate. Moreover, nothing in this provision seeks to preserve interests that were 
divested well before death, something which the drafters were clearly able to articulate in those 
provisions dealing with Medicaid eligibility requirements. 
Indeed, when addressing the eligibility requirements for assistance, under § 1.396p(c)(l)(A), 
the drafters made those who transfer property "for less than fair market value" ineligible for 
assistance. The State argues that it would be absurd to prohibit the recipient and/or recipient's 
spouse from disposing of assets below market value in eligibility determinations, while allowing 
assets to be transferred at no cost post-eligibility for purposes of avoiding reimbursement or 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 7 
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recovery payments in probate. However, § 1396p(c)(l)(A) deals specifically with eligibility, not 
recovery. Had the drafters sought to include this same provision in the area of probate and recovery 
matters, they easily could have made such distinction. The Court notes, however, that even in the 
context of eligibility, "[a]n individual shall not be ineligible for medical assistance ... to the extent 
that (A) the assets transferred were a home and title to the home was transferred to (;l) the spouse of 
such individual[.]" 42 U.S.C. 1396p(c)(2). Thus, even in the stricter setting of eligibility 
detenninations, the drafters recognized and pennitted the transfer of a recipient's interest in the 
home to that recipient's spouse. In addition, the drafters were clearly able to artiiculate specific 
instances and circumstances where look-back dates should be used to counteract suspect transfers of 
property. 
Finally, for reasons which will become apparent later, the Court notes that: provision (B) 
allows the state latitude in applying this expanded definition of "estate," except "in the case of an 
individual to whom paragraph (l)(C)(i) applies[.]" Paragraph (l)(C)(i) addresses "[a]djustment or 
recovery of medical assistance", mandating state recovery of medical assistance where benefits were 
paid to any individual of 55 years of age or older when the medical assistance was received. 
However, that clause and related provisions limit recovery to certain fonns of medical assistance, 
including long-tenn care services and nursing facility services. Id. In this scenario, which appears 
to be the circumstance in this case, the state is required to include this expanded version of "assets." 
B. Interpretation, Construction, and Application of 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(h) 
The State also disputes the magistrate's interpretation of the definitions under § 1396p(h), 
particularly as applied to § 1396p(b)(4). That provision states: 
(h) Definitions[:] In this section, the following definitions shall apply: 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 8
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(1) The term "assets", with respect to an individual, includes all income 
and resources of the individual and of the individual's spouse, including 
any income or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse 
is entitled to but does not receive because of action-­
(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse, 
The State argues that "assets" includes the property which originally belonged to the 
recipient, but of which she was divested due to the action of her spouse, even it he was acting as her 
agent at the time. The Court has several problems with this interpretation. 
First of all, "assets" as described in this definition include "income or resources." The Court 
notes that real property, while it might be described as an "asset" or "resource," is much more 
clearly described as "real property." The drafters of this section were likely aware of this, as they 
had previously used the phrase "real property" in mUltiple sections, including § 1396p(b)(4)(A),(B), 
above. 
More importantly, the definition of "resources" as listed in 1396p(h)(5), "has the meaning 
given such term in section 1382b[.]" Thus, the definition of "resources," specifically excludes "the 
home (including the land that appertains thereto)." 42 U.S.C. 1382b(a)(1). Accordingly, where 
"resources" as contained in this section (1396p(h)) specifically excludes the home, the Court finds it 
necessarily excludes it from the definition of "assets" as well. Thus, even with this expanded 
definition of "assets" applied to § 1396p(b)(4)(A),(B), the Court finds it fails to expand that 
recovery provision to include real property owned by a recipient prior to death. 
C. Interpretation, Construction, and Application of I.C. § 56-218. 
Idaho Code § 56-218(1) is entitled "Recovery of certain medical assistance" and states: 
Except where exempted or waived in accordance with federal law medical 
assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an individual who was 
fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the individual received such 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 9
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assistance may be recovered from the individual's estate, and the estate of 
the spouse, if any, for such aid paid to either or both: 
The State argues this language clearly includes the option ofrecovery from "the estate of the 
spouse" and does not limit the "estate of the spouse" to property in which the recipient had an 
interest at the time of death. The Court recognizes and agrees that this departure from the language 
of the federal provisions indicates a more aggressive policy adopted by this state to recover costs 
from the estate of the recipient's spouse. 
As far as I.C § 56-218 is concerned, the Court agrees with the State that this section clearly 
indicates an intent to recover medical costs from the estate of the spouse of a recipient However, 
several concerns remain regarding whether this provision, standing alone, allows the state to look 
back to any period beyond those transfers effectuated at death. 
First of all, the subsequent provisions of §56-218 further define and limit what is meant by 
"estate." Subsection (4)(a)-(b) ofI.C. § 56-218, states "the term "estate" shall include:" 
(a) All real and personal property and other assets included within the 
individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probate law; and 
(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in which the 
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death, to the extent 
of such interest, including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or 
assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in 
common, survivorship, life estate, living trust or other arrangement 
Id. This language should look familiar, because it is, almost without exception, the same language 
used in the federal code, 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(A), (B). The personal representative argues that 
because I.C §56-218(4)(a)-(b) mirrors the language of the federal statute, it should be interpreted 
accordingly. As discussed above, this language taken in the context of the federal statute clearly 
limits the recovery-eligible estate of the recipient's spouse to property transferred at or around the 
time of death. Thus, the "assistance [which] may be recovered from the ... estate of the spouse" 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 10 
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appears to be limited accordingly. However, when taken in the context of the Idaho Code section, 
and the broader language targeting recovery costs from the estate of the recipient's spouse, the 
ability to recover from a spouse appears to be expanded. In I.C. § 56-218(1), it refers to the 
recipient as the "individual," and the spouse as the "spouse." The language of § 56-218(4)(a),(b) 
refers only to the "individual's estate" or the estate of the recipient. It contains no reference or 
limitation on the estate of the spouse. 
The State's interpretation of these provisions, and the intent to reach the assets of a Medicaid 
recipient's spouse is further supported and explained by the internal rules and regulations of the 
Department. IDAPA 16.03.09.900 is entitled Liens and Estate Recovery, and '''sets forth the 
provisions for recovery of medical assistance," among other things. IDAPA 16.03.09.905.01, states 
in relevant part: 
A claim against the estate of a spouse of a participant is limited to the 
value of the assets of the estate that had been, at any time after October 1, 
1993, community property, or the deceased participant's share of the 
separate property, and jointly owned property. 
Id. The plain language of this section does not restrict the language of I.C. § 56-218, which allows
 
the Department broad authority to seek recovery against the "estate of the spouse." I.e. § 56­
218(1). A subsequent provision, IDAPA 16.03.09.905.05 states:
 
A marriage settlement agreement or other such agreement which separates 
assets for a married couple does not eliminate the debt against the estate of 
the deceased participant or the spouse. Transfers under a marriage 
settlement agreement or other such agreement may be voided if not for 
adequate consideration. 
Id. 
Taking into account the broad language of I.C. § 56-218, in addition to the specific 
provisions in the Idaho Administrative Rules (which have the same force and effect of law per 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 11
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Mallonee v. State, 139 Idaho 615, 619, 84 P.3d 551,555 (2004)), it is clear that Idaho law permits
 
recovery from the estate of the recipient spouse, limited only by the broad interpretation of "estate"
 
of I.e. § 56-218(4)(a)-(b) and time and community property restraints of IDAPA 16.03.09.905.01.
 
Thus, the clear and plain language of Idaho law (without considering the federal provisions and
 
effect they have) would allow the State to recover from the estate of the spouse, so long as the
 
property sought was community property held by the participant after October 1, 1993, which was
 
the case here.
 
E. Preemption Doctrine 
This Court has found that the plain meaning of the Idaho and federal Medicaid provisions 
differ, in that the Idaho provisions clearly and unambiguously broaden the ability of the State to 
recover from separate assets of the recipient's spouse beyond those assets in which the recipient had 
an interest at the time of death. This juxtaposition requires a discussion regarding the validity of the 
Idaho regulations in light of the doctrine of preemption. 
The basis for the doctrine of preemption is found in Article VI, cl. :2 of the United States
 
Constitution, which states that the laws of the United States "shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
 
... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding."
 
Consequently, the United States Supreme Court has established that a state law that conflicts with
 
federal law is "without effect." Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516, Il2 S.Ct. 2608,
 
2617, 120 L.Ed.2d 407, 422-23 (1992); M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.(4 Wheat) 316, 427, 4 L.Ed.
 
579,606 (1819); Lewis v. State, Dept. ofTransp., 143 Idaho 418,146 P.3d 684 (Ct. App. 2006).
 
Congressional purpose is " 'the ultimate touchstone' " of the preemption inquiry. Malone v.
 
White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504,98 S.Ct. 1185,55 L.Ed.2d 443 (1978) (quoting Retail Clerks
 
Int'l Ass'n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96,103,84 S.Ct. 219, 11 L.Ed.2d 179 (1963)).
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This Court's primary focus in the analysis must be to ascertain the intent of Congress. See Cal. Fed.
 
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra. 479 U.S. 272, 280-81, 107 S.Ct. 683, 93 L.Ed.2d 613 (1987). The
 
United States Supreme Court has explained that "[c]onsideration of issues arising under the
 
Supremacy Clause 'start[s] with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are]
 
not to be superseded by Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.'"
 
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,505 U.S. 504, 516, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407
 
(1992) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230,67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447
 
(1947)). Thus, preemption is generally disfavored. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516, 518, 112 S.Ct.
 
2608).
 
Federal law may preempt state law in two ways, either expressly or impliedly. Boundary
 
Backpackers v. Boundary County, 128 Idaho 371, 375, 913 P.2d 1141, 1145 (1996). Express
 
preemption occurs where Congress exhibits intent to occupy a given field of law. Lewis v. State,
 
Dept. of Transp., supra. Where such intent is shown, then any state law encroaching into that field
 
is preempted. !d. In this instance congress clearly did not intend to occupy the entire field of
 
Medicaid law. Rather, the intent appears to be to the contrary, as the laws in this area are full of
 
provisions which encourage the States to enact legislation and rules, and incorporate them into their
 
overall medical assistance plans. See inter alia 42 U.S.c. § 1396a(a)-(b). Nevertheless, many of
 
the sections contained in the federal code require that the states must "comply with the provisions of
 
the federal code, particularly with respect to liens and other recovery for assistance paid. 42 U.S.C.
 
§ 1396p; 42 U.S.c. § 1396a(a)(18).
 
Thus, where congress has not expressed the intent to occupy a given field of law, state law 
may still run afoul of the preemption doctrine to the extent the state law conflicts with federal law. 
Lewis v. State, Dept. of Transp., supra. This is called "conflict preemption" and requires that state 
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law is preempted to the extent it conflicts with the federal law. !d. However, conflict preemption is
 
only found where compliance with both state and federal laws is impossible (Fla. Lime Avocado
 
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963)), or when the
 
state law is "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
 
Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941).
 
In Stafford v. Idaho Dept. ofHealth & Welfare, 145 Idaho 530, 534, 181 P.3d 456, 460 (S.
 
Ct. 2008), the court conducted a review of the Idaho rules regarding Medicaid, in particular the rules
 
involved with Medicaid qualification. While that court noted the need for the State to promulgate
 
rules, it also found that "both the federal government and state government expect federal law to
 
predominate" in that regard. !d. at 460, 534.
 
In the case of In re Estate ofBarg, 752 N.W.2d 52, 64 (Minn. 2008)" the court specifically
 
dealt with a conflict involving the federal statutes at issue in this case. As that court noted, the
 
federal statute regarding recovery contains specific language limiting the field of available recovery.
 
Id. Title 42 of the United States Code, Section 1396p is entitled "Liens, adjustments and recoveries,
 
and transfers of assets." Subsection (b) addresses "[a]djustment or recovery of medical assistance 
correctly paid under a State plan." Parenthesis (1) begins the subsection with the broad rule 
prohibiting recovery in general, and then requiring the State seek recovery in certain circumstances. 
That provision states: 
No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on 
behalf of an individual under the State plan may be made, except that the 
State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly 
paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the case of the 
following individuals: 
42 U.S.c. 1396p(b)(1). Thus, the federal government has outlined a general mle prohibiting 
recovery. As such, Congress has indicated its object and desire to prevent recovery in all but a 
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limited number of circumstances. It follows then, that if these circumstances are expanded by a 
particular state law, the state law becomes an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the 
full purposes and objectives of Congress to limit recovery, and is thereby preempted. 
Subsection (B) explains the required recovery exception against the estate of the recipient 
individual who was 55 years of age or older when assistance was received, but further limits 
recovery to care costs at nursing facilities, home and community. For convenience" that provision 
states: 
In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when the 
individual received such medical assistance, the State shall seek 
adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate, but only for medical 
assistance consisting of-­
(i) nursing facility services, home and community-based servIces, and 
related hospital and prescription drug services, or 
(ii) at the option of the State, any items or services under the State plan 
(but not including medical assistance for medicare cost-sharing or for 
benefits described in section 1396a(a)(1 O)(E) of this title). 
42 U.S.c. 1396p(b)(1)(B)(i-ii). This provision limits recovery by age, by type of service, or by 
types of allowed services any particular state might choose to include. Neither party has argued 
regarding the ability to recover for services in this case. Thus, the issues in this case bring us back, 
full circle, to the interpretation and effect of 42 U.S.c. 1396p(b)(4), 42 U.S.C. 1396p(h)(I), and 
I.C. § 56-218(1), regarding whether recovery may be had against the assets of the recipient's spouse 
in which the spouse did not have any interest prior to the time of death. As discussed in detail 
above, the federal provisions limit such recovery to assets of the spouse in which the recipient had 
an interest at death. 
Because the federal provIsIOns seek, overall, to limit recover:v except in certain 
circumstances, because exceptions to a general statement of policy are to be construed narrowly, and 
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because the state provisions expand this recovery policy, the Court finds the State provisions are 
preempted. Comm 'r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739, 109 S.Ct. 1455, 103 L.Ed.2d 753 (1989). 
D. Effect of Idaho Department ofHealth and Welfare v. Jackman 
Up to this point in the process of interpreting and applying the provisions above, the Court 
has relied upon relatively little case law. By so doing, the Court has followed the rules of 
statutory construction as required by Idaho law. The Court first considered the plain language 
contained in the provisions, which it found unambiguous. Consequently legislative intent and l 
case law are not necessary to further interpret the language. George W. Watkins Family v. 
Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 797 P.2d 1385 (1990); Friends of Farm to Market v. Valley 
County, 137 Idaho 192,197,46 P.3d 9,14 (S. Ct. 2002) (citing Lawless v. Davis,_98 Idaho 175,560 
P.2d 497 (1977) ("Where the language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the 
legislative body must be given effect, and there is no occasion for a court to construe the 
language.")). 
The State, however" argues throughout its briefing that Idaho has clear precedent 
interpreting these provisions differently. In the case of Idaho Department of Health and Welfare 
v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6 (1998), the recipient's spouse received nearly all 
community property of the recipient pursuant to a marriage settlement agreement. After both the 
recipient and the spouse had died, the Department sought recovery from the estate of the spouse. 
Id. at 214, 7. The language of I.C. § 56-218 as it existed at that time allowed recovery from the 
spousal estate only where the estate of the recipient contained absolutely nothing. Thus, although 
there was clear legislative intent that the State should be able to seek recovery from the spousal 
estate, this expressed intent of the legislature would virtually never occur, where the imprecise, 
express language of the statute led to an absurd result. Id. at 215, 8. 
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The Idaho Supreme Court found that a more reasonable interpretation, which would be in 
line with the legislature's intent, would be to allow recovery against the spousal estate where the 
estate of the recipient was insufficient. [d. However, in the very next section, the court found 
federal law preempted the Department's authority given by I.C. § 56-218 to recover from the 
spouse's separate estate. [d. at 216, 9. The court's analysis in that case involved state and 
federal provisions which have since been replaced and/or amended. This Court finds it offers 
little or no guidance to the relevant and determinative issues in this case. 
The State's reliance on Jackman is based largely on the original opinion in that case, 
which has since been substituted. The State urges this Court to consider this opinion, arguing that 
it clearly shows the court's intent to give "assets" a broad interpretation, and that the decision 
would have been different if the court had been able to apply the statutes in their current form. 
The Court does not agree. The full reasons for issuing a substitute opinion are not ascertainable 
by simple comparison of a substitute opinion. Given Internal Rule of the Idaho Supreme Court 
15(t)'s prohibition against citation of unpublished opinions, the Court will not speculate about a 
withdrawn opinion to determine how the clear and unambiguous language of the statutes 111 
question should be interpreted, or to determine the applicability of the preemption doctrine. 
III. Attorney's Fees 
Pursuant to I.A.R. 35(b)(5) and I.e. § 12-117, each party has reserved the right to attorney's 
fees on appeal. Idaho Code § 12-117(1) requires this Court to award reasonable attorney's fees and 
expenses to the prevailing party "if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable 
basis in fact or law." Where questions of law are raised, attorney's fees should be awarded only if 
the nonprevailing party advocates a plainly fallacious, and, therefore, not fairly debatable, position. 
Lowery v. Board of County Com 'rs for Ada County, 115 Idaho 64, 764 P.2d 431 (S. Ct. 1988). A 
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state agency acted without reasonable basis where it has no authority to take a particular action.
 
Reardon v. Magic Valley Sand and Gravel, Inc., 140 Idaho 115, 90 P.3d 340 (S. Ct. 2004). In this
 
case the State acted in accordance with the authority granted it by I.e. § 56-218 and corresponding
 
agency regulations. Although this Court found that provision to be preempted, the magistrate did
 
not make such a clear finding. Given this, and the fact that this is a matter of first impression, the
 
State acted based on reasonable argument and authority.
 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the reasoning above, the decision of the magistrate is AFFIRMED.
 
IT IS SO ORDERED.
 
Dated this lv~ day of March, 2011.
 
Kathryn A. ticklen 
District Ju ge 
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1. The State of Idaho, Department ofHealth and Welfare (hereinafter "the 
Department"), appeals to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Decision ,md Order, 
entered on the 16th day of March, 2011, Honorable Kathryn A. Sticklen, District Judge, 
presiding. 
2. The Department has the right to appeal to the Supreme Court, and the judgment or 
order described in paragraph 1 is appealable under and pursuant to Rules II(a)i(2) and II(b), 
Idaho Appellate Rules, and Idaho Code § 17-201(7). 
3. The issues on appeal include, but may not be limited to: 
a. Whether the Magistrate erred in holding that George Perry, through a general 
power of attorney, had the power to divest Martha Perry ofher interest in the couple's home, and 
gift that interest to himself, even though the power ofattorney did not include any gifling power. 
b. Whether the Magistrate erred in holding that Idaho Code § 56-218(1) -- which 
authorizes recovery from the estate of the spouse where the assets had been community property, 
or had been the property ofthe Medicaid spouse - is preempted by federal law. 
4. No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record. 
5. (a) A reporter's transcript is requested. 
(b) The Department requests the preparation of the following portions of the 
reporter's transcript: The standard transcript supplemented by: 
1. Oral argument presented to the district court at the hearing held November 
18,2010 at 2:00 p.m. 
11. Oral argument presented to the magistrate division at the hearing held 
February 26,2010, at 9:00 a.m. 
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6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the c:lerk's 
record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, LA.R. 
a.	 Last Will And Testament (03/19/2009) 
b.	 Claim Against Estate (4/15/2009) 
c.	 Demand For Notice (4/15/2009) 
d.	 Inventory (5/28/2009) 
e.	 Notice of Disallowance of Claim (6/4/2009) 
f.	 Petition for Allowance of Claim (6/15/2009) 
g.	 Affidavit of Barbara K McCormick In Support of Objection To Dept of Health 
and Welfare's Petition for Allowance of Claim (11/27/2009) 
h.	 Memorandum in Support ofthe PR's Objection to Dept of Health And Welfare's 
Petition for Allowance of Claim (11/27/2009) 
1.	 Memorandum in Support Of Petition for Allowance of Claim (01/29/2010) 
J.	 Exhibit Cover Page (Memorandum In Support Of Petition for Allowance of 
Claim) 
k.	 Exhibits A, B, C, E, F, G (Memo In Support of Petition for Allowance of Claim) 
1.	 Order Disallowing Claim (3/1 0/2010) 
m.	 Appellant's Brief (District Court) (07/08/2010) 
n.	 Respondent's Brief (District Court) (08/26/2010) 
o.	 Appellant's Reply Brief (District Court) (09/16/2010) 
p.	 Memorandum Decision and Order (03/16/2011) 
7.	 Not applicabh::. 
8.	 I certify: 
(a)	 That a copy ofthis notice of appeal has been served on lhe reporter. 
(b)	 That the clerk of the district court has been contacted and arrangements 
have been made to have the court reporter bill this office for preparation of transcripts of the 
hearings dated November 18, 2010 and February 26,2010. 
(c)	 That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the 
preparation ofthe record pursuant to Idaho Code § 31-3212. 
(d)	 That the appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee pursuant 
to Idaho Code § 67-2301. 
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(e) That s{:rvice has been made upon all parties required to be serv,ed pursuant 
to Rule 20. 
DATED this 6th day of April, 2011. 
cfl~~::j-
.c ~CARTWRIGHT 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certifY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was ma.iled, 
postage pre-paid, to the following: 
BARBARA K MCCORMICK
 
C/O PETER C SISSON
 
ATTORNEY AT LAW
 
2402 W JEFFERSON ST
 
BOISE ID 83702
 
KASEY REDLICH
 
C/O ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT CLERK
 
200 W FRONT ST
 
BOISE ID 83702-7300
 
DATED this 1;L day ofApril, 2011. 
{)m;v~.~ 
Dawn Phipps, Legal Assistan 
Contracts and Administrative Law Division 
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MAY 31 2011Fax: 334-2616 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
9, MARGARET LUNDOUIST 
DEPUTY 
In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
State of Idaho, Dept of Health & Welfare ) Docket No. 38694-2011 
vs. ) 
Barbara K. McCormick, Personal ) 
Representative of the Estate of George D. Perry ) 
Notice of Transcript Lodged 
Notice is hereby given that on May 23, 2011,
 
I lodged one (1) transcript of a total of 36 pages in length,
 
as listed below, for the above referenced appeal with
 
the District Court Clerk of Ada County, Fourth Judicial District.
 
~\ U~1.J---­
SusaIIMii~lf, Ri>ltiSR No. 728 
TRANSCRIPTS LODGED 
11-18-10 Oral Argument 
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IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: GEORGE 
D. PERRY. Supreme Court Case No. 38694 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS
 
WELFARE,
 
Petitioner-Appellant,
 
vs.
 
BARBARA K. MCCORMICK, Personal
 
Representative of the Estate of George D. Perry,
 
Respondent on Appeal. 
I, CHRlSTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of 
the State ofIdaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify: 
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the 
course of this action. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following document will be submitted as EXHIBIT to 
the Record: 
1.	 Transcript of proceedings held on February 26, 2010, before Magistrate Court Judge
 
Christopher M. Bieter, filed May 10, 2010.
 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 31st day ofMay, 2011. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: GEORGE
 
D. PERRY. 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 
WELFARE, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
BARBARA K. MCCORMICK, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of George D. Perry, 
Respondent on Appeal. 
Supreme Court Case No. 38694
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of 
the following: 
CLERIC'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCR[PT 
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
Date of Service: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
PETER C. SISSON 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: GEORGE 
D. PERRY. Supreme Court Case No. 38694
 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
 CERTIFICATE TO RECORD
 
WELFARE,
 
Petitioner-Appellant,
 
vs.
 
BARBARA K. MCCORMICK, Personal
 
Representative of the Estate of George D. Perry,
 
Respondent on Appeal. 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk ofthe District Court ofthe Fourth Judicial District of the 
State ofIdaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in the 
above-entitled cause was compiled under my direction as, and is a true and correct record ofthe 
pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as 
well as those requested by Counsels. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the 
7th day of April, 2011. 
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